

Andrei Țaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania during the Decade of Absolutism, 1849—1859

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That period in the history of the Habsburg Monarchy known as the Decade of Absolutism was one of political stagnation for the Rumanians of Transylvania. Their movement for self-determination, which had displayed such vitality during the revolution of 1848/49, came to an abrupt halt under pressure from the triumphant reactionaries in Vienna and Cluj. Their leaders were obliged to disband their committees and accept the role of silent spectators of the political scene. Many preferred exile to the neighboring principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. In spite of the oppressive regime, which would last with little change from the fall of 1849 until the fall of 1859, those patriots who decided to make the best of a difficult situation rendered great service to their people by their work on behalf of the church and education. In this way they strengthened the foundations of their nationality and enabled it to survive better the dangers which lay ahead. Andrei Țaguna, Bishop of the Rumanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania since 1848, provided them with leadership and direction by making the church the principal instrument of their endeavors.

I

During the civil war which raged in Transylvania from the fall of 1848 until the summer of 1849 the Rumanians fought valiantly and at considerable sacrifice on the side of the Habsburgs against the Magyars who supported the revolutionary government in Budapest. The threat to their national existence which militant Magyar nationalism constituted had persuaded most Rumanians, in spite of their sympathy for the political and economic liberalism of the Magyars, to support the Habsburg cause. They hoped by this new demonstration of loyalty to the dynasty to obtain at last the satisfaction of their aspirations for national unity and autonomy within the Monarchy. Their petition of February 25, 1849 to the Emperor

Francis Joseph in which they proposed the establishment of a "duchy" embracing all the Rumanians of the Monarchy, including those of Hungary proper, the Banat, and Bukovina as well as Transylvania, betrayed an unwarranted optimism that the experiences of revolution would somehow transform the Monarchy into a federation of autonomous nationalities. As long as the Magyars, the last of the rebels of 1848 to yield to the forces of reaction, remained a serious military threat, the Austrians welcomed all the assistance the Rumanians could give. Although an informal alliance did exist, they refused to recognize the Rumanian National Committee and rarely missed an opportunity to demonstrate their distrust of its personnel and objectives. During the last few months of military operations against the Magyars, as the tide turned definitely in favor of the Imperial armies and their new allies, the Russians, who had crossed the Transylvanian border in June 1849, Austrian officials, already planning the restoration of the Old Regime, began to treat the Rumanian peasant armies and their officers as potential enemies. All pretense at co-operation with them ceased after the surrender of the main Magyar field army at Világos on August 13, 1849.

The principal objectives of the Court and Austrian officialdom generally were to re-establish internal order as quickly as possible and to provide a solid basis upon which to preserve the unity of the Monarchy in the future. Perhaps, as one authority on Habsburg constitutional history has suggested, they could have achieved both objectives by making even moderate concessions to the various nationalities. This would have created a moral solidarity among them far more permanent than the superficial unity imposed by force.¹⁾ For various reasons they preferred to reorganize the Monarchy in accordance with the principles of absolutism, centralization, and Germanization. The provisions of the Imperial Constitution of March 4, 1849 which had granted limited self-government to the so-called "historical provinces" and had guaranteed equality of rights to all nationalities were never invoked. The entire document itself was abrogated on December 31, 1851 in favor of a set of principles, usually referred to as the Kübeck proposals, which recognized the Emperor as the supreme executive and legislative authority and established an Imperial Council (Reichsrat) composed of elder statesmen to advise him. The already vast bureau-

¹⁾ Louis Eisenmann: *Le Compromis austro-hongrois*. Paris 1904, p. 149.

cracy was expanded to enable it to implement the policies of the Emperor and his ministers in every province, district, and "Kreis" of the Monarchy. Alexander Bach, the Minister of the Interior and after the death of Felix Schwarzenberg, the Minister-President, in 1852 the guiding spirit of absolutism, concentrated the direction of affairs in Vienna and largely ignored local sensibilities.

The "Bach System", as the new regime came to be designated, was rigorously applied in Transylvania. Executive and legislative power was wielded by a governor whose first responsibility was to the various ministries in Vienna rather than to the local population. Since the state of siege proclaimed in September 1848 was lifted only in December 1854, he had almost unlimited authority in carrying out his instructions. He summoned no diet and relied for administrative assistance upon the Gubernium, a sort of council of ministers, in which Austrians predominated — a Glanz in Finance, a Weiss in Justice, and a Häufter in Education. Indeed, most offices in the bureaucracy were filled by Austrians or functionaries imported from Bohemia, Moravia, Bukovina, and Galicia²⁾, with the result that in many places officials were totally ignorant of the language and customs of the people whom they had been sent to govern.³⁾

Transylvania was divided into ten districts, which were subdivided into seventy-nine "Kreise" and six urban departments. Foreigners, who paid little attention to nationality, determined the boundaries of each. The core of the administrative system was the "Kreis", in which the highest degree of centralization obtained. At the head of each was a prefect to whom all other local officials were responsible: political administrators, judges, tax collectors, the gendarmerie, even lawyers and doctors. His competence extended to the smallest details of daily life.⁴⁾ Owing to the extension of the state of siege until the end of 1854, the police and the military had broader powers in Transylvania than in most other parts of the Monarchy and used them to the fullest. There was order and discipline everywhere. The authorities permitted no activity, particularly

²⁾ Ion cavalier de Pușcariu: *Notițe despre întâmplările contemporane*. Sibiu 1913, p. 42.

³⁾ Albert Berzeviczy: *Az abszolútizmus kora Magyarországon, 1849—1865*, 2 vols. Budapest 1922, I, p. 218—219.

⁴⁾ Pușcariu, *Notițe*, p. 40—42.

one with nationalist overtones, which might disturb internal tranquillity.

The Rumanians especially found the "System" difficult to bear. Although the revolution and its aftermath had brought the destruction of the pre-1848 feudal supremacy of the Magyar, Szekler⁵⁾, and Saxon⁶⁾ nations⁷⁾, the situation of the Rumanians vis-à-vis their former masters had not improved greatly. The Saxons and even the Magyars, in spite of their manifest disloyalty to the House of Habsburg, received preferential treatment under the new regime, while the Rumanians were treated like rebels.

The explanation for the Austrian government's handling of the nationality problem in Transylvania is to be found in its innate conservatism, which had been considerably reinforced by the recent conflict. In spite of public pronouncements during the revolution concerning the desirability of achieving national equality, it was in reality unwilling to experiment with new political and social forms.

The Imperial Constitution of March 4, 1849 had made several vague promises to the peoples of the Monarchy that they would henceforth enjoy complete equality before the law and would be allowed to develop freely their nationality and language. With special reference to Hungary and Transylvania, it guaranteed the equality of all nationalities and languages in public administration. It provided further for the re-establishment of the so-called historical crownlands — Transylvania, Croatia, and the Voivodina — as entities completely independent of Hungary. It made no mention of new territorial units such as a Rumanian duchy, but did recognize the special status of the Saxons in the "Fundus regius"⁸⁾ and the Serbs of the Voivodina.

On March 10, 1849 the Austrian Council of Ministers made its reply to the numerous Rumanian petitions and memoranda presented to it in support of the establishment of an autonomous Rumanian duchy. It rejected these proposals on the grounds that the erection of a Rumanian crownland was contrary to the provisions of the new constitution which recognized the areas inhabited by the Rumanians

⁵⁾ A people closely related to the Magyars who lived in eastern Transylvania.

⁶⁾ The name by which the Germans of Transylvania were known.

⁷⁾ In the medieval sense of *natio*, a group set apart from the masses by certain privileges. Nationality was not the criterion for membership. Magyar serfs, for example, were not members of the Magyar nation.

⁸⁾ The area between Braşov and Sibiu.

as historical crownlands whose frontiers could be altered only by special legislation. It also rejected an alternate proposal by the Rumanians that, in view of the mixed nature of the population in many districts, which would make it impossible to determine political boundaries on the basis of nationality, they be granted an autonomous "administration" for civil and church affairs. This, too, the Council of Ministers decided, was out of the question because it would infringe upon the powers reserved in the Constitution to the provincial diets. It suggested that the Rumanians turn to these bodies for the satisfaction of their grievances.⁹⁾

Both during and after the revolution Austrian officials exhibited little understanding of or sympathy for the national aspirations of the Rumanians and the other peoples of the Monarchy. They regarded nationalism as a menace to the integrity of the Monarchy and intended to do all in their power to stifle its growth. They recognized Croatia and the Voivodina as separate crownlands not to satisfy the desire of the Croats and Serbs for autonomy, but to punish the Magyars by dismembering their country. They separated Transylvania from Hungary for the same reason, but had no intention of meddling with its political and social organization. There were precedents for the recognition of an autonomous Transylvania, Croatia, and Voivodina, for they had had historical pasts; a Rumanian duchy had never existed and, hence, there was no precedent for its establishment.

