

Irredentism and Diplomacy: The Central Powers and Rumania, August-November, 1914*)

By GLENN TORREY (Emporia, Kansas)

I

Of the many problems that confronted the Central Powers during the initial months of the First World War none, perhaps, was more frustrating than that of Rumania. A secret member of the Triple Alliance since 1883¹⁾, this strategically important Balkan nation nevertheless proclaimed neutrality at the outbreak of the conflict and after waiting two years for a favorable opportunity attacked Austria-Hungary in August, 1916. During this period of neutrality, the Central Powers, especially Germany, desperately sought to prevent the belligerency of Rumania and, if possible, win her assistance in the war against Russia. These efforts were not only unsuccessful but proved to be a disruptive influence upon the alliance relationship between Berlin and Vienna. The controversy over a common policy toward Rumania was exceedingly sharp, equaling or surpassing in intensity the conflict associated with the celebrated disagreements over wartime policy toward Italy and Poland.²⁾

*) The preparation of this study has been assisted by grants from the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Philosophical Society.

¹⁾ On Rumania's prewar relations with the Central Powers see: Lilio Cialdea, *La politica estera della Romania nel quarantennio pre-bellico*, Bologna, 1933; Ernest Ebel, *Rumänien und die Mittelmächte von der russisch-türkischen Krise 1877/78 bis zum Bukarester Frieden vom 10. August 1913*, Berlin, 1939; and Helge Granfelt, *Der Dreibund nach dem Sturze Bismarcks. I. England im Einverständnis mit dem Dreibund 1890—1896*, Lund, 1962, Chapter VIII, „Die Erneuerung des Osterreichisch-Rumänischen Vertrags.“

²⁾ On the problem of Poland see Werner Conze, *Polnische Nation und deutsche Politik im ersten Weltkrieg*, Köln 1958, and Immanuel Geiss, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914—1918*, Lübeck/Hamburg, 1960. On Italy see W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War*, London, 1957, esp. pp. 260—311, 359—401, and Egmont Zechlin, „Das ‚schlesische Angebot‘ und die italienische Kriegsgefahr 1915“, *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* XIV, Stuttgart, 1963, pp. 533—556.

As in the case of Italy which proved to be analogous in more than one respect, Rumania's attitude toward the Central Powers in 1914 was conditioned to a large degree by the existence of an "Irredentia" under Austro-Hungarian control. Three million ethnic Rumanians, located principally in Hungary and especially in the province of Transylvania where they comprised more than fifty per cent of the population, formed the focal point of Rumanian irredentism.³⁾ These Hungarian Rumanians or Transylvanian Rumanians as they were variously called were subjected to political discrimination and cultural persecution designed to eradicate their cultural identity and to preserve the ascendancy of the Magyar ruling class. Although relatively mild when compared with more recent totalitarian techniques, "Magyarization" was galling and grossly unjust, as even Hungarian historians are now willing to admit.⁴⁾

³⁾ The racial distribution in Transylvania according to the 1910 Hungarian census: total population, 2,678,367; Rumanian, 1,472,021; Magyar, 918,217; German, 234,085. Neighboring counties of Hungary possessed a substantial Rumanian population: total, 3,627,299; Rumanian 1,437,259; Magyar, 1,140,670; German, 496,877. Source: R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians*, Cambridge, 1934, pp. 566—67. There were an additional 273,254 Rumanians living in Bukovina (out of a total population of 794,424) but because of their relative backwardness and a comparatively enlightened Austrian rule they were much less dissatisfied than counterparts in Transylvania. However, the southern portion of this province (around Suceava) was coveted by Rumanians in the Old Kingdom for it was here that the fifteenth century Moldavian ruler, Stephen the Great, had made his headquarters while holding the Turks at Baia for almost half a century. One of Rumania's greatest national heroes, Stephen was buried at nearby Putna. A discussion of the growth of a separatist movement in Bukovina at the end of the war can be found in Erich Prokopowitsch, *Das Ende der österreichischen Herrschaft in der Bukowina*, München 1959.

⁴⁾ Z. Horvath, "The Rise of Nationalism and the Nationality Problem in Hungary in the Last Decades of Dualism", *Acta Historica*, IX, Budapest, 1963, pp. 1—38. This contemporary Marxist historian exhibits a degree of sympathy for the Rumanians previously unknown in Hungarian historiography. A balanced discussion of the problem of the Rumanian minority in Austria-Hungary can be found in Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy*, two vols., New York, 1950, I, pp. 137—49, 305—17; II, pp. 187—207. See also Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 390—431; Harold Steinacker and Friedrich Walter, *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Ungarn und die Südostpolitik Wiens*, München, 1959; Vasile Curticăpeanu, "Aus dem Kampf der Siebenbürger Rumänen um kulturelle Entwicklung am Ende des XIX. und Anfang des XX. Jh.s", *Nouvelles Etudes D'Historie*, vol. II, Bucarest, 1960, pp. 511—30; and Pamfil Şeicaru, *Istoria Partidelor Național, Țărănist, și Național Țărănist*, two vols., Madrid, 1963, I, pp. 149—95.

The influence of Rumania's Hohenzollern monarch⁵⁾, traditional distrust of Russia nourished especially by the latter's annexation of southern Bessarabia in 1878, and popular ignorance of the secret commitment made possible the maintenance of the alliance with Austria-Hungary for over thirty years despite its implicit denial of the nationalist dream of uniting all Rumanians.⁶⁾ However, with the Second Balkan War of 1913 a shift in Rumania's orientation became clearly evident. Rumania's easy victories had an intoxicating effect upon her national consciousness while at the same time Austria's support of Bulgaria at the Peace of Bucarest further estranged the populace and contributed to the substitution of Austrophobia for Russophobia as the national passion. During the first half of 1914, Bucarest moved toward a rapprochement with St. Petersburg; "the old scar of Bessarabia" proved easier to forget than the "fresh-flowing wound of Transylvania".⁷⁾

The crisis of 1914 ushered in a new, explosive phase of Rumanian irredentism. The death of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand shattered the hopes of those Rumanians on both sides of the Carpathians who had heretofore looked to Vienna for eventual solution of the "Transylvanian Question"; the outbreak of war and the opening campaigns stimulated a general expectation that the

⁵⁾ Carol I (prince of Rumania since 1866 and king since 1881) stemmed from the Sigmaringen or South German, Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family. The best biography of Carol is Paul Lindenberg, *König Karl von Rumänien*, two vols., Berlin, 1923. See also Ion Lupăș, *Regele Carol*, București, 1946.

⁶⁾ Zoltan Szaz, "The Transylvanian Question: Romania and the Belligerents, July-October, 1914", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII, Boulder (Colorado), 1953, p. 339; Gheorge I. Brătianu, *Origine et formation de l'unité roumaine*, Bucarest, 1943, pp. 275—6. Granfelt (op. cit., p. 156) points out that Austria-Hungary viewed the alliance, in part, as an instrument of reducing irredentist agitation.

⁷⁾ Szaz, op. cit., pp. 339—40; Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, three vols., London, 1952—7, III (1957), pp. 549—50; I. Rusu Abrudeanu, *România și Războiul Mondial*, București, 1921, pp. 19—20; Brătianu, op. cit., p. 275. For a contemporary statement of the influence of Austro-Hungarian internal and foreign policy upon Rumanian public opinion see the report of the German minister in Bucarest enclosing a memorandum by Virgil Arion, the Germanophile president of the nationalist Liga Culturală pentru unitatea tuturor Românilor. Waldthausen to Foreign Office (hereafter cited as F. O.), 13 May 1914, Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, 1867—1920, microfilmed for St. Antony's College, Oxford (hereafter cited as S. A.), reel 76. For a recent Marxian analysis of the motivation behind Rumanian irredentism, see Vasile Liveanu, 1918: *Din istoria luptelor revoluționare din România*, București, 1960, pp. 70—1.

partition of the multinational empire was at hand.⁸⁾ Even before the end of July it was evident that Rumania would not fight alongside the Central Powers. Carol warned Austro-Hungarian minister Count Ottokar Czernin on the 28th that "the question of the Rumanians in Transylvania has so greatly stirred Rumanian public feeling against Hungary that cooperation between the two armies is practically impossible."⁹⁾ Public antipathy toward the Dual Monarchy was one of the arguments most often voiced in the famous Rumanian Crown Council of August 3, which decisively rejected Carol's impassioned appeal for permission to implement the alliance and march his army against Russia.¹⁰⁾ Likewise, when Rumanian Prime Minister Ion I. Brătianu announced to Czernin the decision of the council to remain neutral, he pointed out the impossibility of applying the treaty if "the Hungarians do not change the situation of the Transylvanian Rumanians".¹¹⁾ A few days later Carol characterized public opinion as so anti-Hungarian that military cooperation with the Dual Monarchy "could call forth revolution".¹²⁾ Queen Elizabeth repeated reports that Carol would be killed

⁸⁾ Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note Politice 1897—1924*, five vols., București, 1927, I, pp. 261—2. Alexander Vaida Voevod, one of the leaders of the Hungarian Rumanians recalls that his first thought upon hearing of the assassination was: „Was werden jetzt Dr. Vaida und die armen Rumänen machen, die nun wieder schutzlos der Magyarischen Willkür preisgegeben sind?“. Georg Franz, „Alexander Vaida-Voevod und die Reformpläne Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands“, *Südost-Forschungen*, XII, München, 1953, p. 190.

⁹⁾ Albertini, *op. cit.*, III, p. 561; Czernin to Berchtold, 1 August 1914, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter cited as H.H.St.A.), *Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914*.

¹⁰⁾ For a reconstruction of the discussion in the crown council see Georges Fotino, "Une séance historique au Conseil de la Couronne 3 Août 1914", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 58, Paris, 1930, pp. 529—41. An important unpublished account by a participant, Minister of Justice Victor Antonescu, can be found in the Manuscript Division, Biblioteca de Stat, Bucarest, Fondul V. Antonescu. This undated memorandum apparently was written sometime after the event, quite possibly to assist Fotino in the writing of the article just mentioned (see Fotino, *op. cit.*, p. 533, Footnote 3.).

¹¹⁾ Memorandum by Brătianu, 5 August 1914, Biblioteca de Stat, Bucarest, Fondul Brătianu.

¹²⁾ Waldthausen to F. O., 13 August 1914, Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, 1867—1920, microfilmed for the University of California, Berkeley, serial I, reel 17, frame 158 (hereafter documents from this source will be cited as U. C. followed by series, reel, and frame numbers, i. e. U. C. I—17/158).

"if he insisted upon going with the Magyars".¹³⁾ While these statements were intended as "apologia" to forestall Austro-German disapprobation and are silent about other factors determining Rumanian policy, the influence of the Transylvanian Question on Rumania's attitude seems well established.¹⁴⁾

Bucarest's indictment of Hungarian minority policy found a sympathetic reception in Berlin where it reinforced the already existing conviction that the loss of Rumania's assistance could be laid at the door of Magyar chauvinism. Furthermore, Brătianu's statement stimulated German hopes that if Hungary inaugurated internal reforms Rumanian public opinion would be sufficiently mollified to enable King Carol to turn his army against Russia. Such a view underlay German Chief of Staff Helmut von Moltke's admonition to his Austrian counterpart, General Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorff, on August 9 to use his influence to secure "promises of milder treatment of Rumanians in Hungary. That is a point of the first order."¹⁵⁾ The German Ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, bombarded the Ballhausplatz with frequent and tactless reminders to this effect which, understandably, created considerable illwill there and in Budapest.¹⁶⁾ But

¹³⁾ Waldthausen to F. O., 7 August 1914, U. C. I—17/126.

¹⁴⁾ A full consideration of the motives behind the decision of August 3 falls outside the scope of this study, but these additional factors will at least be listed: the aggressive nature of Austria-Hungary's action against Serbia which invalidated the *casus foederis* in the alliance and aroused widespread sympathy for this small nation, the decision of Italy to remain neutral, the unpreparedness of the Rumanian army, fear of Russia, desire to avoid an overturn of the Peace of Bucarest (particularly the aggrandisement of Bulgaria), and deep ties with France based upon a close cultural affinity between the two nations. Lilio Cialdea, *L'intervento romeno nella guerra mondiale (giugno 1914 — agosto 1916)*, Pavia, 1941, p. 82; Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 230—5; Brătianu, *op. cit.*, p. 277; Szaz, *op. cit.*, pp. 342—3. As Fotino (*op. cit.*, p. 533) points out, the purpose of the Crown Council was not to decide on which side Rumania would range herself but to find a way to avoid making common cause with the Central Powers as Berlin and Vienna were demanding.

¹⁵⁾ Franz Conrad von Hötendorff, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906—1918*, four vols., Wien, 1921—5, IV (1925), p. 204. For a discussion of the strategy Moltke hoped to inaugurate in the Balkans with Rumania's assistance, see Carl Mühlmann, *Oberste Heeresleitung und Balkan im Weltkrieg 1914—1918*, Berlin, 1942, pp. 42—3.

¹⁶⁾ Tschirschky to F. O., 15 August 1914, U. C. I—17/167; Tisza to Berchtold, 4 September 1914, Stefan Graf Tisza, *Briefe 1914—1918*, I, Berlin, 1928, p. 72. Tisza complained bitterly about the repeated attempts to portray "Hungary as the

during August, as the German mobilization and march into France proceeded even better than had been anticipated, Berlin's concern over Rumania's attitude lessened somewhat. Reports of initial victories on the French frontier produced high spirits as the imperial entourage left Berlin on August 16 bound for the western front. With Rumania in mind, the Kaiser had already come to the conclusion that his government could "...take a firmer stand toward the vacillating powers."¹⁷⁾

II

This false optimism disappeared at the end of August as the Austro-Hungarian army suffered serious reverses on the eastern front. Conrad had unwisely undertaken a precipitate offensive into Russian Poland and after several days of illisory success collided head-on with the main Russian force commanded by the Grand Duke Nicholas and led by the few really capable generals in the Tsar's army. After heavy fighting, the Grand Duke hurled Conrad back into Galicia while to the south General Alexi Brusilov penetrated lightly defended Bukovina. Conrad ordered the Bukovinian capital of Czernowitz (Cernăuți) evacuated on August 31, and Lemberg, the fourth city of the Monarchy and key communications center for all of Galicia, fell on September 3. During the next four weeks, the Austro-Hungarian army gave up one defensive bastion after another. Przemyśl was besieged on the thirteenth. Jaroslav was evacuated on the twenty-first. Even the anticipated stand at the San River had to be abandoned. By October 2, when the retreat finally ended on the Tarnow-Gorlice line, the Habsburg army was 140 miles west of Lemberg; all of eastern and central Galicia was in Russian hands.¹⁸⁾

scapegoat for Rumania's attitude". Tisza to Berchtold, 22 August 1914, Abschriften aus den Staatsarchiven des kgl. ungarischen Minister-Präsidenten. Manuscript copies in Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, California.

