

daß man auf Athos von Luther erfuhr, während wir die konfessionell-parteiische Haltung des kirchlichen Würdenträgers vom Hl. Berge außer acht lassen.

Soweit heute bekannt, bestand der Briefwechsel zwischen dem ungarischen König Zápolya und dem Athosvorsteher Gavriilo aus zwei Briefen des Königs und zwei Antwortschreiben des Protos. Den zweiten Brief des Königs und das zweite Antwortschreiben des Protos haben uns zwei Handschriften aufbewahrt, die — wie wir gesehen haben — beide vom Athos, aus dem serbischen Kloster Hilandar, stammen. Die beiden Handschriften ergänzen sich glücklich. Vielleicht läßt sich auf dem Heiligen Berg auch der erste Teil dieses interessanten Briefwechseles entdecken. Was Hilandar angeht, besteht dafür leider keine Hoffnung. Zweimal — 1952 und 1953 — habe ich die Hilandarer Handschriften erforscht. Ich habe sie Blatt für Blatt untersucht und keinerlei Spur von diesem Briefwechsel gefunden. Slawische und serbische Handschriften gibt es auch in anderen Athosklöstern, u. zw. nicht nur im bulgarischen Zographu- und russischen Panteleimon-Kloster, sondern auch in jenen Klöstern, die jetzt griechisch sind und sich einst in serbischer Hand befanden oder serbische Mönche hatten. Wenn sich der in Frage stehende Briefwechsel auch in jenen Handschriften nicht auffinden läßt, birgt er sich vielleicht in einer der Athos- und Hilandar-Handschriften, die gelehrte Reisende und andere Besucher des Heiligen Berges in alle möglichen Teile der Welt getragen haben.

The Turkish Question and the Religious Peace of Augsburg

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Throughout the Schmalkaldian War and for several years thereafter the Turks had virtually ceased their activities against the Hapsburgs. The truce which had been concluded between Charles and the Sultan in 1545 remained in force for well over a decade. The raids of Dragut, Barbarossa's successor, in the western Mediterranean were not of a nature serious enough to provoke the Emperor to take drastic action against the Turkish fleet. Except for a minor offensive against Minorca and the African coast, Charles' reprisals

against Dragut and his men took the form only of protests to the Porte against Turkish violations of the truce. The agreement of 1545 was not broken during Charles's lifetime, for neither the Emperor nor the Sultan wished to go to war against each other.

During the last decade of his life Charles V showed a growing lack of interest in Eastern European affairs. Between 1547 and 1551 there was no need for Charles to worry about a renewal of Turkish activity on the Eastern front; after 1551 he left Eastern affairs exclusively in the hands of Ferdinand.

From 1547 till 1551 the Turks evinced no aggressive designs against Hungary and the Empire. Having concluded a five year truce, on the basis of *uti possedetis*, with Ferdinand in the summer of 1547, Suleiman thought of taking advantage of this pursue a more energetic policy in the Middle East¹). The Sultan felt that the Hungarian situation no longer warranted his abstaining from action against his mortal enemy, Shah Tamasp. In the summer of 1543 he had strengthened the boundaries of the Territory of Ofen and during the following years the work of internal consolidation was making headway under the supervision of his agents. He had little to fear from the Hungarians, who had no ruler of their own and who hated the Hapsburgs about as much, if not more, than the Turks. He was confident that neither Charles nor Ferdinand would break his agreements with the Porte. The Emperor's difficulties with the Germans and the reliable Turkish alliance with the French gave the Sultan sufficient security that Charles would not attempt to undertake a crusade against the Ottoman Empire at this time. He was even less concerned about any aggressive designs which the King of the Romans might have cherished against Hungary. The Hungarian hatred of the Hapsburgs and Ferdinand's utter inability to do any harm to the Turkish holdings in the past gave Suleiman a feeling of confidence which was further strengthened by his knowledge that strong Turkish garrisons, stationed in Hungary and the surrounding territories, were available in the event that Ferdinand should attempt to violate the terms of the peace treaty of 1547. Secure in the Balkans and Hungary, the Sultan decided to take action against the Persian Shah.

¹) N. Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha, 1908—1913), III, 119; R. B. Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent, 1520—1566* (Cambridge, 1944), 241.

Since 1539 Shah Tamasp had pursued a policy of continuous aggression against the Ottoman interests in the Middle East. Contrary to Suleiman's desire, Tamasp had strengthened his armies and had indulged in countless anti-Turkish intrigues with his neighbors²). These activities, which threatened to undermine the Turkish position in the Middle East, had to be checked before they became downright dangerous. In the summer of 1548, however, the Turks were back in Constantinople. The shrewd Tamasp, by using guerilla tactics, had forced the Turks to withdraw after a year of indecisive battles. But, even after their return to Constantinople, the Turks gave every indication that they meant to stay at home. They did so until the spring of 1552.

During the interval which had elapsed from the conclusion of peace with the Turks in 1547 and the renewal of Turkish hostility against the Eastern possessions of the Hapsburgs in 1552, significant changes had taken place in Germany and the Empire. In 1547 the Schmalkaldian War had ended. The Protestants had been soundly beaten by the imperial armies; their leaders were either imprisoned or forced to submit to the will of the Emperor. But Charles, although victorious, did not wish to take unreasonable measures against the Protestants.

When the Emperor decided to undertake the war against the Lutherans he did not believe that he could eradicate Protestantism by force. He only wanted to destroy the Schmalkaldian League, to subdue its leaders, and to force the remainder of the Lutherans to attend a free council of the Christian Church, a council which would find a fair solution to the religious differences between Catholics and Protestants. Charles, who sincerely desired a thorough reform of the Christian church, looked upon the reunion of the two faiths as the essential step in that direction. In 1546 he had great hopes that the Council of Trent could and would put an end to religious dissent in Christendom. By 1547 his illusions as to papal intentions concerning a true reform of the Church were waning rapidly³).

²) E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (London, 1902), IV, 84 ff.; Iorga, *Op. cit.*, III, 116—9; J. von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, J. J. Hellert, tr. (Paris, 1836—43), VI, 7 ff.

