gibt freilich viel mehr altertümliche slaw. Entlehnungen im Alb. als umgekehrt; doch läßt sich dies sehr leicht verstehen, wenn man die historischen Verhältnisse in Betracht zieht. Denn die ältesten slaw. Lehnwörter des Alb. sind eigentlich keine einfachen Lehnwörter, sondern Wortrelikte (im Sinne Juds), die in Albanien nach der Albanisierung einst slawischer Gebiete hinterblieben (vgl. Seliščev, a.a.O.). Die alb. Lehnwörter des Ssl. konnten dagegen ins Ssl. nur allmählich im Laufe der Zeit durchdringen[14]). Außerdem sind die Serben und die Mazedoslaven in die Urheimat der Albaner (und der Rumänen), d. h. in Ostserbien und Nordmazedonien[15]), ziemlich spät eingewandert, wohl erst zu einer Zeit, als dort nur noch die Rumänen, aber nicht mehr die Albaner siedelten.

Southeastern Europe and the United States

By GEZA CHARLES PAIKERT (Le Moyne College, Syracuse, New York)

The term Southeastern Europe, i. e. the territory ranging from the crescent of the Carpathian mountains down to the Dardanelles never meant, of course, the same to Americans as to Europeans[1]). Since it was a part of another continent and never a zone of strategic value or other primary American interest this problem region of Europe could evidently at no time claim a priority on the agendas of Washington as high as on those of European powers. Hence, it is not sursprising that American scholarship and academic literature specializing in Southeastern Europe is comparatively limited and that a sui generis American politico-economic theory or any kind of doctrine relative to this particular region is, so far,

[14]) Ebenso sind ssl. (vermutlich auch skr.) Elemente ins Mittelgriech. schon im VI. Jh. eingedrungen (vgl. Vasmer, Festschr. Rozwadowski II, S. 153 ff.; Die Slaven in Griechenland, Berlin 1941; Weigand, Balkan-Archiv IV, S. 1-52).

[15]) Vgl. alb. Elemente in der Toponomastik Ostserbiens und Mazedoniens: skr. Niš aus uralb. *Nëish(ë) = Naissus; alb. Shkup < Scupi (sl. Skopje); maz. sl. Štip aus alb. Shtip < Astíbos (Barić, Hymje në hist. e gj. shq., S. 49).

[1]) There is no universal consent in the United States as to what exact area is meant by the term Southeastern Europe. It ist generally agreed that the Balkan Peninsula is the core and most characteristic part of it. Most students of the question (this author among them) include the westernmost rimland of this area, that is, the territory which until 1918 was the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy.

practically non-existent. Besides, a considerable proportion of the few specialists in this field are first generation Americans, whose interest and knowledge are rooted as much in their native Europe as are, in many instances, their inevitable personal leanings and prejudices.

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The masses of American immigrants from Southeastern Europe and their immediate descendants have, so far, contributed little to the American evaluation of the region in question, especially by comparison with the accomplishments of other immigrant groups. As a matter of fact, they could do little, since in their new country they never succeeded in achieving a position of leadership similar to that of their fellow immigrants from the much more developed Western parts of Europe, particularly those who have had no initial difficulty with the English language[2]). In the main, the peoples of Southeastern Europe enjoyed rather poor publicity in the United States, with the probable exception of the Greeks whose more favorable standing was due to classic traditions and partly to the financial success of a few American individuals of Greek descent.

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As far as public opinion is concerned, Americans — especially before World War I — hardly ever considered the problems of Southeastern Europe. If and when they did, they preferred to generalize, applying indiscriminately the traditional Anglo-Saxon catchwords which had been used in connection with the Balkans only, sometimes when the non-Balkan parts (Hungary) of this area were under discussion. While remembering that this was the „Sore spot of Europe", or the „Witches' cauldron", or the „Powder-barrel of Europe" they nursed a stereotyped vision of Southeastern Europe. It was limited to a crazy hodge-podge of wild and uncivilized little countries in which there lived, among romantically costumed native primitives a corrupt set of local bosses and a fantastic crowd of ill-mannered, bomb-throwing rebels. In short, this area became in American public opinion synonymous with an odd spot where there was always trouble and practically no room for any kind of honest business or profitable enterprise.