¹⁷⁾ Memorandum by Bethmann, 11 August 1914, U. C. I—17/149; Georg Alexander von Müller, *Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral G. A. v. Müller*, ed. by Walter Görlitz, Göttingen, 1959, p. 47; Wilhelm Gröner, *Lebenserinnerungen*, Jugend. Generalstab. Weltkrieg, ed. by Friedrich von Gärtringen, Göttingen, 1957, p. 152; See also, Gotthard Jäschke, „Zum Problem der Marne-Schlacht von 1914“, *Historische Zeitschrift*, 190, München, 1960, p. 325.

¹⁸⁾ On the campaign in Galicia see the official Austrian account, *Kriegsarchiv, Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914—1918*, seven vols., Wien, 1929—38, I (1929),

The Austrian defeat coupled with the ignominious failure of the "punitive expedition" against Serbia¹⁹⁾ seemed to demonstrate the morbidity of the Dual Monarchy and brought Rumania back into the limelight of Austro-German diplomacy.

The Habsburg leaders, blaming their military predicament in Galicia upon the delay of a promised German supporting offensive²⁰⁾, bombarded their ally with frantic requests for assistance.²¹⁾ But with a Russian invasion force still in East Prussia and the critical Marne engagement approaching, the German military was fully occupied with its own problems. Unable to send immediate aid to Conrad, the German leaders quite naturally thought again of the twenty divisions prewar Triplice planning had counted on from Rumania. Using the brilliant success of his armies in Northern France and East Prussia as encouragement, the Kaiser telegraphed King Carol on September 3, appealing for him to intervene and stop "the Russian flood".²²⁾ Carol replied that despite the desire of his "whole heart" he could not respond because of the agitated state of public opinion and his inability to find a government which would

pp. 192—345, (esp. pp. 321—335); Rudolf Kiszling, *Osterreich-Ungarns Anteil am Ersten Weltkrieg*, Graz, 1958, pp. 10—16; C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *A History of the Great War*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1934, pp. 39—40, 48—52; Cyril Falls, *The Great War*, New York, 1959, pp. 10—11, 53, 58—62. For a detailed treatment of the struggle for Lemberg, see Max Freiherr von Pitreich, *Lemberg 1914*, Wien, 1929. On the situation in Bukovina see Eduard Fischer, *Krieg ohne Heer*, Wien, 1935, pp. 32—112, or the shorter account, Alexander von Randa, "Die Bukovina in den Weltkriegen" in Franz Lang (ed.), *Buchenland. Hundertfünfzig Jahre Deutschtum in der Bukovina*, München, 1961, pp. 133—36.

¹⁹⁾ On the chaos and lack of coordination between Conrad, General Potiorek (the commander of the force marshalled against Serbia), and the political authorities, see Tisza to Berchtold, 24 August 1914, Tisza, *Briefe*, p. 59; Conrad, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 879; Mühlmann, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁰⁾ Reichsarchiv, *Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918*, fourteen vols., Berlin, 1925—44, I (1925), pp. 3—14, 259—64, III (1926), pp. 188—9; *Osterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg*, I, pp. 332—5; Conrad, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 523—5 *passim*; and Paul K. Freiwirth, "Germany and Austria-Hungary as Allies 1914—1916", unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Maryland, 1961, pp. 204—13.

²¹⁾ Tschirschky to F. O., 4 September, Jagow to F. O., 6 September, Jagow to F. O. 9 September, Jagow to F. O., 11 September, and Tschirschky to F. O., 12 September 1914, Archives of the German Foreign Ministry 1867—1920, National Archives, Washington, D. C., microfilm serial 5276, frames E 327 194, E 327 226, E 327 242, E 327 250 (Hereafter documents from this source will be cited as N. A. followed by series and frame number).

²²⁾ William II to Carol, 3 September 1914, U. C. I—17/207.

carry out his policy. He promised to do all in his power to reverse this situation but pleaded that it would take "time and money".²³⁾ That Carol meant what he said is confirmed by his eager espousal of intervention the next day as he discussed the Kaiser's demarche with Conservative Party Chief Alexander Marghiloman. Rumania would be forced to make a "decision" in twenty to twenty-five days, he predicted. If this were true, Marghiloman responded, Austria-Hungary must concede something to assuage public opinion: a statute for Transylvania and the ceding of the Rumanian portion of Bukovina which included the grave of Stephen the Great. Although Carol agreed that something should be done, he told Marghiloman that he could not mention Bukovina lest Vienna cry "blackmail" and that he thought the demand for a statute too far-reaching.²⁴⁾ Manifesting none of Carol's reticence, Marghiloman immediately visited Count Heinrich von Waldberg, the German Secretary of Legation, to enlist Berlin's support in what was becoming a veritable crusade to elicit concessions from the Dual Monarchy. He received a sympathetic hearing as he related the conversation with the king, especially when he assured Waldberg that accommodation on the part of Vienna and Budapest would make possible Rumania's active intervention. Unless something were done quickly, Marghiloman warned, a Russian offer of Bukovina might unloose an uproar that could well force Carol to abdicate.²⁵⁾ At least three other prominent Rumanian political and military figures made similar recommendations to the German legation and Carol himself told Czernin on September 9 that Tisza could greatly help the cause of Rumania's active intervention if he would give the Hungarian Rumanians "positive promises".²⁶⁾

To the German leadership gathered at Supreme Headquarters in Luxemburg, nervously awaiting the outcome of the battle before Paris, the Rumanian demands seemed an acceptable price for the

²³⁾ Carol to William II, 7 September 1914, U. C. I—17/225.

²⁴⁾ Marghiloman insisted that "more should be asked in order to obtain what we need". Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 257—60.

²⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, I. p. 260; Waldthausen to F. O., 6 September 1914, U. C. I—17/222. Marghiloman attempted to increase German interest by exaggerating Rumania's military preparedness, stating that Rumanian cavalry could be mobilized in four days.

²⁶⁾ Waldthausen to F. O., 6, 7 September 1914, U. C. I—17/217—23. Czernin to Berchtold 9 September 1914, 11 September, H.H.St.A., Politisches Archiv I, Karton Rot 517. (Hereafter cited as P. A. I, Rot, and number).

military aid Austria-Hungary needed so desperately. Emphasizing Rumania's influence upon "the entire situation in Galicia and the Balkans", Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg told Vienna on September 7 that the Rumanian concessions were "pressingly desirable". He instructed Tschirschky to "support warmly" King Carol's request, bringing the issue before Emperor Francis Joseph personally if necessary.²⁷⁾ At first the Habsburg leaders refused to consider the possibility of concessions. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Leopold von Berchtold replied initially that "under no circumstances" would he "enter into Rumania's blackmail"²⁸⁾, adding later:

Austria Hungary conducted the war only for the maintenance of her integrity. If she wished to permit a dismemberment of her provinces, it would have been better to avoid the war and the enormous sacrifice of blood and money and to grant hungry neighbors pieces of [her] own territory without fighting. If one should cede Bukovina or a part thereof, Italy would march into the Trentino. In Bucarest it would be said that Austria had been humbled by Rumania in order then with the next opportunity to claim more ... Before the monarchy would surrender herself to her neighbors it would be better to give up completely.²⁹⁾

This closing threat of a separate peace was more explicit in Berchtold's instructions to his ambassador in Berlin, Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe: "Your excellency may mention to the state secretary conversationally, of course without authorization, that if Germany did not send the assistance agreed upon but suggested the cession of provinces, we, if we followed this last counsel, would be immediately forced to end a war in which we were unnecessarily bloodied through a conclusion of peace."³⁰⁾ The available evidence

²⁷⁾ Bethmann to F. O., 7 September 1914, U. C. I—17/228, 230; On second thought, Bethmann cancelled his instructions for Tschirschky to go over Berchtold's head to the Emperor. Bethman to F. O., 7 September 1914, U. C. I—17/229. On the attitudes prevailing at German Supreme Headquarters early in September, see Egmont Zechlin, „Friedensbestrebungen und Revolutionierungsversuche“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochen-Zeitung „Das Parlament“, B 20/63, Hamburg, 15 May 1963, pp. 11—20 and Jäschke, op. cit., pp. 331—7.

²⁸⁾ Zimmermann to Jagow, 8 September 1914, U. C. I—17/238 (marginalia).

²⁹⁾ Tschirschky to F. O., 9 September 1914, U. C. I—17/244; Memorandum by Berchtold, 9 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 500.

³⁰⁾ Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 8 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 500. Tisza, when he read Berchtold's instructions to Hohenlohe, expressed regret that reference had been made to peace and feared that it would make a "bad impression" on the German leaders. A few days earlier he had written Berchtold that the Habsburg government must prove its value to Germany through fidelity to the alliance and the greatest possible effort in prosecuting the war. German proposals regarding

gives no indication that Hohenlohe found occasion to make a communication to this effect.³¹⁾

On September 9, the day the German retreat at the Marne began, Bethmann wired a sharply-worded rejoinder to Berchtold's arguments, written under the impact of a particularly urgent Austro-Hungarian appeal for aid:

The General Staff declares that it is not yet possible to help Austria. Under these circumstances it appears urgently necessary that Austria win Rumania even also at great sacrifice. . . . The situation is so serious that one must not shrink back from the most extreme measures. . . . According to human calculation, if Rumania joins with us the Russian danger will be eliminated and therewith a favorable outcome of the war prepared. It is up to the Viennese Cabinet to make decisions at this critical time which demand of them heavy sacrifice. But the magnitude of these sacrifices cannot be compared with the advantages which a victorious war certainly promise it, let alone with a catastrophe which an unsuccessful war would bring to both monarchies. I assume that the Viennese cabinet will be conscious of the seriousness of its responsibility.³²⁾

Privately, the German leaders found it hard to reconcile the adamant Austrian refusal to consider concessions with the pathetic appeals from Conrad for aid. This led them to wonder, though only half-seriously, if the Habsburg military situation were really so critical as Conrad pictured it.³³⁾

Within three days, however, the Austro-Hungarian government did an about face, dropping its unconditional opposition to concessions and asking Berlin to assist in opening negotiations with Bucarest. Several influences effected this reversal. One was the reporting of Count Czernin. As an important figure in the entourage of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand and reportedly the latter's foreign minister designate, Czernin had long advocated that the status of the Monarchy's Rumanians be elevated through the reorganization of the Habsburg realm on a federal basis.³⁴⁾ He seems to have been motivated more by a bitter hatred of Hungary than by a concern for minority rights and hoped in this way to destroy

concessions should be met with a friendly if firm attitude. Tisza to Berchtold, 3, 4, 10 September 1914, T i s z a, Briefe, pp. 69, 72—3, 77. However at German Supreme Headquarters the Austro-Hungarian military situation had already awakened fear that Vienna would seek a way out of the war. Gr ö n e r, op. cit., p. 200.

³¹⁾ Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 9 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 500; Zimmermann to Jagow, 8 September 1914, U. C. I—17/238 (marginalia).

³²⁾ Bethmann to Tschirschky, 9 September 1914, U. C. I—17/242.

³³⁾ Bethmann to Tschirschky, 10 September 1914, U. C. I—17/276.

³⁴⁾ Robert A. K a n n, "Count Ottokar Czernin and Archduke Francis Ferdinand", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVI, Boulder (Colorado), 1956, p. 126-7.

the unique privilege and power the Magyars enjoyed as a result of the *Ausgleich* of 1867.³⁵⁾ Despite an apparent understanding with *Tisza* prior to taking the legation in Bucarest in 1913, Czernin maintained an open sympathy for the aspirations of the Hungarian Rumanians which made him suspect in Budapest.³⁶⁾ Robert Kann, in examining Czernin's prewar career, draws up a severe indictment of his character and ability, concluding that even his "basic integrity is very much open to doubt".³⁷⁾ While the evidence from the German and Austrian diplomatic archives available for the present study does not yield such a harsh verdict, it does lend some support to Kann's milder criticism of Czernin a "inconsistent" and a "political Don Quixote"³⁸⁾. But even in the face of these allegations, the fact remains that Czernin's dispatches from Bucarest in the fall of 1914 demonstrate a grasp of the Rumanian situation that was generally quite perceptive — certainly far more so than that of his German colleagues. He recognized much sooner than they that Rumania's foreign relations would be characterized by sheer opportunism and he correctly identified Brătianu as the leading exponent of this policy at a time when the Germans naïvely believed that the Rumanian premier's "heart is on our side".³⁹⁾ The military situation and not concessions would ultimately be decisive for Rumania's attitude, he insisted. A "decisive victory or decisive defeats are more important than the Transylvanian question", he wrote on September 11 in regard to the appeasement of Rumania, "in the first case it would not be needed, in the latter it would be useless". Yet in a prolonged conflict he feared the effect of the worsening of public

³⁵⁾ Czernin could write the archduke on 31 August 1913: "I have no more interest in Count Tisza than in the rest of that Magyar lot. The Magyar clique is a plague spot on the body of the Monarchy . . ." (By the "Magyar clique" Czernin meant the circle of advisors around Berchtold at the Ballhausplatz, chiefly Section Chief Count Johann Forgach and Chief of Cabinet Alexander Hoyos). *Ibid.*, pp. 123-6.

³⁶⁾ Soon after taking up his duties in Bucarest, Czernin gave a newspaper interview in which he criticized Hungary's nationalities policy. *Ibid.*, p. 127. Yet Tisza maintained a generous attitude toward Czernin, respecting his reporting and, in the midst of his busy wartime schedule, even finding time to take an interest in Czernin's wife and children who were then in Vienna. See Tisza to Czernin, 7 September 1914, *Tisza*, Briefe, p. 75.

³⁷⁾ *Kann*, "Count Czernin", p. 143.

³⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 143—4 see below.

³⁹⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 1 August 1914, H.H.St.A., *Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914*. Also, Czernin to Berchtold, 18, 27 August and 10 September 1914, H.H. St.A., P. A. I, Rot 511, 517.

opinion in Rumania and therefore joined temporarily with the Germans in support of concessions.⁴⁰⁾ His action was, of course, inconsistent but completely understandable.

Support for "buying" Rumania also came from the Austrian military. Hardpressed, out of reserves and still in retreat, Conrad was ready to test the faint hope of assistance held out by Marghiloman's demarche. He and his nominal superior, Archduke Friedrich, telegraphed a pessimistic picture of the Austro-Hungarian military predicament to the Emperor and requested that the concessions, including the cession in Bukovina, be granted provided Rumania was ready to march against Russia with its "battle-ready" army.⁴¹⁾ The general pressure of the military situation, reflected in Conrad's demarche, was undoubtedly the greatest single influence in favor of appeasing Rumania.