³) J. Springer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Wormser Reichstages 1544 und 1545* (Leipzig, 1882), 32; W. Maurenbrecher, *Karl V. und die deutschen Protestanten* (Düsseldorf 1865), 58 ff.

Contrary to the Emperor's desire, the Curia did not mean to compromise in any way with the Protestants. It looked upon the Schmalkaldian War as a mean of ending the existence of political Protestantism in Germany and fully expected to dictate its terms to the defeated enemy. The Curia had no intention of reforming the Catholic church except insofar as it would be advantageous to its policies and interests⁴). The papal attitude towards reform had become obvious to the Emperor by 1547, when Paul III ordered the council adjourned from Trent to Bologna. The official reason offered was the plague which had broken out at Trent; the real one was that the Curia, disturbed by Charles' insistence on a radical reform of the Church, decided that it would be better if the council were to resume its activities away from Germany and imperial control in the healthy, sunny Italian city of Bologna⁵). Charles refused to acknowledge the transfer of the assembly and insisted that it be recalled to Trent. The papacy rejected the Emperor's request. Thereupon Charles decided to force the Pope to comply with his wishes by offering the Germans a solution to the religious question which would express his opinion as to what constituted an equitable settlement of their differences. On May 15, 1548, the „Augsburg Interim“ was issued⁶).

Devoted exclusively to doctrinal questions, the „Interim“, which made some concessions to Protestant theology, did not meet with general approval. Both Catholics and Lutherans objected to imperial interference in matters of dogma, and the mere fact that the „Interim“ was to be valid only until a free council offered a final solution to the German religious differences did not make it more popular. Neither were the Protestants or Catholics more satisfied with the political decisions made by the Emperor at the Diet of Augsburg of 1547—48.

⁴) K. Brandi, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation und Gegenreformation* (Leipzig 1942), 307 ff.; Maurenbrecher, *op. cit.*, 147 ff.; M. Philippson, *La Contre-Revolution Religieuse au XVIIe Siecle* (Brussels 1884), 305 ff., 351 ff.

⁵) Maurenbrecher, *op. cit.*, 138; Philippson, *op. cit.*, 140—1.

⁶) K. Brandi, *The Emperor Charles V.*, C. W. Wedwood, tr. (New York, 1939), 578—9; G. Wolf, „Das Augsburger Interim“, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Neue Folge*, II, Vierteljahresschrift 1 (Leipzig 1897 bis 1898), 47 ff.; J. Janssen, *History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages*, A. M. Christie and M. A. Mitchel, tr. (London 1896—1925), VI, 398 ff.

The Emperor's policy towards the papacy required him to adopt a compromising attitude towards the Protestants. Had Charles destroyed political Protestantism altogether in 1548, the chances of the Pope eventually submitting to this wishes were nil. As the Emperor had no desire to forego church reform, he decided to tolerate Protestantism *de facto* if not *de jure* until his goal was accomplished. Charles felt that as long as the Schmalkaldian League was destroyed and as long as Philip of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony were his prisoners he had little to fear by way of a Lutheran reaction. Therefore, before leaving Augsburg in 1548 he ordered that the *Landfriede* be respected by all, that the *Kammergericht* be reformed to suit everybody, and that, until the meeting of the council, the *status quo* be observed in Germany⁷⁾.

These decisions were particularly unpleasant to the Catholics, who had hoped that Charles, upon defeating the Protestants, would force them into absolute submission. On other hand, the Lutherans did not particularly care about the severity of the imperial decisions and about the fact that the Emperor meant to keep the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse as hostages pending the proper execution of his plan of religious pacification. In 1548, however, neither the Catholics nor the Protestants could seriously object to the imperial decisions of Augsburg. The former could hardly have turned against the man who fought for their cause, while the latter were too weak to oppose anything at the time. This situation was to change within a few years, however.

In the eyes of the Protestants Charles had become altogether too powerful as a result of his victory of 1547. His „Interim“ was exceedingly unpopular, his insistence on its observance and on the summoning of a free council was dangerous to their interests, and the imprisonment of Philip of Hesse and Johann Frederick of Saxony was insulting to their pride. Yet only a handful of Lutheran princes had the courage to appose the wishes of the Emperor. These men, led by Albert Alcibiades of Brandenburg-Culmbach, were planning, in conjunction with the new French king, Henry II, a conspiracy against the Emperor for the purpose of preventing the

⁷⁾ Neue und vollständigere Sammlung der Reichsabschiede, welche von den Zeiten Kayser Conrads des II. bis jetzo auf den Teutschen Reichs-Tagen abgefaßt worden, J. J. Schmauss, ed. (Franckfurt am Mayn, 1747), I², 527—609.

destruction of Protestantism in Germany and of strengthening their position at the expense of the Catholics and the Hapsburgs⁸).

The death of Francis I in 1547 did not bring about a change in French policy towards Italy, the Ottoman Empire, and the Hapsburgs. Henry II, upon his succession to the throne, decided to maintain the alliance with the Turks, to oppose, with the cooperation of Paul III, the imperial ambitions of the Hapsburgs, and to undermine Charles' position in the Empire by plotting against him with the discontented Protestant leaders⁹).

Henry's intrigues, which had begun as early as 1548, strongly encouraged the Lutheran princes, who by 1551 were planning a joint offensive against the Emperor. Without Charles' knowledge, an alliance between the Protestants and the French King was concluded at Lochau in October 1551. In return for military support from the French King, the Protestant conspirators, who by now included even the supposedly loyal Maurice of Saxony, agreed to cede to Henry „those towns, which although they have belonged to the Empire for all time, are yet not of German speech“¹⁰). By the end of March 1552, the princes officially began their revolt against the Emperor for the salvation of German Protestantism.

In all events and negotiations that led to the revolt of 1552 one factor is conspicuously absent, namely, the Turkish threat to Hungary and the Empire. Indeed, between 1547 and 1552 the Turkish impact on the German Reformation reached an all-time low. During this period Charles and Ferdinand were not affected in their political decisions by fear of an imminent Turkish attack, and the German Protestants could in no way exploit the Turkish threat for furthering their aims. Neither were the Turks threatening anywhere in the Balkans, nor was Ferdinand worried about the possibility of an impending attack on his possessions.