[2]) In the entire history of the United Staates only a handful of the top leaders were other than descendants of English-speaking nationals and none of these was of Southeastern European origin.

However, World War I and its aftermath brought a brief but marked change in this attitude. During the War and its conclusion, a large number of Americans, spellbound by the greatly appealing messianism of President Wilson, earnestly believed that the United States, being by tradition the champion of human freedom, had been chosen by Providence for the noble task of delivering oppressed peoples in general and those in Southeastern Europe in particular. Americans, honest and refreshingly idealistic in international politics as they are, took it for granted — a belief in which even many of their leaders sincerely concurred — that all this must be done with no ulterior motive at all, but solely for the general good of mankind. Thus, quite irrespective of the bitter awakening and the subsequent return to isolationism that followed World War I, it was easy for the American public to forget completely about Southeastern Europe, once it had been „liberated" and remodelled in what they thought was a better, more democratic fashion by President Wilson and his fellow peace makers.

The events during and after World War II once again made that part of Europe a topic of interest to the American public. However, as usual, it was never discussed as a problem of its own kind calling for a particular solution, but rather (understandably enough) as only a subsidiary part of such over-all concepts as Russian communism, fascism- Hitlerism and related subjetcts. Unlike in the unique period of the first World War, European powers and politics became interesting to the American public (as, of course, to Washington) only with reference to America, Asia and Africa, but not in connection with issues in Europe, least of all in Southeastern Europe.

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The economic relationships between the United States and Southeastern Europe reveal the same familiar pattern. In general, it can be said that at no time during the history of American economic and financial relations with the rest of the world the countries of Southeastern Europe formed an area of special importance to the United States. Investments there were few, loans small and rare, and for trading this part of Europe had no significance during the last half century for the New World either as a source of imports or as a market for exports. The stock reasons for the lack of vigorous, expanding trade relationships were: The low per capita

incomes of the Southeastern European countries (especially in the face of American standards); inadequate transportation facilities in that area; the interruption of War and political upheavals; and, last but not least, the competitive drives of other nations, particularly Germany. Besides, the countries of Southeastern Europe do not produce goods which are in great demand in the United States as most of the exports from this part of Europe could be either produced as well in the United States or else procured without difficulty from some other part of the world.

Southeastern Europeans could — on the other hand — certainly use more American products, chiefly raw cotton, machinery and increasingly so autos. However, the relatively high prices of American goods discouraged this incipient trade and compelled the importers of the Southeastern European area to turn to other, lower priced sources of supply. This was mainly the Reich, the undoubtedly dependable and traditional supplier of the region in question. Under Hitler these ties became enormously intensified as the Third Reich never hesitated to use means other than economic (of which the United States had none) to „encourage" economic relations between her and the smaller countries within her grip and to discourage the latter from trading with the non-German West.

Re-exports also bothered American traders. United States consular officials in Southeastern European countries during the pre-World War I era frequently referred not only to the poor transportation facilities, but also pointed out that many American goods were reaching Belgrade, Athens, and other cities as re-exports from intermediary countries. The British, French and Germans in particular were importing goods from the United States, and re-shipping them to destinations in Southeastern Europe.