Nevertheless, the attitude of Count Tisza toward the proposed concessions would be decisive. The Rumanian problem, after all, was primarily his concern. But even more important, Tisza was the most powerful personality in the Dual Monarchy, exercising an enormous amount of influence over Emperor Francis Joseph. The Hungarian premier combined a brilliant and perceptive mind with an iron will and immense energy, all of which he placed unreservedly at the service of his fatherland. His fervent Magyar chauvinism had brought upon him the hatred of the minority groups while his rigid class orientation and his rough political tactics had earned him many enemies among his own people. With his personal ambition submerged in devotion to race and country, Tisza had dedicated himself not only to preserving the equal status Hungary enjoyed in the Dual Monarchy but indeed to making her supreme.⁴²⁾ At the first mention of Marghiloman's demarche, Tisza poured out his scorn for the Rumanians and insisted quite correctly: "even the most far-reaching concessions would have no influence..."; their

⁴⁰⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 9, 10, 12, 13 September, Czernin to Tisza, 11 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁴¹⁾ Conrad, op. cit., IV, pp. 723—4; Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 12 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁴²⁾ On Tisza see the "Introduction" by Oskar von Wertheimer to Tisza, Briefe, pp. 9—35 and Gustav Erenyi, Graf Stefan Tisza, Wien, 1935. For an example of his influence at the Hofburg, note his role in Berchtold's dismissal in January, 1915. Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold — Staatsmann and Grandseigneur, two vols., Wien, 1963, II, Chapter Four.

attitude would be determined "exclusively" by military developments.⁴³⁾ Yet Tisza was an astute politician. Already he had seen the value in some gesture of accommodation toward his Rumanian minority as a means of strengthening their loyalty to the war effort and of placating Berlin. With this in mind, he had begun to prepare some minor concessions even before they were formally requested.⁴⁴⁾ It was therefore relatively easy for Tisza to adapt this action to the German-supported request from King Carol. On September 11, he indicated his willingness to make a "declaration" regarding the status of Hungary's Rumanian minority but only after Rumania went to war. He specifically rejected the possibility of a "special legal position" for Transylvania as Marghiloman's mention of a statute implied.⁴⁵⁾ Two days later Tisza received a group of Transylvanian leaders, including Iuliu Maniu and Alexander Vaida Voevod, and mentioned "relief for the confessional schools with non-Hungarian language of instruction, modification of the Apponyi school laws⁴⁶⁾, as well as a similar modification of the electoral law with a view toward a less unfavorable representation for the Rumanians." While the others expressed some interest in this vague

⁴³⁾ Tisza to Czernin, 7 September 1914, T i s z a, Briefe, p. 75.

⁴⁴⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 4 September 1914, *Ibid.*, pp. 72—4; Tisza to Czernin, 11 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517. He also dispatched two Hungarian Rumanian bishops to Bucarest to ascertain the true state of affairs there and ostensibly to affirm the loyalty of the Transylvanians to the Habsburg Empire. Publicly the bishops acted as Tisza desired but privately they spread the word that the Rumanian masses in Hungary were "heavy with despotism" and if Rumania did not liberate them would prefer to fall under Russian control than to remain under Hungarian rule. Ion Rusu Abrudeanu, Dr. Miron Cristea: Omul si Faptele, București, 1929, p. 222; Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 261—6; Tisza to Czernin, 14 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517. One may question how widespread these sentiments really were in Transylvania. It is a fact that during the early stages of the war the Rumanians in the Austro-Hungarian army fought loyally if not always effectively. Tisza to Berchtold, 22 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Rudolf Kiszling, „Das Nationalitätenproblem in Habsburgs Wehrmacht 1848—1918“, *Der Donauraum*, IV, Graz, 1959, p. 89.

⁴⁵⁾ Tisza to Czernin, 11 September, Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 12 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁴⁶⁾ The Apponyi school laws of 1907 are too complicated to be summarized briefly and it must suffice to say that they marked the intensification of the process of Magyarization and therefore became a focal point for the complaints of the minorities, especially the Rumanians. See Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, pp. 422—5 and A. J. May, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1867—1914*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, pp. 374—5.

offer, Maniu, anxious to avoid compromising himself or the Rumanian national movement by dealing with Tisza, maintained a cool reserve.⁴⁷⁾

Tisza's willingness to consider Rumanian grievances and the support of the Austrian military appear to have been the decisive factors behind a decision, made on September 12 in a *Kronrat* presided over by Emperor Francis Joseph, to enter into negotiations for the purchase of Rumania's active assistance. The price to be offered was a future "boundary rectification" in Bukovina, including Suceava, and Tisza's promise of concessions for Hungary's Rumanian minority. Berchtold, like the other Habsburg leaders, was justifiably skeptical that Rumania could be moved to intervene at this time and demanded as a prerequisite, even to the opening of negotiations, a secret declaration by the Rumanian government that it was "ready to march against Russia immediately with all [its] power". To spare the Monarchy the embarrassment of a refusal, he asked that the German government act as mediator with its minister in Bucarest communicating the offer to Carol personally.⁴⁸⁾

Although the Austro-Hungarian leaders withheld the details of their decision, especially regarding the cession of Suceava, news of their willingness to initiate discussions with the Rumanian government cast a ray of hope over the German leaders at Luxemburg who were just beginning to realize the ominous implications of the Marne retreat. "We joyfully greet [the] compromising attitude of the Hungarian government...", Bethmann responded. But he warned that now Rumania would probably demand more than previously.⁴⁹⁾ The next day the German government announced that it was now able to send troops to assist Conrad in Galicia and demanded in return that "Austria-Hungary leave no stone unturned to win again

⁴⁷⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 14 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A., Rot 517. V. V. Tilea, Iuliu Maniu: *Der Mann und das Werk*, Hermannstadt, 1927, p. 11.

⁴⁸⁾ Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 12 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Hantsch, *op. cit.* II, p. 677.

⁴⁹⁾ Bethmann to F. O., 13 September 1914, U. C. I—17/281. Although the news of the change in the Austro-Hungarian attitude coincided with the arrival of reports of Hindenburg's second victory in East Prussia, Admiral Müller notes in his diary that a "very depressed" atmosphere reigned at Supreme Headquarters. On the evening of September 14, Falkenhayn replaced Moltke. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 56. Zimmermann (in Berlin) was more optimistic, giving Hohenlohe the impression that he believed Rumania would enter the war soon. Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 13 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

the support of Rumania which has been taken from us through the fault of the policy of Vienna and Pest."⁵⁰⁾ The German leaders were eager of course to perform the role of mediator and decided to speed up the dispatch of a new minister, Baron Hilmar von dem Bussche, to the Rumanian capital for this purpose. The incumbent, Julius von Waldthausen, had been under heavy fire from a number of German businessmen and propagandists in Bucarest who had direct access to the chancellor, as well as from Alexander Beldiman, the Rumanian minister in Berlin. According to the official personnel records of the Foreign Office, these men all agreed that Waldthausen "... had no influence with the Rumanian government ... and his reports were not accurate."⁵¹⁾

Bussche, just returned from an assignment in Buenos Aires⁵²⁾, certainly possessed the energy Waldthausen is reputed to have lacked but he had no experience in Rumanian affairs and he was entering an extremely difficult situation. Enroute to Bucarest he made stop-overs in Vienna and Budapest where Berchtold and Tisza made it clear that they wanted him simply to launch a "trial balloon" in an attempt to get the Rumanian government to spell out its price for intervention. He was not to make a definite offer, especially in regard to the boundary rectification.⁵³⁾ This attitude seems to con-

⁵⁰⁾ Jagow to F. O., 14 September 1914, U. C. I—17/282—3.

⁵¹⁾ Politisches Archiv, Bonn, Kurz-Biographien, pp. 1652—8, esp. entry dated 12 September 1914. Bethmann to F. O., 13 September 1914, U. C. I—17/281. Typical of the extravagant criticism leveled at Waldthausen was that of Ludwig Roselius, a coffee importer from Bremen, who had extensive business interests in the Balkans and who was directing German propaganda and bribery activity in Bucarest. He thought that both Waldthausen and Czernin acted as if they were "in Europe and not the Orient" and consequently failed to adapt their conduct to the "brutal instincts of a completely uncivilized people". He contrasted their activity unfavorably with that of the Russian ambassador who "flatters the people in a manner which would cause him to be shown the door in any civilized country. He gambles and carouses with the young officers all night and if he wins he forgets it. Naturally he has the best horses and the best women." Report by Roselius, 3 September, 1914, U. C. I—17/287. But Waldthausen's ineffectiveness seems well established. Marghiloman notes in his diary that he always dealt with Waldberg, the secretary of the German legation because Waldthausen's "understanding, in truth, is slow". Marghiloman, op. cit., I, p. 260.

⁵²⁾ Bussche was destined to become Under-Secretary for foreign affairs at the Wilhelmstrasse in 1916. See Karl E. Birnbaum, *Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare*, Stockholm, 1958, pp. 216—8.

⁵³⁾ Berchtold to Czernin, 14 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Fürstenburg (Budapest) to F. O., 17 September 1914, U. C. I—17/396.

firm that the Austro-Hungarian leaders had no real expectation that an agreement could be consummated and viewed the whole affair first, as a means of winning time for the stabilization of the military situation and second, as a method of placating Berlin.

While the Germans clung to a false hope of purchasing Rumania's active assistance, their allies, with a more realistic conception of the objectives being formulated in Bucarest, placed their faith instead in immediate German aid on a larger scale. In pursuit of this objective and also, apparently, to sound out the German leaders regarding their determination to continue the war, Emperor Francis Joseph sent a military aide, Field Marshall Ritter von Marterer, to Berlin and Luxemburg.⁵⁴⁾ At Supreme Headquarters, Marterer and Hohenlohe (who had accompanied the field marshall from Berlin) created something of a sensation. Marterer's report on the Austro-Hungarian military position in Galicia made a "critical and unfavorable impression" upon the German leaders who were already deeply depressed over the retreat at the Marne and over alarming reports from King Carol that the Russian invasion of Galicia and Bukovina had unleashed an irredentist current among his people that might soon force him to choose between sanctioning an occupation of Transylvania and abdicating.⁵⁵⁾ Kaiser William, Hohenlohe reported later to Berchtold, was "extraordinarily nervous", and while "determined to continue the war in common until the most extreme . . . affirmed again and again that the situation was never so serious." Hohenlohe went on to summarize the German arguments as follows:

... we should *par un beau geste* throw the Rumanians a crumb, thereby purchasing their intervention. Everything was at stake . . . the Monarchy could compensate itself elsewhere were such a sacrifice indeed to be made . . . The Kaiser repeated that the key to the success of the campaign lay in Bucarest which we must win . . . But of course if it should not succeed, we should not declare war in case Rumania marched into Transylvania but only protest and make it appear

⁵⁴⁾ Conrad, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 793; Zimmermann to Jagow, 16 September 1914, N. A. 5276/E 327 283. Count Hoyos, Berchtold's closest confidant, who had accompanied the field marshall as far as Berlin, probably for the purpose of briefing Hohenlohe, called at the Wilhelmstrasse for a long discussion with Zimmermann before returning to Vienna. Hoyos's resume of the conversation indicates that Zimmermann expressed himself much more favorably toward Vienna's reticence in regard to concessions than did his superiors at Supreme Headquarters. Hoyos Memorandum, 18 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 500.

⁵⁵⁾ Waldberg to F. O., 16 September 1914, Bethmann to F. O., 19 September, U. C. I—17/362, 407; Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

as if Rumania intended simply to protect Transylvania from the Russians. A Rumanian declaration of war will unconditionally lead to one from Italy on us also. This would result in the end of both imperial monarchies.⁵⁶⁾

In discussing the Rumanian question at the Kaiser's dinner table, Marterer mentioned the September 12 decision of the Crown Council to cede the Suceava district of Bukovina, if necessary, in order to win Rumania. Hohenlohe immediately contested the field marshal's authority to make this disclosure.⁵⁷⁾ The Germans, who had no idea that such a definite decision had been made concerning the cession of territory, were angered at having being kept in the dark. Bethmann scolded Vienna by wire: "Hereby additional days were lost in which we could have negotiated in Bucarest, hours which with the progressively more critical temper in Rumania could be fateful." He sought permission to make the cession of Suceava the subject of an immediate demarche in Bucarest and told Tschirschky to demand compliance regardless of the ill will it might provoke from the emperor or the Ballhausplatz.⁵⁸⁾ Falkenhayn informed the Austrian military that, in his opinion, a definitive military victory could be obtained before winter if Vienna succeeded in winning Rumania's cooperation through concessions.⁵⁹⁾

Berchtold replied firmly that the cession could be made only at the successful conclusion of a common war. Exercising insight the Germans lacked, he pointed out that an official offer of Suceava now would be interpreted in Bucarest as an act of desperation and evoke analogous demands from Italy.⁶⁰⁾ He argued, again quite correctly, that Rumania would under no circumstances attack Russia while the

⁵⁶⁾ Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517. The German government had been trying for several days to convince Vienna that as last resort a "protective occupation" of Transylvania by Rumania would be preferable to an armed conflict. Nevertheless, Bethmann attempted to dissuade Carol from considering such a move, terming it "very dangerous" and when so requested by Forgach in a telephone call from Vienna on September 18, Zimmermann agreed to instruct Bussche again to oppose the idea in Bucarest. Bethmann to Waldberg, 17 September 1914, U. C. I—17/374; Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 18 September, Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁵⁷⁾ Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁵⁸⁾ Bethmann to F. O., 19, 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/407, 409, 466.

⁵⁹⁾ Conrad, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 814.

⁶⁰⁾ Duke Giuseppe Avarna, the Austrophil Italian ambassador in Vienna, gave substance to Berchtold's argument by remarking that the cession of Bukovina would have "fateful consequences" in Italy. Tschirschky to F. O., 14 September 1914, U. C. I—22/323.

latter's armies were on the offensive.⁶¹⁾ It took Bussche only 48 hours in Bucarest to come to the latter conclusion also. After interviews with Brătianu and other Rumanian politicians he wired Berlin that all efforts should now be directed toward defeating the rising tide of chauvinism which not only made cooperation impossible but which made a Rumanian attack on Austria-Hungary a distinct possibility.⁶²⁾ At least one important commentator⁶³⁾, like the German statesmen themselves, erroneously assumes that the attempt to win Rumania with concessions failed because it came too late, the implication being that if the offer had been made before or even shortly after the outbreak of war it would have been accepted. The truth of the matter is that this attempt to purchase Rumania's assistance failed, as did all subsequent attempts to influence her policy substantially with concessions, because Rumanian national ambitions dictated the destruction of the Dual Monarchy. Nothing that Austria-Hungary could realistically be expected to offer could outweigh this argument. A consideration of the Rumanian internal situation will make this clear.