From 1547 till about 1552 the German people were gradually becoming convinced that the Turks no longer constituted a grave threat to Germany and the Empire. This trend, which had been noticeable in the middle forties, became outstanding in the early fifties. The element of fear is absent from the various publications

⁸) Brandi, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 282—6; Janssen, *op. cit.*, VI, 321 ff.

⁹) G. Bonwetsch, *Geschichte des Passauischen Vertrages von 1552* (Göttingen, 1907), 15—9; Brandi, *Charles V*, 577, 603—5; *Negotiations de la France* *op. cit.*, VI, 421—2; Maurenbrecher, *op. cit.*, 163—4, 261—6.

¹⁰) Brandi, *Charles V*, 603—4.

of the time and a general feeling of confidence seems to have prevailed among the masses. The Turks were far away, not only geographically but also emotionally, to the Germans of the middle of the sixteenth century¹¹). Even Ferdinand, who was eternally afraid of the Ottomans, was able to take his mind off the Turkish threat for a while.

The decline of the military strength of the Turks was bound to have repercussions on the policy of the Protestants towards the Emperor. In fact, it led to the abandonment of the main weapon which the Schmalkaldians had used in their fight for concessions and recognition in Germany. Under the new circumstances which followed their defeat in 1547 they had to renounce their slogan of „no aid without concessions“. Even though the question of aid against the Turks did come up on two different occasions, at the Augsburg Diets of 1547—48 and 1550—1551, it scarcely could have been exploited in the manner of the past. In 1548 when Ferdinand, with the support of the Emperor, had asked the estates to grant him permanent subsidies for his Hungarian plans, the Protestants were too much at the mercy of the Emperor to dare refuse the Hapsburg demand. In fact, they were willing to grant as much aid as possible, hoping that their gesture would make a favorable impression upon Charles¹²). Although it had no effect on the imperial decisions, the willingness of the Protestants to grant permanent subsidies encouraged the King of the Romans, who decided to ask for more at the next diet. In 1550 Ferdinand renewed his demands for aid against the Turks. This time, however, he was less successful¹³).

¹¹) Schmauss, *op. cit.*, I², 637—8; Die Historischen Volkslieder der Deutschen vom 13. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert, R. von Liliencron, ed. (Leipzig, 1865—69), IV, 526 ff.; L. Gerstenberg, *Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Türken-schauspiels*, (Meppen, 1902), 50—1.

¹²) Sfondrato to Farnese, October 24, 1547, *Nuntiaturreportage aus Deutschland 1533—1559*, W. Friedensburg and others, ed. (Gotha, 1892—1912), X, 157—8 (to be referred to subsequently as N.B.); Sfondrato to Farnese, May 22—23, 1548, N.B., X, 338—9; Santa Croce to Farnese, May 22, 1548, June 1—2, 1548, June 7, 1548, N.B., X, 340—1, 351, 368; *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, C. Weiss, ed., (Paris, 1841—1852), III, 331—2; *Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Straßburg im Zeitalter der Reformation*, H. Virck and others, ed. (Straßburg, 1882—1928), IV¹, 739—42, 955—6, 992—3, 1003—8 (to be referred to subsequently as P.C.).

¹³) *Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte, 1546—1555*, A. von Druffel, ed. München, 1873—1896), I, 501, 532, 561; J. T. de Langosco to the Duke of Savoy, April 9, 1551, „*Extraits de la Correspondance diplomatique de Jean-Thomas de Langosco*,

By 1551 the reaction against the „Interim“ had gained in intensity. Almost all the Catholic and Protestant leaders were strongly opposed to it and even the people showed no intention of obeying the imperial edict; a sheet of paper could not change forms of worship established for at least a quarter of a century. But at Augsburg Charles was unwilling to relent and insisted that the „Interim“ stay in force until a free council could find a better solution to the religious question. At Augsburg moreover, the Emperor was interested in organizing Protestant and Catholic attendance at the Council of Trent, which had been reconvened by the new Pope, Julius III, for the first of May 1551. As the „Interim“ and the Council were the Emperor's main interests at the time, he did not wish to support Ferdinand's new demand for subsidies against the Turks. Not that he was afraid that the Protestants would try to obtain concessions from him had he strenuously supported his brother's request; but rather he saw no immediate necessity for diverting their attention from more important issues. Obedience of the „Interim“ and sending delegates to the Council of Trent were of greater concern to Charles than granting aid against the Turks who did not show the slightest aggressive intention against the King of the Romans. Without Charles' support Ferdinand's demand automatically lost its effectiveness. The Protestants might have granted aid had Charles insisted, but under the circumstances they saw no reason for displaying any generosity. As long as the Emperor was in Germany and the Sultan in Constantinople the Turkish danger was nonexistent. In 1551 Charles was still strong enough to force the Protestants to comply with his wishes. There was no reason for appeasing Ferdinand, who during the last three years had played a most insignificant part in the affairs of Germany. However, the Protestants, who expected the Emperor to leave Germany sooner or later, did not wish to antagonize unduly the King of the Romans. They were willing to comply with his demand and grant assistance with the provision that it could be used only in the event that the Turks again became dangerous to the Empire¹⁴).

Comte de Stroppiana, et de Claude Malopera, ambassadeurs du Duc de Savoie a la cour de Charles-Quint: 1546—1559," G. Greppi, ed., *Compte Rendu des Seances de la Commission Royale d'Histoire*, 2e serie, XII (Brussels, 1859), 199; P. C., V, 106.

¹⁴) P. C., V, 107, 107 note 3, 108—10, 115, 117, 117 note 2; Weiss, *op. cit.*, III, 331—2.

The Protestant decisions of 1548 and 1551 on Ferdinand's demands for aid against the Turks in no way affected the course of events. They did not expect the Turks to come to their rescue as in the past, yet they did not mind encouraging Ferdinand's activities in Hungary: after Charles' departure the absence of the King of the Romans might prove useful to the Protestant cause. But even this type of reasoning was not predominant among the vast majority of the Lutherans, who were thinking more in terms of their immediate survival than in terms of future complications with the Turks. On the eve of the revolt of 1552 the Turkish issue did not affect the lives or decisions of the German Protestants. Not even the conspirators had given it serious consideration when they decided to start the war against the Emperor in March 1552. Only on the eve of the outbreak of the conspiracy did Maurice of Saxony promise Ferdinand support against the Turks in an effort to win his neutrality¹⁵). The bribe was to yield more results than the rebel could possibly have expected at the time.