Although, out of the aforesaid difficulties only those regarding transportation became somewhat smoothed out, American trade with Southeastern European countries experienced only a slight expansion by the eve of World War I. However, new hindrances were not long in arising. Commerce was choked off by the conditions of this conflict and it could never really rally after the end of the War. During the fairly normal period 1926—1930, when the United States was sending to the European Continent merchandise with an average annual value of $ 2 236 501 000, the share of these goods destined for the countries in Southeastern Europe had a value

of only $ 23 862 000. At the same time the United States was importing European merchandise at an average annual rate of $ 1 207 213 000. But only $ 22 524 000 worth of these goods came from the Southeastern European area. Furthermore, over two thirds of all American trade with this part of the world during 1926—1930 was with one country Greece, the one Balkan country bound most strongly to the non-German West. In a later period, 1936—1940, United States annual exports to all of Europe averaged $ 1 332 708 000 and American annual imports from all of Europe averaged $ 627 085 000. The comparable figures for the Southeastern European area in that period were $ 18 126 000 and $ 28 196 000. These few data point out clearly enough how limited in extent were the commercial relations of the United States with that region in the first half our present century.

The insignificance of American trade in Southeastern Europe seems even more striking in the light of the simultaneous gains of Germany. Taking Bulgaria as an example, Germany, even before Hitler, in 1930 was receiving. 26.2 per cent of the exports of that country while the United States could claim only 1.0 per cent of these exports. By 1938 the United States was taking 3.4 per cent of Bulgaria's exported merchandise. But in the same year 58.9 per cent of these Bulgarian products went to Germany. The same story holds true in other Southeastern European countries. In 1930, 4.8 per cent of Hungary's importe came from the United States. This figure rose to 5.3 per cent in 1938. Yet Germany's share of Hungarian imports in the same two years increased from 21.3 per cent to 30.1 per cent. From 1929 to 1938, the United States never took more than 3 per cent of Hungary's exports, and never sent Hungary more than 6 per cent of its imports. Greek imports from the United States were approximately cut in half from 1930 to 1939, while at the same time Greek imports from Germany were almost tripled[3]).

Immediately after World War II, with German foreign trade temporarily out of the picture, the United States in a short lived revival, became a more active trading partner of Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary. This expansion of trade, however, did not survive the lowering of the Iron Curtain, and, with the exception of Greece and Yugoslavia, the actual dollar volume of trade today has been

[3]) Preceding data abstracted from the Foreign Commerce Yearbocks, 1930 to 1940. U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.).

practically eliminated. It is indicentally of some interest to note that since 1951 Germany's share of Southeastern European trade has been on the steady increase again. Between 1948 and 1951, Western Germany's trade with that part of Europe increased about ten times[4]).

In addition to commodity trade, the United States has also carried on a certain amount of investment in Southeastern Europe. Some of this has been of the portofolio type, but most of it appears to be direct investment. For instance, in 1904 the Societé Romano Americana was incorporated in Rumania for the purpose of exploiting Rumanian oil properties. This firm passed under the control of Standard Oil of New Jersey in 1907[5]). In 1929, American investment in Rumanian oil properties amounted to $ 20 million. By 1931, Americans already owned about 10 per cent of the foreign capital in the Rumanian oil industry[6]) (and this ownership increased thereafter). In Hungary, the United States had about $ 3 million invested in oil properties by 1929. Since the imposition of exchange controls prevented earnings from leaving the country, American investors used their profits to make large purchases of Hungarian real estate[7]). In the case of Bulgaria, the United States held in 1936 10.9 per cent of the total foreign investments in that country. On the other hand, in 1938 the United States had only about 500 million dinars invested in Yugoslavia, out of a total of 6 milliard dinars for all foreigners[8]).

In 1943, the last year for which data are available, the value of American direct investments in Southeastern Europe was $ 259 million. This was an increase over the direct investment of $ 93.2 million in 1936 in the same area. However, to obtain a proper perspective, it should be compared to a direct American investment in 1943 of $ 2 377 6 million in Canada, $ 2 803 1 million in the Latin American Republics, and $ 1 785 5 million in Western Europe[9]).

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[4]) ibid, Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1951. (U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D. C. 1953.