III

The spectacular Austrian retreat in Galicia and the Russian penetration of Bukovina fanned the glowing coals of Rumanian irredentism into a burning flame. As if the natural reaction to what appeared to be the impending breakup of the Habsburg Empire was not enough, the fires of fanatical nationalism were deliberately stoked by the military and diplomatic representatives of the Triple Entente and their Rumanian friends. They were assisted by the Balkan tradition of "baksheesh" which made virtually all journalists and politicians responsive to corruption and bribery.⁶⁴⁾ A full consideration of the irredentist current and its impact on Rumanian internal politics lies beyond the scope of this study. However, in

⁶¹⁾ Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁶²⁾ Bussche to F. O., 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/424.

⁶³⁾ M ü h l m a n n, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

⁶⁴⁾ For some general comments on this tradition, see Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 483. For a discussion of the origin of the term "baksheesh" (tip, gratuity, bribe) and its tradition in the Balkans and Near East, see Ray A l a n, "The Three Horsemen of the Arab Wasteland—Hashish, Bakshesh, Maalish", *Commentary*, XIII, New York, 1951, pp. 101—8.

order to impart some idea of the strength and influence of the movement, a few characteristics may be mentioned.

The Bucarest press provided the sounding board for the interventionist agitation. Driven, for the most part, by honest Rumanian nationalism, but lubricated by "showers of corrupting baksheesh", it worked overtime to publish exaggerated accounts of Austro-German defeats and Entente victories, flanked by inflammatory editorials. By the first of September the most widely read newspapers were united in a mighty chorus: "We want war! We want Transylvania!"⁶⁵⁾ The expenditure of fantastic sums by agents of the Central Powers made little or no impression on the tone of the Bucarest dailies.⁶⁶⁾ Street demonstrations, fomented by professional agitators in the pay of foreign agents contributed to the clamor.⁶⁷⁾ Although devoted primarily to Austrophobia and war mongering, the current also included anti-German and then anti-dynastic trends. There was widespread talk of forcing King Carol to abdicate if he failed to countenance an attack on the Dual Monarchy. In anticipation, young rowdies plastered the royal palace with "For Rent" signs.⁶⁸⁾ Pro-Russian sentiment was strong in the army and high-ranking officers expounded Ententophile sentiments in public or openly indoctrinated their troops.⁶⁹⁾

⁶⁵⁾ I. G h e o r g h i u, "Relațiile Româno-Ruse în Perioada Neutralității României (1914 — August 1916)", *Studii și Referate privind Istoria României*, two vols., București, 1954, I, p. 1457; D. C. G a n e, P. P. Carp, two vols., București, 1936, II, p. 522; Nicolae I o r g a, *O viață de om; așa cum a fost*, two vols., București, 1934, II, p. 215; C. X e n i, *Take Ionescu (1858—1922)*, 3rd. ed. București, 1933, p. 280; Report of Roselius, 3 September, Waldthausen to F. O., 11 September 1914, U. C. I—17/253, 263; Czernin to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁶⁶⁾ Bethmann telegraphed Bussche on September 19 that "for the purchase of leading newspapers 10 million would be available, if it will bring success". Bethmann to F. O., 19 September 1914, U. C. I—17/410.

⁶⁷⁾ Few attempts were made to hide the involvement of foreign agents and foreign money. N. P o l i z u - M i c ș u n e ș t i, *Niculae Filipescu: Însemnări 1914—1916*, București, 1936, p. 119. Fasciotti considered the activity of the French minister in organizing street demonstrations "very forward" and "very imprudent". Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 16 October 1914, Italy, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (5th serio, 1914—1918)* I, (hereafter cited as I. D.) no. 946.

⁶⁸⁾ Tjaben (consul) to F. O., 14, 16 September, Waldberg to F. O., 16 September, 1914, U. C. I—17/349, 372, 369. C. B a c a l b a ș a, *București de alta data*, four vols., București, 1927—36, IV (1936), pp. 184—5; Eugen W o l b e, *Ferdinand I: Begründer Groß-Rumäniens*, Locarno, 1938, p. 109.

⁶⁹⁾ M a r g h i l o m a n, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 253—276.

The irredentist current cut across party lines. Take Ionescu, leader of the Conservative Democrats, Nicolae Filipescu of the Conservative Party, and Emil Costinescu, Minister of Finance in the Liberal Cabinet, at one time formed a virtual interventionist triumvirate. In the prewar era all had been considered friends of Germany but the opportunity presented by the war for the realization of Rumania's national ideal proved to be irresistible. Ionescu, through his newspaper *La Roumanie* and his followers who included his brother Toma, rector of Bucarest University, clamored for the breakup of the Habsburg Empire which he contemptuously dismissed as an historical "anachronism".⁷⁰⁾ Filipescu, an emotional, demagogic orator, harangued the masses.⁷¹⁾ Costinescu led the interventionist group within the cabinet and used his official powers to hinder the export of oil and grain to Germany and to interfere with the latter's shipment of war material to Bulgaria and Turkey.⁷²⁾

By mid-September the irredentist current reached decidedly threatening proportions, Marghiloman, Carol, and Brătianu, the main opponents of an immediate attack on the Dual Monarchy, were hard-pressed to resist the pressure of the interventionists. In the September 17 meeting of the executive committee of the Conservative Party, Filipescu demanded that Rumania immediately intervene and give Austria the "finishing blow". It was only by agreeing to prepare the terrain for intervention that Marghiloman persuaded the majority to follow him in reaffirming neutrality.⁷³⁾ This hostility on the part of his own people and the beginnings of doubt regarding the invincibility of the German army threw King Carol into deep pessimism. Also on September 17, he told Czernin that he could not "hold out much longer" and talked of abdicating. Czernin rebuked him, insisting that "God had put him in his post and he could not

⁷⁰⁾ On Ionescu, see the biography by C. X e n i, op. cit., esp. pp. 274—277. Also, St. A n t i n, *Alte Studii și Portrete*, București, 1939, pp. 50—1, 57—8.

⁷¹⁾ For Filipescu's activity, see P o l i z u - M i c ș u n e ș t i, op. cit., pp. 88—97; M a r g h i l o m a n, op. cit. I, pp. 265—267; and Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 14 September 1914, I. D., I, no. 672.

⁷²⁾ *Jurnalele Consiliului de Ministri*, no. 2115, 22 August 1914, Arhiva de Stat, Bucarest; I. R u s u A b r u d e a n u, *România și Războiul Mondial*, București, 1921, pp. 78—9; X e n i, op. cit., p. 265; Memorandum by Stauss, 28 September 1914, U. C. I—17/531; and below, footnote.

⁷³⁾ M a r g h i l o m a n, op. cit., I, pp. 265—72; P o l i z u - M i c ș u n e ș t i, op. cit., pp. 97—103.

flee". As a "special sign of confidence" to prove his loyalty to the Central Powers but which he admitted would "stamp him almost as a traitor to his own people", Carol asked that Vienna inspire Bulgaria to threaten Rumania publicly with attack should the latter invade Transylvania. This, he hoped, would "finally bring people here to reason and they will then lie down".⁷⁴⁾

With the decline in the influence of King Carol, the direction of Rumania's foreign policy passed almost completely into the capable hands of Ion I. C. Brătianu, a crafty, secretive practitioner of "Realpolitik", a man ideally suited to conduct the diplomatic dissimulation Rumania's self-interest dictated. Although as strongly dedicated to the aggrandisement of his country as the chauvinists, Brătianu recognized more clearly than they that the war was as yet undecided and that a premature commitment could be disastrous. He also realized that an attack on the Central Powers would not be a repetition of the promenade into Bulgaria in 1913, especially in light of the woeful state of Rumania's military preparedness.⁷⁵⁾ Furthermore, Brătianu was a firm believer in the necessity of the dynasty and wished to avoid a crisis which he felt might lead to internal unrest and political chaos. For these reasons he opposed the demands of the interventionists equally as strongly as he resisted the desire of King Carol to align Rumania with the Central Powers. To the Ententophiles he was "cowardly" or "pro-German" while in Berlin and Vienna his policy was variously interpreted as "weak" or "Russophile".⁷⁶⁾ In reality, Brătianu was conducting a shrewd

⁷⁴⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 17 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 515. For background information on Carol during this period, see Lindenbergh, op. cit., II, pp. 300 ff, and Eugen Wolbe, *Carmen Sylva. Der Lebensweg einer einsamen Königin*, Leipzig, 1933, pp. 261—7.

⁷⁵⁾ Brătianu told the cabinet on September 23 that the equipment of the army "leaves much to be desired". This was a classical understatement. General D. Iliescu, secretary-general of the ministry of war (Brătianu was minister of war as well as premier), revealed after the war that the only operational plan possessed by the Rumanian army was for an attack on Russia in conjunction with the Central Powers. *Jurnalele Consiliului de Miniștri*, no. 2316, 23 September 1914, Arhiva de stat, Bucarest; General D. Iliescu, *Documente privitoare la Războiul pentru întregirea României*, București, 1924, pp. 11—13.

⁷⁶⁾ Tjaben to F. O., 16 September 1914, U. C. I—17/372; Czernin to Berchtold, 10 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Czernin to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., *Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bucarest/1914*. For some general estimates of Brătianu's policy, see N. Bănescu, *Ion I. C. Brătianu*, Craiova, 1931, pp. 137—9; I. G. Ducea, *Portrete și Amintiri*, București, 1925, pp. 26—7; Iorga, *O viață de*

and skillful policy — secretly preparing to profit from the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire while at the same time attempting to retain some semblance of rapport with the Central Powers in order to be protected if the latter were ultimately victorious. His personal preferences as well as his judgment of the prospects of the war may be inferred from the fact that while he eagerly solicited Russian promises for the annexation of Transylvania he evidenced virtually no interest in repeated Austro-German offers of Bessarabia.⁷⁷⁾ After the battle of the Marne which weakened the widely-held belief in the invincibility of the German army, Brătianu began to step up his preparations for the partition of the Dual Monarchy — whenever that might come.

One such move was to increase his pressure on St. Petersburg for a written promise of Austro-Hungarian territory as payment for a Rumanian commitment to remain neutral vis-a-vis Russia until the end of the war. His able envoy in the Russian capital, Constantin Diamandi, had instructions to work in this direction. In Bucarest, he found the Russian Minister, Stanislav Poklevskii, a willing accomplice to this policy.⁷⁸⁾ A parallel move

om, II, p. 215. Devious and secretive even to the extent of leaving his closest friends and advisors mystified as to his real intentions, Brătianu conducted the foreign policy of Rumania on a strictly personal basis. Highly desirous of close relations with Italy, he was more candid with Fasciotti than probably anyone else, certainly more candid than with any other foreign envoy. In a conversation with the Italian minister on September 28, Brătianu explained his intentions. On the one hand he would resist all attempts to make Rumania march with the Central Powers, while on the other, as Fasciotti relates, he did not intend "to accept the program of those that wish immediately to throw themselves into an adventuresome policy of attacking Austria-Hungary suddenly. He wished to attempt to achieve an accord with the king and with the country, avoiding any violent repression, so as to be able to enter into action when it was necessary and when there was every possibility of success". Fasciotti could well remark that this was a "judicious program". Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 28 September 1914, I. D., I, no. 830.

⁷⁷⁾ As early as August 1, the Central Powers had held out to Rumania the prospect of acquiring Bessarabia. This offer was repeated several times thereafter and would have been emphasized even more except for the general recognition that it had little appeal while the Russian army was on the offensive. Albertini, op. cit., III, p. 567; Bethmann to Carol, 19 September, Jagow to F. O., 25, 28 September, Bussche to F. O., 30 September 1914, U. C. I—17/408, 505, 540, 550.

⁷⁸⁾ At present the best discussion of the Russo-Rumanian negotiations can be found in Alfred J. Rieber, "Russian Diplomacy and Rumania" in *Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe* (Columbia University, Russian Institute Occasional Papers), New York, 1963, esp. pp. 245—249. Also valuable is L. C. Sonovytsky,

was to formalize the community of interest which existed between Italy and Rumania as disaffected members of the Triple Alliance with irredentist claims on Austro-Hungarian territory. The Italian documents now available show that while unofficial exploratory conversations began early in August, neither Rome nor Bucarest was then ready to take the initiative. However, the subsequent military collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia made it appear urgent that they formalize an understanding, as Brătianu put it, "for the liquidation of Austria-Hungary, if the liquidation comes about".⁷⁹⁾ On September 10, Brătianu made a clear bid for the opening of negotiations and after almost a week of cautious reflection and considerable hesitation, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio San Giuliano gave his envoy in Bucarest, Baron Carlo Fasciotti, the permission to open negotiations which the latter had been avidly seeking for over a month.⁸⁰⁾ The Italian-Rumanian Agreement, signed in Bucarest on September 23, provided for a mutual warning of eight days if either party intended to leave neutrality, joint consultation regarding new developments or the need for a more concrete accord, and joint action should a change in policy be necessary. The strictest secrecy was enjoined.⁸¹⁾

"Bukovina in the Diplomatic Negotiations of 1914", *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, VII, New York, 1959, pp. 1586—1629. The major weakness of both these accounts is their neglect of Rumanian sources. Gheorghiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 1452—72 is a Marxian analysis utilizing the more obvious printed Rumanian sources.

⁷⁹⁾ Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 14 September 1914, I. D., no. 671.

⁸⁰⁾ Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 10 September, San Giuliano to Fasciotti, 16 September 1914, I. D., I, nos. 637, 705; See also Cialda, *L'intervento romeno*, pp. 76-8.

⁸¹⁾ The text contained in Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 22 September 1914, I. D., I, no. 773. Apparently Brătianu honored his promise to Rome and did not at that time inform the king or any of the party leaders of the agreement directly. However, he told Marghiloman that he had made "arrangements to communicate everything" to Fasciotti. Almost immediately rumors of the Italian-Rumanian negotiations reached the Ballhausplatz, possibly through Avarna, whose Austrophilism led him to leak information to the Ballhausplatz on a number of occasions. When confronted later by Bussche with this report, Carol "categorically denied" the existence of the agreement. The monarch appears to have been genuinely ignorant as only three days before he had suggested that Germany inspire an Italian threat against Rumania as a means of dampening the irredentist enthusiasm for war. Tschirschky to F. O., 14 September 1914, U. C. I—23/461; Bussche to F. O., 5 October 1914, U. C. II, 17/617; Czernin to Berchtold, 8 October 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

IV

The state of Rumanian public opinion just described and the failure of Bussche's mediation proposals convinced Vienna and Budapest that any accommodation toward Rumania would be useless. Recent reports from Czernin suggested that in Bucarest the stick might be more effective than the carrot. Answering Brătianu's plea of September 19 that interventionist agitation was all but irresistible, the Austro-Hungarian minister replied that the premier's own weakness alone was responsible and that "the mob could be quited if a dozen or so were hanged". Czernin, as the latter related to Berchtold, went on to warn that

the Rumanians would not only find Austro-Hungarian troops in Transylvania but also German and therefore be thrown out again quicker than they thought. The last remark made a noticeable impression on Herr Brătianu although he sought to hide it. He wore himself out to assure me that he would never lend his hand to this but emphasized repeatedly whether he would be able to maintain himself.⁸²⁾

The fact of the matter is that Czernin, acting on Berchtold's suggestion, was bluffing. No German troops were in Transylvania nor were there immediate plans to send any.⁸³⁾ But the idea had such a good effect Czernin recommended that Berlin "really send a few men (one Company) to Kronstadt [Braşov]. This would become known here on the next day and would cause an enormous 'cooling impression' ... This company could be evaluated as the forerunner of an army corps. Believe me the effect would be great. If General Hindenburg were only suspected [of being] in Transylvania with one company, no Rumanian would step over the boundary."⁸⁴⁾

It is not surprising, then, that the Habsburg *Gemeinsamer Ministerrat*, meeting in Vienna on September 20 to consider the Rumanian question, vetoed the German demand for greater accommo-

⁸²⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁸³⁾ Bethmann to F. O., 21 September 1914, U. C. I—17/437.