During the year which preceded the outbreak of the rebellion, certain events had taken place which were to aid profoundly the Lutheran cause. The Protestant conspirators were only slightly aware of their importance. In March 1551 the succession to the Holy Roman Empire had been settled by the leaders of the Hapsburg family. The terms, which provided that Philip of Spain should not only succeed Ferdinand upon his death but also be elected King of the Romans during Ferdinand's lifetime, seriously perturbed Charles' younger brother. Ferdinand would have liked his own son, Maximilian, to succeed him as King of the Romans, and have Philip devote himself exclusively to the western interests of the Hapsburgs¹⁶). At this time, however, Ferdinand had already thought of upsetting his brother's calculations and of taking advantage of that clause of the agreement which stated that Philip's succession as King of the Romans should not be pressed in the event that it would seriously endanger his election as Holy Roman Emperor. Desiring this eventual split between the Western and Eastern possessions of his family, Ferdinand decided to embark upon a policy of consolidation of the Eastern possessions of the Hapsburgs, including the Empire, which would make Philip's election virtually im-

¹⁵) Maurice of Saxony to Ferdinand, March 14, 1552, F. A. von Langen, Moritz, Herzog und Churfürst zu Sachsen (Leipzig, 1841), II, 338.

¹⁶) Supra note 15 and note 17.

possible¹⁷). As a first step in that direction, the King of the Romans decided to convince the widowed Queen of Hungary to agree to transfer her son's right of succession to the Hungarian throne over to the Hapsburgs. By devious means Ferdinand succeeded in inducing Queen Isabella to recognize the King of the Romans as King of Hungary and Prince of Transylvania in return for compensations of cash and land¹⁸). The Agreement of Weissenburg of July 1551 was to bring war clouds on the Turkish horizon.

The Turks were displeased with the Treaty of Weissenburg which was contrary to their interests in Eastern Europe. But in 1551 they were not prepared for a military offensive against Hungary and were thus unable to take immediate reprisals. Ferdinand, who more or less realized Suleiman's inability to undertake large-scale operations against Hungary, was nevertheless afraid that the Turks would, sooner or later, try to interfere with his plans. In order to be prepared for any eventuality, the King of the Romans was interested in obtaining anti-Turkish subsidies from the Germans. The Emperor, however, did not wish to confuse the German issue any more than necessary by asking for subsidies against the Turks. He was not convinced of the existence of a real Turkish threat and did not wish to have the Turkish business interfere with his plans for the pacification of Germany¹⁹). Faced with Charles' intransigence, Ferdinand had to abstain from asking the Germans for aid; the necessity of obtaining subsidies for his plans did not vanish from his mind however.

Maurice of Saxony was not aware of Ferdinand's dilemma. He did not suspect that a serious rift had occurred in the relationships and interests of the two Hapsburg brothers; neither did he expect the Turks to come indirectly to his aid by invading Hungary concurrently with the outbreak of the conspiracy. The rebels relied for ultimate success only on their alliance with King Henry and on

¹⁷) Bonwetsch, *op. cit.*, 20; G. Fischer, *Die persönliche Stellung und politische Lage König Ferdinands I., vor und während der Passauer Verhandlungen des Jahres 1552* (Königsberg, 1891), 11—3; Maurenbrecher, *op. cit.*, 230—43.

¹⁸) Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, 29—34; Merriman, *op. cit.*, 270—1; A. Huber, „Die Verhandlungen Ferdinands I. mit Isabella von Siebenbürgen 1551—1555“, *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, LXXVIII (1892), 4 ff.

¹⁹) Charles' instructions to J. de Rye, March 3, 1552, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V.*, K. Lanz, ed. (Leipzig, 1844—46), III, 100—1; Charles to J. de Rye, March 22, 1552, Druffel, *op. cit.*, II, 283—4; Brandi, *Charles V.*, 606—7.

their conviction that Charles would be unable to gather enough troops in a hurry to oppose the conspiracy successfully when it broke out. Yet Maurice did not wish to take unnecessary chances in the event that the conflict would last longer than expected. Conscious of Ferdinand's interest in Hungarian affairs, he realized that the King of the Romans would always be interested in spontaneous offers of subsidies against the Turks. To avoid interference by Ferdinand in the event that *Blitzkrieg* methods would fail, Maurice decided to bribe the King of the Romans into neutrality by offering him assistance freely against a possible Ottoman invasion of Hungary²⁰). He did not expect, however, that Ferdinand's neutrality and even cooperation would be essential for the successful achievement of the aims of the conspiracy.

The rebellion of March 1552 began in a true *Blitzkrieg* fashion. While Charles, who was caught unprepared, was unable to oppose the conspiracy, the King of France entered the Empire in an effort to make good his part of the bargain which he had concluded with the Protestants. At the same time it was rumored that the Turks were on the verge of invading Hungary. The Emperor was helpless. He knew that he could not convince Ferdinand to take arms against the conspirators because the King of the Romans desired to save his strength for the Turkish attack; he knew that he could not count on the Catholics because they were unprepared; he also knew he could not collect enough troops in time to put down the conspiracy²¹). The Emperor therefore decided that it would be wise to gain time. Within less than a month from the outbreak of the rebellion Charles asked Ferdinand to find out under what conditions would the Protestants agree to reestablish peace in Germany. On April 18 Ferdinand met Maurice of Saxony at Linz and heard the terms of the conspirators. The rebels demanded a thorough reform of the imperial government, the liberation of Philip of Hesse, peace with France, and the settlement of the religious question, not by a general Christian council, but by a council of the German nation. Ferdinand told them that he was not opposed to their demands in

²⁰) W. K u h n s, *Geschichte des Passauischen Vertrages 1552* (Göttingen 1906); 15; Maurice of Saxony to Ferdinand, March 14, 1552, von Langen, *op. cit.*, II, 338.

