

Nationalism and Communism in Bulgaria*)

By MARIN V. PUNDEFF (Northridge, California)

It is, of course, an old confrontation in Bulgaria. *Dimitur Blagoev*, "the greatest disciple of Marx and Engels in Bulgaria and in the Balkans" who also organized the first Marxist group within Russia¹), was the first to formulate, shortly after his return from Russia in 1885, the Marxist position on the surging nationalism of the newly-liberated Bulgarians and the nationalist program of recreating the "San Stefano Bulgaria" which Russian arms had briefly established in 1878 and which the Congress of Berlin had undone. Faced with the first move of the Bulgarian nationalists — the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality in 1885 — and the necessity, because of it, to serve in the army, *Blagoev* denounced it as "wholly the work of Prince Battenberg" and "an act undertaken against the interests of the Bulgarian people."²)

For *Blagoev* the personification of the rampant evils of nationalism and chauvinism was *Zakhari Stoianov*, the chronicler of the epic struggle for freedom in 1876, ardent admirer of *Khristo Botev*, *Vasil Levski*, and *Liuben Karavelov*, and interpreter of their nationalism to the generation of 1885. One of the few revolutionaries of the 1870's to survive, *Stoianov* had seen his role as that of a continuator of the work of the great national leaders of the preceding era and an "apostle" in their tradition of the new national cause, the liberation of Thrace and

*) Paper delivered at the Conference on Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe, held at Stanford University, November 21—23, 1968. Research on the paper was in part supported by a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies.

¹) *Materiali po istoriia na Bulgarskata komunisticheska partiia (1885—1925 g.)*. V pomosht na izuchavashtite istoriata na BKP [Materials on the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1885—1925). An aid to persons studying the history of BCP]. Sofia: BKP, 1964, pp. 13—14. *Blagoev* (1856—1924) is the acknowledged first voice of revolutionary Marxism in Bulgaria. While a student at the University of St. Petersburg, he formed in 1883 the first Marxist group within Russia. Cf. S. A. O v s i a n n i k o v a, *Gruppa Blagoeva. Iz istorii rasprostraneniia marksizma v Rossii* [The Blagoev group; from the history of the dissemination of Marxism in Russia]. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1959.

²) *Dimitur Blagoev, Suchineniia* [Works]. Vol. I, Sofia: BKP, 1957, p. XXXI. Later, in 1906, *Blagoev* changed his mind about the nature of the unification in 1885; see below. The editor of Vol. I notes in his preface that *Blagoev* was at first wrong and that the unification was "a great historic act which was above all the work of the broad popular masses and a work patriotic and progressive in its significance."

Macedonia and their unification with free Bulgaria. Working from Plovdiv, the main city of Eastern Rumelia, he had become the ideologist of the unification movement and president of the Secret Revolutionary Committee which prepared and carried out the unification in 1885.

The polemic with *Zakhari Stoianov* gave *Blagoev* the opportunity to evaluate from the Marxist point of view the entire ideology of Bulgarian nationalism before and after 1878 and to interpret the "great traditions of the Bulgarian national revolutionary movement" for the growing numbers of followers of *Marx* in Bulgaria. In a brochure entitled "Nashite Apostoli" (Our Apostles), which he published in 1886, *Blagoev* launched a sharp, vituperative attack on *Zakhari Stoianov* (the tract was subtitled "Zakhari Stoianov as a publicist, revolutionary, apostle, and patriot") to expose the chief proponent of the nationalist viewpoint as an inept agitator with a narrow, chauvinistic outlook, to whom the word "revolution" meant only national liberation and never social upheaval. Unlike such new self-appointed apostles, *Blagoev* said, *Karavelov* and *Botev* never "allowed chauvinism and pseudopatriotism to seize their soul" and never told the people that "this is not the time to preach revolutionary ideas." On the contrary, *Karavelov* had called in his newspapers *Svoboda* and *Nezavisimost* for the fullest national and social liberation when he wrote that "we want all or nothing, we want complete freedom" and that "All nations in Europe today are in motion, everyone wants to move ahead, every nationality wants to live independently, every man wants to be governed by his own will . . . and does not want to have on his back individuals to govern him by their whims and feed on his sweat and blood. Only absolute freedom (as, for example, in America and Switzerland) can abolish the historic, national, and ethnic differences." Even more radical than *Karavelov*, *Botev* had written that "our revolutionary party and almost the entire Bulgarian people (except its traitors and exploiters) are now convinced that anyone, who by his status is an enemy of even that minimal liberalism by which the so-called progressives follow the development of mankind's freedom, is no friend of the man who plans to place his life on the broad foundations of this freedom and who does not want to be a servant or slave either to foreign or to domestic oppressors."³)

Echoing *Marx*, *Blagoev* explained in "Nashite Apostoli" that, following the advance of freedom in the French Revolution, a new oppressor — "the anointed King Capital" — had arisen to hold down and exploit the nations within a variety of national despotic, constitutional, and republican forms of government. The historic trend, however, was leading to the break-up of these forms, to the liberation of the exploited masses, and to the organization of "individual communes bound to-

³) Ibid., pp. 211—213.

gether by a federal union, in which both entire nations can live autonomously and every man can be free individually." Even though not Marxists, *Karavelov* and *Botev* had understood the trend and direction of social progress, as could be seen in their advocacy of a Danubian federation and in *Karavelov's* praise of the United States of America and Switzerland as federal unions where "the main basis of social and political organization is communal self-government under which the people directly govern themselves . . ." ⁴⁾ *Zakhari Stoianov* had completely failed to understand these ideas, as his superficial account of the revolutionary events before 1878, "Zapiski po bulgarskite vustaniia" ⁵⁾, demonstrated.

Such history, *Blagoev* said, might nurture patriotism and muscle-bound nationalism (natzionalno pekhlivanstvo), but there was a question whether such education was useful and, moreover, history of the kind *Stoianov* wrote, was incapable of explaining "the essence of the ideas and ideals of the Bulgarian revolutionary party." The ideal of unity of the Bulgarian nation, which the Congress of Berlin had dismembered in three parts—Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia—was dear to the Bulgarian revolutionaries of the preliberation period and was a valid one today, but the question was "what kind of unification, in what conditions, and with the aid of what means?" For some people, the ideal of the unification of the three parts inhabited by Bulgarians was a chauvinist cry for war and victory, based "not on the idea of personal freedom and the good of the people, but on alleged 'historic and national tasks' which we better call 'historic and national stupidities', such as 'Greater Bulgaria', 'Krum's and Simeon's empire', and so on. Such a unity rests not on human rights and human greatness, but on muscle-bound nationalism, which erects monuments to human stupidity and ignorance, such as conquest of Constantinople, seizure of the Aegean Sea, and hegemony of the Balkan peninsula." ⁶⁾ The real unification of Bulgarians from all three parts, *Blagoev* concluded, was their liberation from domestic and foreign tyranny through a general revolution of the people, headed by a party of true revolutionaries and not chauvinists of *Stoianov's* stripe.

In another piece written at this time, *Blagoev* gave the first outline of the Marxist solution for the Macedonian question which, he said, was for Bulgaria the sine qua non of her progress. ⁷⁾ Starting from the premises that states faced the dilemma of choice between conflict and

⁴⁾ Ibid., pp. 221—223.

⁵⁾ Portions of them appeared subsequently in English translation as Pages from the Autobiography of a Bulgarian Insurgent. London, 1913.

⁶⁾ *Blagoev*, *Suchineniia*, Vol. I, pp. 243—244.

⁷⁾ Ibid., pp. 46—54.

cooperation or, in his words, between struggle and union, and that the highest form of union would eventually be a federation on a global scale, *Blagoev* dismissed struggle as "abnormal" and individualism as bankrupt and declared that the future belonged to collectivism. In the Balkans, he said, this meant that the young, small, and undeveloped "mini-states" should unite in a regional federation in order to survive amidst the imperialist drives of the Great Powers and to have a chance to progress. The Balkan federation "should have as its goal the liberation of Macedonia and the assurance to all nationalities in the Balkan peninsula of broad freedom of self-government and socialization of their material and moral resources . . ." Only a federation would bring progress, happiness, and strength to the Balkan nationalities, he said, and it could become the forerunner of the world federation.

Blagoev's polemic with *Zakhari Stoianov* and other writings in the 1880's thus drew the earliest battle lines between Marxists and nationalists in Bulgaria. After the Bulgarian Marxist (Social Democratic) Party was formed in 1891, *Blagoev* became the spokesman of its militant, revolutionary wing, founding in 1897 a theoretical journal *Novo Vreme* (New Time) for the purpose of expounding orthodox Marxism and countering the appeal and "broad" activities among the various classes, especially the peasantry, of Marxist "opportunists, reformists, class collaborators, and Bernsteinian revisionists" in Bulgaria.⁸⁾ In the pages of *Novo Vreme*, which he edited for more than twenty years, and other publications *Blagoev* continued to define the correct positions for his wing of orthodox or "narrow" Marxists (in terms of the narrow, working-class appeal which they pursued). When the "Narrows" split from the party in 1903, it was *Blagoev* who led them on to become the counterparts of *Lenin's* Bolsheviki in Bulgaria, join *Lenin's* Communist International in 1919, and transform themselves into the Bulgarian Communist Party.⁹⁾

Following the disastrous Ilinden Uprising organized by the Macedonian revolutionaries in 1903, *Blagoev* also formulated the attitude of the "Narrow" Marxists toward the two organizations behind the uprising in Macedonia and the region of Adrianople (Turkish Thrace), the Internal Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organization and the Supreme Macedonian Committee in Sofia.¹⁰⁾ Both organizations, he said, had the same goal — the liberation of Macedonia and Thrace and their annexation to Bulgaria — and were in this sense both nationalistic. However, while the Supreme Committee in Sofia was completely con-

⁸⁾ *Materiali po istoriia . . .* (1885—1925 g.), pp. 43—46.

⁹⁾ Cf. the article on him in *Kratka Bulgarska Entsiklopediia* [Concise Bulgarian Encyclopedia]. Vol. I, Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1963, pp. 246—248.

¹⁰⁾ *Blagoev*, *Suchineniia*, Vol. X, Sofia: BKP, 1959, pp. 53—73, 287—288.

trolled by the Bulgarian monarchy and was simply an instrument of Bulgarian nationalism, the Internal Organization (IMRO) was showing considerable independence and, since the disastrous uprising, an interesting ideological development. A left wing in IMRO was becoming vocal¹¹⁾ in demanding that the "Supremists" in Sofia cease their meddling in the affairs of Macedonia and stop sending guerrilla bands over the border to keep conditions inflamed. Macedonia, in Gladstone's phrase, was for the Macedonians, that is, not only for the Bulgarian element (which, *Blagoev* pointed out, was larger in comparison with the other national elements individually)¹²⁾ but for all the other ethnic elements residing in it as well. While he found the slogan "Macedonia for the Macedonians" wrong, *Blagoev* called the efforts of the members of IMRO's left wing and advocates of a federal solution like *Iane Sandanski*, *Dimo khadzhi Dimov*, and others, "very sympathetic" and advised that they placed them on the "principles of contemporary revolutionary internationalism", or orthodox Marxism. IMRO, he said, should change its approach from working among the peasantry for a peasant revolution to revolutionizing the Macedonian proletariat in the urban centers, without distinction as to nationality and religion, by means of "socialist agitation and propaganda." Finally, and very significantly, *Blagoev* told his Marxist followers to help IMRO "to understand the necessity of such a widening of its outlook, principles, and tactics" by joining the IMRO ranks and, working from within, to "give it the new content we speak of."

This then was the beginning of the penetration of the nationalist Macedonian revolutionary organization by *Blagoev's* Marxists, which was to have such fatal consequences for IMRO in the years after World War I. At first the penetration was slow and unpromising, and it was in fact not until the disasters (national catastrophes, in the phraseology of Bulgarian historiography) which befell the Bulgarian nationalist program in the second Balkan war and in World War I that significant portions of IMRO became receptive to the Marxist agitation and propaganda and important IMRO functionaries exchanged their nationalist creed for Marxism or tried to fuse the two.

In the decade before the Balkan wars younger leaders began to emerge around *Blagoev*, adding on occasion their voices to the ideological positions which the "father of Bulgarian Marxism" formulated in regard to the plans of Bulgarian nationalists. The circle of rising young

¹¹⁾ Its first organ was *Revolutionsen List* (Revolutionary Sheet) published in 1904—1906; *ibid.*, p. 517.

¹²⁾ It should be pointed out that *Blagoev* himself was born in Macedonia (near Kastoria, in present-day Greek Macedonia) and hence a Macedonian of Bulgarian national consciousness.

men included *Georgi Bakalov* (1873—1939)¹³, *Khristo Kabakchiev* (1878—1940)¹⁴, *Vasil Kolarov* (1877—1950)¹⁵ and *Georgi Dimitrov* (1882—1949)¹⁶, but until 1923 they remained in the magisterial shadow of "Diadoto" (the old man), as they reverently called *Blagoev*. In a major work on the history of socialism in Bulgaria (*Prinos kum istoriata na sotsializma v Bulgariia*) published in 1906, *Blagoev* revised some of his earlier views on the program and actions of the Bulgarian nationalists and reaffirmed others.¹⁷ The unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885, he now said, had been a good thing ("a progressive step", in the Marxist polarity of progressive and reactionary events) in that it had created a larger national unit and better conditions for the economic and political development of the nation. "The nationalist enthusiasm evoked by the unification was so great and general" that neither internal nor external efforts to undo it had any success. The sudden war which Serbia declared on Bulgaria and the withdrawal of the Russian advisers to the Bulgarian army "raised a storm of indignation throughout the country and caused the national energy to rise to the highest level. All able to bear arms hurried to rally under the banner of fighting for the unification and the integrity of the fatherland."¹⁸ Did *Blagoev* change his mind because, in the perspective of twenty years, the act accomplished by *Zakhari Stoianov* and the other nationalist leaders was simply a proven success, or because he had originally made a doctrinal error of evaluation? He did not explain. In regard to the Macedonian question, on the other hand, *Blagoev* affirmed the position he had taken earlier that the nationalist movement to liberate Macedonia had degenerated into an instrument of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie in pursuit of its class interests.

In "*Prinos kum istoriata na sotsializma v Bulgariia*" *Blagoev* also affirmed the view — consistent with Marxist orthodoxy at the time and anathema to Marxist orthodoxy today — that Russia was the main reactionary power in Europe and that Russian imperialism was the chief enemy of progressive developments in the Balkans in general and of

¹³) At times very unorthodox, *Bakalov's* writings have been selectively reissued in *Izbrani proizvedeniia* [Selected Works]. Sofia: Bulgarski pisatel, 1963—1964; 4 volumes; and *Izbrani istoricheski proizvedeniia* [Selected Historical Works]. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1960.