Even if the Rumanians of Transylvania had had an "historical past", which would presumably have justified their having an "historical present", Austrian officials would have been reluctant to recognize it. Alexander Bach himself summed up the feelings of his colleagues in a memorandum to the Emperor in August 1849: "It cannot be denied that the Rumanian nation owing to the low level of its spiritual and political development and the small number of persons qualified for service does not possess the prerequisites for a separate government or administration of its own."¹⁰⁾ In addition, Bach and his colleagues held Rumanian intellectuals, priests, and peasants suspect on account of the radical political and economic views which they had espoused in 1848 and 1849.

⁹⁾ Mihail P o p e s c u : Documente inedite privitoare la istoria Transilvaniei între 1848—1859. București 1929, p. 38—40.

¹⁰⁾ Silviu D r a g o m i r : Studii și documente privitoare la revoluția Românilor din Transilvania în anii 1848—1849, 5 vols. Sibiu-Cluj 1944—1946, I, p. 334.

As a consequence of this hostility and lack of understanding the Rumanians suffered more from the new territorial division of Transylvania than their neighbors. Large numbers of them were included in districts with Magyar, Szekler, or Saxon majorities or within the boundaries of the Serbian Voivodina, and no effort was made to satisfy their aspirations for unity. In southern Transylvania, for example, Rumanian communities which had never been under Saxon jurisdiction were incorporated into the predominately Saxon Sibiu district.¹¹⁾ On the other hand, the organization of the new districts and "Kreise" left the Magyars, Szeklers, and Saxons some degree of unity. The Saxons seemed particularly favored. The new Sibiu district corresponded roughly to the former "Fundus regius", and the Saxon Count remained as its principal administrative official.

The organization of the judiciary also ignored the oft-proclaimed principle of equality for all nationalities. In August 1849 Senates, or high courts, were established for the Magyars and Saxons but not for the Rumanians. The government excused itself on the grounds that a Senate for each nationality would place too heavy a burden upon the state treasury. Fearful that they would again find themselves subject to laws "dictated by medieval barbarism [and] invented simply to humiliate us", the Rumanians petitioned for the establishment of a Rumanian Senate and the introduction of the Austrian civil and criminal code, but in vain.¹²⁾

Few Rumanians obtained official posts under the new regime. In the central administration of Transylvania there were only three Rumanians: two school inspectors, one for the Uniates and one for the Orthodox, and a translator for the official gazette. Only two Rumanian lawyers were allowed to argue cases before the Court of Appeals in Sibiu, the highest tribunal in the principality. No Rumanian held a position of importance in the Treasury, which supervised the financial affairs of the principality.¹³⁾ Magyars and Saxons filled most of the important administrative positions in local government even in areas with overwhelming Rumanian majorities.¹⁴⁾ In Zarand County, for example, those Rumanians, few in number, who had held

¹¹⁾ G. Bogdan-Duică: 1848/9 în Țara Bârsei. Țara Bârsei, I, 1929, p. 195—196; Popescu: Documente, p. 228—229.

¹²⁾ Foaia pentru minte, inimă și literatură (Braşov), no. 5, February 1, 1851, p. 39—40.

¹³⁾ Puşcariu: Notițe, p. 42.

¹⁴⁾ Berzeviczy: Az abszolutizmus kora, I, p. 151—152.

public office up to 1848 were retained, but all new appointees were either Germans from Bukovina or Saxons. All official records and correspondence had to be in German.¹⁵⁾ Even in Blaj, the center of the Rumanian national movement for over a century, a Rumanian could not obtain appointment as prefect, and German was a prerequisite for public office.¹⁶⁾ In Alba Iulia and the surrounding area Magyars almost exclusively were appointed to positions in the law courts. No Rumanians were being hired and those who had been retained in service were not promoted as rapidly as their Magyar colleagues.¹⁷⁾ On the other hand, the government obliged the Rumanian population to bear more than its share of the onerous burden of military conscription. For example, the city of Sibiu which had nearly 20 000 inhabitants, most of whom were Saxon, sent forty recruits per year to the army, while Săliște, a neighboring Rumanian city of 5 000, provided twenty-three; the town of Rășinari, predominately Rumanian, provided twenty-two recruits, the Saxon town of Heltau only three.¹⁸⁾

Rumanian leaders reacted vigorously and with indignation to what they regarded as the perfidy of Austrian officialdom. From the fall of 1849 until the spring of 1850 a steady stream of Rumanian representatives from the Banat and Hungary proper as well as from Transylvania besieged the various ministries in Vienna with petitions and memoranda seeking the fulfilment of promises and half-promises made to them during the war. Almost without exception they expressed their wish for the political union of all the Rumanians of the Monarchy.¹⁹⁾ They cited their services to the Crown and the provisions of the March 4 Constitution which guaranteed equality to all nationalities and protested against the neglect of their vital interests in Transylvania and Hungary. They had interviews with Felix Schwarzenberg, Bach, Karl Bruck, the Minister of Finance, and Leo Thun, the Minister of Religion and Education,

¹⁵⁾ Biblioteca Academiei Republicii Populare Române (B.A.R.P.R.), București, Ms. rom., vol. 998, 221—222: Grigore Mihali to George Barițiu, December 19, 1849.

¹⁶⁾ *Drağomir*: Studii și documente . . . 1848—1849, II, p. 131—132.

¹⁷⁾ *Gazeta de Transilvania* (Brașov), no. 3, January 8, 1851, p. 10.

¹⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, no. 11, February 5, 1851, p. 44.

¹⁹⁾ Nicolae Popea: *Memorialul Archiepiscopului și Mitropolitului Andreiu baron de Șaguna, sau luptele naționale-politice ale Românilor, 1846—1873*. Sibiu 1889, I, p. 389—400; Sterie Stinghe: *Documente privitoare la trecutul Românilor din Șchei*. 5 vols. Brașov 1901—1906, IV, p. 43—44.

but to no avail. A. Treboniu Laurian, one of the outstanding figures of the national movement of 1848—49, summed up the feelings of his colleagues in the following letter to a friend: "They have received us warmly enough and have promised to support us and to satisfy our grievances to the best of their ability now and even more later on; they ask only that we Rumanians have faith in the government — the same old story."²⁰) Laurian and others were shocked to find that the ministers with whom they talked professed to know nothing about the great petition which the Rumanians had drawn up on the Field of Liberty at Blaj in May 1848 or the reports by Rumanian military commanders about their services to the imperial cause during the revolution.²¹)

In Transylvania itself there was great ferment among all classes of the population. Simeon Bărnățiu, the intellectual leader of the national movement in 1848—49, composed several proclamations urging his compatriots to use every means possible to persuade the Austrian government to grant their "just demands" and to inform their people of their rights by newspaper articles and preaching.²²) George Barițiu, another leader of the Rumanian cause in 1848—49 and a political liberal, proposed to publish the reports of Rumanian military heroes like Avram Iancu, the defender of the Munții Apuseni (Western Mountains) in the spring of 1849, in his newspaper the *Gazeta de Transilvania*, in order to prove the importance of the Rumanian contribution to the victory over the Magyars and the enormity of Austrian ingratitude. Alexander Sterca Țuluțiu, Uniate vicar of Sylvania in Sălaj since 1835, instructed his clergy to make certain that their people submitted petitions to and obtained replies from the new officials only in Rumanian and that they impress upon their people their right to have officials of their own nationality at all levels of government.²³)

In all parts of Transylvania, in towns and villages, Rumanian intellectuals, priests, and peasants held meetings of protest. Some

²⁰) B.A.R.P.R., Ms. rom., vol. 996, 196: Laurian to George Barițiu, January 4/16, 1850.

²¹) *Foaia pentru minte*, no. 13, December 26, 1849; p. 97; *Dragomir: Studii și documente . . . 1848—1849*, I, p. xviii.