²¹) Brandi, *Charles V*, 607—9; Bonwetsch, *op. cit.*, 37—48; Janssen, *op. cit.*, VI, 456—73; Maurenbrecher, *Op. cit.*, 293—9.

principle²²), but that he would have to submit them to the Emperor for approval. He was certain that Charles' answer would be available within a month and proposed that all German princes meet at Passau by May 26 for the purpose „of abolishing the dissensions and abuses of the German nation“²³). Maurice accepted Ferdinand's proposition but had no intention of abandoning the war against the Emperor. The conspirators were suspicious of Charles whom they expected would rearm and turn against them when ready. Therefore they decided to continue their offensive and gain enough power in Germany to make any reversal impossible. They also relied on their ally Henry II to divert the Emperor's forces away from Germany and even hoped that a Turkish diversion in the East would make Charles more amenable to their terms. Their expectations were not to be entirely in vain.

According to their plans, the Protestant rebels continued their offensive in Germany. Their immediate aim was Innsbruck, where Charles and his few troops were located. By the middle of May the conspirators had reached the vicinity of the imperial stronghold. Charles, unable to defend himself, fled across the border on the night of the nineteenth. The victorious Protestants had visions of dictating their terms to the Hapsburgs at the conference of Passau which was to meet within one week. On May 27 the meeting of Passau was formally opened by Ferdinand²⁴).

Speaking for the conspirators, Maurice of Saxony complained against the Emperor's interference in German affairs and against the activities of the Reichskammergericht against the Protestants. He demanded that Lutheranism be recognized as an official religion in Germany, and, rejecting a priori all the decisions of an ecumenical council, he insisted that all disputed articles of the „Interim“ be settled by a national congress or a similar religious conference. Even if no agreement could be reached, a perpetual religious peace was nonetheless to be concluded between the Catholics and the Protestants²⁵). Ferdinand, although aware of the severity of the terms, was willing to accept them. But not so the Emperor.

²²) Bonwetsch, op. cit., 49; Janssen, op. cit., VI, 474—5.

²³) Janssen, op. cit., VI, 475; Bonwetsch, op. cit., 53—5, 59.

²⁴) Janssen, op. cit., VI, 480.

²⁵) Ibid., 481.

By May 1552 the King of the Romans had decided that it would be futile to continue the war against the Protestants. The Council of Trent had been unable to find a solution to the religious question, the French King had invaded the Empire, Charles had been forced to flee, panic and desolation reigned throughout the regions devastated by the war, and Germany was tired of wars and rebellions. All these considerations, however, could not have induced Ferdinand to accept unconditionally Protestant terms so contrary to Charles' desires had it not been for a new Turkish invasion of Hungary.

By the spring of 1552 the Turks were at last ready to avenge the Treaty of Weissenburg. Encouraged by the German rebellion and by Henry's appeal for cooperation, Suleiman decided to send an army under Achmet Pasha to restore Turkish prestige in the Hungarian kingdom²⁶). Already at Linz, Ferdinand seemed extremely apprehensive over the Ottoman attack, which by April had reached Wesprim. At that time, Maurice, in an effort to secure the cooperation of the King of the Romans, had offered Ferdinand a substantial amount for his Hungarian plans provided that he was able to convince Charles to make peace with the conspirators on their own terms²⁷). Ferdinand fell for the bait, but conditions were unpropitious for the conclusion of any agreement at the time. At Passau Maurice renewed the offer and even pledged the support of the remaining Protestants; the King of the Romans could not resist this proposition, especially since the Turks were still active in Hungary. He decided to ask Charles to accept the Protestant offer as formulated by their leaders. The Emperor did not wish to comply either with Maurice's or with Ferdinand's request.

Charles, upon leaving Germany, realized that for the time being the game was over. The Council of Trent had not fulfilled his expectations, the „Interim“ proved to be a failure, the Germans were tired of war, Ferdinand was uncooperative, and the Turks and French had reappeared on the scene. Discouraged by his inability to settle the German situation effectively, the Emperor was willing to obey the wishes of his brother and of the German people, but only as far as they were compatible with his convictions. Although

²⁶) Charriere, op. cit., II, 172 ff., 195; F. B. von Buchholtz, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinands des Ersten* (Wien, 1831—38), VII, 302—8; Hammer, op. cit., VI, 33 ff.; Iorga, op. cit., III, 40 ff.

²⁷) Bonwetsch, op. cit., 49.

disappointed in the Council of Trent, Charles had not yet abandoned the idea of a conciliar settlement of the religious question; although defeated by the Protestants he had not yet forsaken the idea of returning to Germany in order to subdue them again if necessary. He was, however, willing to leave Germany alone, provided that a satisfactory compromise could be reached with his opponents. But Maurice's offer was highly unacceptable. He could not agree to allow the fate of the Empire to be decided while he was abroad, nor did he wish to conclude a perpetual peace with the Protestants²⁸).

In June the Emperor answered the conspirators that, while he was willing to consider all just complaints against his administration, he would not allow any changes in the Empire while he was abroad. Neither could he agree to a permanent recognition of Protestantism in Germany. However, he promised that he would return to Germany and make every attempt to find an equitable solution to the religious question²⁹). Charles' counter-offer was found unacceptable by the confederates, who decided to continue the hostilities until the Emperor submitted to their wishes. Ferdinand was in a frenzy. Achmet Pasha was still in Hungary while at home the Germans were yearning for peace. He did not wish to forego the aid which Maurice and his associates had promised him, yet he could not reach an agreement with the Lutherans as long as Charles refused to accept their terms. More interested in support for his Hungarian plans and in peace for Germany than in Charles' imperial authority and moral scruples, Ferdinand did everything in his power to induce the Emperor to accede to the demands of the Protestants. Letter upon letter was sent to Charles, each reiterating the seriousness of the Turkish threat to Hungary and the need of peace in the Empire³⁰). But Charles could not be moved. He did not believe that a threat to Hungary, no matter how serious, warranted concessions as radical as those demanded by the rebels.