¹⁴) *Kabakchiev's* selected works are in *Izbrani proizvedeniia* [Selected Works]. Sofia: BKP, 1953.

¹⁵) Most of *Kolarov's* writings are in the posthumous collection *Izbrani proizvedeniia* [Selected Works]. Sofia: BKP, 1954—1955; 3 volumes.

¹⁶) *Dimitrov's* works are in the posthumous collection *Suchineniia* [Works]. Sofia: BKP, 1951—1955; 14 volumes.

¹⁷) *Blagoev's* history of socialism in Bulgaria makes up Vol. XI of his *Suchineniia*. Sofia: BKP, 1960.

¹⁸) *Ibid.*, pp. 88—89.

Bulgaria's progress in particular.¹⁹⁾ Grounded in the writings of both *Marx* and *Engels*, this view was fully shared by the Russian Bolsheviks, and one may add, *Blagoev's* own experience as a student and Marxist organizer in St. Petersburg in the early 1880's included little to endear the tsarist system to him. Therefore, in discussing the regime of *Stefan Stambolov* after 1886, he saw *Stambolov's* efforts of blocking Russian interference, dictation, and pressure as a "struggle for national independence" against Russia's determination to turn Bulgaria into a "trans-Danubian province" of her empire. This reasoning led *Blagoev* to the paradoxical position (at least in terms of Bulgarian Marxist orthodoxy today) of endorsing the anti-Russian policy of *Stambolov* — one of the great nationalist leaders of Bulgaria — and to regard his nationalism as a progressive force brought into existence and fully justified by Russia's reactionary encroachments.²⁰⁾

The high point of the ideological and political confrontation between the Bulgarian "Narrows" and the nationalists of various stripes came in the war years of 1912—1918. As the Balkan league was formed and war preparations began, powerful emotions of patriotism and nationalism swept over the nation. The war against Turkey was felt to be the chance to avenge the five centuries of enslavement and to prove to the world that although they had obtained their freedom through foreign intervention, Bulgarians were men enough to deserve it. It was to be the noble charge of the young, strong, righteous nation upon the crumbling citadels of the decaying empire to free "the still enslaved brothers" from its clutches, unify itself, and fulfill its historic destiny. As the war started and, within a few weeks, the Bulgarian army swept through several victories to the approaches of Constantinople, it seemed to a world watching with admiration and to Bulgarians that the hour of triumph of Bulgarian nationalism had struck.

According to current Bulgarian historiography, the only party which fought at this hour of glory against the nationalist policy and opposed the Balkan war was the party of the "Narrows", while "all other parties, from the extreme right to the extreme left" joined in the "chauvinist howl" drowning out "the lone sober voice of our party."²¹⁾ While this is not

¹⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. XII—XVI, 90—94.

²⁰⁾ The present orthodox view is that Russia did not threaten the national independence of Bulgaria and that *Stambolov* and the upper bourgeoisie surrounding him sought, as clients of England and Austria, to "break the centuries-old ties of friendship and comradeship between the Bulgarian and the Russian peoples and to represent the Western capitalist countries and Turkey as friends of Bulgaria." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 594, editorial note 49, and *Istoriia na Bulgariia; vtoro preraboteno izdanie v tri toma* [History of Bulgaria; second revised edition in three volumes]. Vol. II Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1962, pp. 115—116.

²¹⁾ *Materiali po istoriia ... (1885—1925 g.)*, pp. 117—120; *Blagoev, Suchineniia*, Vol. XVI, Sofia: BKP, 1961, p. V.

exactly true²²), the leadership of the "Narrows" did make a considerable effort to denounce the plans for war, and later the war itself, as being dictated by the interests of the bourgeoisie and harmful to the interests of the working class, and to propagandize its position that only a Balkan federal republic could satisfactorily and peacefully resolve the Balkan problems.²³) Before the outbreak of the war, at the annual congress of the party, Kabakchiev read a report on "The Situation in the Balkans and Social Democracy" which branded the rise of patriotic and nationalist sentiment as a "chauvinist delirium" hiding "the complete bankruptcy of nationalism" and leading not to the liberation of "the enslaved brothers" in Macedonia but to new conquests in the name of so-called national ideals. The congress resolved that the party (then consisting of 1,923 members) should carry on a "most resolute" struggle against the nationalist and dynastic policies of the bourgeoisie in the Balkan countries and for the establishment of a Balkan federal republic which, by uniting the nations of the peninsula, "will secure their independence, clear the road of their social development, give new impetus to the class struggle, and advance the hour of triumph of socialism." Only a Balkan federal republic would be able to assure "independence and unity to the Macedonian people as well as to all other Balkan peoples."²⁴) It is noteworthy that the resolution of the 1912 congress referred to the diverse populations of Macedonia as one people or nation (*narod*) entitled, like the other Balkan peoples, to a separate identity, independence, and unity.

After the outbreak of the war, the "Narrows" sent *Kabakchiev* as their delegate to the Basel congress of the Second International to present these positions, but the congress barred him from speaking and from the Balkans heard instead *Ianko Sakuzov*,

²²) The Soviet historian V. A. Zhebovskii, for example, has pointed out that the leader of the Agrarian party, *Alexander Stamboliiski*, viewed the events of 1912 as if the whole nation had lost its mind. Cf. his *Bolgariia nakanune balkanskikh voin, 1912—1913 gg.* [Bulgaria on the eve of the Balkan Wars, 1912—1913], Kiev, 1960, p. 205.

²³) It may be noted that, due to the mobilization, only three members of the Party's Central Committee (*Blagoev*, *Kabakchiev*, and *Dimitrov*) were left in Sofia to guide its activities. In propagandizing the idea of a Balkan federal republic, *Blagoev* took the view that it could be established by the bourgeoisie if pressed in that direction by the Balkan proletariat headed by its Marxist parties. *Lenin*, who endorsed the idea of a Balkan federation, advocated that it should be realized through a revolution of the workers and the peasants. Current historiography criticizes *Blagoev* for the discrepancy with *Lenin*. Cf. *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, Vol. II, p. 254.

²⁴) Text of the resolution in *Bulgarskata Rabotnicheska Partiiia (Komunisti) v rezoliutsii i resheniia na kongresite, konferentsiite i plenumite na TsK*, Vol. I, 1891—1918 [Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) in resolutions and decisions of the congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Committee, Vol. I, 1891—1918]. Sofia: *Bulgarska Rabotnicheska Partiiia-komunisti*, 1947, pp. 337—338.

the leader of the Bulgarian "Broad" socialists.²⁵) Wartime censorship curtailed criticism in print, and the party journal *Novo Vreme* ceased to appear. When it resumed publication in September, 1913, the successful war against Turkey was over, the gains from it had been squandered in the disastrous second Balkan war, which King *Ferdinand* and the war clique of all-or-nothing maximalists and IMRO leaders had started against Serbia and Greece, and defeated Bulgaria had signed a peace treaty in Bucharest partitioning Macedonia and giving Bulgaria the smallest piece of it. The „Narrows“ could say to the nationalists "We told you so", and did. When it reappeared, *Novo Vreme* reproduced the party's warnings against the war as a chauvinist folly that was sure to end in a national catastrophe, and reaffirmed its position that a Balkan federal republic was the only solution of the national question in the Balkans.²⁶)

The Balkan wars thus gave the "Narrows" their first major ideological victory over the nationalist creed, and they sought to gain further ground by calling for the trial of *Ferdinand* as the main culprit for the national disaster. *Ferdinand*, however, weathered the storm and within two years, backed by nationalist leaders, revenge-bent military, and Macedonian irredentists, took Bulgaria into World War I on the side of the Central Powers. Yet, a profound crisis of the nationalist ideology was in the making. The disaster of 1913 had shaken the confidence in the established national leadership, and the consensus on the nationalist program had given way to doubts about its costly goals. In the storm of indignation after the second Balkan war much had been said about victories won by brave peasants only to be squandered in reckless and inept pursuit of dreams of Balkan hegemony. The quick victory over Serbia in 1915 and the occupation of her part of Macedonia bolstered somewhat the position of the nationalists, but as the war lengthened and the prospects for keeping the occupied territories dimmed, the fear spread that the nationalist leaders had taken the country on the road to another catastrophic defeat. When the Allies broke through the Bulgarian lines on the Macedonian front in September, 1918, the fear of a "second national catastrophe" in five years became reality.

World War I and the ideological and political responses it evoked pushed *Blagoev* and the Bulgarian "Narrows" even closer to *Lenin* and

²⁵) Khristo Kabakchiev, Bio-bibliografii. Sofia: BKP, 1958, pp. 27—28.

²⁶) Excerpts in Bulgarskata Rabotnicheska Partiiia (komunisti) v rezoliutsii ... pp. 343—346. However, current Marxist orthodoxy in Bulgaria, based on *Lenin's* assessment that the war against Turkey was a "big step forward in the destruction of the remnants of the Middle Ages in all of Eastern Europe", regards the first Balkan war as having had "an objectively progressive character" which "explains the victories of the allied armies and the heroism of the popular masses shown in it." Cf. Istoriiia na Bulgariia, Vol. II, p. 268, and Kratka Bulgarska Entsiklopediia, Vol. I, pp. 175—176.

the Russian Bolsheviks. As the socialists in the Second International turned to supporting their national governments in the war, *Lenin*, finding safety in Switzerland, denounced the leaders of the International for seeking "at a moment of the greatest world-historical importance to replace socialism by nationalism" and aligning themselves not with the international working class but with the "chauvinist bourgeoisie" of their individual countries. The International of these "social-chauvinists" supporting the bourgeois slogans of "Defense of the Fatherland" and "Internal Peace" was dead. The task of the hour, *Lenin* said, was for all revolutionary socialists to turn the imperialist war into an international class war, overthrow their national governments, and form a new, Communist International of revolutionary Marxists everywhere.²⁷⁾

The "father of Russian Marxism", *Georgi Plekhanov*, on the other hand, took the opposite view. The attainment of the aims of Social Democracy everywhere, he said, required that Russia be victorious in the war because the defeat of Russia would be defeat of democracy in France, Belgium, and even England, and the triumph of German imperialism would halt the progress of the revolutionary movement in Russia and elsewhere. To prevent this from happening, *Plekhanov* appealed to all Marxists to support Russia in the war. Responding with an article entitled "Magister Dixit", *Blagoev* found the old master's voice no longer convincing. *Plekhanov's* argument, he said, could equally well apply to Germany, for the cause of Social Democracy in Germany would be set back by a victory of the Russian autocracy. The task of Marxists in Bulgaria and in the Balkans, *Blagoev* asserted, was to preserve the Balkans for the Balkan peoples and to prepare the ground for a Balkan federal republic. A Russian victory would mean the descent of Russian imperialism to the Straits and the consequent subordination of the Balkan nations to Russia. The aims of the Marxists would be served not by a Russian or a German victory, but by a revolution "which will break out as a result of the present war."²⁸⁾ As *Blagoev* put it on another occasion, "when this war ends, the proletariat must find enough strength in itself to impose its dictatorship. I believe that the proletariat will have that strength and will use the arms it now

²⁷⁾ Cf. his "Voina i rossiiskaia Sotsial-Demokratiia [The War and Russian Social Democracy] in V. I. L e n i n, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia v trekh tomakh* [Selected Works in three Volumes]. Vol. I, Moscow, 1960, pp. 631—639; *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia* [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia]. Vol. VI, Moscow, 1965, col. 146.

²⁸⁾ *Blagoev*, *Suchineniia*, Vol. XVI, Sofia: BKP, 1961, pp. 491—497. When German Marxists made a similar appeal on behalf of a German victory, *Novo Vreme* (February 1, 1915) drew a parallel with *Plekhanov's* appeal in an editorial entitled "Plekhanov i Parvus" [Plekhanov and Parvus]; for the text, see *Bulgarskata Rabotnicheska Partiia (Komunisti) v resoliutsii . . .*, pp. 361—364.

carries to overthrow its enemies and put an end to the present bloody system."²⁹⁾

On the eve of the move of *Ferdinand* and the nationalists to join the Central Powers against Serbia to obtain her part of Macedonia, the parliamentary group of the "Narrows" (*Blagoev, Georgi Kirkov, Kolarov, Kabakchiev, Dimitrov*, and others) addressed a manifesto to the Bulgarian working class to warn it of what was coming. The "policy of revenge and conquest", the manifesto declared, would bring on "certain and much more dreadful catastrophe" than that of 1913:

... If the Balkan peoples do not rid themselves of the folly of each becoming "great" and acquiring hegemony in the Balkans, they will be individually overrun and conquered by the Great Powers. Wars between Balkan states do not benefit them but their enemies. In 1885 Serbia was defeated. In 1897 Greece was defeated. In 1912 Turkey was defeated. In 1913 Bulgaria was defeated. If the Balkan States plunge into another war, which will bring the foreign conqueror into the heart of the Balkans, they will all be defeated, ruined, and conquered! We declare that nothing divides the Balkan peoples and that what plunges them into internecine wars are the capitalist and dynastic interests of the ruling classes and dynasties. The salvation of the Balkan and European peoples from the horrors of the raging world war is in the overthrow of capitalism and its companions, militarism and imperialism. This, however, shall be achieved only by implacable revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat of all countries, welded together by international solidarity. Across the frontiers we offer a friendly hand to the workers of Serbia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey, and together with the united Balkan proletariat we shout: Down with the war! Long live the peace! Long live the international working class solidarity! Long live the Balkan federal republic! Long live the liberating revolutionary socialism!³⁰⁾

The reaction of the Bulgarian government to this virtual call for revolution was to start court proceedings against the parliamentary group of the "Narrows" for engaging in "treasonable activities", but the case was not prosecuted and their leaders remained free for the duration of the war.³¹⁾ In the war years the party made considerable effort, with some success, to reach the troops with its propaganda and

²⁹⁾ Speech at a rally in October, 1914, quoted in *Materiali po istoriia ...* (1885—1925 g.), p. 142.

³⁰⁾ Text in appendix to *Blagoev, Suchineniia*, Vol. XVII, Sofia: BKP, 1962, pp. 467—472.