²²) B.A.R.P.R., Ms. rom., vol. 992, 221: Aron Florian to George Barițiu, December 29, 1849/January 10, 1850.

²³) Ioan Ardeleanu: *În legătură cu revoluția dela 1848 din Ardeal, Transilvania LXVII* (1936), p. 558—559.

of these appear to have been part of a well-organized campaign, for at them priests and others distributed form petitions condemning the re-establishment of the Saxon "Fundus regius" and the installation of Magyar and German officials in Rumanian districts. The participants gave Şaguna, Bărnuţiu, Bariţiu, Laurian, and others full powers to represent the Rumanian nation in negotiations with Austrian authorities.²⁴⁾ In some areas, in the vicinity of Arad, for example, violence broke out as peasants refused to obey the new officials.²⁵⁾ Elsewhere, peasants began to hoard weapons in the expectation of further clashes with the police.²⁶⁾

The civil and military governor of Transylvania, General Ludwig Wohlgemuth, acted swiftly and ruthlessly to suppress all opposition. The police arrested large numbers of Orthodox and Uniate priests who, they suspected, were the chief organizers of "secret meetings" and "political conspiracies."²⁷⁾ Their main offense seems to have been that they, following the example of Saxon pastors, were circulating petitions and collecting letters giving delegates to Vienna authority to act on their behalf.²⁸⁾ Many were brought to trial before military courts where in order to prove their innocence they were obliged to produce a "certificate" from a protopope, civil official, or village elder attesting to their loyalty to the Monarchy. Some spent as long as a year in jail before they could establish their innocence. The police kept Rumanian intellectuals who had taken an active part in the national movement under close surveillance. Avram Iancu and his lieutenants were especially suspect on account of their negotiations with the Magyars in the spring and summer of 1849 and their refusal to accept the decorations which the Austrian government had awarded them. The police interrogated them frequently about their relations with revo-

²⁴⁾ See the numerous petitions in: Ioan B i a n u and G. N i c o l a i a s a, *Catalogul manuscriselor româneşti*, vol. III. Craiova 1931, p. 461—463, 465, 466, 467; B o g - d a n - D u i c ă : 1848/9 în Ţara Bârsei, p. 195—197.

²⁵⁾ P. P. P a n a i t e s c u : *Emigraţia polonă şi revoluţia română dela 1848*. Bucureşti 1929, p. 124: report of the Polish agent Lenoir, December 7, 1849.

²⁶⁾ Henry Miller M a d d e n : *The Diary of John Paget, 1849*. *Slavonic and East European Review* XIX (1939—1940), p. 261.

²⁷⁾ Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Kabinettsarchiv, Geheime Akten, Nachlass Schwarzenberg, Karton 9, Fasz. II, no. 85: Wohlgemuth to Schwarzenberg, November 26, 1849; P o p e a : *Memorialul*, p. 364; *Memoriile Archiepiscopului şi Mitropolitului Andrei Şaguna din anii 1846—1871*. Sibiu 1923, p. 33.

²⁸⁾ *Gazeta de Transilvania*, no. 20, December 8, 1849, p. 77—78.

lutionaries from the Rumanian principalities and held them in prison for as long as three weeks at a time, and searched their homes for incriminating books and letters.²⁹⁾ When Bariţiu persisted in his condemnation of these abuses of authority, Wohlgemuth on March 9, 1850 ordered the *Gazeta de Transilvania* to cease publication.

Rumanian priests and intellectuals who had journeyed to Vienna on their nation's behalf fared no better than those who had remained at home. The Viennese police subjected Bărnuţiu, Laurian, and others to frequent interrogations and, when they continued to make "nuisances" of themselves, ordered them to leave the city.³⁰⁾

In a letter to George Bariţiu in the fall of 1850 Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian, a law student who had helped to organize the national assembly on the Field of Liberty in May 1848, expressed the frustration and bitterness which Rumanian patriots everywhere felt at their treatment by the Austrians: "We fought and we shed our blood for the Emperor and for the rights of our nation, not for medals or money. Now we see that the throne has been reinforced by the blood of some 40 000 Rumanians killed and by the destruction of some 300 villages, but in spite of all this our nation still groans under the old tyranny and finds itself in a more miserable state than before 1848. Then we had not tasted liberty, but now we have and we have sacrificed our lives and possessions for it, but still it is denied us."³¹⁾

By the summer of 1850 the regime in Transylvania had succeeded in suppressing all public manifestations of discontent among the Rumanians. Their leaders, forced to discontinue their political activities, turned their attention during the next decade to the further development of the national culture. The most active among them and one who regarded a vigorous indigenous culture as the most

²⁹⁾ B.A.R.P.R., Ms. rom., vol. 992, 231—232: Aron Florian to George Bariţiu, September 14/26, 1850; Popescu: *Documente*, p. 176, 275—276; Dragomir: *Studii şi documente . . . 1848—1849*, II, p. 137; Madden: *Diary of John Paget*, p. 261; Nicolae Bălcescu, *Scrieri istorice*, Notes and introduction by P. P. Panaitescu, Craiova, n. d., p. 214: Bălcescu to Ion Ghica, October 22, 1849.

³⁰⁾ G. Bogdan-Duică: *Notes-ul de însemnări al lui Simeon Bărnuţiu, 1849—1863*, *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Naţională*, II (1923), p. 213—215; George Fotino: *Din vremea renaşterii naţionale a României. Boierii Goleşti*, 4 vols. Bucureşti 1939, III, p. 37—38; Enea Hodoş: *Din corespondenţă lui Simion Bărnuţiu şi a contemporanilor săi*. Sibiu 1944, p. 6.

³¹⁾ B.A.R.P.R., Ms. rom., vol. 996, 19.

certain guarantee of their continued existence as a separate nationality and who devoted his life to its progress was Andreiu Şaguna.

II

Şaguna was born on January 1, 1809 (December 20, 1808, old style) into a family of Macedo-Rumanian wine merchants in Miskolc in northwestern Hungary.³²⁾ In 1829, after completing his course of study in law and philosophy at the University of Buda, he entered the Serbian theological institute at Vršac in the Banat, where a Rumanian section had recently been established, to prepare for the Orthodox priesthood. Following his entrance into the Order of Saint Basil in 1833, he rose rapidly in the church hierarchy and in May 1845 was appointed archimandrite of the Monastery of Kovil, one of the wealthiest in the Serbian Metropolis. His ability and devotion to duty won for him the admiration and patronage of his superiors. When the ailing Vasile Moga, Bishop of the Rumanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania since 1811, died in October 1845, the Serbian Metropolitan, Joseph Rajačić, obtained from the Emperor Ferdinand Şaguna's appointment as vicar-general of the diocese. During his first year Şaguna was preoccupied with an ambitious program of church reform and a difficult assignment from the Governor of Transylvania to pacify the peasantry of the Munții Apuseni, who were on the verge of open rebellion against the government over unjust taxation. His success in both undertakings made him the leading candidate for bishop, and on February 5, 1848 Ferdinand, upon the recommendation of Rajačić, approved his election. At his consecration in Carlovitz on April 30 he announced his program for the future "to awaken the Rumanians of Transylvania from their deep slumber and to lead them along the path to all that is true and good."³³⁾

³²⁾ The two most complete biographies of Şaguna are: Nicolau Popoa: *Archiepiscopul și Mitropolitul Andreiu baron de Şaguna*. Sibiu 1879, and Ioan Lupuş: *Vieața și faptele Mitropolitului Andreiu Şaguna*, in: *Mitropolitul Andreiu baron de Şaguna. Scriere comemorativă la serbarea centenară a nașterii lui*. Sibiu 1909, p. 1—400; see also: Keith Hitchins: *The Early Career of Andreiu Şaguna (1808—1849)*. *Revue des Études Roumaines* IX—X (1961—1962), p. 47—76.

³³⁾ Popoa: *Archiepiscopul*, p. 40.