[5]) Cleona Lewis, America's Stake in International Investments, (Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1938), p. 580.

[6]) South-eastern Europe: a Political and Economic Survey (London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939), p. 134.

[7]) Lewis, op. cit. pp. 188—89.

[8]) The Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 148.

[9]) The Economic Almanac 1953—54, p.. 572—73.

Another economic relationship between the United States and Southeastern Europe is that arising out of postwar reconstruction. Taking two Southeastern European countries as an example, the United States government after World War I acting under the Liberty Loan Act extended a credit of $ 5 million to Greece and $ 25 million to Rumania. Between 1920 and 1922 Greece received furthern loans of $ 10 million[10]). From 1940 to 1949 the United States government loaned $ 128 million to Southeastern European countries, with $ 111 million of this amount going to Greece, the faithful wartime ally and much abused victim of enemy invasion. During the same period, the United States government made outright grants of $ 1 296 million to the Southeastern European countries with the lion's share of $ 975 million again going to Greece[11]). Yet these amounts were even proportionally small in comparison with the economic aid granted by the United States to France, Great Britain and other countries of Western Europe.

The sporadic and feeble nature of private American investment in Southeastern Europe clearly indicates that, as in the case of commodity trade, there has never been a strong basis for sound economic ties between the two areas.

Last, but not least, economic relationships between the United States and Southeastern Europe have been affected by the conflict between what might be called the „trading autarchy" of Germany (and to a much lesser extent that of Tsarist Russia) and the „trade internationalism" of the United States. In this long-standing struggle, American economic internationalism has not shown sufficient strength to achieve a position of dominance or even significance in the Southeastern European economy.

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With all this in mind, let us turn to the political aspect of the picture, namely the attitude of Washington toward Southeastern Europe. In a nation like the United States, in which economic interests and even more public opinion are known to carry greater weight than they do in most other countries, it is not surprising that the considerations of the former are usually pretty much aligned with those of the State Department. Of course, this does not

[10]) Lewis, op. cit., p. 362.

[11]) Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950, (U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.) pp. 832—33.

mean that there are never substantial factors which at times override public opinion and even economic considerations. One must not for a minute forget that the basic rule and ultimate underlying motive of American foreign policy, pragmatic rather than dogmatic as it all too often appears, is and always was power politics. Could it be otherwise in a world-wide competition of powers whose main driving force also is and has been since time immemorial the same power politics?[12])

Moreover, we have to bear in mind two other important realities in American foreign policy without which no analysis of this kind can be complete. One is that from 1812 onward not only did the United States refrain from any armed conflict with England, but while increasingly complementing the policies of the latter it became the erstwhile mother country's most dependable associate, reaching eventually the status of a senior partner, if not that of a big brother. Accordingly, American policies, including those connected with Southeastern Europe, were basically synchronized with those of Britain. The United States could act thus all the more easily since that part of Europe constituted no exception to the fact that ever since the aforesaid date vital American interests never crossed those of England.

The other reality refers to the generally less-emphasized fact that until the end of World War II basic American interests did not once conflict with those of Russia either. From the point of W e l t a n s c h a u u n g , the present incarnation of Russia — the Soviet Union — came even closer to the utopian American mind than Britain ever did. Hence, it was not at all difficult for many of the progressive planners of the Roosevelt administration to build up Soviet Russia, especially during the last War, as another admirable land of the brave and home of the free. Indeed, was not the Soviet Union, the heroic wartime buddy, born — like the United States — out of a revolution that overthrew the detestable rule of kings and bishops, an act so dear to the still puritanical hearts of many Americans? Was not material progress emphasized in this brave new world, just as in the United States, and was not Soviet collectivism ultimately just another (less adequate, perhaps)

[12]) The French proverb, „C'est le ton qui fait la musique", seems to hold true even in the realm of power politics. There is hardly any power which can boast with a record of foreign policy motivated by more humanitarian and ethical considerations of absolute value than the United States.