⁸⁴⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., *Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bucarest/1914*. The German government thought it advisable not to deny the presence of German troops in Transylvania once Czernin had spread information to this effect. German troops were sent to Austria's aid in Galicia and this contributed to the original confusion and to errors made by later commentators (e. g. Mühlmann, *op. cit.*, p. 66). Bethmann to F. O., 21 September 1914, U. C. I—17/437. Within twenty-four hours, rumors spread that Bussche had threatened at Castle Peleşi that "500,000 Germans" would punish Rumania if she entered Transylvania. Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 273.

dation, especially the suggested "preventative occupation" of Transylvania. Berchtold as chairman spoke first and argued that an Austro-Hungarian offer to Rumania would simply increase the latter's demands. On the other hand, he pointed out that Czernin had noted a sobering effect in Bucarest when it became clear that an attack on Austria-Hungary meant war with Germany and probably Bulgaria also. It was his intention to nourish this anxiety. Tisza supported Berchtold's decision to resist the "repeated German demands" but said he was ready to make concessions to Hungary's Rumanian minority in the school and church questions. But autonomy for the province, as the Germans insisted, was out of the question because it would simply lead to greater "complications". Tisza recognized, and quite correctly, that the war had awakened an irredentist passion in Rumania that would be satisfied with nothing less than the annexation of the province. In the same vein, Austrian Minister President Count Karl von Stürgkh, commenting on the "preventative occupation" suggested by Berlin, remarked that, in his opinion, a Russian invasion of Transylvania would be less dangerous than a Rumanian occupation.⁸⁵⁾

While the Austro-Hungarian government was hardening in its determination to stare down the Rumanian threat and seek allies in another direction⁸⁶⁾, the German leaders were being stampeded into appeasement by a series of alarming reports from Bucarest. King Carol told a German friend at breakfast on September 20, that he was "powerless" toward the army and could not "hold out much longer".⁸⁷⁾ Later in the day when Bussche called for his initial audience Carol told him that "revolution" was "not impossible" and that in order to better the situation it would be very desirable to send German troops to Transylvania and also to "stir up the Bul-

⁸⁵⁾ Protokolle, Ministerrat Sitzung, 20 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 312; Hantsch, op. cit., II, pp. 677—80. For a valuable discussion of the origin, history, and functioning of the Gemeinsame Ministerrat, see M. Komjáthy, „Die organisatorischen Probleme des Gemeinsamen Ministerrats im Spiegel der Ministerrats-Protokolle" in V. Sándor and P. Hanák (eds.), Studien zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie, Budapest, 1961, pp. 389—417.

⁸⁶⁾ Austro-Hungarian unwillingness or inability to come to terms with Rumania caused Berchtold to investigate the possibility of drawing Sweden into the struggle against Russia. See W. M. Carlgren, Neutralität oder Allianz: Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Schweden in den Anfangsjahren des ersten Weltkrieges, Stockholm, 1962, pp. 56—7.

⁸⁷⁾ Bussche to F. O., 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/434.

garian king against Rumania". Speed was necessary because the Russians had given a written offer of Transylvania and southern Bukovina and demanded an answer.⁸⁸⁾ Bussche immediately requested that William II send Franz Joseph a "very energetic telegram" and demand "under military necessity that Count Tisza make the Transylvanian Rumanian concessions also without immediate active cooperation" on the part of Rumania.⁸⁹⁾ Alfred Zimmermann, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs and top man at the Wilhelmstrasse during the residence of state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow and Bethmann at Supreme Headquarters, sent for Hohenlohe and told him that unless Austria-Hungary implemented Bussche's suggestions a Rumanian attack could not be prevented. At the same time Bethmann telegraphed Tschirschky ordering him to Budapest to confront Tisza personally.⁹⁰⁾ In morning and afternoon sessions on September 22, the German ambassador reminded the Magyar leader "very emphatically" that

after having in true alliance loyalty accepted this war which stemmed from Austria's South Slav exigencies, we could now expect that Austria-Hungary take into consideration our fundamental desires and do everything possible in order to improve the chances for a favorable outcome of this struggle for existence.

Tisza, anxious not to estrange the German leaders, responded in a conciliatory tone even though he had no intention of capitulating to their wishes. He assured Tschirschky that he was "laboring continually in order to find a way and a manner in which to accomplish something useful in the Rumanian question."⁹¹⁾ Actually Tisza had

⁸⁸⁾ Bussche to F. O., 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/424. The text of Bussche's message as received in Berlin read that the Russians had offered "seven corps" and the Rumanian inhabited portions of Bukovina. Most likely this was a cipher error in the transmission of the word, "Siebenbürgen", for Transylvania was actually mentioned in the Russian offer (Sonev'ytsky, op. cit., pp. 1602—3); it would seem pointless for Carol to modify it in this manner. A copy of the faulty text forwarded to Vienna caused considerable concern that the Russians were ready to furnish Rumania with seven army corps to assist in an invasion of the Dual Monarchy. Tisza to Berchtold, 21 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁸⁹⁾ Bussche to F. O., 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/424. Bussche advised, however, that Austria not be forced to make the concessions in Bukovina for neutrality alone but only those in Transylvania. A territorial cession, he argued, would cause too much resistance in Vienna while those in Transylvania were most important anyway. Bussche to F. O., 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/428.

⁹⁰⁾ Zimmermann to Jagow, 20 September 1914, N. A. 5276/E 327 327; Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 20 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Bethmann to F. O., 21 September 1914, U. C. I—17/437.

⁹¹⁾ Tschirschky to F. O., 22 September 1914, U. C. I—17/476.

been attempting to arrange an entente with the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians but had been stymied by the refusal of some of the more radical to enter into any type of an agreement.⁹²⁾ Tisza revealed that as a substitute he was carrying out an exchange of letters with Ion Mețianu, the Rumanian Orthodox Metropolitan of Hermannstadt (Sibiu). Announcing this action to Tschirschky, Tisza made it clear that he did this first of all to please Germany and second to strengthen King Carol, not because of public opinion within the Monarchy.⁹³⁾

Tisza's letter to Mețianu, dated September 22, mentioned three vague promises: "revision of the school law in a direction favorable to the confessional school", a "positive use of the Rumanian language by the administrative authorities", and "a revision of the electoral law which would open a further field for the political activity of our Rumanian fellow citizens".⁹⁴⁾ The metropolitan dutifully replied with a grateful acknowledgement.⁹⁵⁾ Vague and ineffectual as these concessions were, Tisza could still remark to Czernin that they were "a hard blow for Hungarian public opinion but I hope to use my prestige to carry it through".⁹⁶⁾

Despite the exchange of letters and Tisza's initial desire for their quick publication to avoid an "indiscretion", the concessions were not officially announced until November.⁹⁷⁾ While Bussche pressed for their immediate revelation, Czernin argued that this move should be carried out only in conjunction with a victory in Galicia lest they be interpreted as an act of desperation and weakness. With "the fantastic hate and general rapaciousness of the entire Rumanian people directed at Transylvania", Czernin wrote on September 24, Tisza's concessions would "sound like a bad joke" and be like putting "a drop [of water] on a hot stone" or attempting to "extinguish a burning house with a garden sprinkler".⁹⁸⁾

⁹²⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 14 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

⁹³⁾ Tschirschky to F. O., 22 September 1914, U. C. I—17/476.

⁹⁴⁾ Tisza to Mețianu, 22 September 1914, S. A., Reel 76.

⁹⁵⁾ Mețianu to Tisza, no date, S. A., Reel 76.

⁹⁶⁾ Tisza to Czernin, 24 September, 1914, S. A., Reel 76.

⁹⁷⁾ See below.

⁹⁸⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 24 September 1914, H.H.St.A., Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914. Brătianu expressed little or no interest in these concessions and the Crown Prince positively advised against their publication at this time. Bussche to F. O., Jagow to F. O., 25 September 1914, U. C. I—17/497, 513.

Alone with their efforts to persuade Austria-Hungary to placate Rumania with concessions, the German leaders did not fail to warn Bucarest against an attack on the Dual Monarchy. Bussche stressed to all party leaders immediately upon his arrival that Germany and her ally "were not be separated and stand together in life and death".⁹⁹⁾ And, on September 23, he received instructions from Jagow to deliver an even blunter warning to all Russophile statesmen: "Through taking sides with Russia, Rumania runs to her certain destruction, since Austria's and our punishment would not be withheld. Rumania must realize that an attack on Transylvania means war with Germany too. Also, we would with all means support Bulgarian revisionism." Simple cleverness, Jagow continued, would dictate that Rumania delay taking sides until a decision on the battlefields.¹⁰⁰⁾ While the German threats incited the fury of the chauvinists, there is evidence that they injected a note of caution into the thinking of many Rumanians.¹⁰¹⁾

Following the earlier suggestion of Carol, the German government inspired additional warnings from Constantinople and Sofia. A thinly veiled threat that the Turkish fleet led by the German battle cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" would attack Constanța if Rumania attacked Austria-Hungary, caused concern¹⁰²⁾, but it was the potentially hostile attitude of Bulgaria, as Berchtold predicted, that created the most anxiety in Bucarest. In this case, Berlin was able to manipulate the reservoir of mistrust and ill-will left over from the Balkan wars. *Vasile Radoslavov*, Bulgaria's Austrophile premier, accepted with alacrity the German invitation to warn Rumania that if the latter's troops invaded Transylvania the Bulgarian army would immediately march into the Dobrudja.¹⁰³⁾ However, the available evidence indicates that *Radoslavov*, or at least *Radev*, the Bulgarian minister in Bucarest, was involved in a secret attempt to work out a rapprochement between Bulgaria and

⁹⁹⁾ Bussche to F. O., 20 September 1914, U. C. I—17/433.

¹⁰⁰⁾ Jagow to F. O., 23 September 1914, U. C. I—17/487; *Marghiloman*, op. cit., I, p. 283.

¹⁰¹⁾ *Marghiloman*, op. cit., I, pp. 273, 289; Czernin to Berchtold, 28 September 1914, H.H.St.A., Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914.

¹⁰²⁾ Zimmermann to Bussche, 23 September, Wangenheim to F. O., 24 September, Bussche to F. O., 28 September 1914, U. C. I—17/482, 510, 541; Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 28 September 1914, I. D., I, no. 831.

¹⁰³⁾ Zimmermann to Michahelles (Sofia), 20 September, Michahelles to F. O., 21 September 1914, U. C. I—17/426, 456.

Rumania whereby the latter would retrocede the Southern Dobrudja in return for a free hand against Austria. At the same time as Radoslavov was protesting that he had delivered the warning, Radev's attitude, according to Czernin, "appeared virtually to urge Rumania to attack us". Confronted with this contradiction, Radoslavov shifted the blame to his minister and the Russophile party in Sofia.¹⁰⁴⁾ However it seems likely that the premier was implicated because Radev was never recalled. It would be perfectly natural that after the Austro-German reverses of early September, Bulgaria would, as Czernin put it, "keep a door open so that if we fail she will have a way of salvation".¹⁰⁵⁾ Yet Rumania's deep-seated fear of Bulgarian revisionism prevented the development of any confidence in Sofia's intentions. The net effect of Bulgaria's behavior, therefore, was in the sense desired by Berlin and Vienna and exerted perhaps the strongest single restraining influence upon the interventionists. Even Filipescu was not ready to move without being sure of Bulgaria's attitude.¹⁰⁶⁾

V

The interventionist crisis in Bucarest moved toward a climax during the last week of September. The crescendo of irredentist agitation pressed hard against Carol, Marghiloman, and Brătianu. On September 23, the monarch, now abed with what proved to be a fatal illness, told a German confidant that in "three or four days he would be presented with the choice of intervening in Transylvania or abdicating". His abdication manifesto was already prepared. This would be his last weapon with which to threaten the interventionists.¹⁰⁷⁾ What might follow Carol's abdication was unknown.

¹⁰⁴⁾ Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 24, 30 September 1914, I. D., nos. 783, 849; Czernin to Berchtold, 30 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Tarnowski (Sofia) to Berchtold, 29 October, Berchtold to Czernin, 7 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 515; Bussche to F. O., I—17/548; Marghiloman, op. cit., I. p. 280.

¹⁰⁵⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 26 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 515.

¹⁰⁶⁾ Bussche to F. O., 24 September 1914, U. C. I—17/486; Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 24 September 1914, I. D., no. 783; Marghiloman, op. cit., I, pp. 280, 289.

¹⁰⁷⁾ Bussche to F. O., 23 September, Tjaben to F. O., 24 September 1914, U. C. I—17/475, 502; Lindenberg, op. cit., II, p. 318. For the text of Carol's abdication manifesto and a letter in which he explains his action (apparently intended for Francis Joseph and William II) together with a polemical Marxist commentary, see

No one, not even the king himself, seemed to be sure of the intentions of Crown Prince Ferdinand, or even if he would remain in Rumania if his uncle abdicated.¹⁰⁸⁾ In any case, it appeared certain that with the departure of Carol, Ferdinand's English wife, Marie, would become the dominating influence behind the throne, either as the consort of her husband or as the regent for her son, the future Carol II. The latter situation loomed as a distinct possibility for Marie had sworn that should Carol and Ferdinand depart she would remain with her children in order to carry on the work the old king had begun.¹⁰⁹⁾ In light of the truly remarkable qualities of leadership she demonstrated later in the war, Marie's professed intention cannot be dismissed as an idle boast. And, if the possibility of Carol's abdication were not enough, his illness added to the anxiety of the Austro-German leaders. They had no reason to question Czernin's conclusion: "... if he dies, I fear we must accept the intervention of Rumania against us".¹¹⁰⁾

If there were indications that King Carol was in danger of succumbing to the irredentist onslaught, there was also the danger that the interventionist wing of the Conservative Party might overturn Marghiloman's neutralist leadership. At a meeting of the executive committee of the party on September 24-25, Filipescu and his supporters delivered a violent attack on Brătianu's policy and called for an immediate invasion of Austria-Hungary for the realization of the national ideal. It was only with difficulty and after Filipescu angrily stalked from the room following a heated exchange with a

T. Bugnariu and L. Bányai, "Tradăria Transilvaniei de către Carol I și Carol al II-lea de Hohenzollern în ajunul primului și celui de al doilea Război Mondial", *Studii și Referate privind Istoria României*, two vols., București, 1954, II, 1429—38. A German translation and a more temperate Marxian interpretation of these documents can be found in Margot Hegemann, "Zum Plan der Abdankung Carols I von Rumänien im September 1914", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, V, Berlin, 1957, pp. 823—6.