³¹⁾ *D. Mitev, Kum vuprosa za proletarskiiia internatsionalizum na BRSDP (t. s.)* [On the question of the proletarian internationalism of the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (Narrow Socialists)]. Sofia: BKP, 1957, and *A. M. Koren'kov, "Internatsionalistskaia pozitsiia bolgarskikh tesnykh sotsialistov v period pervoi mirovoi imperialisticheskoi voiny 1914—1918 gg.,* [The internationalist position of the Bulgarian Narrow Socialists during the first global imperialist war, 1914—1918] in *Uchenye zapiski Instituta Slavianovedeniia* [Scholarly notes of the Institute of Slavic Studies], Vol. X, Moscow, 1954, pp. 351—388. Leaders of the Agrarian Union (*Stamboliiski, Raiko Daskalov*) who also criticized *Ferdinand* were, however, tried and jailed, possibly because they were influential among the much greater force of the Bulgarian peasantry. The membership of the "Narrows" dropped radically to 650 in 1915 (*ibid.*, p. 367).

tried to prepare to exploit the national collapse which it predicted and sought.³²⁾ Its appeal broadened particularly when the tsarist regime collapsed in Russia and *Lenin's* Bolsheviks successfully exploited the collapse to carry out the first Marxist revolution. Unlike Russia, however, Bulgaria did not collapse internally until the breakthrough on the front and the retreat of the demoralized troops. The Bulgarian soldiers — also peasants in uniform — followed in their mass *Stamboliiski* and the Agrarian Union rather than *Blagoev* and the "Narrows". At Radomir, southwest of Sofia, mutinous soldiers proclaimed the overthrow of the monarchy and establishment of a republic, with *Stamboliiski* (who was released from jail to cope with the situation) as president and *Daskalov* as commander-in-chief of the republican forces. Attempting to march on Sofia, the mutineers were, however, defeated in the outskirts of the city by loyal troops commanded by one of the leaders of IMRO and general in the Bulgarian army, *Alexander Protogerov*. The defeat of this so-called Vladaia Uprising ended the first practical possibility of a large-scale revolution in Bulgaria which the "Narrows" could exploit.³³⁾

Before going to the mutinous troops, *Stamboliiski* had approached *Blagoev* with "an offer for common action" to overthrow the bourgeois government and "for joint seizure of power", indicating that the Agrarians accepted the program of the "Narrows" on the proviso that small-scale private ownership would be preserved.³⁴⁾ *Blagoev*, however, "categorically refused" to collaborate, explaining that the "Narrows" were engaged in an independent class struggle and were committed not to make agreements or compromises with any other party. *Blagoev's* refusal to work together with the Agrarians was due, present Marxist historiography explains, to "the old, pre-Leninist view of the peasants as a reactionary class which could rebel, but which could not make a revolution, that is to say, move the historical process forward."³⁵⁾ Conscious of their tiny size as a political organization, the "Narrows"

³²⁾ V. I. Vladimirskaia, "Bor'ba Bolgarskoi Rabochei Sotsial-Demokraticheskoi Partii (tensykh sotsialistov) protiv imperialisticheskoi voiny (1914—1918 gg.)", [The struggle of the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (Narrow socialists) against the imperialist war (1914—1918)] in *Uchenye zapiski Instituta Slavianovedeniia*, Vol. XIV, Moscow, 1956, pp. 3—55; here pp. 33—35; *Rabotata na BKP v armiiata, 1891—1918: dokumenti i materialy* [The work of the BCP in the army, 1891—1918; documents and materials]. Sofia: BKP, 1966, pp. 241—309.

³³⁾ M. A. Birman, *Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Bolgarii v 1918—1919 gg.* [The revolutionary situation in Bulgaria in 1918—1919]. Moscow, 1957, pp. 102—112, 120—149, and 372—373; *Khristo Khristov, Revoliutsionnata kriza v Bulgariia prez 1918—1919* [The revolutionary crisis in Bulgaria in 1918—1919]. Sofia: BKP, 1957.

³⁴⁾ *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, Vol. III, Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1964, pp. 25—26.

³⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

compounded their error by concluding that the "Fate of the revolution in Bulgaria depended basically" (or "three-quarters", as they put it) on the course of events in the major European countries, a stand which "in essence condemned the party to passive waiting."³⁶⁾

The refusal of *Blagoev's* "Narrows" in 1918 to make common cause with the peasantry was more probably due to their very Leninist fear that the small party of professional revolutionaries would drown in an ocean of politically conscious peasants. In any case, the refusal had far-reaching consequences for all concerned — Marxists, Agrarians, and nationalists — some of which extend, as we shall see, to the present time. In the ensuing years to 1923 during which *Stamboliiski* headed an Agrarian government, the gulf between these two enemies of the nationalists widened. Influenced by the success of the revolution in Russia and by the revolutionary events in Germany, Bavaria, and Hungary, the "Narrows" took the uncompromising position that their immediate task was to overthrow the Agrarian government and establish a "socialist Soviet republic" in Bulgaria to join hands with the proletarian revolutions in Russia and elsewhere. Moving in this direction, the "Narrows" took part in March, 1919, in the formation of the Third or Communist International in Moscow, "the capital of the first proletarian fatherland", and renamed themselves Communists to conform with *Lenin's* directives. At their first congress as Communist Party in 1919, they openly committed themselves in a newly-drafted program to establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat of the Soviet type in Bulgaria by means of an armed revolt. This, current Party historiography agrees, was "a major historical event for our Party."³⁷⁾

Faced with this Communist commitment to revolution and subservience to the aims and purposes of Soviet Russia, *Stamboliiski* chose to adhere to democratic principles and let the Communists function as a legal party. As they picked up strength in the parliamentary elections, they became the main force battling him in the National Assembly and, to the extent that they weakened the Agrarian government, they aided its nationalist enemies on the right. After the initial shock of the defeat in "the second national catastrophe", the nationalists had huddled together with IMRO irredentists, army officers from the newly-formed Military League, and other elements from the displaced bourgeois parties to fight what they termed "the spirit of national defeatism" and "demoralization" perpetuated by the Agrarians and the Communists. Regarding the Communists simply as foreign agents and holding

³⁶⁾ B i r m a n, *Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Bolgarii*, p. 114. The Party's membership rose only to 2,041 by 1918.

³⁷⁾ *Materiali po istoriia . . . (1885—1925 g.)*, pp. 170—172.

the Agrarians responsible for accepting the loss of Macedonia³⁸), the nationalist bloc, disguised under the name of "Demokraticheski Sgovor" (Democratic Entente), prepared to overthrow the Agrarian regime and "cleanse the country of internal enemies."

As the plans of the nationalists became obvious, the question arose once again whether Agrarians and Communists could join forces against the common enemies. A step in this direction was taken when they joined hands on the issue of whether or not those responsible for the national catastrophe in 1918 should be tried. In the referendum of November, 1922, which put the issue to the voters, Agrarians and Communists voted a joint ballot and received a massive majority. In the ensuing months, however, the Communist leaders again veered away to the position that the Agrarian government was the main enemy at this juncture and that "the blade of the struggle" must be aimed at it.³⁹) The Party press reduced its agitation for struggle against the "Fascist threat" and painted the Agrarian regime as "no less an evil than" the nationalist bloc, and on the eve of the coup d'état in June, 1923, the Party leadership took the decision to direct the struggle equally against the bloc forces and the Agrarian government, on the reasoning that it was conducting a class struggle against both the urban and the rural bourgeoisie; in the struggle between the Agrarians and their enemies, the Communists were to remain neutral and take no sides.⁴⁰)

The coup, carried out by the army and IMRO forces, brought to power a nationalist government headed by Professor *Alexander Tsankov*, who, like *Mussolini* in Italy, had a socialist background and had evolved toward national—rather than international—socialism. The return of the Bulgarian nationalists (or Fascists, as their enemies preferred to call them) to power was unquestionably made much easier by the stand which *Blagoev* and the other leaders of the Bulgarian Communists had taken toward the Agrarian regime and the impending events. Present Party historiography in fact finds the main reason for

³⁸) Having signed the peace treaty of *Neully*, *Stamboliiski* pursued a policy of fulfilling its terms. Friendly toward Serbia and hostile toward the ideology of Macedonian irredentism, he implicitly accepted the partition of Macedonia in the so-called Nish Agreement of 1923 and advocated reconciliation with Bulgaria's neighbors to lead to a South Slav or Balkan federation. In regard to Western Thrace, his policy was to obtain implementation of Article 48 of the Treaty of *Neully* which provided that the freedom of Bulgaria's economic outlets to the Aegean Sea shall be guaranteed by subsequent arrangements. However, his vigorous stand at the *Lausanne* conference in 1923 for implementation of Article 48 brought no results, and Greece was confirmed in unrestricted possession of the area.

³⁹) *Materiali po istoriia . . .* (1885—1925 g.), pp. 208—209.

⁴⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 210; *Blagoev*, *Suchineniia*, Vol. XIX, Sofia: BKP, 1963, pp. 330, 473.

the success of the putschists to be "the absence of common action" with the Agrarians and "the Party's decision not to act."⁴¹⁾

Following the debacle of the Party's policy of neutrality, the Comintern condemned the Bulgarian Communists for their mistaken stand and dispatched *Kolarov* (who had been appointed in 1922 secretary-general of the Comintern) to Bulgaria to straighten out and "Bolshevize" the thinking of his compatriots.⁴²⁾ As it turned out, the direct intervention of the Comintern led to an even greater debacle. Pressed by *Kolarov*, the Party leadership now decided to prepare for an "armed anti-Fascist uprising" based on a united front of workers and peasants and aimed at establishing a workers-peasants government in Bulgaria. Some left-wing Agrarians agreed to collaborate⁴³⁾, but the preparations were too hurried and the forces inadequate, and "the first anti-Fascist uprising in the world" which *Kolarov* and *Dimitrov* led in September, 1923, ended in a bloody repression. The Comintern-directed uprising gave the nationalists in power a good excuse to do away with thousands of their enemies from the left, outlaw the Communist Party, and suppress it as an effective political organization.⁴⁴⁾ Its cadres decimated, the Party went into a shadowy underground existence, while its leaders took refuge in Moscow, for the most part in *Kadavergehorsam* service of the Comintern.⁴⁵⁾

The nationalist camp, too, sustained heavy casualties in the wake of these fateful events. Disheartened by Bulgaria's two military disasters, IMRO leaders began to veer toward the organization's left wing, composed of federalists and Marxists, and toward the Marxist solution for the Macedonian question. Contacts between IMRO's triumvirate (*Todor Alexandrov*, *Alexander Protogerov*, and *Petur Chaulev*) on one hand, and the Bulgarian Communists and Comintern representatives on the other, had grown steadily in 1922 and 1923, and the possibilities

⁴¹⁾ *Materiali po istoriia ... (1885—1925 g.)*, p. 212. After the Party came to power in the wake of World War II, *Dimitrov*, in a report to the Party's Fifth Congress in 1948, criticised "the ill-fated policy of neutrality" in 1923 as having been rooted in doctrinaire "Narrow Socialism" which, in contrast to Bolshevism, had continued to "consider Marxism rather as a doctrine than as a guide to revolutionary action." Through the Party's failure to act in concert with the Agrarians, he said, "an excellent opportunity was missed to utterly rout the monarcho-fascist forces at the very start of their offensive ..." Cf. *G. Dimitrov, Selected Works (1910—1949)*. Sofia: Foreign Languages Press, 1960, pp. 321—322.

⁴²⁾ *J. Degras, ed., The Communist International, 1919—1943: Documents, Vol. II, 1923—1928*, Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 47—51.

⁴³⁾ Cf. the autobiography of one of *Stamboliiski's* close associates, *Kosta Todorov*, *Balkan Firebrand*. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1943, pp. 193—206.

⁴⁴⁾ *Richard Busch-Zantner, Bulgarien*. Leipzig, 1941, pp. 141—142.

⁴⁵⁾ *Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883—1936*. Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 132.

for an alliance were discussed both before and after the coup d'état against the Agrarian regime.⁴⁶⁾ After the Communist uprising the contacts were continued, mainly in Vienna where *Dimitrov* temporarily established the Party's headquarters. The Vienna negotiations, conducted for IMRO by *Chaulev* and *Dimitur Vlahov*, produced in April, 1924, an agreement which was to have disastrous consequences for the Macedonian organization. Under the agreement, the national revolution which IMRO sought was to be fused with the social revolution of the Communists to bring about the solution of the Macedonian question within a Communist framework. An IMRO statement of future policy based on the agreement indicated that:

IMRO fights for the liberation and unification of the separated fractions of Macedonia into a completely independent political unit within its natural geographic and ethnographic boundaries. It considers that the political existence of Macedonia can be guaranteed only by an union of Balkan peoples . . . in the form of a Balkan Federation, alone capable of paralyzing the annexationist efforts of the Balkan states . . .

2. As regards the realization of these tasks . . . IMRO counts exclusively on the moral support of the European progressive and revolutionary currents and on the aid — moral, material and political — of the USSR which today shows itself to be the only state fighting for the liberation of all oppressed peoples . . .

3. Consequently, the organization severs all liaison with the rulers of Sofia and resolves to oppose their policy.

4. Appreciating the immense importance of a united revolutionary front in the Balkans . . . IMRO will give its complete support to the formation, as soon as possible, of the united front . . . IMRO will also establish contacts with the Communist Parties of the Balkan States.⁴⁷⁾

On the Communist side, the motivation for this momentous, if short-lived, alliance with IMRO was traceable to *Blagoev's* directive to the "Narrows" two decades earlier to try and give the Macedonian revolutionary movement a Marxist direction. The motivation of the leaders of IMRO has been more difficult to fathom. The triumvirate, or at least *Alexandrov* and *Protogerov*, apparently hoped that the alliance would not only bring badly needed funds, but would frighten the Western Powers and the Balkan governments into attitudes more favorable to the Macedonian cause. On both sides, it was undoubtedly a question, in Leninist terms, of *kto kogo*, of who would use whom.

As an expression of the new orientation, IMRO was also to begin publication of a monthly under the title "La Fédération Balkanique" and the editorship of *Vlahov* in Vienna. When it appeared (July 15, 1924), the journal's first issue carried the text of the famous May Manifesto to the Macedonian People, which, over the signatures of the trium-

⁴⁶⁾ For the complex story of the rapprochement, see Elisabeth B a r k e r, *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, pp. 48—54, and R o t h s c h i l d, *The Communist Party of Bulgaria*, pp. 170—184.