version of the only true formula of living: the American way of life? And, last but not least, was not the Soviet Union the most ardent and powerful anti-pole of the wickedest of all vices; the fascism of Hitler? Of course, this rosy appraisal gave way to one of an entirely different hue as soon as the United States, for the first time on record, came in direct contact with the Soviet Union (as the heir of Tsarist Russia) over issues other than a single supreme goal, the winning of the War. But the afore-mentioned sympathy, eloquently embodied during the troublesome War days in the highly impressionable President of the United States, left much more tangible effects than a mere tender feeling. The decisions of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam concerning the order of the world in general and that of Southeastern Europe in particular bear witness to this.

Judging it from the sole angle of the aforesaid realities and disregarding all other, equally important considerations America's cool attitude towards the most formidable contestant for the „Open Door" in Southeastern Europe, the German Reich appears quite logical. Washington seemed to be convinced that it had every reason to watch the Southeastern European policies of the dynamic Empire with growing distrust. Did not the very concept Southeastern Europe (Südosteuropa), the complex, scholarly study of the German Akademiker, Oekonomen and Geopolitiker, become gradually distorted from an abstract notion in politico-economic theory into a most concrete and timely catchword in politics? And was there not — so it appeared to the rivals of the Reich — in this catchword a vast variation of greatly alarming potentials only all too unmistakably implied?

In the opinion of some influencial Americans many of the policy planners of the pre-1945 Germanies identified Südosteuropa with an indispensible part of the Reich's rightful sphere of interest, its Lebensraum, an integral part of the empire's grandiose Eurasian Großraumwirtschaft. More so, it became interpreted as a curious, but by no means inadequate German version of the Monroe Doctrine. And some experts in Washington, being Americans, never failed to speculate in this connection in terms of the so immensely important undertones of their own much cherished doctrine ...

In the last decades before 1917, with Imperial Russia as well as Germany and the Habsburg Monarchy in the race for the remains of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Washington, though by far less interested than London or Paris, and rather in the comfortable

role of a benevolent, indifferent observer, had a hard time, indeed, deciding whom to place at the top of its list of the unwanted competitors for Southeastern European supremacy. With the downfall of Tsarist Russia in 1917 and especially after the rise of Hitler, this dilemma ceased to exist, as Germany became the undisputed leader of the aforesaid list, holding that doubtfully flattering position until the time of her collapse at the end of World War II.

The victory of the Entente in the first World War offered to the victors (among them the United States), in accordance with time-honored tradition, the unique opportunity of settling the problem of Southeastern Europe on the exclusive terms of the winners. But since all the member powers of the triumphant Allies happened to be located outside of the immediate reach of this much coveted area geography deprived them of its direct control. Thus, only the second best choice remained, i. e., an arrangement whereby Southeastern Europe, especially the Balkans, was to remain free from the menacing (to the Entente) control of either of the hungry and at this point defeated powers in the immediate vicinity of this region. In plain English, this meant a solution with no part whatsoever for the three historic contestants of the area in question, namely, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. Actually, through this solution the balance of power, which was already leaning heavily in favor of the victors, shifted further.

However, the price of this glory proved to be a rather heavy one. For the purpose of forestalling any possible absorption or integration by or under the aegis of the afore- mentioned Big Three the new arrangement called for the emancipation and transformation into small, independent nattional units of the hitherto already much too partitioned but still semi-colonial Southeastern European area. For the execution of this plan the peace makers at Paris happily employed the greatly celebrated magic formula of the day, the otherwise noble principle of national self-determination. Indeed, this gallant hobby-horse of President Wilson, which was to solve all problems and answer all questions, came as a highly welcome windfall for those who were painstakingly seeking excuses to justify adequately the destruction of the vanquished rivals.