¹⁰⁸⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 19 September 1914, H.H.St.A., *Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914*.

¹⁰⁹⁾ Wolbe, *Ferdinand I*, p. 109; Czernin to Berchtold, 30 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 8 October 1914, I. D., no. 920. Prince Carol, Marie's eldest son and next in line for the throne after Ferdinand, stated that he considered himself exclusively Rumanian and had no intention of leaving the country. Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 292; Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 30 September 1914, I. D., no. 851.

¹¹⁰⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 24 September 1914, H.H.St.A., *Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914*.

Marghiloman supporter that the party chief was able to persuade the committee to reaffirm neutrality. Even so the group insisted that preparations be made for intervention at a later date.¹¹¹⁾

Brătianu found himself in similar trouble with his cabinet and with the Liberal Party. A strong group of Liberals supported Finance Minister Costinescu in his alliance with Ionescu and Filipescu and were willing to overturn their chief if he continued to resist. Brătianu, according to informed sources, stood virtually alone in the cabinet and the premier himself indicated in conversations with Marghiloman that he was close to resignation.¹¹²⁾

It was in this atmosphere on September 24, that word of a new Russian offer reached Bucarest. Foreign Minister Serge Sazonov had finally given in to the month-long campaign of his minister in Bucarest, Stanislav Poklevskii, and agreed to meet Brătianu's demand for a formal recognition of Rumania's claims to annex Transylvania and Southern Bukovina as compensation for benevolent neutrality.¹¹³⁾ The charge of many commentators that the Russian Foreign Minister thereby committed a major tactical blunder seems justified. In return for surrendering his only means of luring Rumania into the war, he required only a paper promise of her neutrality. Why, as Poklevskii argued, such an arrangement would prevent Rumania from attacking Russia later should the fortunes of war turn decidedly in favor of the Central Powers is not clear.¹¹⁴⁾ But from the Rumanian point of view Sazonov's change of attitude represented a diplomatic triumph of major importance.

Berlin and Vienna got wind of the Russian offer almost immediately but erroneously assumed that it concerned intervention, not

¹¹¹⁾ Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, pp. 276—82.

¹¹²⁾ *Ibid.*, pp. 265—7, 269, 275—6; Unsigned memorandum, 24 September 1914, Fondul Brătianu, Biblioteca de Stat, Bucarest; Polizu-Micșunești, *op. cit.*, pp. 111, 119; Cialdea, *L'intervento romeno*, pp. 85; Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 25, 28 September 1914, I. D., nos. 797, 830; Czernin to Berchtold, 24 September 1914, H.H.St.A., Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914.

¹¹³⁾ Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 282. Initially, the Russian proposal was presented as Sazonov's "personal opinion" but the negotiations, which were being conducted in St. Petersburg between Diamandi and the Russian foreign minister, progressed rapidly and a draft of a formal agreement was ready on 26 September. The best and most complete account of this stage of the negotiations can be found in Sonevitsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 1613—21.

¹¹⁴⁾ Albert Pingaud, *Historie diplomatique de la France pendant la grande guerre*, three vols., Paris, 1938, I, 174—80; Cialdea, *L'intervento romeno*, pp. 81—93; Rieber, *op. cit.*, pp. 248—53.

merely neutrality. Hence they interpreted the announcement of a crown council for the following week and the ensuing controversy over foreign policy primarily as a debate over war or peace rather than over the acceptance of the Russian offer.¹¹⁵⁾ To a certain degree they were right. The interventionists, trusting neither Brătianu nor the Russians fully, would argue with considerable truth that the achievement of Rumania's national ideal would be more certain through a war of conquest than through a promise from St. Petersburg. Consequently, it appeared at first as if they might refuse to support Brătianu's diplomacy and thereby precipitate a governmental crisis.¹¹⁶⁾

Upon receiving word of the new Russian demarche, the German government again turned to appeasement, asking Vienna to supplement the concessions envisioned by Tisza with a promise of a "boundary rectification" in Bukovina.¹¹⁷⁾ Berchtold immediately refused, emphasizing the stimulus such a move would give to Italian irredentism. He said he had no objection to Bussche giving King Carol a confidential and verbal assurance "that the German government will see to it after the conclusion of peace that Rumania receive the district which includes the grave of Stephen the Great", but since no public announcement could be made, nor could Brătianu be informed because of his suspected liason with Italy, Berchtold saw no value in such a promise.¹¹⁸⁾ Czernin, on the other hand, was alarmed enough over the crisis touched off by the new Russian offer to retreat temporarily from his policy of intimidation and to propose that if the invasion of Transylvania became "unavoidable", the province be surrendered to Rumania. A secret agreement with Carol would assure its return after the war in exchange for Bessarabia and Southern Bukovina.¹¹⁹⁾

Tisza was quick to point out that Czernin's advice, if followed, would simply aggravate the Rumanian danger. Sanctioning the occupation of Transylvania would, on the one hand, undermine

¹¹⁵⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 24 September 1914, H.H.St.A., Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914; Czernin to Berchtold, 29 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Bussche to F. O., 25 September 1914, U. C. I—17/503.

¹¹⁶⁾ See below.

¹¹⁷⁾ Jagow to F. O., 25 September 1914, U. C. I—17/505.

¹¹⁸⁾ Jagow to F. O., 28 September 1914, U. C. I—17/540; Memorandum by Berchtold, 30 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

¹¹⁹⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, in Bussche to F. O., 25 September 1914, U. C. I—17/500.

King Carol's resistance to the irredentist current and make the invasion inevitable, while, on the other hand, it would not satisfy the chauvinists but rather whet their appetite for more. Furthermore, the effect the loss of the province would have upon morale within the Monarchy and upon Italian irredentism would be disastrous. "...I cast my vote", Tisza wrote Berchtold on September 26, "that we consider a Rumanian invasion of our territory, be it Transylvania or Bukovina, as a hostile act which would be equated with a declaration of war and cause actual resistance... This is perhaps the only way of holding Rumania back... The idea that it would really come to war with us and with Germany... will of course have an effect on the... very cautious Rumanians."¹²⁰⁾

Simultaneously, Tisza moved ahead to set up the defense of Transylvania. Denuded of troops by the demands of the eastern front, the province could boast of only three thousand gendarmes and four thousand national guard. But in light of the spectacular success of Colonel Eduard Fischer in Bukovina with similar forces¹²¹⁾, and the fact that only a portion of Rumania's army could be turned against Transylvania as long as the Bulgarian army stood on the Danube, Tisza believed that they could well offer significant resistance. Even these minimal forces, he argued, could contain a Rumanian invasion until "we could rush in a corps or two of troops from other theaters and then we would see how the military value of the Rumanian army really stands." Throughout the whole crisis Tisza maintained his sharp contempt for the "cowardice of the Rumanian ranters".¹²²⁾ Berchtold endorsed Tisza's attitude and proposed that Czernin and Bussche, instead of sanctioning an invasion of Transylvania, intervene energetically with the king, Brătianu, and other leading statesmen — using threats, including a reference to the publication of the secret treaty.¹²³⁾ Despite Bussche's association with Czernin's plan, the German government likewise thought a "preventative occupation" unwise. Zimmermann told Hohenlohe in Berlin he opposed granting Rumania permission to march into Transylvania and like Berchtold, favored warning Bră-

¹²⁰⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 26 September 1914, Grof István T i s z a, *Összes Munkái*, five vols., Budapest, II (1924), pp. 155—56.

¹²¹⁾ See footnote 18.

¹²²⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 26 September, Tisza to Czernin, 29 September 1914, T i s z a, *Összes Munkái*, II, pp. 155—65, 172—5; E r e n y i, op. cit., p. 282—3.

¹²³⁾ Berchtold to Czernin, 26 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

tianu and Carol of the "unavoidable consequences" an aggressive move would have.¹²⁴⁾

On September 27—28, in accordance with Berchtold's instructions, Czernin had long conversations with Filipescu and Ionescu. He thanked the former for his prewar friendliness, but declared it quite possible that this conversation would be their last. After requesting permission to speak frankly, Czernin assured Filipescu he found the latter's policy completely understandable from the Rumanian point of view. Filipescu replied that a moment such as this would never come again; Rumania must profit therefrom and realize the "Greater Rumanian idea". Czernin warned him not to misjudge the military situation for if Rumania joined the wrong side "it would be the end". Rumania would not merely be diminished but divided between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. A Hungarian governor would come to Bucarest. Czernin noted a sobering effect on Filipescu who listened very attentively. It was possible, he said, that Czernin was right. He confessed that he wavered and was torn by emotions which excited him. Czernin concluded his argument by promising Bessarabia and "a reward" for the Hungarian Rumanians.¹²⁵⁾ Next, Czernin called on Take Ionescu and spoke with him in "exactly the same sense". Ionescu, however, was less responsive. Czernin convinced himself that this could be attributed to his "egotism and immorality".¹²⁶⁾

On September 30, Czernin visited Princess Marie to deliver yet another warning against an attack on the Dual Monarchy. He told her, as he reported to Berchtold, that "the future of Rumania and her children categorically demanded that the king should remain at the rudder . . . Ionescu must be dealt a blow at the crown council and neutrality declared . . . Then Rumania would be protected against internal unrest and could quietly await the future . . . The Crown Princess wanted to know if Rumania would be rewarded with Bessarabia through this position. I said yes . . . She told me that I had convinced her that this role momentarily was in Rumania's interest.

¹²⁴⁾ Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 27 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517. Quite often, however, Zimmermann appears to have given Hohenlohe the impression that he was more favorably inclined to the Austro-Hungarian point of view than was actually the case. See footnote no. 54.

¹²⁵⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 28 September 1914, H.H.St.A., Gesandtschaftsarchiv Bukarest/1914.

¹²⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

As for the future she knew not."¹²⁷) While Czernin has undoubtedly colored this account to enhance his own importance, there is evidence that Marie's failure to encourage the interventionists contributed to their failure to carry the day.¹²⁸)

Although the Central Powers, in ignorance, viewed the Russian offer with apprehension, its net effect was to weaken the arguments of those who demanded immediate intervention and to give a powerful boast to Brătianu's policy of cautious neutralism. The premier moved quickly to exploit his diplomatic success. While Diamandi was negotiating the details of the agreement in St. Petersburg with Sazanov, Brătianu gained the approval of the cabinet and then sought out the support of the party leaders. Visiting Marghiloman on September 28, Brătianu explained the status of the negotiations and stated that he would sign the document as president of the council under his own responsibility. The king was not to be informed, he told Marghiloman "because if it is possible that later we go as allies of Austria (which was his hidden but absolute wish) the thing could be made through a change of government." His most immediate objective was to secure general acceptance of his policy before the meeting of the Crown Council and then use the latter to reaffirm neutrality.¹²⁹)

Brătianu's desire to avoid immediate intervention while guaranteeing Rumania's interests in the event of a Russian victory temporarily coincided with Marghiloman's objectives and the latter encouraged the premier to pursue the negotiations, agreeing to use his influence with Conservative Party leaders to gain their approval also.¹³⁰) He called the executive committee together on September 30—31 for a full policy discussion. Filipescu, though showing a little more restraint since his conversation with Czernin, led the faction which called for immediate intervention: "If it were known that Germany would triumph then I [would] beg on my knees that you not leave neutrality. But I believe the contrary and I believe that our intervention would be able to decide victory." The Brătianu government, he complained, "procrastinates, pretends that it has all kinds of proposals . . . Should we sell our neutrality as some say? It is good

¹²⁷) Czernin to Berchtold, 30 September, 9 October 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

¹²⁸) Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 292.

¹²⁹) *Ibid.*, I, p. 284; Bănescu, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

¹³⁰) Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 284.

to have a document in hand but a policy of chance is not as good as a decisive policy. It will not have the guarantee of England which, in the end, may promote the integrity of Hungary." He admitted the Bulgarian danger and said that there must be a prior agreement with Sofia: "A single Bulgarian division would overpower us." Marghiloman, ably supported by Ion Lahovari, effectively exploited the committee's distrust of Bulgaria and Russia as well as their desire to avoid the dynastic crisis which they believed intervention would certainly entail. In the end, the committee again supported Marghiloman's motion to reaffirm neutrality temporarily but instructed him to declare to the king that intervention would come eventually and that the terrain must be prepared. The king was to declare his willingness to follow this policy or abdicate.¹³¹⁾

Late the same evening, Brătianu informed Marghiloman that the negotiations with Russia were proceeding rapidly and sought his support for the cancellation of the crown council. Costinescu had submitted to Brătianu's authority on the basis of the Russian offer and Take Ionescu had also agreed so, if the Conservatives approved, the council would be superfluous. Marghiloman concurred and gained Filipescu's acquiescence. On the evening of October 1, the conservative party leader hosted Brătianu and Ionescu in his palatial home on Strada Mercur where they drafted a communique announcing the cancellation of the Crown Council. With these men temporarily united behind Brătianu the crisis of Rumanian intervention was for the moment over.¹³²⁾

The negotiations with Russia were quickly consummated. The Russian government recognized Rumania's right "to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Rumanians" at a moment chosen by the Bucarest government which, in turn, committed itself to observe a "benevolent neutrality" in relation to Russia. Russia further agreed to guarantee Rumanian's territorial integrity, to maintain the complete secrecy of the agreement, and allow the ethnic principle to determine the division of Bukovina. The only hitch in the negotiations was a delay in signing occasioned

¹³¹⁾ Polizu-Micșunești, op. cit., p. 103; Marghiloman, op. cit., I, pp. 287—91.