⁴⁷⁾ As translated in R o t h s c h i l d, *op. cit.*, pp. 184—185.

virate, explained the new course of IMRO.⁴⁸⁾ The first public disclosure of the new orientation of Macedonian affairs, the manifesto threw the Bulgarian nationalists into consternation. Having returned to Bulgaria and pressed by the *Tsankov* government, *Alexandrov* and *Protogerov* repudiated their signatures and declared that *Chaulev* and *Vlakhov* had acted without authority.⁴⁹⁾ Remaining in Vienna, *Chaulev* in turn accused them of lying and kept his word about tying the Macedonian cause to the chariot of a Communist revolution. Reprisals followed swiftly, and the first to die was *Alexandrov* (August 31, 1924). The mystery surrounding his assassination in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia (the so-called Petrich District) made possible its attribution to the Communists (as a reprisal for *Alexandrov's* desertion of the united front) as well as to the nationalists (for his dalliance with the Communists).⁵⁰⁾ *Dimo khadzhi Dimov*, the IMRO federalist who had joined the Communist Party, was killed in Sofia two weeks later. *Chaulev*, trying to hide, was tracked down in Milan and shot. By 1928 it was *Protogerov's* turn; the order for his assassination was issued by the new nationalist leader of IMRO, *Ivan Mikhailov*, in execution of a decision to punish all who bore responsibility for the murder of *Todor Alexandrov*. In the ensuing confrontation between the Protogerovists and the Mikhailovists, IMRO was bled so heavily that when the new Zveno government outlawed it in 1934, its surviving members readily acquiesced in its demise.⁵¹⁾

Thus, the encounter of nationalism and Communism within IMRO ended in the ruin of the Macedonian organization as an instrument of Bulgarian nationalism and in further losses for the Communists. However, while the encounter helped to destroy a major segment of the nationalist forces, for the Communist Party, having a solid base beyond reach in the Soviet Union, it was only an episode on the road to eventual victory. Giving yeoman service to the "first proletarian fatherland" and the Comintern, *Kolarov*, *Dimitrov*, and other Party leaders living in the USSR had at hand resources and organizational tools with which the Party in Bulgaria could be rebuilt and placed, as indeed it was after 1935, on Bolshevik tracks.

⁴⁸⁾ Most of the manifesto is translated in *Barker*, *Macedonia*, pp. 55—57.

⁴⁹⁾ *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, Vol. III, pp. 170—171; *Rothschild*, *The Communist Party of Bulgaria*, pp. 186—187.

⁵⁰⁾ For the view that the Communists were behind the assassination, see *Zagovorut protiv Todor Aleksandrov, po dannii na Vutreshnata Makedonska Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia* [The plot against Todor Aleksandrov; based on data from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization], n. p., 1924, pp. 93—99.

⁵¹⁾ In the decade from 1924 to 1934 the IMRO assassinations numbered 624 federalists and Communists, 220 Protogerovists, and 40 Mikhailovists; cf. *Rothschild*, *The Bulgarian Communist Party*, p. 192.

It was while on Comintern business in Germany that *Dimitrov* landed in the well-known circumstances surrounding the Reichstag fire in 1933, which catapulted him into international renown and made him *Stalin's* secretary-general of the Comintern and the acknowledged leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party. At the Leipzig trial his able self-defense against *Göring* and the prosecution struck themes of patriotism and Slavic anti-German nationalism that pleased *Stalin* enormously and provided directions for the new propaganda required by the German threat.⁵²⁾ Countering the taunts by *Göring* and *Goebbels* about his Balkan background, *Dimitrov* drew on national pride to turn the tables against the Nazis:

I have not only been roundly abused by the press — something to which I am completely indifferent — but my Bulgarian people have also, through me, been characterized as savage and barbarous. I have been called a suspicious character from the Balkans and a wild Bulgarian. I cannot allow such things to pass in silence . . .

True that the level of material well-being is not so high in the Balkans as elsewhere in Europe, but it is false to say that the people of Bulgaria are politically or mentally on a lower level than the peoples of other countries. A nation which lived for five hundred years under a foreign yoke without losing its language and its national character, a working class and peasantry who have fought and are fighting against Bulgarian Fascism and for Communism — such a nation is not savage and barbarous . . .

Long before the time when the German Emperor Charles V said that he talked German only to his horses and the German noblemen and intellectuals wrote only in Latin and were ashamed of the German language, in "barbarous" Bulgaria the apostles Cyril and Methodius had created and disseminated the literature in Old Bulgarian . . . I have no reason to feel ashamed that I am a Bulgarian, and I am proud to be a son of the Bulgarian working class . . .⁵³⁾

The emergence of *Dimitrov* to international prominence and his articulation of the new Comintern line of the popular or patriotic front

⁵²⁾ Since it governed the views of the Bulgarian Communists, the evolution of the attitude of Soviet leaders toward national pride and patriotism requires a brief explanation. The basic position comes from *Lenin's* article "O natsional'noi gordosti velikorossov" (On the national pride of the Great Russians), written during the controversy over patriotism in the latter part of 1914. In *Lenin's* spirited words, "Is the feeling of national pride alien to us, the Great Russian conscious proletarians? Of course not! We love our language and our fatherland . . . We are proud that (the Great Russians produced) Radishchev, the Decembrists, the revolutionaries of various classes in the 1870's . . ." The proletarian love of country, he said, is love of the country's progressive traditions which serve the interests of the proletariat everywhere; in this sense proletarian patriotism is the same as proletarian internationalism. (*Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, Vol. I, pp. 640—643). From this position developed the so-called Soviet patriotism of the Lenin period, which was briefly overshadowed in the late 1920's by a hostility to patriotism as a tool of the class enemy, and which was revived and intensified by *Stalin*; cf. Erwin Oberländer, *Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschichte: Dokumentation*. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967, pp. 15—28. Oberländer dramatically but wrongly dates the start of Stalinist patriotism from the rescue of the crew of the "Cheliuskin" in the Arctic and the glorification of Soviet heroism by the Soviet press in 1934.

⁵³⁾ G. Dimitrov, *Suchineniia*, Vol. IX. Sofia: BKP, 1953, pp. 260—261.

against domestic and international Fascism coincided in Bulgaria with the revival of nationalism as an aggressive force and its resurgence in Bulgarian political life. The years from the end of World War I and the second national catastrophe to the mid-1930's had been the period of crisis for the ideology of Bulgarian nationalism. Defeated on the battlefield, discredited in two national debacles, and abandoned by the bulk of the nation, it had survived in small pockets among the officer corps, the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie, and, of course, the refugees from Macedonia and Thrace.⁵⁴) Even in these circles, however, it lost its noble and romantic aspects of the past and took divergent, often antagonistic, forms which pitted the moderate nationalists against the chauvinists, the virulent extremists influenced by Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, and persons who sought career, adventure, and gain through nationalism. After 1923 the officer corps became divided along these lines between followers of *Damian Velchev*, one of the makers of the coup d'état against the Agrarian regime who recognized the need for reconciliation with the peasant masses and evolved toward republicanism, and officers close to King *Boris*. Moderate nationalists among the intellectuals formed the so-called "Father Paisii Bulgarian Union" and the "Union of Bulgarian Scholars, Writers, and Artists" for propaganda of mild nationalism and revisionism, while radical rightists began to echo ideological tenets of the European right and formed several ambitious and militant organizations. All small in numbers, the most important of them were the "National and Social Movement" of *Tsankov*, the *Ratnitsi* (promoters, defenders of national interests) led by *Asen Kantardzhiev*, and the "Bulgarian Legion" led by *Ivan Dochev*.⁵⁵) Closely paralleling his father's pattern of ruling, King *Boris* succeeded by 1935 in securing the monarchy through an alliance with nationalist, irredentist, and militarist elements and making himself the sole director of Bulgarian policy until his death in 1943.

Like his father, *Boris* also chose Germany as his political and economic partner and backer of the aims of Bulgarian nationalism. Amidst nationalist clamor that Bulgaria was the only vanquished country which by 1938 had not gained from the revision of the territorial settlement, *Boris* approached *Hitler* for a consideration of the Bulgarian claims to Southern Dobrudja, lost to Rumania in 1913, and Western Thrace, lost

⁵⁴) On the numerous refugee organizations and their role after 1918, see *Ivan Ormandzhiev*, *Nova i nai-nova istoriia na bulgarskiiia narod* [Modern and contemporary history of the Bulgarian people]. Sofia, 1945, pp. 573—574. *Ormandzhiev*, a refugee from the Adrianople area, was one of the leading spokesmen of the Thracian nationalists in Bulgaria.

⁵⁵) In 1944 all three succeeded in escaping to Germany. *Tsankov* has since died in Argentina; *Kantardzhiev* lives in Los Angeles and *Dochev* operates a "Bulgarian National Front" from New York. It publishes the periodical *Borba*.

to Greece in 1919, but found the Germans anxious to preserve the tranquillity of the Balkans as a vital supply area.⁵⁶⁾ By the summer of 1940, however, the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia forced a thorough reconsideration of the Rumanian territorial issues, and Germany, along with Italy, mediated to satisfy the Bulgarian claim to Southern Dobrudja.⁵⁷⁾ In the Bulgarian-German conversations (July 27, 1940) *Hitler* plainly was concerned with the threat of Russian-backed Communism in Bulgaria. Questioned on this point, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister *Popov* indicated, none too realistically, that "Communism had been completely eradicated" in Bulgaria and that the Bulgarian attitude toward Russia stemmed not only from gratitude for the liberation from Turkey in 1878, but from Bulgaria's "spirit of independence and her fear of being swallowed by her great Russian neighbor."⁵⁸⁾ This fear was undoubtedly behind the moderation of the Bulgarian demand for Southern Dobrudja only, rather than for all of this ancient Bulgarian land, so that Bulgaria could avoid a common border on the Danube with the "great Russian neighbor."⁵⁹⁾

The fears of the Bulgarian nationalists of a Russian descent down the Black Sea coast to Bulgaria were altogether justified. After the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which left the lines of division in the Balkans beyond Bessarabia undrawn, the Soviet government approached *Boris* with a proposal for a pact of friendship and mutual assistance in order to gain a foothold in Bulgaria, but *Boris* declined and agreed only to expanded trade relations.⁶⁰⁾ When the Southern Dobrudja issue became urgent, the USSR again sought to gain ground in Bulgaria by backing the Bulgarian demand and, after the transfer was accomplished, by claiming credit for it.⁶¹⁾ The Soviet determination to obtain a position in Bulgaria by diplomatic rather than revolutionary

⁵⁶⁾ Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918—1945, Series D, Vol. V., Washington, 1953, pp. 335, 351—352, and 360. In presenting the Bulgarian claims to Western Thrace, the Bulgarian minister in Berlin stressed that "even if only a few Bulgarians were living there now" as a result of the shifts of populations, the region should be "regarded as age-old Bulgarian territory" and that "if this question should at some time be resolved in Bulgaria's favor, it would also be to the interest of Germany, who would thereby also receive an outlet to the Aegean Sea."

⁵⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, Vol. X, Washington, 1957, pp. 332—334.

⁵⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 337—341.

⁵⁹⁾ Northern Dobrudja, an area of the original Bulgarian state of the seventh century, was recognized as Bulgarian land in the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, but in 1878 the Russians gave it to Rumania in compensation for ceding Bessarabia to them. For a brief period after the defeat of Rumania in World War I, Northern Dobrudja was under the "condominium" of Bulgaria, Germany, and the other Central Powers, but reverted to Rumania when the war ended.

⁶⁰⁾ *Istoriia na Bulgariia*, Vol. III, p. 363.

⁶¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

and military means climaxed in November, 1940, in the dramatic Soviet efforts to renegotiate the partnership with Germany and win the cooperation of the Bulgarian government. Going to the limits permitted by the circumstances, on November 25, 1940, the Soviet government dispatched a special envoy to Sofia (Arkadii Sobolev) with a 12-point proposal of terms for a Soviet-Bulgarian deal designed to satisfy the nationalists. Emphasizing "the community of interests" of the two countries, the proposal recalled the Soviet support of Bulgaria in the settlement of the Southern Dobrudja issue and stressed the Soviet Union's "full understanding for the interests of Bulgaria in Western Thrace" as well as its readiness to help in their realization. There were, however, "authentic reports that Turkey will oppose by military means the advance of Bulgaria toward the south", and since the USSR also found Turkey antagonistic to its interests in the Straits, common interests with Bulgaria dictated the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty "which would be helpful to Bulgaria in realizing her national aspirations not only in Western but also in Eastern Thrace." The pact would not "in any circumstance affect the internal regime, the sovereignty or the independence of Bulgaria", and if a threat of attack or actual attack by Turkey developed, "the Soviet Union will assist Bulgaria with all available means and support her in the realization of Bulgaria's well-known claims in the European part of Turkey." The Soviet Union promised to render all necessary military and economic assistance to Bulgaria and was prepared to drop its objections to her accession to the Tripartite Pact "on condition that the mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria be concluded. It is entirely possible that in that case the Soviet Union will join the Tripartite Pact."⁶²)

Pursuing a policy reminiscent of 1878 and the ensuing years, Russia sought now, as then, to join forces with Bulgarian nationalism in order to reach her larger objectives in the Balkans and at the Straits. Setting ideology aside for the moment, the Soviet government declared itself prepared to assist the Bulgarian nationalists in annexing Western Thrace from Greece and, going beyond the current agenda of Bulgarian nationalism, to secure by military action much of European Turkey for Bulgaria. Turkish Thrace, leaflets distributed by the Bulgarian Communists explained, would become Bulgarian to the Enos-Midia line which Bulgaria had briefly attained in 1913.⁶³) In Bulgaria the Communists

⁶²) Text of the Soviet proposal in Marin Pundeff, "Two Documents on Soviet-Bulgarian Relations in November, 1940", in *Journal of Central European Affairs* (January, 1956), pp. 367—378. The text has also been published in *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Vol. XI, Washington, 1960, pp. 772—773, from which the quotations are taken.

⁶³) *Ibid.*, p. 726.

were enlisted in a widespread campaign to explain the meaning of the "Sobolev mission" and the gains for Bulgaria which acceptance of the Soviet proposal would bring, and to mount popular support for the conclusion of the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty.⁶⁴) Fearful of Russian imperialism as well as of Bolshevism, however, *Boris* and his ministers declined the Soviet offer, disclaiming that Bulgaria had any interest in the Straits question. The Bulgarian people, the reply indicated, "have their national ideals, but precisely (the settlement of the Southern Dobrudja issue) shows that these can be realized in a peaceful manner. As long as Bulgaria tries to achieve peacefully her revisionist claim to the western part of Thrace, there exists no Turkish danger."⁶⁵) The reply in effect rejected the resurrection of the idea, at least under Soviet sponsorship, that the nationalist program included a claim to Turkish Thrace.