During the revolution of 1848—49 he provided the Rumanian cause with devoted, if cautious, leadership. He remained loyal to the House of Habsburg throughout the long struggle, for he believed that the Rumanians with their meagre resources and experience could protect themselves from Magyarization and achieve their national aspirations only with its help.³⁴⁾ He insisted that the national movement respect constitutional forms and used his considerable influence to combat those who wished to abandon their dependence upon Austria. He believed that the Emperor would not fail to reward them generously for their devotion. His services to the national movement were many: he presided over the National Assembly held at Blaj on May 15—17, 1848, at which the intellectuals drew up a sixteen-point program for national self-determination, and led a delegation to Vienna to present it to the Emperor; during the summer of 1848, at the behest of the Emperor and his advisers, he negotiated with the new Hungarian government in Budapest in order to effect a peaceful settlement of Magyar-Rumanian differences; he was the principal author of the petition of February 25, 1849 in which the Rumanians of Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, and Hungary proper requested political union and autonomy within the Monarchy; he faithfully defended the national interest against its detractors in the spring and summer of 1849 in Vienna, even though it had become clear to him that the Austrians had no intention of satisfying the political aspirations of his people.³⁵⁾

By the fall of 1849 he had accepted the triumph of reaction as irrevocable and declined to lead new delegations of Rumanian leaders to Vienna to present petitions to the Emperor and his ministers because he believed that his colleagues were merely deluding themselves in thinking that delegations and petitions could alter the course of events.³⁶⁾ Instead, he urged them to turn their thoughts and energies to the strengthening of those institutions which had preserved their nationality during times of crisis in the past. Chief among these, he believed, was the Orthodox Church, whose ritual and practices he considered a peculiar expression of

³⁴⁾ D r a g o m i r : Studii și documente . . . 1848—1849, I, p. XXV.

³⁵⁾ HHStA, Nachlaß Schwarzenberg, Karton 2, Fasz. V, no. 279: Şaguna to Schwarzenberg, April 23, 1849.

³⁶⁾ P o p e a : Memorialul, p. 364; P o p e a : Archiepiscopul, p. 262: Şaguna to Ioan Dobran, November 10, 1849.

the Rumanian soul and upon whose strength and vitality would depend the spiritual and intellectual progress of the Rumanian nation.³⁷⁾

III

If the Orthodox Church were to meet this challenge successfully, it was imperative, Şaguna believed, that all ambiguities concerning its constitutional status vis-à-vis the state and the Ecumenical Eastern Orthodox Church be eliminated. He was determined to put an end to its subjection to the state and to the Serbian Patriarchate of Carlovitz³⁸⁾, for unless the Orthodox Church of Transylvania were independent of outside interference he feared that whatever progress it might make could easily be undone. He conceived of the ideal relationship between church and state as one of harmony and cooperation in furthering the development of the Christian community rather than one of suspicion and rivalry. This was a natural consequence of the fact that the "church was in the state and the state was in the church [and] the Christian was a citizen and the citizen was a Christian."³⁹⁾ The Orthodox Church, like its sister churches, had important obligations to the state which it could fulfil only if an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect prevailed: "The church . . . furthers the aims of the state through its teachings based upon Holy Scripture and through its admonitions to the faithful to obey and honor in word and deed the officers of the state, to acquit themselves of their taxes, and to defend the state against its enemies."⁴⁰⁾ The state, for its part, had certain responsibilities toward the church, the most important of which were respect for the canons and institutions of the church, material support of its educational and charitable work and of the clergy, and the recognition of the church's right to administer its own purely religious affairs, institutions, and property without interference.⁴¹⁾

³⁷⁾ Andreas von S c h a g u n a : Compendium des kanonischen Rechtes der einen, heiligen, allgemeinen und apostolischen Kirche. Hermannstadt 1868. p. xii; P o p e a : Archiepiscopul, p. 262.

³⁸⁾ In 1848 the Emperor had raised the Metropolis to this rank.

³⁹⁾ S c h a g u n a : Compendium, p. 282—283.

⁴⁰⁾ Ibid., p. 280—281.

⁴¹⁾ Ibid., p. 284—285; Andreiu de Ş a g u n a, Anthonismos, sau desluşire comparativă asupra broşurei "Dorinţele dreptcredincioşului cleru din Bucovina . . ." Sibiu 1861, p. 6.

The first step in the establishment of a satisfactory church-state relationship, Şaguna believed, must be the restoration of the Orthodox Metropolis of Alba Iulia, which had ceased to function in 1700 when the Metropolitan and a large number of his clergy signed the Act of Union with Rome and thereby established the Rumanian Uniate Church, for only this would place his church on a firm constitutional foundation. To accomplish this would require the dissolution of all ties between the diocese of Transylvania and the Patriarchate of Carlovitz, notably the subordination of the former to the latter in matters of dogma and administration, which Joseph II had created by decree in 1783 and 1786. Şaguna's former patron, Patriarch Rajačić, and the Serbian hierarchy, which dominated the Orthodox Church in the Habsburg Monarchy, were unalterably opposed to any plan which might divide the church and thereby weaken it in its struggle against Roman Catholic proselytism.⁴²⁾ At a conference of Orthodox bishops held in Vienna from October 15, 1850 until July 2, 1851, Şaguna recognized the futility of further negotiations with the Serbs and decided to seek a resolution of the issue directly from the Emperor. He reasoned that since the bond between the Serbian Patriarchate and the Rumanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania was the result of a political act rather than of church legislation, it could be broken in the same way, by a decree of the Emperor.

His efforts to re-establish the Metropolis were continually frustrated by the ultramontanists in the Austrian bureaucracy, especially Bach and Leo Thun, the Minister of Religion and Education from 1849 to 1860, who promoted Roman Catholicism at the expense of Orthodoxy and Protestantism. It was only after the system of absolutism had been discredited that the Emperor and his advisers approved the restoration of the Metropolis in 1864.

Bach was chiefly concerned with the political consequences of his religious policy. He believed that by strengthening the Roman Catholic Church he would be able to achieve more rapidly the centralization of state power and the creation of the "Gesamtmonarchie". As far as the Rumanian Orthodox were concerned, he hoped that their adherence to the Union with Rome would constitute an effective makeweight to the Calvinist Magyars, who represented

⁴²⁾ Keith Hitchins, *Andrieu Şaguna and the Restoration of the Rumanian Orthodox Metropolis in Transylvania, 1846—1868*, *Balkan Studies* VI (1965), p. 11—13.

the most serious challenge to the incorporation of Transylvania into the centralized Monarchy. As a consequence, throughout the period of absolutism the Austrian government used every means possible to make the Union attractive to the Rumanians and, at the same time, opposed every important proposal made by Şaguna to give the Orthodox Church new strength and cohesion.

The most enthusiastic champion of this policy was undoubtedly Leo Thun, a staunch Roman Catholic who regarded the Orthodox contemptuously as "schismatics."⁴³⁾ Not only did he believe that they were spiritually impure, but that they represented a distinct threat to the physical security of the Monarchy, since, in his view, the Orthodox Church could not give those guarantees against willful behavior on the part of its clergy which the Roman Catholic Church, by virtue of its great centralization, could. In the Roman Catholic Church, he informed Şaguna during an interview in 1855, the numerous councils which enforced canon law and the archbishops who supervised the conduct of the clergy limited the power of the bishop, while in the Orthodox Church in Transylvania there was no appeal from the decisions of a capricious bishop. Therefore, he concluded, the government must continue to maintain strict control over its affairs.

Şaguna, half in amusement and half in anger, assured Thun that the Orthodox Church had a canon law of its own, which the bishop, who was after all ultimately responsible before God for its actions, was obliged to respect, and that it offered the state a special guarantee of loyalty in that it, unlike the Roman Catholic Church, could not appeal to a higher authority outside the Monarchy. If there were any irregularities in the governance of his church, these were, he suggested, owing to external factors resulting from centuries of subjugation rather than to any defects in its constitution or to his own shortcomings.⁴⁴⁾ Thun's hostility to the Orthodox was, he concluded, unwarranted, for the Christian community, although divided into numerous confessions, was one in its adherence to the teachings of Christ. "That", replied Thun, "as a Catholic I cannot accept."⁴⁵⁾

⁴³⁾ Ilarion Puşcariu: *Mitropolia Românilor ortodocși din Ungaria și Transilvania*. Sibiu 1900, Acte, p. 66.

⁴⁴⁾ Ilarion Puşcariu: *Documente pentru limbă și istorie*, 2 vols. Sibiu 1889—1897, I, p. 314—316.