¹³²⁾ Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 3 October 1914, I. D. I, no. 878; Marghiloman, op. cit., I, p. 292—3; Cialdea, L'intervento romeno, p. 92; Pingvad, op. cit., I, p. 181.

by the Russian attempt to insert a definition of "benevolent neutrality" designed to force Rumania to cut off entirely the flow of German supplies to Turkey and to facilitate the dispatch of Russian war material to Serbia. When Diamandi flatly refused, Sazanov dropped this demand. On October 2, the agreement was formalized by an exchange of notes between the Rumanian envoy and the Russian foreign minister.¹³³⁾

The day the agreement was signed in St. Petersburg, Marghiloman travelled to Sinaia to brief the king and to sound him out as the executive committee had directed. The monarch was clearly ill, with "crises" at night and in need of continual injections of morphine. But, it also appeared as if the detente Brătianu had achieved in internal politics had revived his spirits somewhat. Marghiloman warned the king that he must consider the eventual necessity of an anti-Austrian policy. Although the king made no direct reply, his interlocutor gained the overall impression that Carol "would not be intractable" toward intervention "when the moment would come". But, Marghiloman added in his diary: "... the king does not believe it will come". The monarch seemed to feel that recent war reports indicated a trend favorable to the Central Powers. From the remaining course of the conversation Marghiloman reproduces, as well as excerpts from the king's diary, it is clear that Carol knew of the Russian offer, though perhaps not its details.¹³⁴⁾ Brătianu's postwar assertion that he had the king's secret approval for the negotiations seems substantially correct. Withholding of explicit and official knowledge from Carol and maintaining the appearance of signing

¹³³⁾ The Russian reservations regarding the interpretation of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" and the Russian guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity formed the basis of subsequent negotiation. In a compromise solution reached in mid-October, the Russian government presented, and the Rumanian government accepted, a note stating that the guarantee by the former was diplomatic not military in nature. On the interpretation of "benevolent neutrality", Poklevskii explained the view of his government to Brătianu orally. *Sonev y t s k y*, op. cit., pp. 1621—26; *Rieber*, op. cit., pp. 249—50.

¹³⁴⁾ Marghiloman, op. cit., I, pp. 294—6; Constantin Diamandy, "Ma Mission in Russe 1914—1918. I." *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 49, Paris, 1929, pp. 810—14, 818—20. It is quite possible that the impression Carol gave regarding his willingness to accept a war against Austria-Hungary may have been simply a means of placating his people until a change in the war situation would silence the interventionists. See Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 30 September 1914, I. D., I, no. 850.

on his own authority alone (which is what Brătianu led the Russians to believe) would make possible a future reorientation in Rumania's foreign policy should this prove necessary.¹³⁵⁾

VI

The failure of the September crisis to issue in a Rumanian attack on Austria-Hungary produced a note of optimism in Berlin and Vienna.¹³⁶⁾ But had the Central Powers known all the facts about the situation in Bucarest they would have found little reason to rejoice. While the meaning of the agreement with Russia should not be overemphasized¹³⁷⁾, it did mark an important step on Rumania's pilgrimage from the Triple Alliance to the Triple Entente. And, almost immediately, the Russian government moved to exploit the treaty to stop the flow of German war material through Rumania to Bulgaria and Turkey and to halt the export of Rumanian oil and grain to Germany. Despite Brătianu's refusal to levy a complete embargo as St. Petersburg desired, the Austrophobe Emil Costinescu utilized his powers as finance minister to reduce both German transit and export to a mere trickle.¹³⁸⁾ Furthermore, the September crisis had made physical and emotional demands upon King Carol which

¹³⁵⁾ See Constantin Kirițescu, Ion I. C. Brătianu în pregătirea războiului de întregire, București, 1936, pp. 12—14.

¹³⁶⁾ Czernin could write on 30 September that "the situation has undoubtedly grown quieter again" and Jagow agreed on the same day that "the situation in Rumania no longer appears to me to be so serious". Czernin to Berchtold, 30 September 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517; Jagow to F. O., 30 September 1914, U. C. I—17/547.

¹³⁷⁾ Although this agreement was certainly a significant step toward intervention, its most immediate effect, as has been demonstrated, was to retard an attack on the Dual Monarchy. And, if the war had moved toward a final and decisive German victory, Rumania most certainly would have joined the Central Powers in order to obtain Bessarabia. Filipescu himself expressly stated that he would advocate such a policy. Marghiloman, *op. cit.* I, p. 269.

¹³⁸⁾ See Ulrich Trumpener, "German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation", *Journal of Modern History*, XXXII, Chicago, 1960, pp. 145—9; Salomansohn to F. O., 21 October 1914, S. A. reel 87; Poklevskii to Sazonov, 6 October 1914, in Otto Höttsch (ed.), *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zaristischen und der Provisorischen Regierung, 1878—1917.* eleven vols., Berlin, 1933—42, Reihe II, Vol. VI (I) 1934, No. 366; Rieber (*op. cit.*, pp. 250—2) erroneously states that the Rumanian shipments to Germany continued uninterrupted until Rumania entered the war in 1916.

his body, already weakened by age and chronic illness, was unable to meet. In the early morning hours of October 10, the monarch suffered a heart attack, dying in the arms of his wife shortly after 5:00 A.M.¹³⁹⁾ Whereas the death of Carol three weeks earlier might have tipped the balance in favor of the interventionists, now it had little discernible effect. Still, the Central Powers had lost their most influential, yet perhaps overrated, supporter in Bucarest. The new king, though outwardly pledged to maintain his uncle's foreign policy, possessed an essentially weak personality which enhanced the influence of Brătianu and especially that of the new queen, Marie. The latter's Anglo-Russian sentiments now reigned at court where German influence had previously been dominant.¹⁴⁰⁾ The death of Carol truly marked the end of an epoch for Rumanian foreign policy.

But the German leaders, failing to grasp the extent of Rumania's estrangement, viewed the temporary diminution of the irredentist current during October as an opportunity to heal the breach with their erstwhile ally through far-reaching Austro-Hungarian concessions. The Habsburg government, on the other hand, considered the events of September to be an object lesson in the folly of appeasement and resisted German demands for immediate publication of the exchange of letters with the Rumanian metropolitan and for the offer of more extensive concessions. This renewal of the controversy between Berlin und Vienna formed the last phase of the Transylvanian Question in the fall of 1914.

One stimulus of the German argument was the appearance in Berlin of the exiled Hungarian Rumanian leader, A u r e l C. P o p o v i c i.¹⁴¹⁾ A l e x a n d e r B e l d i m a n, the Rumanian minister, brought

¹³⁹⁾ Victor A n t o n e s c u, "La Mort du Roi Carol I", manuscript in Biblioteca de Stat, Bucarest; W o l b e, Carmen Sylva, p. 267; Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 10 October, 1914, I. D., I, no. 929.

¹⁴⁰⁾ M a r i e, Queen of Rumania, Ordeal. The Story of My Life, New York, 1934, p. 5; W o l b e, Ferdinand I, pp. 113—19; G a n e, op. cit., II, p. 521; D i a m a n d y, op. cit., p. 422; Stefan M e t e ș, Regele Ferdinand al României, Cluj, 1935, p. 32. Fasciotti to San Giuliano, 10 October 1914, I. D., I, no. 929. The Germans erroneously believed that Ferdinand was firmly in control and, like his uncle, loyal to the Central Powers. Bussche to F. O., 13, 19 October 1914, U. C. I—17/717, 725; Memorandum by Prince Karl von Wedel, 22 October 1914, U. C. I—18/146. Wedel represented Kaiser William at Carol's funeral.

¹⁴¹⁾ P o p o v i c i, one of the early leaders of the Rumanian National Party, had been forced to flee Hungary in 1892 when he was sentenced to four years imprison-

Popovici to the Wilhelmstrasse on October 4, where in conversations with Zimmermann he emphasized that one of the chief desires of his people was the appointment of a Rumanian minister to the Hungarian cabinet.¹⁴²⁾ The next day Popovici submitted a memorandum outlining more detailed concessions.¹⁴³⁾ These agreed by and large with requests voiced to Bussche in Bucarest by Transylvanians there for Carol's funeral.¹⁴⁴⁾ As a result of Popovici's visit, Zimmermann instructed Tschirschky to press Berchtold and Tisza for the appointment of the minister.¹⁴⁵⁾ The suggestion that a Rumanian enter the Hungarian cabinet aroused Tisza's anger. He denounced Popovici as "nothing more than an intriguing journalist saturated with the so-called Greater Austria idea" and dismissed the appointment of a Rumanian minister as an "impossible absurdity".¹⁴⁶⁾ Angered at continuing German agitation on the issue, Tisza attacked Bussche for allegedly encouraging the Rumanian demands and even reprimanded Czernin for not combatting them

ment for his part in authoring the famous "Replique", a pamphlet in which Rumanian students in Budapest outlined in great detail their people's grievances against the Magyar regime. Later in exile, he wrote a book, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Osterreich* (Leipzig, 1906), which proposed a federal solution to the minority problems of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Popovici's ideas found favor, temporarily at least, with Archduke Francis Ferdinand and their author enjoyed access to the Heir Apparent's circle at Palace Belvedere. Popovici was in Switzerland when the war broke out. Ş e i c a r u, *Istoria Partidelor*, I, pp. 163—70; A b r u d e a n u, *op. cit.*, pp. 21—3; K a n n, *Multinational Empire*, II, pp. 197—207; Victor C h e r e s t e ş i u, et. al., *Din Istoria Transilvaniei*, two vols., Bucureşti, 1960—1, II (1961), pp. 259—63; Nicolae I o r g a, *Istoria Românilor*, ten vols., Bucureşti, 1936—9, X (1939), p. 355; F r a n z, *op. cit.*, pp. 179—80; Robert W. S e t o n - W a t s o n, *Racial Problems in Hungary*, London, 1908, pp. 301—2.

¹⁴²⁾ Zimmermann to Jagow, 4 October 1914, U. C. I—17/596.

¹⁴³⁾ The most important points included: 1) redistricting of electoral units in a manner more favorable to the Rumanians; 2) appointment of a Rumanian to the Hungarian cabinet with the power to safeguard Rumanian rights in all areas of administration, justice, education, and economic life; 3) seventy Rumanian seats in the Hungarian Diet; 4) official recognition and use of the Rumanian language in the administration of Rumanian-inhabited areas; 5) a Rumanian university and additional lower schools; 6) financial support for and the end of jurisdictional discrimination in relation to the Rumanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches; 7) abolition of the „Magyarization" laws; 8) free use of the Rumanian national flag. Memorandum by Dr. Aurel Popovici, attached to: Zimmermann to Tschirschky, 5 October 1914, S. A. Reel 76.

¹⁴⁴⁾ Bussche to F. O., 18 October 1914, U. C. I—17/728.

¹⁴⁵⁾ Tschirschky to Tisza, 4 October 1914, T i s z a, *Briefe*, p. 88.

¹⁴⁶⁾ Tisza to Tschirschky, 6 October 1914, *Ibid.*, p. 89.

strenuously enough. At the same time, Tisza reiterated his intention to implement eventually the concessions he had already promised.¹⁴⁷⁾ But throughout October he offered a wide variety of reasons why publication was not yet opportune.¹⁴⁸⁾ To the Germans, who were inclined to attribute the worst of intentions to Tisza, his procrastination seemed suspiciously like an attempt to avoid concessions altogether. Bussche bitterly remarked that "in Hungary they appear to be incorrigible. The responsibility for the unfriendly attitude toward us in Rumania is Hungary's and Count Tisza should finally give in while there is yet time."¹⁴⁹⁾ Bethmann complained that "...Budapest seems always to hesitate petty-mindedly with concessions as soon as the war situation appears more favorable, during just such a moment when accommodation is bound to be efficacious." "We consider [the] promise of the concessions as given to us", he instructed Tschirschky, "and must insist on prompt fulfillment".¹⁵⁰⁾ Prince Karl von Wedel, returning from his mission as the Kaiser's official representative at Carol's funeral, backed up Bethmann's words in personal interviews with Berchtold and Francis Joseph.¹⁵¹⁾ Tisza stood firm, however, declaring that the granting of concessions in Transylvania was a "purely internal Hungarian affair". He intended to "determine the time and the means" of its fulfillment.¹⁵²⁾

This attitude infuriated the German leaders, especially after Turkey's entry into the war late in October¹⁵³⁾ enflamed their

¹⁴⁷⁾ Tisza to Czernin, 14 October, Czernin to Tisza, 17, 19 October, Tisza to Czernin, N. d., Hohenlohe to Berchtold, 26 October 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

¹⁴⁸⁾ Initially, Tisza insisted as a pre-condition for his move the expulsion of Russian troops from Hungarian territory; then with the death of Carol, he maintained that the concessions, if made public, would be interpreted as a bribe for the new monarch; finally he counseled delay because another Austro-Hungarian reverse in Galicia had intervened. Tschirschky to F. O., 8 October 1914, S. A. Reel 76; Tschirschky to F. O., 18 October 1914, U. C. I—17/726; Tisza to Berchtold, 1 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

¹⁴⁹⁾ Bussche to F. O., 18 October 1914, U. C. I—17/728.

¹⁵⁰⁾ Jagow to F. O., 20 October 1914, U. C. I—17/740; Bethmann to F. O., 26 October 1914, U. C. I—18/037.

¹⁵¹⁾ Memorandum of Prince Karl von Wedel, 22 October 1914, U. C. I—18/146.

¹⁵²⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 1 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

¹⁵³⁾ On Turkey's decision to intervene, see the authoritative account based on the German archives: Ulrich Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities", *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIV, Chicago, 1962, pp. 369—80.

desire to secure Rumania's active assistance. Bussche demanded in a wire to Berlin on October 29 that Austria-Hungary, "whose mistaken policy is to blame for the non-participation of Rumania", once again offer a portion of the Bukovina as an incentive. Ignoring abundant evidence to the contrary, he gave credence to the advice of isolated Germanophiles like Petru Carp that such a prize would reverse public opinion and make it possible a declaration of war on Russia.¹⁵⁴⁾ At the Wilhelmstrasse, Zimmermann tended to discount Bussche's proposal, not on the basis of its totally defective assessment of the Rumanian scene but upon a secondary but equally valid objection that it would meet with insurmountable resistance in Vienna.¹⁵⁵⁾ At Supreme Headquarters, however, Bussche's recommendations arrived during a crucial reassessment of military and diplomatic policy and found ready acceptance. The German leaders gathered at Charleville¹⁵⁶⁾ were groping for a solution to the dilemma of a two-front war amid clear indications that their bloody October offensive in Flanders, the "Kindermord von Ypern", was failing to achieve the decisive victory in the West they desperately sought. Falkenhayn was becoming convinced that the eastern front must be liquidated, by diplomatic if not military means.¹⁵⁷⁾ Rumania's attitude in either case could be extremely influential. Russia would certainly be more inclined to a separate peace if Rumania now joined Turkey alongside the Central Powers. If not, the resulting Balkan Bloc, to be augmented almost certainly by Bulgaria, might be able to tip the military balance in the east. "The German General Staff", Bethmann wired Tschirschky on November 3, "is convinced that if Rumania would join our cause and occupy Bessarabia the war could be definitely brought to a successful conclusion." The chancellor repeated Bussche's view that Rumania's attitude was due

¹⁵⁴⁾ Bussche to F. O., 29 October 1914, U. C. I—18/055. Carp's point of view was supported by General Iliescu. Bussche to F. O., 2 November 1914, U. C. I—18/063.

