

Russian Landmilitia and Austrian Militärgrenze

(A Comparative Study*)

By ALAN D. FERGUSON (New Haven)

In January 1788 Prince Gregory Potemkin wrote to his Empress, Catherine II, that, „One may take it as a general rule that border settlements should be military“¹). He was referring, of course, to Russia's southern frontiers and specifically was justifying his efforts to organize Cossack regiments for the defense of those areas. Yet his remark underscored a concept of military organization which had been utilized in Russia for several generations and in Austria for at least two centuries. The rulers of both nations had chosen to employ a system of military settlement in defending their southern borders from attack by the troops or vassals of the Ottoman Porte. In Russia this technique was not developed in an organized, state-directed manner until the reign of Peter I when the Ukrainian Landmilitia was created by forming regiments from certain settlers in southern Russia and establishing them in theoretically self-sustaining military communities obligated to defend the frontier from Tatar raids and Turkish attack. In Austria, on the other hand, where direct attack by Turkey was a major threat throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Emperor Ferdinand I, in 1564, granted Privilegien to families settled along his southern frontier between the Adriatic and the Drave if they would fight under Austria's banner. These patents gave tax-free use of lands and administrative regulation in return for military service. From this small beginning was to grow the very extensive military settlement organization known as the Militärgrenze. By the time that the Russian Landmilitia reached its peak of development in the 1730's, the Militärgrenze were likewise flourishing, although not then at their point of greatest size or organization. Nevertheless, because both institutions were independently established for the purpose of defending against Turkish power and since they both were organized on the principle of military settlement, there is some interest in noting how they were similar and wherein they differed.

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¹) Adamczyk, T., *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Potemkins* (Emsdetten, 1936), p. 75.

Although the chief factor which led Peter I to adopt, and his successors to continue, the organized system of military settlement known as the Landmilitia was defense against Turkey and the Porte's vassals, the Crimean Tatars, he did not depend upon the Austrian example for his model. He undoubtedly knew of the Grenz-institut, but available evidence would indicate that he was more influenced by the Swedish counterpart, the indelningsverk. It is well-known, of course, that he utilized Swedish models in much of his governmental organization.

As Russia's southern frontier was extended slowly toward the Black and the Caspian seas during the late seventeenth century, Russian need for defense against the Tatars became increasingly more apparent. The stockades, forts and redoubts manned by small contingents of regular troops were far from sufficient to meet the mobile guerilla tactics of the nomadic Crimean horsemen. As part of the policy aimed at solving this problem, the Russian Tsars followed the principle of awarding land grants to persons best prepared by experience to defend themselves and their families, and who were willing to get land on the condition that such defense was their responsibility²). A majority of these people were, of course, former soldiers who had served the state. The balance of the population was made up of former state servants, Cossacks, Ukrainians, and remnants of other contingent ethnic groups. By mid-seventeenth century, the southern region of Russian territory possessed a distinctly military flavor. Each town and settlement was at once an agricultural community and a military rallying point.

Two things were necessary for survival-fighting ability and agricultural knowledge. In spite of this situation, however, the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and his advisors felt it necessary to establish more coordinated defenses. To this end they undertook the erection of a series of fortresses along a line which followed approximately the present-day northern boundary of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Known collectively as the Belgorod Line, with the frontier town of Belgorod as its central fortified place, the system of forts was completed only during the succeeding reign. So quickly did southward colonization advance, however, that by 1700 this Line was greatly reduced in value as far defending the settlers was con-

²) B a g a l e i, D. I., Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy moskovskago Gosudarstva (Moscow, 1887), p. 112. Cited hereafter as B a g a l e i, Ocherki kolonizatsii.

cerned; many of their homes and farms lay well below the chain of fortresses. In the latter years of the seventeenth century and during the early decades of the eighteenth, Tatar raids became particularly severe³). Although Peter I maintained garrison troops along the lower Dnieper River and at his forts at Taganrog and Azov, these defenses were eliminated when Turkey inflicted the heavy defeat on the Tsar at Stanilishte on the Pruth River in 1711. The peace terms after this abortive Russian campaign took away from Peter not only his Dnieper forts, but Azov and Taganrog as well, throwing the Empire's southern boundary back almost to the Orel River. The Tatars were not slow in taking advantage of the diminished defenses. In 1711 a major incursion was undertaken by them against the shipyards at Voronezh. Two years later they took some 14 000 captives in a raid on the Kievan area; and in 1717 a repeat raid against Voronezh netted them 10 000 more settler prisoners⁴). There was little doubt that the colonists in the Ukrainian territory needed more than their own unorganized efforts aided by scattered garrisons and the obsolete Belgorod Line to protect them from these fierce attacks.