⁴⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

Thun's opposition to Şaguna sometimes expressed itself in petty ways. For example, he persisted in using the negative and deprecatory term "nicht-unirt" (non-united) instead of "Orthodox" or "Eastern Orthodox", which Şaguna proposed.⁴⁶⁾ With regard to the organization of the Orthodox diocesan consistory, Thun would ignore petition after petition from Şaguna and then, after months or even years had elapsed, would send him a request for additional information. The ponderous ways of the Austrian bureaucracy assisted him greatly in his work of obstruction. For example, not until August 9, 1856, six years after Şaguna had first brought up the matter, did the Council of Ministers finally agree to consider the question of the proper designation of the Orthodox Church in Transylvania. It approved the recommendations of Thun that the name "Greek non-United" be retained, since it tended to make the differences between the two Rumanian confessions less acute and thereby reduced the friction between them, and emphasized the "naked fact" that the union of the Eastern church with the Western had only been partially completed.⁴⁷⁾ On December 14, 1856 the "Reichsrat" reviewed the whole controversy — the original petition, the objections of the Minister of Religion, the findings of the Council of Ministers, and a bulging file of supporting documents — and then accepted Thun's proposal that it postpone a decision until a complete study of all the petitions against the use of the term "Greek non-United" could be made.⁴⁸⁾ There the matter rested until the period of constitutional experiment of the 1860's.

Şaguna's efforts to obtain control over the administration of church endowments were also unsuccessful. There were four, valued at approximately 130 000 florins, the income from which Şaguna was anxious to use for his educational projects. The Orthodox had never been permitted to manage these funds themselves. Before 1849 the Transylvanian Treasury, and after that the Ministry of Religion, had decided each year how the income from them would be spent.⁴⁹⁾ The only change which the Council of Ministers and the "Reichsrat" would approve was a stipulation that the Minister of Religion make an annual accounting to the "non-united" bishop of how

⁴⁶⁾ Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Vienna, Z. 1202, April 1, 1855.

⁴⁷⁾ HHStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Minister-Conferenz-Kanzlei, K.Z. 3141.856, M.C.Z. 2870 ex 856; Puşcariu: Mitropolia, Acte, p. 151—152.

⁴⁸⁾ HHStA, Reichsrat, 1419/R, 1856.

⁴⁹⁾ Puşcariu: Mitropolia, Acte, p. 145—147.

the income from the endowments had been used and invite him to make suggestions concerning future allocations of funds.⁵⁰⁾

Much more ominous for the existence of the Orthodox Church was the zealous campaign undertaken by Bach and Thun to induce all Rumanians to join the Uniate Church. They believed that the quickest and most effective way to accomplish this would be to create a Uniate Metropolis for the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Banat. On November 18, 1850, after consultation with high Roman Catholic Church officials, including I. Scitovsky, the Archbishop of Esztergom and the Primate of Hungary, they completed plans for the establishment of the Metropolis with its see at Alba Iulia. The new Metropolitan was to be completely independent of the Archbishop of Esztergom, who had had jurisdiction over the Uniate Church since its creation in 1700, and was to have as suffragans the bishops of Oradea Mare, Gherla, and Lugoj.

The entire project was a clever appeal to Rumanian national feeling. The establishment of the Metropolis itself would satisfy the desire of the Uniates to free their church from foreign, i. e. Magyar, supervision and to protect it from further Catholicization, a fact which Bach and Thun apparently did not grasp. Although Uniate leaders were eager to promote the Union as a means of obtaining political and economic rights for the whole Rumanian nation⁵¹⁾, they opposed any changes in dogma or ritual which might separate them irrevocably from their Orthodox brothers. The establishment of a new Uniate bishopric at Lugoj in the Banat was an attempt to take advantage of the discontent of the Rumanian Orthodox with Serbian dominance of their church. Since ill-feeling between Serbs and Rumanians over the disposition of church funds and the filling of church offices was very intense at this time⁵²⁾, Bach and Thun hoped that the prospect of a bishop of their own would persuade many to join the Uniate Church.⁵³⁾ Thun hoped for the same results in the

⁵⁰⁾ HHStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Minister-Conferenz-Kanzlei, K.Z. 4091.853, M.C.Z. 3304 ex 853; Reichsrat, 439/R, 1853.

⁵¹⁾ Pușcariu: *Mitropolia*, Acte, p. 73.

⁵²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 104—105, Șaguna to the Military and Civil Governor of Transylvania, October 27/November 8, 1852: "The Rumanians must accept Serbian bishops, who concern themselves with the Serbianization of the Rumanians through the introduction of the Slavic language in Rumanian churches and schools and the appointment of Serbian priests and protopopes in Rumanian parishes."

⁵³⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 74; *Memoriile... Șaguna*, p. 52.

Orthodox diocese of Arad and, therefore, worked diligently for the election of Serbian bishops.⁵⁴⁾

In order to ensure the success of their plans, Bach and Thun tried to persuade Şaguna, whose ability they grudgingly admired, to join the Union. Using Alexandru Sterca Şuluţiu, Uniate Bishop of Alba Iulia and Făgăraş, as an intermediary, they proposed that Şaguna lead his people into the Union with Rome, in return for which he would be appointed head of the Uniate Metropolis. At a face-to-face meeting in Vienna in the fall of 1850 Şuluţiu revealed to Şaguna the details of his conversations with various Austrian ministers, who, he said, had made it clear that the progress of the Rumanian nation would depend upon the union of the Orthodox with Rome.⁵⁵⁾ Şaguna was astounded by these proposals and bluntly refused to betray the religion of his forebears. Subsequent efforts to win him over to the Union were equally fruitless, for, as he himself remarked: "My vigilance . . . toward the behavior of the regime in Vienna never relaxed, for I had come to realize that Ministers Bach and Thun were the blind instruments of the Ultramontanists."⁵⁶⁾

The organization of the Uniate Metropolis proceeded slowly. Finally, on November 26, 1853 Pope Pius IX issued the Bull "Ecclesiam Christi ex omni lingua", which removed the bishopric of Alba Iulia and Făgăraş from the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Esztergom and raised it to the rank of a Metropolis. On November 16, 1854, he confirmed the nomination of Şuluţiu as Metropolitan.

Şaguna regarded the struggle against the Union as a matter of life and death for his church and spared neither himself nor his clergy in thwarting the designs of Leo Thun and the Catholic party: he discouraged mixed marriages, for under existing conditions the children would have to be raised as Uniates⁵⁷⁾; he punished severely Orthodox priests who went over to the Uniate or Roman Catholic churches⁵⁸⁾; he forbade Orthodox children to attend Uniate schools

⁵⁴⁾ HHStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Minister-Conferenz-Kanzlei, K.Z. 3839.852, M.C.Z. 3062/852; H o d o ş : Din corespondenţa lui Simion Bărnuţiu, p. 21.

⁵⁵⁾ AVA, 1018/856, Pras. II; P u ş c a r i u : Mitropolia, Acte, p. 68—69, p. 74—75; Memoriile . . . Şaguna, p. 45, 53.

⁵⁶⁾ P u ş c a r i u : Mitropolia, Acte, p. 75.

⁵⁷⁾ Ibid., p. 132; P o p e a : Memorialul, p. 363; Gh. T u l b u r e : Mitropolitul Şaguna. Opera literară, scrisori pastorale, circulări şcolare, diverse. Sibiu 1938, p. 427—428; Şaguna's circular letter of June 13, 1857.

⁵⁸⁾ AVA, Oberste Polizeibehörde, Pras. II, Z. 4282, 1856; P o p e s c u : Documente, p. 173—174.

and the Orthodox faithful to engage Uniate priests to officiate at baptisms, weddings, and funerals in order to reduce Uniate influence among his people; and he undertook a sweeping program of reform in order to strengthen the spiritual and material resources of his own church.

These countermeasures brought Uniate and Catholic proselytizing among the Orthodox to a standstill, to the great irritation of Şaguna's enemies: "The schism is promoted all the more by Bishop Şaguna's intrigues because Archbishop Şuluţiu is much less active and does not know how to stop his encroachments... In order to further the Union, an easy task, moreover, in view of the favorable disposition of the Rumanians toward it, it will be necessary to neutralize Şaguna's pernicious influence."⁵⁹) They also complained that Şaguna had ingratiated himself with the civil authorities in Transylvania to such an extent that they made no effort to curtail his interference with the Union⁶⁰), a charge which seems to be borne out by a spirited defense of the Orthodox and praise for Şaguna's educational work by Governor Karl Schwarzenberg.⁶¹) Schwarzenberg professed the profoundest admiration for Şaguna and in a letter to Leo Thun in 1854 criticized the Minister for his total lack of comprehension concerning the religious situation in Transylvania and pointed out that the Orthodox possessed a more vigorous and orderly church and school organization than the Uniates.