¹⁵⁵⁾ Zimmermann to Bussche, 3 November 1914, N. A. 5277/327 600.

¹⁵⁶⁾ Since late in September, this small town in Northern France had hosted the Kaiser and his entourage.

¹⁵⁷⁾ Paul R. Sweet, "Leaders and Policies: Germany in the Winter of 1914—1915", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVI, Boulder (Colorado), 1956, pp. 230-33; Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18*, Düsseldorf, 1961, pp. 217—24; Zechlin, *op. cit.*, B/20/61, pp. 274—6, 278, B/20/63, pp. 3—6, 10—11, 23—6; Conrad, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 312—14, 340—2; Reichsarchiv, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 555—559, VI, 405—13.

to the lack of sufficient concessions and instructed his ambassador to remind the Habsburg leaders that "... we have at the request of Emperor Francis Joseph, who appealed to our alliance loyalty, ventured this war and carry it on against France, England, and Russia. We can demand that Austria-Hungary also make those sacrifices which are unavoidable for the success of the whole. They are insignificant compared to the prize at stake." Tschirschky was instructed to insist, even before the emperor if necessary, that the concessions be implemented.¹⁵⁸⁾

The Austro-Hungarian leaders answered the German demarche with a mixture of realistic analysis and special pleading. B e r c h - t o l d accurately labeled the hope of moving Rumanian to intervene as "incomprehensible" and the result of unreliable reporting. Nevertheless, he agreed to support the publication of the Transylvanian concessions because of Berlin's insistence. But if the German government really wanted to influence Rumania's attitude, he stated, it should send "large contingents of troops, even at the cost of restricting operations in France and strike a joint blow at the advancing Russian army." If not, he warned, a new Russian penetration of Hungary and Transylvania and consequently the intervention of Rumania against the Central Powers could be expected.¹⁵⁹⁾ Tisza likewise put his finger on the weakness in the German reasoning. He labelled the hope of achieving Rumania's intervention prior to the defeat of Russia "an illusion which the more we chase it the farther it will flee us." He continued:

It is absolutely erroneous to believe that the unfavorable mood in Rumania is to be ascribed to Hungarian nationalities policies ... public opinion there has been turned against us not because it goes badly for the Rumanians in Transylvania but because they believe they can get Transylvania ... I have no illusions about the effect of my concessions in Rumania. Nevertheless I intend to carry them out ...¹⁶⁰⁾

The Germans remained unconvinced and clung to their misconceptions. "If one wishes the help of Rumania in the world war", Jagow wrote in private letter to Tschirschky, "so must one seek to remove political irritation with corresponding concessions, even if it means sacrifice. All of Tisza's arguments are formalistic sophist-

¹⁵⁸⁾ Bethmann to F. O., 3 November 1914, U. C. I—18/066.

¹⁵⁹⁾ Memorandum from Austro-Hungarian Embassy (Berlin), 6 November 1914, U. C. I—18/081.

¹⁶⁰⁾ Tisza to Tschirschky, 5 November 1914, U. C. I—18/136.

ries which violate political logic . . . Germany who bears the load of military help should have influence in [the] political decisions."¹⁶¹⁾

Tisza finally published on November 8 his exchange of letters with the Rumanian metropolitan¹⁶²⁾, but the concessions were poorly received in Bucarest and the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians remained unsatisfied.¹⁶³⁾ However, the Rumanian response angered the Hungarian premier less than the criticism leveled at his action by the German press¹⁶⁴⁾ and especially by the Austro-German propaganda organ in Bucarest. In the latter case, *Ziua*, managed by a member of the German colony but numbering among its contributors the well-known Transylvanian journalist and writer, Ion Slavici, questioned whether Tisza's "vague" and "undefined" promises would really be implemented and openly proclaimed the "bankruptcy" of the idea of a unitary Magyar state.¹⁶⁵⁾ Tisza also complained that Bussche's conduct was undermining his move and asked Berlin to inform its envoy that the German government "disavows mixing in a purely internal affair of the Hungarian government."¹⁶⁶⁾ While Tisza's charge is difficult to document, it is clear that in a private conversation with Marghiloman Bussche did belittle the concessions and one newspaper could state that "from the very first day of his arrival Count Bussche has not ceased to show his concern over the unrighteousness under which the Rumanians in Transylvania are thrown and to declare that it was his chief task to intervene in Budapest on behalf of greater rights and advantages for the Rumanians."¹⁶⁷⁾ Zimmermann, likewise, was not careful to hide his personal opinion of Tisza's action. He remarked

¹⁶¹⁾ Jagow to Tschirschky, 10 November 1914, N. A. 9852/H 316 804.

¹⁶²⁾ To the original concessions Tisza added an amnesty for Rumanians under indictment for political crimes and, secondly, permission to display the Rumanian flag along with the Hungarian flag. Tisza to Czernin, 6 November 1914, *Tisza*, *Osszes Munkái*, II, pp. 268—9.

¹⁶³⁾ Bussche to F. O., 9 November 1914, Zimmermann to Jagow, 10 November 1914, U. C. I—18/140; Bussche to F. O., 14 November 1914, S. A. Reel 76. Tisza did his best to stimulate some artificial enthusiasm for his action among his Rumanian subjects but with limited success. Tisza to Berchtold, 12 November 1914, *Tisza*, *Osszes Munkái*, II, pp. 300—1; Berchtold to Czernin, 19 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 577.

¹⁶⁴⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 12 November, Tisza to Berchtold, 26 November, 1914, *Tisza*, *Briefe*, pp. 108, 117.

¹⁶⁵⁾ Tschirschky to Zimmermann, 1 December 1914, S. A. Reel 88.

¹⁶⁶⁾ Berchtold to Hohenlohe, 6 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 517.

¹⁶⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.; Marghiloman, op. cit., I, pp. 324—5.

to the Viennese journalist Heinrich Kanner in a conversation at the Wilhelmstrasse on November 16, that he "knew from experience that Tisza's promises were not worth much."¹⁶⁸⁾

Despairing success in eliciting additional concessions through official negotiations with the Habsburg government, Bethmann and his subordinates next attempted to marshal support privately among influential personalities in Vienna and Budapest. The chancellor dispatched Count Anton Monts, a veteran German diplomat with connections among Austrian politicians and nobility, to the Habsburg capital.¹⁶⁹⁾ Other lobbyists including Victor Naumann, a confidant of Bavarian premier Count Hertling, supported Monts.¹⁷⁰⁾ Those contacted in this amazing display of extra-official diplomacy included the Heir Apparent, Archduke Karl, Count Stephen Burian, the Hungarian permanent representative at the Hofburg, as well as Count Albert Apponyi and other members of the Hungarian opposition.¹⁷¹⁾ General Hindenburg added his influence to the mounting pressure by telegraphing Archduke Friedrich and Conrad, requesting their intervention on behalf of the attempt to win Rumania.¹⁷²⁾ One self-appointed advisor to the Wilhelmstrasse even suggested that this activity be supplemented by the dispatch of a Prussian general to Budapest with direct orders from Kaiser Wilhelm to force the concessions on Tisza.¹⁷³⁾

By mid-November, this agitation, together with the fact that a highlevel conference was long overdue, convinced Tisza that it was necessary for him to meet with the German leaders personally.¹⁷⁴⁾ Monts agreed that it was "absolutely imperative" that Tisza

¹⁶⁸⁾ The Kanner Papers, manuscript copy, Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, California.

¹⁶⁹⁾ Jagow to F. O., 5 November 1914, U. C. I—18/072.

¹⁷⁰⁾ Naumann to Hertling, 12 November 1914, U. C. I—18/212; Zimmermann to Tschirschky, 16 November 1914, U. C. I—18/171.

¹⁷¹⁾ Naumann to von Stumm, 2 November 1914, U. C. I—18/114; Naumann to Zimmermann; 16 November 1914, S. A. 76; Monts to F. O., 17 November, Monts to Zimmermann, 19 November 1914, U. C. I—18/205, 215; Josef Redlich, *Schicksalsjahre Osterreichs 1908—1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs.* ed. by Fritz Fellner, two vols., Graz, 1953—4, II (1954) pp. 284 ff.

¹⁷²⁾ Conrad, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 486; Tisza to Berchtold, 13 November 1914, Tisza, Briefe, p. 109.

¹⁷³⁾ L. Korodi to Zimmermann, 16 November 1914, U. C. I—18/192.

¹⁷⁴⁾ Tisza to Berchtold, 12 November 1914, Tisza, *Osszes Munkái*, II, pp. 300—1; Tisza to Burian, 13 November 1914, Tisza, Briefe, p. 110. Although Tisza insisted

be received at Supreme Headquarters.¹⁷⁵⁾ Bethmann responded affirmatively to Francis Joseph's request on behalf of Tisza and the Hungarian premier arrived at Charleville on the evening of November 19.¹⁷⁶⁾ During the two-day meeting, the German leaders, bold and critical at a distance, now made a complete capitulation to Tisza's point of view. While it must be recognized that the momentary success of the second Austro-Hungarian offense against Serbia and the apparently imminent intervention of Bulgaria seemed to make the appeasement of Rumania less necessary¹⁷⁷⁾, the available evidence indicates that Tisza's strength of will and power of argument played an important role in his success.¹⁷⁸⁾ William II, who saw in Tisza the qualities he admired or imagined he possessed himself, had always held the Magyar leader in awe.¹⁷⁹⁾ And Bethmann, whose sharp rejoinders had filled the diplomatic pouch to Vienna and Budapest for over two months also fell under Tisza's spell. The Magyar visitor "categorically" declared that the idea of further concessions to the Rumanians was "altogether out of the question" and forcefully restated his unanswerable argument that military and diplomatic pressure alone could influence Rumania's behavior. When he announced that Emperor Francis Joseph had decreed that "under no circumstances" could be acquiesce in the cession of Austro-Hungarian territory, Emperor William replied that he "understood completely". Bethmann possessing a basically weak personality like his sovereign¹⁸⁰⁾ agreed with Tisza that further concessions "would be interpreted by vacillating and covetous Rumania as a sign of weakness on our part". Although Tisza

that his chief purpose was to create a better image of "our energy and capability of action", he was preoccupied with the Rumanian issue. Tisza to Burian, 14 November 1914, T i s z a, Briefe, p. 110.

¹⁷⁵⁾ Tschirschky to F. O., 17 November 1914, U. C. I—18/181.

¹⁷⁶⁾ T i s z a, Briefe, p. 262 (footnote no. 79).

¹⁷⁷⁾ Belgrade fell to the Austro-Hungarian army on November 21. C r u t t w e l l, op. cit., pp. 90—2. On Bulgaria's attitude, see Jagow to F. O., 22 November; Michahelles to F. O., 24 November 1914, U. C. I—12/625, 640.

¹⁷⁸⁾ Berchtold had recently commented about his own difficulties with the "hard-headed and strong-willed" Tisza. Report of Prince Karl von Wedel, 22 October 1914, U. C. I—18/146.

¹⁷⁹⁾ A l b e r t i n i, op. cit., I, p. 508; II, p. 176.

¹⁸⁰⁾ See the accounts of Bethmann's wartime leadership in B i r n b a u m, op. cit., and in Ernest R. M a y, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914—1917*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1959. The latter (p. 199) concludes that the chancellor was "temperamentally disinclined to battle for convictions".

ran into stiffer opposition when he visited Zimmermann in Berlin while, enroute home, the triumph at Charleville was sufficient for the Hungarian premier to comment contentedly to Czernin: "My trip turned out very favorably in all respects."¹⁸¹⁾

Although his superiors might be willing to let the Rumanian issue drop temporarily, Bussche was not. "I regret", he wrote Zimmermann privately on December 6, "that Tisza, who is 'great in word, small in deed' has made such an impression in Berlin. In my opinion, the assistance of Rumania is decidedly worth Bukovina which is miserably ruled by Austria... Signs multiply that Rumania will even yet go with us but this will not come about without a reward from [the] Austrian side..."¹⁸²⁾ Bussche's point of view incited a violent personal attack from Czernin. Labelling his colleague's ideas as "very foolish or very frivolous", the Austrian envoy attributed them to "the feminine vanity of this man and his unconquered desire for a diplomatic success". Rather than offering any hope that Rumania would respond to concessions at this time, the evidence, he insisted, indicated that she was preparing to attack the Dual Monarchy soon. The only effective deterrent would be an improvement in the Austro-Hungarian military position. "The fate of the world", Czernin concluded melodramatically, "will be decided in the next few weeks".¹⁸³⁾ Contemporary reports from widely varying sources substantiated this analysis of Rumanian intentions¹⁸⁴⁾; subsequently published evidence adds positive confirmation. Excerpts from General Iliescu's daily notebook, for example, show that on November 27 Brătianu "ordered a study on the hypothesis that war with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria would come in the spring", and that on January 15 the premier gave the Rumanian general staff a "strategic directive" for "an offensive against Austria-Hungary in connection with the left wing of the Russian army and a defensive operation in the south facing Bulgaria."¹⁸⁵⁾

¹⁸¹⁾ Accounts of the discussions concerning Rumania at the conference can be found in Bethmann to Zimmermann, 22 November 1914, U. C. I—18/239 and Tisza to Czernin, 26 November 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 500.

¹⁸²⁾ Bussche to Zimmermann, 6 December 1914, U. C. I—18/354.

¹⁸³⁾ Czernin to Berchtold, 13 December 1914, H.H.St.A., P. A. I, Rot 515.

¹⁸⁴⁾ Bronsart (military attache) to War Ministry, 20 November 1914, Dr. Guttman to F. O., 21 December 1914, Romberg (Berne) to F. O., 31 December 1914, U. C. I—18/257, 443, 457.

¹⁸⁵⁾ Iliescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 37—8.

During the winter and early spring of 1915, Austro-German diplomacy was preoccupied with averting the threat posed by Italian irredentism. But when this effort failed and Italy aligned herself with the Triple Entente (April 25), Berlin resumed its efforts to persuade its Habsburg ally that Rumania must be placated. This new venture in appeasement was no more successful than had been the attempt of the previous autumn. Fortunately for the Central Powers, however, the famous Gorlice-Tarnow offensive intervened and as the Austro-German armies pushed the Russians out of Galicia and most of Poland during the summer of 1915, Brătianu drew back. But a year later the Rumanian premier cast his country's lot with the Triple Entente and thereby brought to fulfillment the policy which he had conceived in the autumn of 1914.