The American President while enthusiastically engaged in Europe in the making of a brave new world could not, of course, have been entirely free from considerations other than the unselfish materialization of the aforesaid principle. Notwithstanding his well-

known zeal for noble ideas, which took its roots from the best traditions of American humanitarianism and which gave most of his actions an air of sincerity, he was much too well aware of the reality that the chief purpose of the entrance of the United States into the War was to do away with Germany's menacing drive. His main idea was, as it could not be otherwise, what he thought was best for the interest and security of his country. His train of thought appears to be somewhat in the line of the following words of his learned compatriot, Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis: „what the United States really gained from the War was the overthrow for a generation of the military German empire which victorious would have been in a position for an inevitable Japanese alliance that would have caught the nations of the New World in the jaws of a crushing vise of occidental and oriental military and naval power. The price of temporary immunity while high was hardly excessive"[13]).

In the light of this, it is small wonder indeed, that President Wilson did not choose to notice the all too obvious reality that the application of certain universal principles such as the right of national self-determination — of which he happened to be the most ardent advocate — proved to be by far not universal but most one-sided only. By the same token he remained silent when the Versailles order of the world in general and that of Southeastern Europe in particular became fashioned not so much for the advancement of the underprivileged but rather for the weakening of the rivals of the victors.

The new arrangement of Southeastern Europe which was designed to block German aspirations meant simultaneously the total destruction of the controversial partner of Germany, the Habsburg Monarchy, herself a contestant for Southeastern European supremacy. Apart from the fact that this competitorship had by no means been welcomed by the Western Democracies, there can be little doubt that one of the main reasons for the d e b e l l a t i o and complete dismemberment of the Monarchy was its aforesaid partnership with regard to her power potential.

In the United States this unpardonable partnership was greatly overshadowed by the fact that next to Tsarist Russia, the Danubian empire of the Habsburgs has had the poorest publicity in America,

[13]) Samuel Flagg B e m i s, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3 rd ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1950) p. 669.

being known there as the most arch-reactionary of all the powers and exceptionally oppressive to its many national minorities. Besides, the short-lived tragic experiment of Maximilian of Habsburg in Mexico in 1864-67 was not entirely forgotten by Washington, where this ill-fated incident was regarded as a serious threat to the sacro-sanct Monroe Doctrine[14]).

Thus, upon the ruins of the doubtlessly defective but in terms of economy, administration and even culture indisputably very coherent Monarchy there were created a number of new establishments adjacent to the newly remodelled Balkan states. Since the latter themselves were only recently established on the debris of the Ottoman Empire (whose downfall had been followed with such ghostly promptness by its perennial foe, the Habsburgs), they were still struggling with growing pains. What happened was that instead of integrating large complementary regions (the sole, but powerful justification of the Habsburg Monarchy) the new arrangement in Southeastern Europe was made precisely on the opposite principle.

The price of this experiment was soon paid by history, as the new order in Southeastern Europe collapsed at its first real test, the drive of Hitler and all that followed in its disastrous wake. The error of the Paris peace-makers seems even more aggravated in the light of a unique situation which occurred at that specific time. Beginning in 1918, there existed for about fifteen long years a power vacuum in Southeastern Europe (as also in the whole Eastern half of the Continent), a single chance in many centuries which, amazingly enough, was left utterly uncapitalized upon by the apparently all too much exhausted victors. With the exception of Constantinople and its periphery, there was no more Turkey left in the Balkans, the Habsburg Monarchy ceased to exist, and Germany was

[14]) The most significant additional factor that made President Wilson and his entourage severe prosecutors of the Habsburg Monarchy was, of course, the growing concern of the United States about the governing of the various national minority groups in Austria Hungary in connection with which a steady and well organized stream of protests flooded Washington, too. Most effective were the Czech (and Slovak) patriots and political emigrés whose complaints about the present and whose plans for the future enjoyed a great and favorable publicity in the United States and whose influence in Washington weighed certainly heavier than that of any small nation at all times. A great deal of credit for the success of the Czechs goes to Mrs. Charlotte Garrigue Massaryk, the Amercan born wife of the founder of Czecho-Slovakia, whose influential activity in the political party of President Wilson cannot be emphasized enough.

knocked out of the arena for what looked then to the victors a long, long time. Above all else, Russia, the perennial shadow over the Balkans and the black-sheep member of the war-time Entente was temporarily out of the game, too, and it took more than two decades before the Soviets were able to continue where the Tsars had left off.