Efforts to extend the Union caused bitter strife between Orthodox and Uniates. The competition for converts, the frustration of the legitimate aspirations of the Orthodox for an independent church organization, and the continuous posing of Metropolitan Şuluţiu as a national leader of all Rumanians and as the rightful successor of the old Rumanian Metropolitans of Alba Iulia⁶²) rent the bonds of unity which their common sacrifices during the revolution of 1848—49 had created. It appeared to many observers that the Rumanian nation was now one in theory only and that the national movement had suffered irreparable harm.⁶³)

⁵⁹) AVA, Z. 4282, 1856.

⁶⁰) Popescu: Documente, p. 174.

⁶¹) Puşcariu: Mitropolia, Acte, p. 159: Schwarzenberg to Thun, no date, but probably 1854.

⁶²) Nicolae Popea: Vechi'a Mitropolia ortodosa romana a Transilvaniei, suprimarea si restaurarea ei. Sabiniu 1870, p. 167—169.

⁶³) Lupaş: Şaguna, p. 136, note 3: Aron Florian to Ioan Maiorescu, July 3, 1852; Hodoş: Din corespondenţa lui Simion Bărnuţiu, p. 52—53.

IV

In spite of official hostility and the poverty of his diocese Şaguna proceeded resolutely with his projects for the regeneration of the Orthodox Church. His outlook, it must be emphasized, was far from parochial, for he was deeply concerned about the effects his work would have on the Rumanian nation as a whole. For him there could be no distinction between Orthodoxy and nationality, since the one had helped to preserve the other during past periods of foreign political domination. In the new period of uncertainty which lay ahead the Rumanian people must preserve and develop their cultural heritage if they wished to remain a nation: "Take away all these things from a people, take away its religion, its language, its customs, its dress, and its games, and you may be certain that it has ceased to live spiritually... A people lives only so long as it is conscious of its past and is alive to its future; when these two sparks have been extinguished, it has ceased to live, even though it continues to exist."⁶⁴) Now, as in the past, he believed that the church was the natural instrument of national self-fulfilment.

The parish clergy was the object of his continuous attention, for he was convinced that the success of his entire program would depend upon its moral and intellectual vigor. The priest served his village simultaneously as spiritual guide, schoolmaster, and even political leader, and, consequently, as had been amply demonstrated during the revolution of 1848—49, exercised a decisive influence over his parishioners.⁶⁵) The fact that he also frequently shared their economic hardship reinforced the bonds of sympathy and understanding which united them. Yet, as Şaguna himself reluctantly admitted, many priests were unfit to bear such heavy responsibilities. They often neglected their duties and seemed interested only in providing for their own comfort.⁶⁶) He attributed their delinquency to inadequate training and grinding poverty.⁶⁷) The diocese had no seminary in the proper sense of the term and could provide candi-

⁶⁴) Lupaş : Şaguna, p. 211.

⁶⁵) See a contemporary description in Charles Boner : *Transylvania. Its Products and Its People*. London 1865, p. 369.

⁶⁶) Poepa : *Archiepiscopul*, p. 165—166; *Tulbure* : Şaguna, p. 259—260: circular letter of May 19, 1853.

⁶⁷) *Telegraful Român (Sibiu)*, no. 2, January 7, 1853, p. 6.

dates for the priesthood, many of whom had had little instruction beyond the primary school, with only a year's course at the theological institute in Sibiu. Since they were for the most part peasants, few candidates could afford to go elsewhere for their education, and the diocese was too poor to help them. Once in his parish the new priest had to rely upon fees from weddings and funerals or upon what he could earn from odd jobs or from manual labor in a landowner's fields to support himself and his family.⁶⁸⁾ Unlike his Roman Catholic and Protestant counterparts, he received no financial support from the public treasury and was obliged to pay state taxes.

Aware of the inadequacy of his own resources, Şaguna throughout the Decade of Absolutism persisted despite repeated disappointments and humiliations in seeking the financial support of the state to provide suitable educational facilities for priests and to guarantee them a regular income. He was largely unsuccessful in convincing Austrian authorities that an enlightened Orthodox clergy could contribute enormously to the well-being of Transylvania. In the fall of 1849 he proposed that the Ministry of Religion contribute 200 000 florins a year for ten years to an endowment fund for the Orthodox Church, the income from which would be used to provide the clergy with suitable benefices. He based his request on the fact that the Orthodox clergy bore a proportionate share of society's burdens and ought, therefore, to partake of its benefits.⁶⁹⁾ The Ministry ignored this particular request, but, finally, in 1854 promised to grant Orthodox priests and schoolteachers modest canonical portions. During the remainder of the decade, however, little was done to implement this program.⁷⁰⁾

Although Şaguna had the almost unanimous backing of both clergy and laity for his efforts to obtain state assistance for the church, as is evident from the numerous petitions submitted to the Ministry of Religion⁷¹⁾, public opinion counted for little during the

⁶⁸⁾ B o n e r : Transylvania, p. 367—368.

⁶⁹⁾ "Despre unu memorialu din 1849 alu episcopului Andreiu Siagun'a, Transilvania, 1885, no. 21—22, p. 170, 174.

⁷⁰⁾ L u p a ş : Şaguna, p. 126.

⁷¹⁾ HHStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Minister-Conferenz-Kanzlei, K.Z. 4877.853, M.C.Z. 3954 ex 853; K.Z. 5068, M.C.Z. 4121 ex 853; K.Z. 5069, M.C.Z. 4122 ex 853; K.Z. 5158, M.C.Z. 4188 ex 853; K.Z. 5225, M.C.Z. 4243 ex 853; K.Z. 467.854, M.C.Z. 367 ex 854; K.Z. 1127.854, M.C.Z. 937 ex 854.

Decade of Absolutism, and this remained his principal success. The Ministry rejected his request for thirty state scholarships for theology students⁷²⁾, but agreed to set aside a small sum from Orthodox endowments, which it administered, to provide scholarships for twelve students.⁷³⁾ In reply to other proposals Thun cynically suggested to Şaguna that if facilities in Transylvania were inadequate, then he should send his students to Vienna or Cernăuți in Bukovina.⁷⁴⁾

Rumanian patriots of both confessions were so concerned with the plight of their respective parish clergies that in 1857 in an unusual act of solidarity for that time Orthodox and Uniate leaders petitioned Emperor Francis Joseph to relieve their priests of the obligation to pay state taxes, as had been done for those of other churches, so that they might devote their slender resources to the needs of their people.⁷⁵⁾ Their petition went unanswered.

In improving the training of priests Şaguna, therefore, had to rely mainly upon what his own people could contribute. In 1852 he obtained permission from the Governor of Transylvania to hold a public subscription to raise money for the purchase of a larger building for the seminary.⁷⁶⁾ The new facilities made it possible for him to extend the course of study from one to two years and to open a one-year teacher training institute which every candidate for the priesthood was obliged to attend. He was also able to expand the curriculum of the seminary and to introduce a regular schedule of lectures.⁷⁷⁾ The new required courses give some indication of the parish priest's diverse occupations: Greek, church history, canon law, the Bible, ethics, pastoral duties, pedagogy, methodology of teaching, church singing, agriculture, and practical medicine.

The dual role of the clergy as priests and schoolmasters exemplified Şaguna's views concerning the close relationship between the church and the school. He could not conceive of the one as separate from the other⁷⁸⁾, for he understood education to be not merely the acquisition of knowledge or the preparation for a career but a moral

⁷²⁾ Ibid., K.Z. 4974.853, M.C.Z. 4030 ex 853.

⁷³⁾ Ibid., Reichsrat, 410/R, 1853; 484/R, 1853.

⁷⁴⁾ Lupaş : Şaguna, p. 146—147.

⁷⁵⁾ Popescu : Documente, p. 233—235.

⁷⁶⁾ Tulbure : Şaguna, p. 250—252; circular letter of January 8, 1852.

⁷⁷⁾ Lupaş : Şaguna, p. 144—145; Popoa : Archiepiscopul, p. 310.