The Soviet pressure and the activities of the Bulgarian Communists only made *Boris* more determined to throw his lot with Germany, and on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact on the assurance that the impending German operation against Greece would make Western Thrace Bulgarian. As it turned out, Bulgaria was also able to occupy Yugoslav Macedonia when, after the challenge of the Yugoslav coup d'état, *Hitler* moved to destroy and dismantle Yugoslavia. Thus, by design and fluke, *Boris* and the nationalists came quite close to attaining the "Greater Bulgaria" of the San Stefano treaty but, ominously, as in World War I, the gains depended upon a German victory. As the war expanded to involve the Soviet Union and the United States, it became clear that the third nationalist gamble in thirty years might end, like the first two, in a national catastrophe.

To keep room for maneuvering and undercut the activities of the Bulgarian Communists, *Boris* resolved to remain outside the German-Russian war and preserve diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet government was not to be appeased, nor the Bulgarian Communists undercut. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the Soviet leaders, having been rebuffed by *Boris* in their diplomatic efforts in November, 1940, became determined to attain their objectives in Bulgaria by revolutionary and military means when the tide of the war turned. While the German armies knifed into Russia, the Bulgarian Communists began to organize, on orders from Moscow, for sabotage, partisan operations in the German rear, common action with other anti-Fascist forces in Bulgaria, and eventual seizure of

⁶⁴) N. Gornenski, *Klasite v Bulgariia i borbite im, 1934—1944* [The classes in Bulgaria and their struggles, 1934—1944]. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1967, pp. 110—116.

⁶⁵) Documents on German Foreign Policy, Vol. XI, pp. 756—757.

power.⁶⁶⁾ The political framework of their activities became the so-called Fatherland Front, a patriotic variant of the united or popular front, proclaimed by *Dimitrov* in 1942 over the Bulgarian-language "Khristo Botev" radiostation broadcasting from Tiflis, in Soviet Georgia. As it was eventually constituted, the Fatherland Front comprised the Communists, left-wing Agrarians, "Broad" Socialists, *Zveno* leaders, and Independents, united by common opposition to the pro-German policy of *Boris* and the nationalists rather than by complete agreement on ultimate objectives.

From the very beginning of the Bulgarian occupation of Greek Thrace and Yugoslav Macedonia, the Bulgarian Communists evaded taking a clear stand on the question of the final disposition of these territories. The Soviet Union, as we have seen, was fully in favor of Bulgaria's acquisition of Western Thrace, and in the interwar years the Comintern habitually regarded the Bulgarian Communists and their allies in IMRO — and not the Yugoslav and Greek Communists — as the forces with which Macedonia was to be revolutionized. This attitude stemmed as much from the strength of the Bulgarian Communists in the Comintern as from the weakness of the Yugoslav and Greek Communists in Macedonia and dovetailed with the strong though latent feeling among Bulgarian Communists that Macedonia in the last analysis was a Bulgarian land. Accordingly, when Yugoslav Macedonia was incorporated into Bulgaria, they adopted the simple formula of "one territory— one party" and proceeded to extend their activities to it.⁶⁷⁾ The public stand which they had to take when the program of the Fatherland Front was announced in 1942 indicated only that Bulgarian troops involved in suppressing the Serbian partisans must be withdrawn and that "the national interests of the Bulgarian people must be secured in accordance with the Atlantic Charter through accords with the other Balkan nations" under the auspices of the Soviet Union and other "freedom-loving countries."⁶⁸⁾ Symptomatic of the difficulties which the Mace-

⁶⁶⁾ From June, 1941, to January, 1943, these activities were admittedly minor until the Soviet victory at Stalingrad stimulated the expectations of general victory. Cf. N. Gornenski, *Vuoruzhenata borba na bulgarskiiia narod za osvobozhdenie ot khitleristkata okupatsiia i monarkho-fashistkata diktatura (1941—1944 g.)* [The armed struggle of the Bulgarian people for liberation from Hitlerite occupation and the monarcho-fascist dictatorship]. Sofia: BKP, 1958, pp. 134—137.

⁶⁷⁾ For details, see *Barker*, *Macedonia*, pp. 65—90.

⁶⁸⁾ Text of the program in *Govori radiostantsiia "Khristo Botev"*, 23 iuli 1941—22 septemvri 1944 [Here speaks radiostation "Khristo Botev", July 23, 1941—September 22, 1944]. Sofia: BKP, 1950—1952; 7 vols, Vol. III, pp. 12—13. This record of the broadcasts includes wartime statements by *Dimitrov*, *Kolarov*, and other party functionaries. *Kolarov's* broadcasts along similar lines over Radio Moscow are in his *Protiv khitlerizma i negovite bulgarski slugi* [Against Hitlerism and its Bulgarian lackeys]. Sofia: Bulgarska rabothicheska partiia-komunisti, 1947.

donian question presented to the Bulgarian Communists was the difference of views between *Todor Pavlov*, a leading Communist intellectual, and *Traicho Kostov*, secretary of the Central Committee in Bulgaria, as to whether there was a separate Macedonian people. *Pavlov*, a Macedonian from Shtip in Yugoslav Macedonia, affirmed the traditional Bulgarian view that no such people existed and that throughout their history Macedonians had always felt themselves Bulgarians. Taking the orthodox ideological view, *Kostov* on the other hand affirmed the right of Macedonians to separate existence, but in terms not definite enough to satisfy the Yugoslav Communists.⁶⁹⁾

The strength of the Yugoslav partisan movement, however, gave new direction to Macedonian affairs. In line with Marxist orthodoxy and, more specifically, *Stalin's* views on the national question⁷⁰⁾, the Yugoslav Communists proposed at the Jaitse veche in 1943 to organize postwar Yugoslavia as a federation of six nationalities, of which the Macedonians were to be one.⁷¹⁾ Under this plan Yugoslav Macedonia was not only to cease being the "South Serbia" appendage of Belgrade it was in the prewar period; it was to become the nucleus of a Macedonian nation to draw to itself the parts held by Bulgaria and Greece either within the new Yugoslav federation or a future Balkan federation of Communist nations. To move in this direction, the Macedonians were to cultivate for themselves, first in Yugoslavia and then elsewhere, a distinct national identity through the development of a separate national language, a national sense of historical evolution, and a church of their own.⁷²⁾ Having the support of the Soviet Union and the cadres with which to implement this plan, the Yugoslav Communists moved to take over Yugoslav Macedonia when the German position in the Balkans verged on collapse.⁷³⁾

Thus, when the Red Army entered Bulgaria (after the Soviet declaration of war on September 5, 1944) and installed the Fatherland Front

⁶⁹⁾ L. Mojsov, *Bugarska radnicka partija (komunista) i makedonsko natsionalno pitanje* [The Bulgarian Worker's Party (Communists) and the Macedonian national question]. Belgrade: Borba, 1948, p. 72.

⁷⁰⁾ Cf. J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936.

⁷¹⁾ *Istoriia Yugoslavii v dvukh tomakh* [History of Yugoslavia in two volumes]. Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 226—228.

⁷²⁾ The efforts to create a Macedonian national language and historiography are well known. On the separation of the Macedonian dioceses from the Patriarchate of Serbia and the creation of a Macedonian Orthodox Church, see D. Slijepcevic, *Pitanje makedonske pravoslavne tsrkve u Jugoslaviji* [The question of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia]. Munich, 1959.

⁷³⁾ On the Soviet backing of the decisions at the Jaitse veche, see *Istoriia Yugoslavii*, Vol. II, pp. 227—228. On the partisan movement in Yugoslav Macedonia, see M. Apostolski, *Osloboditelnata vojna na makedonskiot narod (1941—1945)* [The war of liberation of the Macedonian people (1941—1945)]. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo, 1965.

coalition in power, the Bulgarian Communists were already committed, by Soviet policy, to accept *Tito's* approach to the Macedonian problem. The problem of the Bulgarian occupation of Western Thrace, however, was another matter. The Soviet government, like the tsarist governments before it, preferred that the area be in Bulgarian hands, especially when Bulgaria herself was in Russian hands. The chaotic conditions in Greece, furthermore, precluded any immediate possibility of effective control of the area by the Greek Communists. Using the pretext of German threat to the Bulgarian flank, the USSR allowed the Bulgarian government to hold on to the area with troops and administrators pending further developments.⁷⁴) It took the personal intervention of *Churchill* to reverse the first nationalist move of the Bulgarian Communists. Hurriedly flying to see *Stalin* on October 9, 1944, about this and other pressing issues, *Churchill* made it the absolute precondition that Bulgaria evacuate Western Thrace if an armistice agreement was to be signed with her.⁷⁵) Concerned with larger stakes, *Stalin* yielded for the time being. As the territorial issues were deferred to the negotiation of the peace treaties and to another chance for the Soviet Union to play the role of champion of Bulgarian nationalist claims, the Russians became increasingly involved in a conflict with Bulgarian national sensitivities which seemed headed for a repetition of the tsarist blunders in the 1878/86 period so roundly condemned at that time by *Blagoev*.

Ever since *Stamboliiski* put his imprint on Bulgarian political life, the Bulgarian peasants had become keenly conscious of the idea that the country rested, economically and politically, on their shoulders and that, being the great majority of the nation, they needed only a democratic system to be "masters in their own house". The bourgeois parties, they felt, had led the nation into two disasters and they had to take over in 1919 to save it. The cost of this ideology was the hostility of both the bourgeoisie and the Communists to the Agrarian regime in 1919/23 as well as the sharp divisions in the Agrarian leadership itself, but the ideology survived nonetheless. As World War II evolved into another defeat of the nationalist program of the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, especially that portion which followed left-wing leaders, prepared to recover the role from which it had been bloodily thrown out in 1923 and to save the country once again. It was willing to share this

⁷⁴) S. S. Biriuzov, *Sovetskii soldat na Balkanakh* [Soviet soldier in the Balkans]. Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1963, pp. 192—193. *Biriuzov* was then the Soviet commanding general in Bulgaria and chairman of the Allied Control Commission.

⁷⁵) William H. McNeill stated in 1953 in his *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941—1946*. Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 494, that Western Thrace was "one of the first issues, and perhaps the one which brought *Churchill* in such haste to Moscow."

task with others, but domination of Bulgarian political life by anyone else was out of the question.

From political and doctrinal considerations, the Soviet government, however, was determined to make the Bulgarian Communists the dominant force in Bulgaria. It had employed them consistently in the inter-war period and in making known its proposal appealing to Bulgarian nationalism in 1940. In the war years it fostered the Communist-led partisan movement and propaganda to revive the notion of "Grandfather Ivan" solicitous of the future of the Bulgarian people and to depict as "national treason" any move to exclude Russia from a leading role in Bulgarian affairs. Its concept for the reshaping of the political life and social structure of the country was certainly the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is to say, of the Communist Party. Agrarian leaders and others in the Fatherland Front coalition were held suspect either of compromises with the bourgeoisie or, as relations within the Grand Alliance worsened, of ties with England and the United States.

Thus, by the beginning of 1945, a rift opened between peasant expectations and Soviet policies. Much else contributed to it as it widened to become once again a chasm between Bulgarians and Russians: ruthlessness in executions and "liquidations" of thousands of nationalists and "Fascists", dispossession of propertied segments, Russification and Sovietization of the country, primitiveness and criminality among the Russian soldiery. The first sign of the conflict with the new Bulgarian nationalism was the removal of *Dr. G. M. Dimitrov* from the leadership of the Agrarian Union and his departure to second exile (he had spent the war years in exile in Cairo) in the United States. As the conflict deepened, several major trials of army officers and others were staged to head off the powerful trend toward anti-Russian nationalism. Their climax was the trial and execution of the Agrarian leader, *Nikola Petkov*, in 1947 on charges of plotting to create a pretext for the armed intervention of the Western Powers in Bulgaria or, in short, of "national treason".⁷⁶⁾

While the new nationalist opposition to Russian dictation and its agents was being beheaded, the Soviet government attempted to win over some nationalist sentiment by playing the role of sponsor of Bulgaria's national interests in the negotiation of the peace treaties and protector of her national independence against real and alleged foreign designs and encroachments. At the Paris Peace Conference *Molotov* publicly assured the Bulgarian delegation that the Greek demands for portions of Southern Bulgaria inhabited by the Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians) will be blocked and that the integrity of Bulgaria's territory, including Southern Dobrudja, will be preserved. He also assumed the posture of

⁷⁶⁾ The Trial of Nikola D. Petkov. Sofia, 1947, pp. 39—41.

champion of Bulgaria's cause in the discussion of reparations and other burdensome clauses of the Bulgarian peace treaty signed in 1947.⁷⁷⁾

However, while this Soviet posture was unequivocal and constant in relation to Greece and the Western Powers, in Bulgarian-Yugoslav affairs Soviet policy changed sides to enlist for the changing Soviet interests first Yugoslav and then Bulgarian nationalism. In 1944, the main Soviet ally in the Balkans was *Tito*, whose program of recognizing a Macedonian nation within a federated Yugoslavia and seeking to unify it within an initial federation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, was in principle backed by the Soviet Union. For *Tito*, then emerging as a Yugoslav nationalist with large visions, this program involved developing the national consciousness of the population of Bulgarian Macedonia (the former *Petrich District*, or Pirin Macedonia) along the same lines as this was done in Yugoslav Macedonia and with the aid of propagandists from Yugoslav Macedonia so as to prepare the conditions for joining the two parts of the structure under one Yugoslav roof. This process was hopefully also to extend at an opportune moment to Greek Macedonia so as to detach it from Greece.⁷⁸⁾ In *Tito's* immediate plans, however, the first step was the acquisition of the Bulgarian part of Macedonia while Bulgaria herself joined the Yugoslav federation as its seventh member.

For the Bulgarian Communists this program had acceptable and unacceptable aspects. Committed to a policy of self-determination for the Macedonian people and turning Macedonia from an "apple of discord" into a "healthy unifying link" in the Balkans, they were willing to allow the development of a common national consciousness in Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonia as the Yugoslav leaders planned it. The joining of Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia's part and the addition of Bulgaria to the Yugoslav federation on terms other than absolute Bulgarian-Yugoslav parity was quite another matter. As differences on the question of parity hardened and Bulgarian and Yugoslav nationalisms clashed, for the second time since 1941 within the framework of Com-

⁷⁷⁾ V. B o z h i n o v, *Zashtitata na natsionalnata nezavisimost na Bulgariia, 1944—1947* [The defense of the national independence of Bulgaria, 1944—1947]. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1962, pp. 151—227. The Soviet delegation also lent support to the Bulgarian counter-demands for the "return of Western Thrace" to Bulgaria.