²⁸) Charles to Mary, July 16, 1552, Druffel, op. cit., II, 682—4; Charles to Ferdinand, June 30, 1552 and August 5, 1552, Lanz, op. cit., III, 318 ff., 420; Brandi, Charles V, 614; Bonwetsch, op. cit., 103 ff.

²⁹) Charles to Ferdinand, June 30, 1552, Lanz, op. cit., III, 318—27; Charles to Mary, July 16, 1552, Druffel, op. cit., II, 681—6; Bonwetsch, op. cit., 148 ff.

³⁰) Charles to Mary, July 16, 1552, Druffel, op. cit., II, 681—6; Ferdinand to Charles, July 24, 1552, July 28, 1552, August 1, 1552, August 5, 1552, August 10, 1552, August 12, 1552, Lanz, op. cit., 389—90, 396—7, 406—7, 413—8, 430—1, 439—46, 453—4.

By mid-summer the Emperor had been able to collect an army strong enough to alarm Maurice and his allies. Although he desired to use it against Henry II, Charles did not exclude the possibility of directing it against the Protestants, if necessary³¹).

Henry's attack on Metz and Strassburg had seriously antagonized the Emperor. Not only was he upset by the Franco-Protestant alliance and by its possible consequences to the Empire, but he was also afraid that the French King might direct his forces against the Netherlands and thus endanger the Hapsburg holdings in North-western Europe. Rather than proceed against the Protestants he would have preferred to remove the French threat to his possessions, provided an acceptable truce could be reached with the conspirators. A temporary peace with the Lutherans would have given him the opportunity to settle his accounts with Henry while Ferdinand, with German cooperation, could have tried to settle his with the Turks in Hungary. Once successful against the French, he could return to the Empire and personally attend to the settlement of the German political and religious questions. Guided by these considerations, the Emperor, in July, reiterated his offer to the Lutherans. Without agreeing to any reforms during his absence or to any actual legal recognition of Protestantism, Charles was willing to conclude a truce on the *s t a t u s q u o* basis. This truce was to last until a *R e i c h s t a g*, under his presidency, would attempt to find a definitive solution to German religious and political problems³²). The Protestants received Charles' answer late in July; on August 2 all but Albert Alcibiades decided to accept the Emperor's offer³³). They could hardly have done otherwise.

By the end of July the conspirators had realized that their chances of winning permanent recognition for Protestantism by force were slight. Their offensive, which had been gradually slackening, had at last been stopped at Frankfurt. Their ally Henry II had not been of much help to them. After the capture of Metz he was unable to make any progress into the Empire and thus could not create

³¹) Brandi, Charles V, 614; Bonwetsch, op. cit., 178; Kuhns, op. cit., 81—2.

³²) Schmaus, op. cit., II¹, 3—14; Bonwetsch, op. cit., 173—6, 184; Kuhns, op. cit., 85—6; Charles to de Rye and Seld, July 11, 1552, Lanz, op. cit., III, 361—5; Charles to Ferdinand, July 17, 1552, Lanz, op. cit., III, 381.

³³) Maurice of Saxony to his councillors, August 1, 1552, Druffel, op. cit., II, 713; Bonwetsch, op. cit., 184; Kuhns, op. cit., 91—2; Schmauss, op. cit., II¹, 3—14.

the diversion which the rebels had expected. Moreover, the French alliance had greatly displeased the German nation which looked upon Henry as an ally of the Infidel. Neither had the Turkish diversion in Hungary been of much use to the Protestants. Charles did not consider it powerful enough to warrant his making too many concessions, while Ferdinand, who was agreeable to their requests, was in no position to influence his brother decisively in their favor. The news that Charles was again in a position to take up arms against them did not inspire the rebels to adopt a stubborn attitude towards the Emperor's final proposition either. Yet, even though the Treaty of Passau did not fully satisfy the hopes of the Protestants, it was in many ways very advantageous to the Lutheran cause. The Protestant leaders could accept it without too many reservations because it did more or less fulfill their expectations. Even though the Passau agreement did not recognize Lutheranism as an official religion, the chances of its becoming one in the very near future were considerable.

In contrast with Charles, who by 1552 still had hopes of unifying Germany by means of a council or a war, the Germans, regardless of denomination, were inclined towards peace. Tired of wars and rebellions, convinced that the Protestants were altogether too strong to be subdued effectively by the Emperor, the vast majority of the Germans was unopposed to recognizing a formal division of the country into Catholic and Lutheran regions. Ferdinand too was in favor of giving official recognition to an existing state of affairs, and the Protestant leaders realized that much. They knew that Charles could not rely on the Germans to force them back into the Catholic fold; they also knew that Ferdinand was altogether too interested in Eastern affairs to go to war against them. They could afford to wait until Charles called the diet which he had promised; if there was any fighting to be done it could wait till then. For the time being, the Protestants, almost unanimously, were willing to accept the elements of uncertainty included in the provisions of the Treaty of Passau. They preferred to have Charles involved in a war against their former ally Henry II rather than see him involved in a war against themselves. They could profit by the respite to consolidate their gains and to strengthen the desire of Ferdinand and the German people for a rapid, final, and peaceful settlement of the outstanding religious and political questions. The work in that direction was started at once. The Protestants, with the exception of Albert

Alcibiades, granted the King of the Romans subsidies for the consolidation of his position in Hungary. Maurice of Saxony even promised to help Ferdinand expel Achmet Pasha from Hungary³⁴). The Lutherans did not have to worry about their future; within less than three years they were to obtain official recognition for their religion in Germany.

The Treaty of Passau could not, at best, have lasted for any length of time. It was a compromise solution, signed by everyone with the conviction that it would not have to be respected for too long. The Emperor considered its terms to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and was thinking of repudiating most of its provisions on the occasion of the national diet which he had promised; the Protestants were dissatisfied with the temporary nature of the agreement and the insufficiency of the concessions obtained from Charles; Ferdinand was disappointed that no permanent peace had been established for he cherished the illusion that a Germany at peace would give unconditional support to his Hungarian policy. Yet, with the exception of Albert Alcibiades, everyone was inclined to work peacefully towards achieving their respective ends.