⁷⁸⁾ Tulbure : Şaguna, p. 111.

and spiritual maturing as well. Since the function of the school was thus closely bound up with the mission of the church, Şaguna insisted that education be organized on a confessional basis. The Orthodox, therefore, must have their own schools separate from those of the Uniates, Roman Catholics, and Protestants. He vigorously opposed the establishment of so-called "mixed" schools — those operated jointly by Uniates and Roman Catholics and Orthodox — because he feared that they might fall under the exclusive control of the former and thereby become instruments of proselytism.⁷⁹⁾ In view of the Bach regime's emphasis upon centralization he also opposed the replacement of church supported schools by a state school system, which he suspected would promote German language and culture to the neglect of Rumanian.⁸⁰⁾

Şaguna concerned himself chiefly with the village primary school. At the time of his arrival in Transylvania in 1846 these were the only schools, few in number, which the Orthodox possessed. His goal was to establish at least one primary school in every parish. In order to mobilize the resources of his diocese as efficiently as possible he set up a unified chain of command. He reserved for himself the general superintendence of Orthodox schools, but made each protopope responsible for the conduct of school affairs in his district and each priest responsible for the construction and the proper functioning of the village school. To provide the necessary incentive at all levels he and his protopopes were to make frequent tours of inspection. He was too well acquainted with the poverty of his people not to realize that some villages would be unable to support a school. He refused, however, to permit any of his parishes to join with the parish of another church to build a school until he had exhausted all other possibilities.⁸¹⁾ In 1853, however, he felt obliged to modify his position on confessional schools in the interest of learning. He gave poor parishes permission to co-operate with their Uniate neighbors to maintain a village school provided that expenses were borne in proportion to the number of students of each confession and that religious instruction was given after school.⁸²⁾ In spite of serious obstacles, Şaguna could report to his clergy in 1858 that there were

⁷⁹⁾ *Memoriile . . . Şaguna*, p. 67.

⁸⁰⁾ *P o p e a : Archiepiscopul*, p. 316.

⁸¹⁾ *T u l b u r e : Şaguna*, p. 254: circular letter of April 24, 1852; p. 263: circular letter of September 7, 1853.

⁸²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 265—266.

600 Orthodox primary schools in full operation as compared to 100 a decade before.⁸³⁾

Şaguna's accomplishments in secondary and higher education were more modest than in primary education. This was owing in part to his own concentration on the village school and in part to the refusal of officials in both Vienna and Cluj to appropriate large sums for advanced education for Rumanians, which they considered unnecessary. In 1850 Şaguna proposed to the Ministry of Religion the establishment, with the financial assistance of the state, of gymnasias throughout Transylvania to serve Orthodox communities. Three years later, in November 1853, Thun advised the Emperor that Şaguna's petition lacked "any basis for serious consideration", an opinion in which Francis Joseph concurred.⁸⁴⁾ Undeterred, Şaguna had already gone ahead on his own and in 1852 had laid the foundation stone of the Orthodox gymnasium in Braşov. He was eager to provide interested students with the opportunity to train themselves for careers in business and to this end petitioned the Ministry to establish a school of commerce in Abrud under the auspices of the Orthodox Church. It agreed in principle, but took no action until after 1860.⁸⁵⁾

Şaguna took only a moderate interest in higher education. In the early 1850's he petitioned for the establishment of a law school for Rumanians in Cluj⁸⁶⁾ and tried to persuade the Saxon Law Academy in Sibiu to give some of its courses in Rumanian, all to no avail. This is as far as he went. He rebuked those intellectuals who wished to establish a Rumanian university, for he believed that the intensity of their patriotic sentiments obscured their view of political and economic realities. Their people simply could not afford to maintain a university and even if they could, it was highly unlikely that the government would approve a project designed to foster Rumanian national feeling. Şaguna's pessimism was justified, for in 1853 the Reichsrat rejected such a proposal from a group of intellectuals on the grounds that the low level of Rumanian cultural

⁸³⁾ L u p a ş : Şaguna, p. 164.

⁸⁴⁾ HHStA, Kabinettskanzlei, Minister-Conferenz-Kanzlei, K.Z. 4974.853, M.C.Z. 4030 ex 853.

⁸⁵⁾ P o p e a : Archiepiscopul, p. 314—315.

⁸⁶⁾ August Trebonius L a u r i a n i : Die Romänen der österreichischen Monarchie, 3 vols. Wien 1849—1851, III, p. 108—110.

development and the inability of their language to express complex philosophical and technological thought made a Rumanian university a useless luxury.⁸⁷⁾

Early in 1850 Şaguna petitioned the Governor of Transylvania for permission to establish a printing house to serve the needs of the diocese. His immediate concern was to supply textbooks for the new primary schools and religious books to the churches at low cost, since few of his people could afford those which had to be brought from Budapest or Carlovitz. Ignoring protests from the Catholic party within the government and from the Uniate hierarchy that this concession would hamper the progress of the Union⁸⁸⁾, Wohlgemuth approved Şaguna's request. He was convinced that Şaguna would be guided in his use of the printing privilege by complete loyalty to the dynasty. Şaguna himself supplied the capital with which to buy two cast-iron presses in Budapest and a building to house them in Sibiu, and on August 27, 1850 the presses began operation.⁸⁹⁾ In the next decade under the imprint of the "Tipografie diecesană" the diverse literary products of the Orthodox, ranging from ABC's to Şaguna's own learned treatises on canon law and ethics, appeared in ever-increasing numbers.

His publishing venture a success, Şaguna became eager to have a newspaper of his own. The attitude of the editors of the *Gazeta de Transilvania*, the only Rumanian political journal in Transylvania, toward the Orthodox Church in general and his own policies in particular had, it seemed to him, become increasingly hostile. On occasion, they went so far as to publish appeals to the Orthodox to end their "schism" and to come over to the Union.⁹⁰⁾ Finally, in 1855, he took the extraordinary step of forbidding his clergy to buy or read the *Gazeta* on the grounds that it no longer served the interests or needs of the Orthodox community and had lost all moral value.⁹¹⁾ He had positive reasons also in seeking permission to publish a newspaper. It would assist in the spreading of useful

⁸⁷⁾ HHStA, Reichsrat, 484/R, 1853.

⁸⁸⁾ George Barişiu: *Părţi alese din Istoria Transilvaniei*, 3 vols. Sibiu 1889—1891, III, p. 560—561.

⁸⁹⁾ N. Bănescu: *Stareţul Neoni. Corespondenţa sa cu C. Hurmuzachi şi Andreiu Şaguna. Vălenii-de-Munte 1910*, p. 81, 91.

⁹⁰⁾ *Memoriile . . . Şaguna*, p. 59, 85, 86; *Tulbure: Şaguna*, p. 196: pastoral letter of December 5, 1855.

⁹¹⁾ AVA, 189/I, no. 36, Pras. II: Iankowsky to Kempen, January 16, 1856.

knowledge and would offer men of letters an opportunity to publish and thereby stimulate the creative energies of his people.⁹²⁾ In his petition of October 30, 1852 to Governor Schwarzenberg he suggested that it would also serve to reinforce the confidence of the Rumanian people in the dynasty.⁹³⁾

Austrian authorities acted with unusual swiftness and on December 15, 1852 approved Şaguna's request. They were convinced of his loyalty and were confident that the editorial policy of his newspaper would reflect this. A second Rumanian newspaper might also reduce the influence exercised by the *Gazeta de Transilvania* and promote political disunion within the Rumanian nation, which could only benefit the regime. A limited concession of this sort might also help to redress the balance between the Rumanians on the one hand and the Magyars and the Saxons, who were displaying an annoying independence of late, on the other, and thereby facilitate the application of the ancient and successful policy of divide and rule.

The first issue of the *Telegraful Român* appeared on January 1, 1853. Until 1863 it was printed twice a week and thereafter three times a week. The editing of it was Şaguna's favorite occupation during the Decade of Absolutism. He frequently corrected the proofs himself, and no article was printed until he had seen it.⁹⁴⁾

It proved to be invaluable as a vehicle for his own ideas and projects. In addition to articles designed to stimulate interest in education and the building of schools and to encourage priests to perform their duties efficiently and with dignity, the *Telegraful Român* contained frequent articles on agriculture, commerce, and industry. Şaguna was especially concerned with agriculture, upon which the overwhelming majority of Rumanians depended for their livelihood and which he regarded as the "sole source of their culture and happiness". Rumanian agriculture faced a serious crisis because individual plots had been continually subdivided through inheritance and were no longer adequate to satisfy the needs of the peasant and his obligations to the state. The steady increase of population made the situation worse each year. As a remedy Şaguna

⁹²⁾ *Telegraful Român*, "Prenumaraţiune", December 8, 1852 (old style).