⁷⁸⁾ B a r k e r, *Macedonia*, p. 83. The fact that Greek or Aegean Macedonia was regarded by the Yugoslav Communists as an integral part of Macedonia is amply documented in the joint work by D. Z o g r a f s k i and others, *Egejska Makedonija vo nashata natsionalna istorija*. [Aegean Macedonia in our national history] published by the Institute of National History of the Macedonian People. Skopje, 1951. The Greek civil war in 1946—1949 contained opportunities for incorporating the area into Yugoslavia and had the Greek Communists succeeded with *Tito's* aid, it is very likely that they would have yielded to his demand for Aegean Macedonia.

munism, the initial plans for federating were shelved in 1945 with the explanation that England and the United States were opposed to them.⁷⁹⁾

However, the old ideological commitments of the Bulgarian Communist leaders lingered on. Having accepted the principle of self-determination for the Macedonian people, they allowed the inhabitants of the Pirin area to indicate in the first postwar census in 1946 whether they considered themselves Macedonians or Bulgarians, and on numerous occasions the view was reaffirmed that the unification of the Macedonian people would be effected within the framework of the Yugoslav federation.⁸⁰⁾ The Macedonian policy of the Communists provided a good issue to the Agrarians and "Broad" Socialists who had left the Fatherland Front coalition, and while they were able to publish newspapers they charged that the Macedonian nation was an invention of the imperialist Communists in Yugoslavia, that the Macedonian language was an artificial creation full of Serbisms, and that the Bulgarian Communists themselves were guilty of national treason for abandoning Bulgaria's legitimate interests and being even willing to give up a piece of the national territory. The Bulgarian as well as the Yugoslav Communists in turn accused the Bulgarian opposition leaders of reverting to "Greater Bulgaria" chauvinism and annexationism. In a pamphlet entitled "Teoriia i praktika na velikobulgarskiiia shovinizum" (Theory and practice of Greater Bulgaria chauvinism)⁸¹⁾, the Communist Minister of Education *Kiril Dramaliev* reviewed the history of Bulgarian chauvinism since the 1880's, when *Blagoev* first attacked it, and declared that, regardless of the new chauvinism of the Agrarian and Socialist dissidents, the Macedonian question was on its way to solution as *Gotse Delchev* and the progressive leaders of IMRO had envisaged it. Macedonia could be free only on the basis of a Balkan accord which, *Dramaliev* said, was in the process of being established. The greatest obstacle to it remained "the chauvinist ruling clique" in Greece, but there was no doubt that "in the near future the Greek people will manage to cast off the tyranny" and establish "a truly democratic system such as already exists in the rest of the Balkan states." The "complete unification of the Macedonian nation within the framework of Yugoslavia" would then occur by the action of the two Slavic countries with

⁷⁹⁾ D. Mitrev, *BKP i Pirinska Makedonija* [The Bulgarian Communist Party and Pirin Macedonia]. Skopje: Kultura, 1960, pp. 63—65; Barker, *Macedonia*, p. 101.

⁸⁰⁾ For citations, see Mitrev, *BKP i Pirinska Makedonija*, pp. 66—83. Mitrev quotes a resolution passed by the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1946 stating inter alia that the basic part of the Macedonian people was constituted as the People's Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia and that the "unification of the other parts remains to be completed on the basis of the People's Republic of Macedonia and within the framework of Yugoslavia."

⁸¹⁾ Sofia: *Bulgarska rabotniceska partiia-komunisti*, 1947.

the eventual participation of "the future free and democratic Greek republic."⁸²)

By the summer of 1947 and in the midst of the Greek civil war, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation plans were revived for diplomatic discussions and when *Dimitrov* and *Tito* conferred at Bled, Yugoslavia (August, 1947) an agreement was reached to begin the process of uniting the two countries by establishing a customs union and eliminating frontier restrictions and formalities. The Macedonian problem was to be solved within the framework of the future federation by adding Bulgarian Macedonia to the Macedonian republic in Yugoslavia. Until the federation became possible, the groundwork was to be laid through the cultural rapprochement of the populations of the two Macedonian regions. As a result of the agreement, ninety-three teachers arrived in the Pirin area from Yugoslav Macedonia to assist in the teaching of the correct Macedonian language and Macedonian history. Bookshops were established in a number of towns, filled with books, journals, and newspapers from Yugoslav Macedonia, and a Macedonian National Theater in Gorna Dzhumaia, the main town of Pirin Macedonia, began to present plays in the new language.⁸³) The basic themes of the new Macedonian history taught to the Pirin population were that the Macedonians had their own distinct historical development, that their national revival had been wrongly represented by Bulgarian nationalists in the past as part of the Bulgarian revival, that they had fought against the "tyranny" of the Bulgarian Exarchate just as stubbornly as against that of the Greek Patriarchate, that the IMRO of *Gotse Delchev* was a truly Macedonian organization for national liberation while the IMRO of *Todor Alexandrov* was an instrument of Bulgarian chauvinism, and that the Macedonian republic in Yugoslavia was the first national state of Macedonians everywhere.

At the height of these activities, however, larger events erupted and put an end to them. Visiting Bucharest in January, 1948, *Dimitrov* discussed the idea of a customs union with Rumania and, in reply to questions from the press, elaborated on the prospects of a federation embracing all Balkan countries including Greece. *Dimitrov* was promptly rebuffed in "Pravda" and, using the incident to halt the trend toward local initiative and independence, *Stalin* summoned Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders for a meeting in Moscow. There, he and *Molotov* lectured them on the absolute necessity of checking with the Soviet government before they made any plans, arrangements, or statements, but while *Dimitrov* bowed to abuse and dictation, the Yugoslav leaders became even more adamant toward Soviet "big-power chauvinism"

⁸²) *Ibid.*, pp. 39—40.

⁸³) *Mitrev*, BKP i Pirinska Makedonija, pp. 88—111.

and control. As the Stalin-Tito feud broke out into the open in June, 1948, *Dimitrov* dutifully took his place behind *Stalin* in the concerted Cominform effort to isolate Yugoslavia and bring the Yugoslav leaders down. The propagandists from Yugoslav Macedonia were ejected of the Pirin area, the border was sealed, and a propaganda barrage was opened to depict *Tito's* Macedonian policy as a smokescreen for imperialist and chauvinist designs. The new Macedonian language was thrown out as a Serbianized dialect and Bulgarian was restored as the language which the population of Pirin Macedonia "spoke and which it could comprehend", while the interpretation of Macedonian history reverted to the old nationalist views that in the medieval period Macedonia and the bishopric (later archbishopric) of St. Kliment of Okhrid had been strongholds of Bulgarian culture and Bulgarianism, that in the modern era before 1913 the Macedonians were an integral part of the Bulgarian religious and ethnic domain and that in 1913 only the Bulgarian part of Macedonia had become truly free. To bring the Pirin population back into Bulgarian consciousness, the propaganda of the Bulgarian Communists began to stress the contributions of Macedonians who in the modern era had identified with Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Marxist movement. In this direction, *Blagoev* was made, among others, a local hero and in 1950 Gorna Dzhumajia, the center of the new administrative district for the Pirin area, was renamed Blagoevgrad. On the other side of the border, the Yugoslav propaganda responded with counter-charges that the Bulgarian Communists had returned to chauvinist policies and that they had never intended to apply the principle of self-determination in their part of Macedonia or allow the development of Macedonian national identity and autonomy there.⁸⁴⁾

⁸⁴⁾ For the tenor of Bulgarian propaganda on the Macedonian issue during the *Stalin* era, see Dino K'osev, *Titovata banda—orudie na imperialistite* [Tito's gang—a tool of the imperialists]. Sofia: 1951, and *Istoriia na makedonskoto natsionalno-revolutsionno dvizhenie* [History of the Macedonian national-revolutionary movement]. Sofia, 1954. A Macedonian from the Greek part, K'osev joined the federalists in IMRO in 1925 and the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1927. Since 1950 he has been one of the editors of the Party's newspaper *Rabotnicheskoto Delo* [Workers' Cause] writing commentaries on foreign affairs. His more recent publications are *Gotse Delchev, Biografichen ocherk* [Biographic sketch]. Sofia: BKP, 1967, and *Gotse Delchev; Pisma i drugi materialii* [Letters and other materials]. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1967. Among other Bulgarian materials, see the official *Documents sur la politique hostile et agressive du Gouvernement yougoslave contre la République Populaire de Bulgarie*. Sofia, 1952, and *Petso Traikov, Natsionalizmut na skopskite rukovoditeli* [The nationalism of the leaders in Skopje]. Sofia, 1949. The line of Yugoslav policy is evident in the books by *Mojsov* and *Mitrev* cited above and in *D. Mitrev, Pirinska Makedonija vo borba za natsionalno osloboduvanje* [Pirin Macedonia in the struggle for national liberation]. Skopje, 1950, published by the Central Committee of the Popular Front of Macedonia; *D. Vlakhov, Makedonija; momenti od istorijata na makedonskiot narod* [Macedonia; moments from the history of the

So began the latest phase of the recurrent conflict between Bulgarian and Yugoslav nationalism within the context of the common ideology of Communism. In the two decades since 1948 it has evolved from virulent hostility verging on use of force in the *Stalin* era, through fluctuating policies in the Khrushchev era, to the present tension resulting from the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In its beginning in the Stalin era, the conflict was dramatized by the hunt of so-called Titoists which focused on *Traicho Kostov*, the leading functionary of the Party within Bulgaria after 1935 and generally regarded as *Dimitrov's* likely successor. Although he was accused of conspiring with *Tito* (and American diplomats) and executed as a Titoist shortly after *Dimitrov's* death in 1949, *Kostov* was guilty of anything but the crimes with which he was charged. He had been cool to the idea of surrendering Pirin Macedonia to Yugoslavia and federating on any basis other than absolute Bulgarian-Yugoslav parity, and was for these reasons regarded in Yugoslavia as a Bulgarian nationalist.⁸⁵⁾

Kostov's nationalism, however, had manifested itself more clearly and sharply in relation to the Soviet Union, and this was the real reason for his undoing. In charge of Bulgaria's economic development, he had become aware of Soviet exploitation practices and had voiced on occasion his opposition to the terms of Bulgarian-Soviet agreements. As *Milovan Djilas* records, during the critical Moscow conference on the federation issue in 1948, *Kostov* took exception, in *Stalin's* presence, to injustices in the existing economic agreements with the Soviet Union and incurred *Stalin's* displeasure.⁸⁶⁾ In the circumstances of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, *Stalin's* simply equated *Kostov's* "nationalist deviation" with that of *Tito* and, suspecting an existing or a possible future connection between the two, he provided the opportunity to *Vulko Chervenkov*, a Moscow-trained Stalinist and *Kostov's* main rival, to be *Kostov's* accuser, liquidator, and successor.⁸⁷⁾

Faced with the developments in Yugoslav Macedonia, the Communist leadership in Sofia and Moscow could not fail to recognize that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church could be useful as a national institution in any moves to counter *Tito's* policies on the Macedonian question. The

Macedonian people]. Skopje, 1950, and D. Tashkovski, Raganjeto na makedonskata natsija [The birth of the Macedonian nation]. Skopje, 1966. *Vlakhov*, it may be noted, emerged at the end of World War II on the side of the Yugoslav Communists and became a leading functionary in Yugoslav Macedonia.

⁸⁵⁾ M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, p. 185.

⁸⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 173—183.

⁸⁷⁾ The record of *Kostov's* trial is in *The Trial of Traicho Kostov and His Group*. Sofia, 1949; see also V. Chervenkov, *Leçons fondamentales de la découverte de la bande traichokostoviste et la lutte pour son anéantissement*. Sofia, 1950.

usefulness of the Russian Orthodox Church had been recognized by *Stalin* in World War II when he allowed the restoration of the Russian patriarchate and the assumption of a significant role by it in the field of foreign affairs. In line with *Stalin's* policy toward the Russian national church, in Bulgaria the Communists had indicated on occasion that the Bulgarian Church could have a similar status if it rid itself of some of its leaders "with ossified brains and extremely conservative views" and became "a truly people's church."⁸⁸) However, a decision to build up the Church for a special role was not revealed until March, 1949, when a new law on the religious denominations indicated that, being historically the church of the nation, it could expect to rise in status under the Communist regime. The implied *quid pro quo* required the Church on its part to fit itself into the policies of the regime and in particular to give it vocal support on national and international issues. As a first step the Church was allowed to control its higher theological education through the separation of the faculty of theology from the University of Sofia and its establishment as an independent Academy of Theology, named significantly, like the university itself, after St. Kliment of Okhrid.

The decision that the Bulgarian Church was to be raised to patriarchal status, which it had lost during the Turkish conquest in the fourteenth century, became known in the latter part of 1950 when, in compliance with the new law, the Church adopted a new statute providing, among other innovations, for restoration of the patriarchate. The patriarchal election itself was held on May 10, 1953, resulting predictably in the elevation of the Metropolitan of Plovdiv, Kiril, to be Patriarch of Bulgaria.⁸⁹) Like the church in Russia, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was thus strengthened as an instrument of the regime to satisfy patriotic and nationalist sentiments while religion as a competing ideology continued to be combatted and circumscribed. As a move to restore the Church to its historic status and end its inferiority vis-à-vis the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Balkan national churches, however, the reestablishment of the patriarchate could only please the latent sentiments of Bulgarian nationalism.

In the years since *Stalin* died and *Chervenkov* was replaced by *Todor Zhivkov* as Moscow's man in Sofia, *Kostov* has been exonerated, rehabilitated, and posthumously proclaimed "Hero of Socialist La-

⁸⁸) Speech of *Georgi Dimitrov* at the celebration of the millennium of St. Ivan of Rila at the Rila Monastery, May 26, 1946; text in his *Suchineniia*, Vol. XII, Sofia: BKP, 1955, pp. 188—190.

⁸⁹) Cf. *Deianiia na tretiaa tsurkovno-naroden subor*, Sofia, 8—10 mai 1953 [Proceedings of the third council of clergy and laity, May 8—10, 1953]. Sofia: Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1953, and *Deset godini bulgarska patriarshia*, 1953—1963 [Ten years of the Bulgarian patriarchate, 1953—1963]. Sofia: Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1963.

bor."⁹⁰) Although not explicitly vindicated for his stand against Soviet policies of economic exploitation in *Stalin's* time and against *Tito's* designs, he remains the main symbol to Bulgarian Communists and the Bulgarian people at large that a Communist can and should be guided in dealing with other Communist countries by his own country's concrete interests rather than by abstract formulae of international proletarian solidarity. The abolition, on Soviet initiative, of the joint Soviet-Bulgarian companies in 1954—1955 was an indirect admission that *Kostov's* "nationalist deviation" had a point, and when *Khrushchev* exposed the crimes of *Stalin*, including his highhandedness in regard to *Tito*, it became officially possible for the Bulgarian Communists to conceive that the Soviet Union could be guilty of the "big-power chauvinism" with which it had been charged by the Yugoslavs.