The Treaty of Passau had been particularly unpleasant to Albert of Brandenburg. Less of a fanatic than an opportunist, Albert believed that he was strong enough to continue the war single-handedly. Taking advantage of the fact that Charles had ratified the Treaty of Passau and started war against the French King, Albert continued his devastation of Germany³⁵). The campaign which Charles directed against the French in the fall of 1552 did not meet with much success. The Emperor had intended to recapture Metz but, due to the insufficiency of his troops and to poor weather conditions, he was forced to abandon the siege of the city in January 1553. Albert, encouraged by this setback, decided to continue his plundering of Germany. More than once the Emperor tried to bribe him into submission, but each time without success. On the other hand, the rebel's behaviour had thoroughly antagonized all the German princes; even his former allies were afraid of his activities. Maurice of Saxony was uneasy about the possibility of a raid on his possessions; the Protestant and Catholic princes were worried over the unrest

³⁴) K u h n s , op. cit., 92; P. C., V, 367—8, 410; B o n w e t s c h , op. cit., 187; Ferdinand to Charles, August 1, 1552, L a n z , op. cit., III, 406—7; Ferdinand's instructions to Dr. Zazius for Charles, August 6, 1552, L a n z , op. cit., III, 422—24.

³⁵) J a n s s e n , op. cit., VI, 491 ff.

which his activities created throughout Germany. By 1554 his ravages were brought to an end. Defeated by Duke Henry of Brunswick and placed under the ban of the Emperor, Albert, having exhausted himself militarily, was forced to flee into France in the spring of 1554. The rebellion of 1552 had, at last, come to an end. A definitive peace was in sight.

While Albert was indulging in a one man rebellion, the Hapsburgs, the Catholics, and the Protestants had been steadily moving towards a final pacification of Germany. In the fall of 1552 the troops of Achmet Pasha had finally returned to Constantinople. The material damage which they did to Hungary was slight; the moral effect on Ferdinand heavier. The return of the Turks had revived the powers of intrigue which had been latent in Hungary for several years. The former Queen, Isabella, who regretted the exchange of Weissenburg, saw in the Turkish invasion a means of reversing the decision of 1551. Through shady negotiations she tried to induce Suleiman to recognize the Zapolias as the legitimate rulers of Hungary³⁶). Suleiman was not interested in her propositions because he did not wish to fight for the re-establishment of Zapolia's line in Hungary at a time when he was about to undertake a punitive expedition against the Persian Shah. The Sultan, however, had no objection to making things difficult for the Hapsburgs, whose entrenchment in Hungary he did not favor. To avoid the possibility of Ferdinand's gaining ground while Turkish troops were busy in the Middle East, Suleiman ordered the garrisons stationed in the Territory of Ofen to keep Hungary in a continuous uproar until he could attend personally to Hungarian affairs. Moreover, to indicate his determination that there should not be any Hapsburg interference in Eastern Europe, the Sultan bluntly rejected an offer of recognition made by Ferdinand through a special ambassador in 1553³⁷). This time, however, the King of the Romans would not take no for an answer.

The invasion of Hungary of 1552 had proved to Ferdinand that the Turks were no longer in a position to threaten seriously either Hungary or the Empire. Convinced that the Turks could not inter-

³⁶) Huber, *op. cit.*, 10 ff.; Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, 44—9; A. Lefaiivre, *Les Magyars pendant la domination Ottomane en Hongrie (1526—1722)*, (Paris, 1902), I, 115 ff.; Ferdinand to Charles, December 10, 1552, January 26, 1553, December 29, 1553, September 15, 1554, Lanz, *op. cit.*, III, 523—4, 537, 603—4, Charles to Ferdinand, January 12, 1552, Lanz, *op. cit.*, 532.

³⁷) Ferdinand to Charles, December 29, 1553, Lanz, *op. cit.*, III, 603—4; Iorga, *op. cit.*, III, 44—5.

tere with his ambitions while away from Europe, the King of the Romans, in accordance with his plans for consolidation of his position in Eastern Europe, decided to take advantage of Suleiman's absence to pursue a policy which aimed at strengthening the territories he had acquired through his treaty with Isabella³⁸).

In order to achieve his goal, the King of the Romans needed the establishment of an immediate peace in Germany. He looked upon Germany as the main source of supplies for his Eastern plans and sincerely believed that, were she pacified, the Germans would be willing to support his ambitions. Moreover, he understood that so long as a threat of continuous disorder hung over the Empire, he could not very well concentrate on Eastern affairs. As the King of the Romans had no illusions about bringing the Protestants back into the Catholic fold at any time except by force, and as he did not even wish to contemplate this alternative, which would seriously interfere with his Hungarian plans, Ferdinand from as early as March 1553 decided to convince Charles to summon a diet for the settlement of the German problems as soon as possible³⁹). For a while the Emperor did not wish to accede to his brother's request, but by June 1554 he decided that the pacification of Germany, even if it meant the legal recognition of Protestantism, was advisable.

Charles had ratified the Treaty of Passau against his better judgment. At the time however, he trusted that he would be able to return to Germany and personally attend to the work of pacification. But as time went on, the Emperor realized the futility of taking such a step. The results of the war against Henry had not met with his expectations; a stalemate had been reached in the fighting following the Emperor's withdrawal from Metz; the German situation was going from bad to worse as was the Emperor's health which had never been very good and which had been seriously affected by the winter spent in front of Metz. Yet, as long as there was a hope that he could find a solution to the religious question other than complete submission to the wishes of the Protestants, the Emperor was unwilling to summon the diet which he had promised at Passau.

³⁸) Suriano to the Doge, July 26, 1554, August 8, 1554, *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe*, G. Turba, ed. (Wien, 1889—95), III, 3—4, 5—6; Ferdinand to H. von Plauen for Maurice of Saxony, June 8, 1553, *Druffel*, op. cit., IV, 182; Ferdinand's instructions to M. Guzmann for Charles, March 3, 1553, *Lanz*, op. cit., III, 549—57, P. C., V, 562.

³⁹) Ferdinand's instructions to M. Guzmann for Charles, March 3, 1553, *Lanz*, op. cit., III, 549—57.