⁹³⁾ *Lupaş*: Şaguna, p. 193—194.

⁹⁴⁾ Ioan cavaler de Puşcariu: *Reminiscenţie din anul 1860 de un contemporan*. Sibiu 1897, p. 22—23.

urged priests, teachers, and more prosperous landowners to take the initiative in establishing "associations" to provide the peasant with information about new tools, techniques, and crops and guidance in their use. He also suggested that more Rumanians turn to the crafts and small business as a means of raising their standard of living and of relieving the pressure of population in the villages.⁹⁵⁾

V

During the Decade of Absolutism Şaguna wished to avoid political controversy of the kind which might cast doubt upon his own and his church's attachment to the fundamental principles which governed the Monarchy. In spite of his difficulties with various ministries in Vienna and with the government in Cluj, he remained steadfast in his loyalty to the dynasty. The experiences of the revolution of 1848—49 had taught him that the Rumanians by themselves were too weak to turn to their advantage the struggle between Habsburg imperialism and Magyar nationalism. Furthermore, in surveying the Decade of Absolutism, it seemed to him that his people had made substantial progress in strengthening the bases of their national existence: their churches and schools were able to serve their needs better than at any time in over a century; they could use their own language in church and school and before any official; they could freely enter the craft and commercial guilds; and they were generally free of the oppressive and discriminatory rule of the three former privileged nations.⁹⁶⁾ The alternative to absolutism, however distasteful certain aspects of it were to him, appeared to be subjection once more to uncompromising Magyar nationalism. Under the circumstances he believed that the continued progress of his people in the foreseeable future was dependent upon the well-being of the "Gesamtmonarchie". When, therefore, war broke out with France and Sardinia in the spring of 1859, Şaguna summoned the Rumanians to defend their Emperor with all their resources and instructed his priests to offer up prayers for victory over his enemies.⁹⁷⁾

⁹⁵⁾ See the series of articles entitled, "Agricultura" in the *Telegraful Român*, no. 9, January 31, 1853; no. 10, February 4, 1853; no. 11, February 7, 1853.

⁹⁶⁾ *Tulbure*: Şaguna, p. 219: pastoral letter of April 20, 1859.

⁹⁷⁾ *Lupaş*: Şaguna, p. 217—219.

Şaguna's politics found little favor among the intellectuals of 1848 who had led the struggle for national self-determination. They disapproved of his yielding the political initiative to Vienna. They were justly bitter against Austria for its betrayal of their cause and believed that they must henceforth rely upon the resources of their own people if they were to accomplish their ends.⁹⁸⁾ Their failure had not diminished the intensity of their national feeling. They strove to maintain the unity which their people had achieved during the revolution and observed with fascination the process by which Moldavia and Wallachia were gradually moving toward political unification.⁹⁹⁾

The Uniate priest from the Munţii Apuseni, Simion Balint, expressed the feelings of many when he declared that Transylvania belonged by right to the Rumanians, for they were the most numerous and the original inhabitants of the land.¹⁰⁰⁾ He and Avram Iancu believed that they could achieve salvation only through close association with their brothers beyond the Carpathians and did what they could under police surveillance to propagate the so-called doctrine of Daco-Romanism.¹⁰¹⁾ Simion Bărnuţiu from his self-imposed exile in Italy, where, moreover, as to a second homeland many disillusioned Rumanians of the generation of 1848 went to nourish their national feeling¹⁰²⁾, also looked forward to the eventual union of all Rumanians. He urged his countrymen to purge their language of Slavic words and letters in order to fortify their nationality.

Consumed by their zeal to strengthen the national movement, Bărnuţiu and his colleagues regarded the strife between Ortho-

⁹⁸⁾ Hodoş : Din corespondenţă lui Simion Bărnuţiu, p. 9—10; Ion Nistor : Decorarea lui Avram Iancu şi a camarazilor săi, Academia Română, Memoriile Secţiunii Istorice, XI (1930), p. 316, 322.

⁹⁹⁾ Popescu : Documente, p. 289, 294; see also: Ştefan Pascu : Ecoul unirii Ţării Româneşti şi Moldovei în Transilvania, in: Studii privind unirea principatelor, edited by Andrei Oţetea et al. Bucureşti 1960, p. 451—466.

¹⁰⁰⁾ Popescu : Documente, p. 295.

¹⁰¹⁾ Ibid., p. xxiii—xxiv, 289—290.

¹⁰²⁾ Hodoş : Din corespondenţă lui Simion Bărnuţiu, p. 35: "We have not come to Italy simply to learn the Corpus Juris and the Austrian Code, but also to see [it] with our own eyes and to bring from it a little chip of wood to our hearths in Dacia in order to keep the fires of our nationality burning".

dox and Uniates as a catastrophe.¹⁰³⁾ Some held Șaguna responsible for the growing disunity on account of his refusal to sanction "national", or "mixed" schools and his insistence that the Orthodox maintain strict independence of the Uniates in all religious and educational matters. They went so far as to accuse him — in this writer's opinion, unjustly — of being more concerned with the affairs of his church than with the welfare of the nation as a whole.¹⁰⁴⁾ Confessional discord, which they believed had done great harm to the national movement, reinforced their anti-clericalism and in the next decade caused them to agitate for the removal of the two bishops as the de facto political leaders of the nation.

Defeat in the war against France and Sardinia caused Francis Joseph to re-examine the principles upon which the dynasty had maintained its power and prestige among the non-German nationalities of the Monarchy in general and the Rumanians in particular. In the spring and summer of 1859 disturbing reports had been received from Transylvania concerning widespread unrest among the Rumanian peasant masses and the imminence of a large-scale uprising¹⁰⁵⁾ and the spreading by priests of "Moldo-Wallachian" propaganda and of rumors that their brothers from Wallachia were about to invade Transylvania to liberate them.¹⁰⁶⁾ One agent of the gendarmerie in Sibiu advised his superiors in Vienna that only the great influence which Șaguna wielded over his parish priests had prevented a complete deterioration of the situation. The bishop, he continued, had always conducted himself in loyal fashion, but had obtained no satisfaction from the Ministry of Religion, a fact which could have unfortunate consequences in the present crisis. Would it not be wise, he suggested, to make concessions to the bishop as a tangible sign of the esteem in which he was held?¹⁰⁷⁾

¹⁰³⁾ A. Papiu-Illarian: *Istori'a Romaniloru din Daci'a superioare*, 2 vols. Vienna 1851—1852, II, p. 208; "Epistola repausatiloru Simionu Barnutiu si Ioanu Maiorescu adresata din Viena catra romanii dela Brasiovu la a. 1852 in cause nationali", *Transilvania*, 1885, no. 13—14, p. 101—102.

¹⁰⁴⁾ Bogdan-Duică: *Notes-ul de însemnări al lui Simeon Bărnuțiu*, p. 216.

¹⁰⁵⁾ Popescu: *Documente*, p. 281—282; AVA, 2650/1859, Pras. I; D. A. Sturdza and C. Colescu-Vartic: *Acte și documente relative la istoria renascerii României*, 10 vols. București 1889—1909, IX, p. 313; Victor Place to Count Walewski, May 5, 1859.

¹⁰⁶⁾ Popescu: *Documente*, p. 282.

¹⁰⁷⁾ AVA, 2650/1859, Pras. I.

After peace had been concluded at Zürich on November 10, 1859 the policy of the Austrian government toward the Rumanians changed radically. From 1860 until 1864, during the period of constitutional experiment, Şaguna's attachment to the dynasty seemed to have justified itself. His critics became silent as the Rumanians obtained recognition as an equal of the Magyars and Saxons in political life and seemed destined, on the basis of their numbers, to become the principal support of the dynasty in Transylvania.

VI

Şaguna's greatest accomplishments during the Decade of Absolutism were in the field of education and general cultural development, notably, the renaissance of the Rumanian village school and the infusion of new life into the parish clergy. A political moderate, he believed in attempting only what was possible. He went to the utmost limits in his struggles with Leo Thun and other ministers to obtain what he believed belonged by right to his church and nation, but he never questioned the system in whose name they governed. Always responsive to the spirit of the times, he was convinced that his people could not realize their political ambitions by flouting the new order, but at the same time he recognized the intensity of their national feeling and tried to satisfy it in a manner suited to the age.