Stalin's passing and the new Soviet recognition, reluctant as it has been, that there could be various national roads to the same goal of socialism, brought the earlier phase of drab sameness in the bloc to a close and opened the way for reassertion of the national individuality and the national heritage. According to current Party historiography, the new phase began in Bulgaria with the so-called April Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in 1956, which heard a report by *Zhivkov* on the lessons for the Party from the Twentieth Congress of CPSU.⁹¹) The main task now was to lessen the alienation among Bulgarian Communists and the people at large caused by the excessive subservience to the Soviet Union during the *Stalin* era and to head off the danger of anti-Soviet nationalism rising in the country. In the ensuing years the Party launched a major effort to explain, above all to its disoriented members, that loyalty to the Soviet Union as the "true fatherland of the working people" did not rule out the highest degree of patriotism in a Communist because, as *Lenin* had taught, proletarian internationalism was harmonious with patriotism. However, Party propagandists explained, it was obvious from the Hungarian events that the imperialists were counting on nationalism to deflect the working people in the socialist countries from the right course of fidelity to the Soviet Union. In the last analysis, the litmus paper with which to detect nationalism in these circumstances was the attitude toward the USSR. All existing tendencies to "slide down the slippery road of bourgeois nationalism" were to be mercilessly exposed by the Party.⁹²) The Party's Seventh

⁹⁰) See the posthumous collection of selected writings of *K o s t o v*, *Izbrani statii, dokladi, rechi* [Selected articles, reports, speeches]. Sofia: BKP, 1964, p. 6.

⁹¹) *Materiali po istoriia . . . , 1925—1962 g.* Sofia: BKP, 1964, pp. 383—389.

⁹²) *Ts. Nikolov, Rabotata na BKP sled Aprilskiiia plenum za vuzpitanieto na komunistite, 1956—1962* [The work of the Bulgarian Communist Party after the April plenum on the indoctrination of the Communists, 1956—1962]. Sofia: BKP, 1964, pp. 287—307.

Congress in 1958 reemphasized that "the struggle against revisionism and bourgeois nationalism" was "the first and foremost task of the Party."⁹³)

Under *Zhivkov's* guidance, the Party thus turned to the present policy of intensive cultivation of patriotism, national pride, and national dignity tempered by proletarian internationalism so as to transform the elements of anti-Soviet nationalism and natural love of country into a controlled emotional force for attainment of new national unity as well as the regime's political and economic objectives. One aspect of the patriotic campaign and the return to the national individuality, traditions, and heritage has been the removal of objectionable names of localities and institutions imposed during the *Stalin* era. The State Library in Sofia, at first named after *Kolarov*, was renamed the Cyril and Methodius National Library; after being known as Stalin for some years, Varna resumed its old name; Pernik ceased being Dimitrovo; Kolarovgrad once again became Shumen; the official gazette and one of the symbols of the Bulgarian state since 1879, *Durzhaven Vestnik*, was restored to its traditional name and appearance after more than a decade of denationalized title (*Izvestiia na Prezidiuma na Narodnoto Subranie*) and format.

Another aspect of the patriotic campaign has been the return to the themes, emphases, and interpretations of traditional Bulgarian historiography. After a decade or so of barren doctrinaire historiography on the Soviet models of the *Stalin* era, the historical craft was allowed to rid itself of the paralysis (*skovanost*), sycophancy, careerism, distortions, and dogmas which had pervaded it after 1944⁹⁴) and produce not history fitted in preconceived socio-economic schemes, but history filled with national achievements and glory and full-blooded national heroes. The new circumstances required revision of the two-volume Marxist version of Bulgarian history written in the *Stalin* era⁹⁵), and even a cursory comparison of it with the new version under the same title⁹⁶) reveals the features of the new patriotic historiography. In contrast to the earlier hostile treatment, the medieval khans and tsars of Bulgaria — *Asparukh*, *Krum*, *Omurtag*, *Boris*, *Simeon*, *Kaloian*, *Ivan Asen* — are extolled in the center of the historical account as the builders of the state and the nation rather than presented as incidental figures produced by socio-economic forces and ruling on behalf of the class of feudal

⁹³) *Materiali po istoriia . . . 1925—1962 g.*, p. 435.

⁹⁴) See the report on the conference of Bulgarian historians to deal with the "ravages of Stalinism", *Istoricheski Pregled* No. 2, 1963, pp. 142—149.

⁹⁵) *Istoriia na Bulgariia*. Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo 1954—1955.

⁹⁶) See note 20 above.

magnates.⁹⁷⁾ The new historiography takes obvious pride in the empire-building activities of the Bulgarian medieval kings and the unique position of Bulgaria in the age of *Boris* and *Simeon* as one of the three empires — next to those of the Byzantines and the Carolingians — and one of three cultural centers of contemporary Europe. It is particularly careful to stress that the Bulgarian empire included Macedonia and that Macedonia has played in the medieval as well as the modern period an essential role in the life of the Bulgarian nation.

The new approach to presenting the national history made possible the reemergence of historians of the old nationalist school who had been displaced from teaching and research positions after 1944 and had been kept in limbo during the Stalin era. Able historians of that school such as *Ivan Duichev*, *Mikhail Arnaudov*, *Ivan Snegarov*, *Borislav Primov*, *Ivan Ormandzhiev*, and others were now given much rein and opportunity to produce history in their accustomed ways. Even Communist historians who made careers after 1944 by upholding Stalinist orthodoxy, began to adjust their ideas and change their minds on various issues of historical interpretation. A case in point is *Dimitur Kosev*, a leading Communist historian, professor at the University of Sofia, member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, and president of the Bulgarian Historical Association. In a study on the ideology of *Paisii* published in 1962⁹⁸⁾, *Kosev* explicitly repudiated his earlier position that *Paisii*, a member of the church intelligentsia and therefore a bourgeois by class origin, was a spokesman of the bourgeoisie and that his "Istoriia Slavianobulgarska" was a "manifesto of the rising Bulgarian middle class." Changing his mind about the interpretation of *Paisii* and his work from a purely class point of view, *Kosev* now asserted that *Paisii* was the spokesman of "the Bulgarian national revolution" and of the nation as a whole. To lend support to his new position, which in effect is the view established by the old nationalist historians, *Kosev* resorted to a statement by Lenin to the effect that "one cannot be a Marxist and not feel deepest respect for the great bourgeois revolutionaries who had the world historical right to speak for the bourgeois 'fatherland' and summoned tens of millions of people in the new nations to civilized life." With such appropriate support, it is now possible to regard the Bulgarian bourgeoisie as a progressive force

⁹⁷⁾ Illustrative of the new adulation is the fact that an imposing monument is to be erected in the center of Sofia to honor *Asparukh* as "the founder of the Bulgarian state." *Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 9, 1968.

⁹⁸⁾ *D. K o s e v*, "Za ideologijata na Paisii Khilendarski" [On the ideology of Paisii of Hilendar]. *Paisii Khilendarski i negovata epokha (1762—1962)*; sbornik ot izsledvaniia po sluchai 200-godishninata ot Istoriia Slavianobulgarska [Paisii of Hilendar and his era (1762—1962)]; a collection of studies on the occasion of the bicentennial of "Slavic-Bulgarian History"]. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1962, pp. 7—30.

entitled to an honorable place in the history of the national revival.

The vehicles of the campaign to inculcate the new "socialist" patriotism go beyond historiography and involve literature, literary and linguistic studies, education, the arts, the press, and other media of mass communications. For example, history of literature, traditionally a forte of Bulgarian scholarship and a popular and influential genre in Bulgaria, is pervaded by the same themes that dominate general history. The comprehensive four-volume history of Bulgarian literature since the Middle Ages, which the Academy of Sciences began to publish in 1962⁹⁹), is built on the premises that schematicism and simplistic class-struggle approach must be eschewed, since at various periods the interests of the ruling classes coincided with the interests of the nation as a whole, and that the subject must be studied without preconceived ideas which lead scholars to discover "what we have decided in advance."¹⁰⁰) Although its authors would claim to be Marxists in doctrine or method, academically they are products of the prewar school of nationalist philology and find it more natural to follow in the footsteps of the old masters like *Ivan Shishmanov*, *Boian Penev*, *Mikhail Arnaudov*, than in the footsteps of *Marx*. Thus, in his preface to the first volume *Georgi Tsanev* sets the tone of national pride, leading off with the point that "the literature of Bulgaria is the oldest Slavic literature" and that its representatives established "next to Constantinople and Rome a new center of cultural accomplishments in Europe." One of the work's co-authors, *Petur Dinekov*, makes the point, in defending the nation's literature in its initial period against the charge that it was unoriginal and imitative, that it was permeated by passionate nationalism as evidenced in the fiery tract "O Pismenekh" (Concerning the Alphabet) of *Chernorizets Khrabur* and many other defenses and glorifications of the new national alphabet, language, and culture.¹⁰¹) *Dinekov* and another co-author of the work, *Emil Georgiev*, point out emphatically that the only proper designation of the language of the new culture is Old Bulgarian, rather than Old Slavic or Old Church Slavonic, because *Cyril* and *Methodius* made the first translations in the Salonika dialect which, by its characteristics, formed a part of the Bulgarian linguistic domain. The terms Old Slavic, favored by Soviet and other scholars, and Old Church Slavonic are purely functional — to show that this language was also used by other Slavs and by the Orthodox Church — and fail to specify the ter-

⁹⁹) *Istoriia na bulgarskata literatura v chetiri toma* [History of Bulgarian literature in four volumes]. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1962 —.

¹⁰⁰) *Ibid.*, Vol I., p. 8.

¹⁰¹) For details on the patriotic and nationalist nature of early Bulgarian literature and the views of Communist scholars on the subject, see *Marin Pundeff*, "National Consciousness in Medieval Bulgaria", *Südost-Forschungen*, Vol. XXVII, 1968, pp. 1—27.

ritorial and national identity of the oldest of all recorded Slavic languages.

In the field of literature, the Party has restored to honor for their patriotism many writers of the post-1878 period (*Ivan Vazov, Zakhari Stoianov, Pencho Slaveikov*, and others) who were condemned in the Stalin era for "nationalist tendencies." Writers of the current generation who utilize historical and patriotic topics in their works are particularly encouraged. Much praise has recently been accorded to *Dimitur Talev*, a Macedonian of Bulgarian national consciousness, who made "the national awakening of the Bulgarians in Macedonia" the main theme of his numerous novels like "The Bells of Prespa", "Samuil", "Ilinden", "The Monk from Khilendar", and others.¹⁰²⁾

In education, the main task in character formation is to cultivate socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism by drawing on inspirational subjects in the nation's history, Party history, and the achievements of the regime since 1944. Particular attention is to be given to the development of national pride, "implacable hatred" of all manifestations of "national nihilism", sense of national honor and dignity, "love for the nation's armed forces", and "readiness to defend the accomplishments of our socialist fatherland."¹⁰³⁾ Concerned about the state of mind and the attitudes of the young generation, in December, 1967, the Party adopted the so-called *Zhivkov* theses on the work of the Bulgarian Komsomol, which found that the "bourgeois ideology" continued to make inroads among the youth and that the manifestations of nihilism toward the nation's history, heritage, and current achievements were widespread. The resulting decisions of the Central Committee stipulated that the work of patriotic education must be approached in fresh ways and greatly strengthened so as to inculcate effectively "love and respect for the history of the nation, the Bulgarian state, the Communist Party, the fatherland, and the native way of life and folklore." Adding a new dimension to its program of building up the nation, the Party also decreed in the same decisions that childbearing is to be encouraged with financial and moral incentives in order to raise the size of the nation to ten millions within the next few years.¹⁰⁴⁾

In the daily and periodical press, the Party propagandists seize upon all conceivable occasions of Party pronouncements, significant and contrived anniversaries of personalities and events from the nation's history, publication of scholarly and literary works, etc., to elaborate,

¹⁰²⁾ I. V a n d o v, "Patriotizmut i nashata suvremenna khudozhestvena literatura" [Patriotism and our contemporary belles lettres], *Novo Vreme*, No. 7, 1968, pp. 65—74.

¹⁰³⁾ *Narodna Prosveta*, No. 10, 1967, p. 109; K. V a s i l e v a, *Izvori na patriotichno vuzpitanie* [Sources of patriotic education]. Sofia: BKP, 1968.

¹⁰⁴⁾ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 28, 1967.

often with much pathos, on the twin virtues of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. A recent example of these efforts is the celebration of the 280th anniversary of the uprising at Chiprovets, in northwest Bulgaria, where leaders of the Catholic Bulgarians organized a rebellion in 1688 to throw off the Turkish rule and join forces with the advancing Austrian armies. Despite the fact that they were clergymen in the service of Rome, *Petur Bogdan*, *Petur Parchevich*, *Iliia Marinov*, and other leaders of the Bulgarian Catholics have been praised for their national consciousness and patriotism and for placing the interests of their people above their religion and duties.¹⁰⁵) In its search for subjects of patriotic inspiration, the Party press has not been averse to featuring articles on the great patriotic churchmen of the past and on the Rila, Bachkovo, Troian, and other monasteries as "citadels of the Bulgarian spirit and Bulgarianism."

A pillar of patriotism ever since the nation was Christianized in the ninth century, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has found that the patriotic campaign affords its excellent opportunities to recover some of its place in the history of the nation and thereby in the consciousness of Bulgarians today. With many contributions to national life to draw upon, church historians and writers have filled the pages of the church periodicals *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, *Dukhovna Kultura*, and *Godishnik na Dukhovnata Akademiia "Sv. Kliment Okhridski"* as well as separate publications, with studies of patriotic churchmen, the role of the Archbishopric of Okhrid in national history, the work of the Exarchate in Macedonia, and other topics with nationalist flavor. The Church has also been sensitive to the religious developments in Yugoslav Macedonia which culminated in July, 1967, in the complete separation of the Macedonian Church from the Patriarchate of Serbia and its establishment as the successor of the "Archbishopric of St. Kliment of Okhrid", but has not gone beyond the explanation that Kliment was a Bulgarian bishop and that the archbishopric was throughout its existence a Bulgarian institution. An excellent and prolific historian formed in the prewar nationalist school, Patriarch *Kiril* has been in the forefront of patriotic church historiography with numerous studies of leading Bulgarian churchmen of the nineteenth century, Russian aid in the creation of the Exarchate, Catholic propaganda among the Bulgarians, the Uniate movement in Macedonia, and other important works.¹⁰⁶) Under his guidance

¹⁰⁵) *Rabotnichesko Delo*, September 17, 1968. On the role of the Bulgarian Catholics in these events, see Marin P u n d e f f, "Les Racines du Nationalisme Bulgare", *Revue des Etudes Slaves*, Vol. XLVI, 1967, pp. 128—133.