It is true that the breakdown of the new Balkan arrangement came not by itself, but together with that of the entire order of the world that existed before World War II. However, one wonders, indeed, whether the all-out collapse was not initiated or at least stimulated by the tumbling down of the new Balkan structure which was — ironically enough — designed to be one of the main pillars of the order established at Paris. It has always been a difficult task to defend that order, but it seems far more difficult to find reasonable excuses for the interwar conduct of the erstwhile Entente powers with regards to the work they did at Paris in general and to Southeastern Europe in particular. In sum, they proved to be incapable and often even unwilling to integrate Southeastern Europe into any kind of working entity and immunize or protect its petty principalities, which perpetually quarrelled among themseves, against the ever increasing pressure of Berlin.

They faileed to comprehend and materialize the keynote to the whole question, namely, the economic and financial stabilization of this region which primarily in the Balkans was traditionally unorganized and underdeveloped. The United States, safe in its own splendid isolation, and lacking a second Wilson who would be willing to lead another (this time a financial) „crusade" in Europe, did little or nothing — even during the relatively placid and fat years before the depression — to prevent economic stagnation and later disaster in Southeastern Europe[15]). Granted that the German politico-economic pressure in that area was, indeed, formidable at that time, the United States can still not be entirely relieved of sharing the responsibility of the non-German West. American interests were given up in Southeathern Europe with practically no serious resistance, a fact which certainly proved to be helpful in making this region wide open for German prospectors.

The United States in its isolationist shell, abstained from any possible action to promote a revision of the Southeastern European question on the one hand, and did not show determination to de-

[15]) See above pp. 529—532.

fend the existing s t a t u s q u o (in the foundation of which she was so greatly active), on the other. All it did was listen with increasing sympathy at the lamentations of the Western Democracies about the "encroachments" of Germany. The outcries of the West became louder, and Washington's sympathy more intensive when the new, unscrupulous and high-pressure management of Hitler took over, but still no serious initiative of any kind was taken.

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Since the events and changes which overwhelmed the area in question during and especially after World War II are too recent, too polemical and much too personal, it was not the intent of the author to include them in his present analysis. His conclusions concerning American attitudes towards Southeastern Europe could be summed up in three basic points:

1. American experiences with Southeastern Europe in the recent past evidenced that an essentially disinterested policy (and all too often no policy at all) proved to be neither efficient nor expedient. Consolidated and satisfactory conditions in that turbulent region — remote and of no direct interest that region may have appeared to the New World — are indispensible elements of a global peace, to which cause the United States had so unmistakably committed itself. An "interested" policy can, of course, under no cirumstances and by no power be effectuated (as it is being done at present by the Soviet Union) in form of an exclusive control over that area.

2. Southeastern Europe is a potential economic (in its ultimate possibility politico-economic) unit with sound probabilities to become eventually a solid integration of complementary regions. Hence, no program (universal, American or any other) concerning European arrangements in general and those affecting Southeastern Europe in particular can be regarded as complete which fails to take into account this basic premise.

3. The ultimate source of most of Southeastern Europe's troubles proved to be the economic underdevelopment and the chronic financial crises which habitually prevailed in that region. Consequently, no outside attempt aimed at the regimentation of that territory into any working system of international co-operation has a chance to succeed which disregards the prime condition of the matter: a truly complete economic and financial rehabilitation and stabilization of Southeastern Europe, collectively, on the aforesaid premise.