Only in the spring of 1554 did Charles realize that he could wait no longer.

According to reports from Ferdinand and others, the situation in Germany was as troubled as ever despite Albert Alcibiades' defeat. The Protestants were uneasy over Charles' delay in summoning the diet, while the Catholics seemed afraid of the possibility of new disorders. The masses, afraid of devastations and yearning for peace, were restless enough to alarm their overlords. The King of the Romans had continuously and urgently insisted in his letters that a permanent peace should be established, both for the sake of peace itself and for the advantages which it would offer to his Hungarian plans. As Henry II seemed ready to renew his offensive against the Emperor by an attack on the Netherlands, and as his health was failing him more and more, Charles, although not convinced that peace would fulfill Ferdinand's expectations, nevertheless decided to allow his brother to call a diet for the purpose of settling the German situation⁴⁰). He, however, would not and could not attend it. Neither the French war nor the state of his health would allow it; besides, his conscience could never have agreed to granting unconditional recognition to heresy in Germany. It was up to Ferdinand to attempt a settlement of the German religious and political questions. He did not need the consent of the Emperor for any of his decisions but could act as an all-powerful King of the Romans⁴¹).

The imperial decision of June 8, 1554 was the equivalent of submitting to the wishes which the Protestants had cherished for over a quarter of a century; it virtually guaranteed the official recognition of Lutheranism as an official religion in the Empire. Indeed, Ferdinand, eager for peace and subsidies, wasted no time in convoking a diet at Augsburg for November 1554.

The negotiations for a final settlement of the religious question did not begin until the spring of 1555. With Ferdinand's approval, a decision was reached on the basic question of recognizing Lutheranism as an official religion in Germany. Legal recognition too was granted to those who belonged to the newly recognized religion⁴²).

⁴⁰) Charles to Ferdinand, June 8 (10), 1554, *ibid.*, 622 ff.

⁴¹) *Ibid.*

⁴²) G. Wolf, *Der Augsburger Religionsfriede* (Stuttgart, 1890), 38 ff., 139 ff., 168; Schmauss, *op. cit.*, II¹, 14—136; Ferdinand to Charles, July 9, 1555, August 20, 1555, August 27, 1555, September 10, 1555, September 24, 1555, Lanz, *op. cit.*, III, 662—7, 675—8, 678—80, 680—1, 683—6.

On September 25, 1555, the German Protestants had at last attained their goal. The Peace of Augsburg did not mean an end of troubles for Germany. New problems, arising from the division of the Empire into Catholic and Protestant sections, were to face Ferdinand. For the time being, however, the King of the Romans had every reason for congratulating himself; peace had been established and subsidies against the Turks were forthcoming.

Although the Religious Peace of Augsburg cannot be credited to the Turkish threat against the eastern possessions of the Hapsburgs, nevertheless the Ottoman threat to Ferdinand's interests in Hungary substantially influenced the final outcome of the Protestant struggle for recognition in Germany. In 1548 the Protestant cause seemed doomed. Defeated in war, forced to accept the „Interim“, faced with eventual submission to the decisions of a council, the Lutherans had little to anticipate. In 1552, Maurice of Saxony, as leader of a victorious conspiracy against the Emperor, was on the verge of dictating his terms to a defeated Charles. This extraordinary change in the fortunes of the German Protestants should be ascribed to a unique set of circumstances all working in favor of the eventual establishment of Lutheranism in the Empire.

Between 1547 and 1552 Charles had committed a series of mistakes which cost him dearly. In 1547, as a result of his insistence on a radical reform of the Church, he had alienated the papacy; from 1548 on, in consequence of this insistence on the observance of the „Interim“, he had been gradually alienating the Catholics; in 1551, upon his insistence on Philip's succession as King of the Romans, he had alienated Ferdinand. The defeated Protestants were to reap the fruits of the Emperor's mistakes. Taking advantage of the respite which Charles, with his papal policy, had given them, the Protestants were able to strengthen themselves and to organize the conspiracy of 1552. When the rebellion broke out they discovered that the Emperor's German policy had given them two unexpected allies: the Catholics and Ferdinand, who, instead of joining forces with Charles, decided to assume the role of spectators during the conflict. In fact, Ferdinand, who was more interested in obtaining subsidies against the Turks than in supporting the interests of his brother, became the promoter of the Protestant demands for recognition. Ferdinand's cooperation was most welcome to the Lutherans; it strengthened their bargaining power with the Emperor and it precipitated the eventual recognition of Protestantism at Augsburg.

Charles, although aware of his failure in dealing with the German situation, would never have conceded defeat had it not been for his knowledge that he could not rely on Ferdinand and the Catholics for cooperation. When in 1554 it became obvious to him that neither Ferdinand nor the Catholics would support him in his struggle for religious unification, when it became obvious to him that the King of the Romans was prepared to sacrifice his moral scruples for the sake of peace and subsidies against the Turks, the Emperor decided to admit defeat. Broken in health and spirit, Charles had to recognize, in the fall of 1555, that the concessions which the Protestants had been able to obtain since 1532 could not be eradicated by wars or councils as long as unity of purpose and action did not exist in Christian Europe, or in the Holy Roman Empire.

Religion in Albania during the Ottoman Rule

An Essay

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Few countries have experienced such unusual confessional changes as Albania. After the religious schism of 1054, she was split into a Catholic north and an Orthodox south. Westerners from across the Adriatic, first the Normans and later the Angevins while the Venetians had occupied parts of the littoral, invaded Albania and attacked the Byzantine Empire. The *thema* of Durrës (Dyrrhachium) and its Metropolis became the most active theater of contest between the two faiths¹). Whenever the Western armies were successful, the border line of the Eastern Church receded; whenever Byzantium was victorious, its frontiers expanded. Church power followed the vicissitudes of the political power which supported it.

Caught between the East-West struggle, the local lords and bishops in Albania tried to adapt themselves to the changing situations. They wavered between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, according to their momentary interests²). These oscillations, however, and the mixed population of cities, such as Dur-

¹) M. Šufflay, *Srbi i Arbanasi (Serbs and Albanians)*, (Belgrad, 1925), pp. 85—89, 94.

²) Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 94.