¹⁰⁶) For a complete list of *Kiril's* works to 1964, see M. Kovachev, "Negovo Sveteishestvo bulgarskiat patriarkh Kiril; pregled na knizhovnoto mu delo" [His Holiness the Bulgarian Patriarch Kiril; survey of his literary work]. *Godishnik na Dukhovnata Akademiia "Sv. Kliment Okhridski"*, Vol. XIII, 1964, pp. 345—432.

the Church has proclaimed two new national saints by canonizing *Paisii* in 1962, in connection with the bicentennial of his "Istoriia Slaviano-bulgarska", and Bishop *Sofroni of Vratsa* in 1965, for similar reasons of service to the nation.

Contesting much common ground, patriotic historiography in Bulgaria and nation-building historiography in Yugoslavia have repeatedly and heatedly clashed over the way each represents the history of the Macedonians. Here again, for lack of space, a few illustrations rather than an account of these clashes will suffice. Taking strong exception to the presentation of "Bulgarian medieval history" in the first volume of "Istorija Naroda Jugoslavije" (Belgrade, 1953), the Bulgarian historian *Liubomir Ionchev* found the claim that there was a Macedonian state and ethnic unit in the Middle Ages completely groundless since no contemporary historical source referred to its existence. The worst distortion of Bulgarian history, *Ionchev* said, was the attempt to represent the western Bulgarian lands, to which the state authority had shifted in the tenth century, as "the Macedonian state of *Samuil*". All historical sources of the period, including an inscription found in Yugoslav Macedonia in 1958, attested that *Samuil* was a Bulgarian tsar from the dynasty of *Simeon* and *Boris* and that Macedonia was simply a part of the Bulgarian realm. Having "sunk in the quagmire of revisionism", the Yugoslav historians, *Ionchev* concluded, were in no way different from the Serbian chauvinist historians of the past in falsifying the historical truth and "fanning up the flames of national hatred and chauvinism."¹⁰⁷) In another article to prove, at least to the satisfaction of his

Kiril's major historical studies are Natanail mitropolit Okhridski i Plovdivski (1820—1906). [Natanail, Metropolitan of Okhrid and Plovdiv (1820—1906)]. Sofia, 1950; Suprotivata sreshtu Berlinskiia dogovor; Kresnenskoto vustanie [The resistance to the treaty of Berlin; the Kresna uprising]. Sofia, 1955; Ekzarkh Antim (1816—1888) [Exarch Antim (1816—1888)], Sofia, 1956; Graf N. P. Ignatiev i bulgarskiiat tsurkoven vupros [Count N. P. Ignatiev and the Bulgarian Church question]. Sofia, 1958; Bulgaromokhamedanski selishta v Iuzhni Rodopi [Bulgarian Muslim settlements in the Southern Rhodopes]. Sofia, 1960; Prinos kum bulgarskiiat tsurkoven vupros; dokumenti ot avstriiskoto konsulstvo v Solun [A contribution to the Bulgarian church question; documents from the Austrian consulate in Salonika]. Sofia, 1961; Katolicheskata propaganda sred bulgarite pres vtorata polovina na XIX vek [The Catholic propaganda among the Bulgarians in the second half of the 19th century]. Sofia, 1962; Prinos kum uniatstvoto v Makedoniia sled Osvoboditelnata voina, 1879—1895; dokladi na frenskite konsuli v Solun [A contribution to the Uniate question in Macedonia after the war of liberation, 1879—1895; reports of the French consuls in Salonika]. Sofia, 1968; and Bulgarskata ekzarkhiia v Odrinsko i Makedoniia sled Osvoboditelnata voina (1877—1878), Tom purvi (1878—1885) [The Bulgarian Exarchate in the Adrianople area and Macedonia after the war of liberation, 1877—1878; Vol. I, 1878—1885]. Sofia, 1969.

¹⁰⁷) *Istoricheski Pregled*, No. 6, 1961, pp. 106—114. On the view that there was a Macedonian state under *Samuil*, see D. T a s h k o v s k i, *Samuilovoto tsarstvo* [Samuil's kingdom]. Skopje, 1961.

Bulgarian readers, that *Samuil* was a Bulgarian, *Ionchev* attacked the most vulnerable part of the favorite thesis of Macedonian propagandists in Yugoslavia that Macedonian history showed three high water marks in the empire of *Alexander the Great*, the medieval kingdom of *Samuil*, and the present-day socialist republic in Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁸⁾

Another Bulgarian historian, *Mikhail Voinov*, who specializes in ethnic questions, has resorted, as Bulgarian nationalist historians used to do before 1944, to the findings of Serbian historians and folklorists of the nineteenth century which indicated that the Macedonian Slavs were Bulgarians. A favorite authority in this respect has been *Stefan Verković*, the Bosnian scholar who spent many years in Macedonia and in 1860 published his famous collection of Bulgarian folksongs from Macedonia, "*Narodne pesme makedonski bugara*".¹⁰⁹⁾ Citing *Verković*, *Voinov* has pointed out that before the Serbian government decided on an active policy in Macedonia after the Congress of Berlin, the Slavs in Macedonia had only Bulgarian national consciousness. To serve the purposes of the Serbian government after 1878, the idea of "Macedonianism" had been fostered by Serbian propagandists so as to destroy the sense of Bulgarianism and prepare the ground for separation of Macedonians from the Bulgarian national unit.¹¹⁰⁾ Particularly active in the effort to defend Bulgarian historic rights against attacks in Yugoslavia as well as in Greece has been *Voin Bozhinov* who has emerged since the 1950's as one of the principal articulators of the new historiography. Speaking with an authoritative voice as deputy director of the Institute of History in the Academy of Sciences, *Bozhinov* has called for the use of history in patriotic education to show the unflagging struggle of *Rakovski*, *Karavelov*, *Levski*, and *Botev* for "the preservation of the national unity of the Bulgarian people" and their "passionate defense of the fatherland against the activities of foreign propagandas and governments designed to destroy that unity and to seize Bulgarian lands."¹¹¹⁾ Another young historian imbued with "socialist patriotism",

¹⁰⁸⁾ *Istoricheski Pregled*, No. 1, 1965, pp. 29—48; see also B. Blagoeva, "Za proiskhoda na Tsar Samuil [On the origin of King Samuil], *ibid.*, No. 2, 1966, pp. 79—95.

¹⁰⁹⁾ The latest manifestation of the attention to *Verković* in Bulgaria is the major work by *Mikhail Arnauđov*, *Verkovich i "Veda Slovena"*; *Prinos kum istoriia na bulgarskii folklor i bulgarskoto vuzrazhdane v Makedoniia* [*Verković and "Veda Slovena"*; a contribution to the history of Bulgarian folklore and the Bulgarian revival in Macedonia]. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1968.

¹¹⁰⁾ *M. Voinov*, "Kum vuprosa za bulgarskata narodnost v Makedoniia" [On the question of the Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia], *Istoricheski Pregled*, No. 5, 1966, pp. 61—72.

¹¹¹⁾ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 14, 1967. For the clash with Greek historians at the Institute for Balkan Studies in Salonika as to whether the majority of the Macedonians before 1878 were Greeks or Bulgarians and whether the Pomaks in the Rhodope region are Muslimized Bulgarians or an ancient Thracian tribe, see *Bozhinov's* article in *Istoricheski Pregled*, No. 1, 1963, pp. 102—105.

Goran Todorov, has been active in bringing to light documents on "the struggles of the Bulgarians for national church and schools in Macedonia" and stressed that even *Sandanski*, a federalist by conviction, had declared himself ready to take up arms to defend the work of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia.¹¹²⁾

The most recent occasions for the new patriotic historiography to voice the old themes of Bulgarian nationalism have been the celebrations of the 1050th anniversary of the death of St. Kliment of Okhrid and the 90th anniversary of the great events of 1876—1878. The Kliment commemoration provided the opportunity to point out with great emphasis and elaboration that, regardless of the claims of the Yugoslav Macedonians, he was a Bulgarian bishop, working on behalf of the Bulgarian king and spreading Christianity and enlightenment among the Bulgarian Slavs in Macedonia. In a special collection of studies published for the occasion, one of the leading medievalists, Professor *Dimitur Angelov*, polemicized with the Macedonian historian *Dragan Tashkovski* over *Kliment's* role in Macedonia and concluded that *Kliment* was "one of the most illustrious men in the history of medieval Bulgaria" for having laid the foundations of learning in the vernacular of the Bulgarian Slavs and thereby making an essential contribution to the formation of the Bulgarian nation.¹¹³⁾ To make plain that this is also the official view of the Bulgarian government, a new large coin has been issued showing on one side the image of *Kliment*.¹¹⁴⁾

The 90th anniversary of the events surrounding the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 has created a series of opportunities for high-pitched patriotic propaganda. Beginning in 1966, the anniversaries of the April uprising of 1876, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877—1878, the brave stand of the Bulgarian volunteers at the Shipka Pass, the treaty of San Stefano, and the exhilarating experience, brief though it was, of the liberation and unification of the entire fatherland have been celebrated throughout the country with emphasis on the patriotism of the Bulgarian participants in these events, the generosity of the Russian assistance

¹¹²⁾ *Études Historiques*, Vol. III, Sofia: Académie des Sciences de Bulgarie, 1966, pp. 173—239. Co-researcher in the project was Nikolai Z h e c h e v.

¹¹³⁾ D. A n g e l o v, "Bulgarskata narodnost i deloto na Kliment Okhridski", in: *Kliment Okhridski*; sbornik ot statii po sluchai 1050 godini ot smurttu mu [Kliment of Okhrid; a collection of articles on the 1050th anniversary of his death]. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1966, pp. 7—24; reprinted in English under the title "Clement of Okhrida and Bulgarian Nationhood" in *Études Historiques*, Vol. III, pp. 61—78. The Yugoslav Macedonians also commemorated the anniversary and published two collections of articles, *Kniga za Kliment Okhridski* [A volume for Kliment of Okhrid] edited by B. K o n e s k i and others (Skopje, 1966) and *Slovenska pismenost; 1050-godishnina na Kliment Okhridski* [Slavic letters; 1050th anniversary of Kliment of Okhrid] edited by P. I l i e v s k i (Okhrid, 1966).

¹¹⁴⁾ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, August 25, 1968.

to the national cause, and the struggle of the nation for unity.¹¹⁵⁾ The commemoration of the San Stefano treaty and the evocation of the "Greater Bulgaria" ideal which it has always symbolized to Bulgarians were certain to be interpreted in Yugoslavia as a reaffirmation of the old nationalist goal of regaining Macedonia. Since much more than scholarship was involved, the Yugoslav government took action. The Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade was summoned and told that the revival of the San Stefano ideal by Bulgarian propaganda could harm Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations.¹¹⁶⁾ The press in Belgrade and particularly that in Skopje launched a heavy barrage of charges that chauvinism was again rampant in Bulgaria and that Bulgaria harbored the desire to annex Yugoslav Macedonia at some opportune moment. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the resulting rumors of Soviet plans for similar action against Yugoslavia and deployment of troops in Bulgaria heightened the fears that the moment of opportunity for Bulgaria was at hand.

To allay the tension, the Party newspaper for the Blagoevgrad district, *Pirinsko Delo*, published on August 10, 1968, a full-page editorial which reviewed the charges of Bulgarian nationalism and "Greater Bulgaria" chauvinism in the Yugoslav press and explained that since the April, 1956 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Bulgaria pursued a policy of friendly relations with Yugoslavia and its component republics, including Macedonia. Despite the fact that the Yugoslav propagandists were meddling in Bulgarian internal affairs in the Blagoevgrad district and were misrepresenting the history of the Macedonian Bulgarians, the objectives of the Bulgarian people remained the same: to build a socialist society, strengthen the peace in the Balkans, and "reinforce the good neighbor relations with the peoples of the Yugoslav federation." Similar editorials calling for restraint and reason also appeared in *Rabotnichesko Delo*¹¹⁷⁾, and on September 29, 1968, the Bulgarian official news agency BTA was authorized to state that "the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria rejects" the Yugoslav charges "that Bulgaria has claims to Yugoslav territory." Socialist Bulgaria, the announcement emphasized, has "no territorial claims toward any country" and is committed to "the inviolability of the frontiers established after World War II" and to peaceful relations with her neighbors in the Balkans.¹¹⁸⁾

¹¹⁵⁾ See, for example, *ibid.*, March 1, 1968; August 4, 1968.

¹¹⁶⁾ *New York Times*, February 4, 1968.

¹¹⁷⁾ See issues for August 21 and September 1, 1968.

¹¹⁸⁾ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, September 29, 1968. For further discussions, see Paul L e n d v a i, *Eagles in Cobwebs; Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1969, Viktor E. M e i e r, *Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa*. Opladen: Leske, 1968, and J. F. B r o w n, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule*. New York: Praeger, 1970.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Bulgarian Communists, having started out as enemies of nationalism, have now taken charge of it as a force which must be guided and which can be used to advantage. To be sure, their current terminology defines it as "socialist patriotism" tempered by proletarian internationalism, but the line between patriotism and nationalism has always been a thin and often imperceptible one and an intensely cultivated love of country can easily acquire an aggressive spirit. According to the available evidence, it would appear that the purpose of the Bulgarian Communists in this area of internal propaganda is to transform the negative sentiments against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party as its instrument in Bulgaria into a positive emotional force through which a new national unity can be built within the country and the nation's historic place in the sun can be protected. National debacles and disappointments have brought about in Bulgaria a kind of sobriety and sophistication which are not the climate for romantic, irrational, and virulent nationalism. It would however, be a mistake to conclude that expansionist nationalism could not rise again. If the Soviet Union were to move toward an armed conflict with any of Bulgaria's neighbors, it is obvious that Bulgarian nationalist aspirations will be rekindled and Bulgarian nationalism will be used in the same ways as the Soviet Union used it in 1940 in relation to Rumania, Greece, and Turkey and in 1948—1953 in relation to Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria as elsewhere, so long as conflicts of interests, which people feel to be national, occur or are fomented, nationalism will surge as a powerful response.