Not until after 1721, when he had achieved his objectives on the Baltic by defeating Sweden, did Peter give close attention once again to his southern lands. In December 1722 he issued orders that from amongst the settlers living in the gubernii⁵) of Kiev and Azov were to be recruited five regiments of infantry troops for the dual purpose of defending against Tatar raids and acting as a ready force in the event of a reportedly imminent attack by the Porte⁶). He indicated that the persons to be used for this force were

³) Between 1682 and 1693 there were at least one hundred and nineteen Tatar raids on the southern settlements. Bagalei, *Ibid.*, pp. 260, 263; Sumner, B. H., *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 1949), p. 15, n. 3. Cited hereafter as Sumner, *Ottoman Empire*.

⁴) *Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva*, 148 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1867-1916), XXV, 375. Sumner, *Idem*.

⁵) The Russian word guberniia indicates a geographical area defined for administrative purposes. In this sense a guberniia corresponded to a French gouvernement, a German Land, or an English province. The plural form is gubernii.

⁶) *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*. First series, 45 vols. in 49 (St. Petersburg, 1830), VI, No. 4131. Cited hereafter as PSZ, First. The Turks were greatly irritated at the Tsar's campaign against Persia in Trans-Caucasia. The Russian emissary at Constantinople, Nepliev, worked hard for four years to keep the Porte from attacking.

former soldiers and serving men who had received land grants from the state⁷). Known as the Ukrainian Landmilitia, these regiments came to form the nucleus of an army corps based upon the principle of settled troops.

According to the regulations issued for the Landmilitia through the year 1724, the regiments were commanded from two centers, one each in Azov and Kiev gubernii; in the former at Voronezh, in the latter at Sevsk. The maximum total complement for the organization was set at seven thousand five hundred men, made up of fifty companies of one hundred and fifty men each with ten companies per regiment⁸). Actually this figure was not reached during Peter's reign. In February, 1724 the senate ordered that recruits be enrolled, one from every sixteen Ukrainian families, until 5,187 men were on the rosters⁹). Men were selected from lists, provided by the governors of the two gubernii, of those former service people on whom a special tax was laid for the support of these troops¹⁰). The exact number of recruits was reached by calculating the number of privates who could be paid at the rate of six rubles per year from the proceeds of that tax. Age limits were set at between fifteen and thirty, so that the maximum period of service was fifteen years. As the men were collected they were divided into two categories, regular and irregular, on a basis of three of the former to two of the latter. Thus there were three regular regiments, two irregular. The latter units acted as ready reserves for the former. Officer staffs for the regular regiments were provided by the War College from its rosters of regular line personnel, while local nobility, Wallachians, and Serbs in the Russian service were to be used as officers for the irregular units¹¹). Cadres of under-officers were to

⁷) These people held a special status in Russian society. They were called the *odnodvortsi*, or people of one household. As small landowners they could, at one time, own serfs although they were usually so poor that they worked the land themselves. In 1724 they lost nearly all social and political privileges. In 1713 Peter had through the Senate, ordered the formation of five Landmilitia regiments from these people to perform local garrison duties. Although these units were assembled, they were soon disbanded and never used. The men who had been in that earlier mobilization were the first to be used in 1722. PSZ, First, V, No. 2643; VI, No. 4131.

⁸) Ibid., VII, No. 4223.

⁹) Ibid., VII, No. 4463. In the course of his reign Peter used 6,427 of the former serving people in his Ukrainian Landmilitia. Ibid., XI, No. 8787.

¹⁰) Ibid., VII, No. 4200.

¹¹) Ibid., VII, Nos. 4200, 4205.

be supplied by the War College from other regiments for both the regular and irregular Landmilitia units. After their initial mustering, all of the regiments were placed under the general command of Prince Golitsyn, who was given charge of all Russian troops in the Ukraine.

Following drill and training the men were sent to danger points along the border. From these stations, during the good weather months from the first sowing until the final harvest, they acted as both a passive and an active defense force¹²⁾. During the winter months they lived in their homes, but were subject to call should the occasion arise. Their officers lived in the same districts and were, presumably, responsible for keeping a loose check on the men so that when spring came they would be ready for the more active duties¹³⁾. Food and clothing were supplied by the men themselves since, as the regulations stated, they would rarely be away from their home districts long enough to need other sources of supply¹⁴⁾. When long marches did take place, the state would furnish these things from its storage magazines. Arms and ammunition were issued by the War College, and all troops received pay at the same rate as paid to regular garrison troops. Both the pay and the military equipment were paid for by levying a special tax on the population of the Ukraine who were not serving in the Landmilitia¹⁵⁾. When in 1723 the Tsar changed these regiments from infantry to mounted status, it was decreed that the state would pay for the initial purchase of horses and would allow each soldier one ruble per year maintenance of his mount. Riding equipment would also be provided by the government.

A major growth of this organization came during the reign of Empress Anna, in the 1730's. Under the vigorous supervision of Field Marshal Burkhardt Christoph von Münnich, General-in-Chief of the Russian Army, the number of regiments was increased to

¹²⁾ One of the chief functions of the troops was to conduct raids against the Tatars. Peter believed in aggressive defence.

¹³⁾ Ibid., VII, No. 4561.

¹⁴⁾ Ibid., VII, 4223.

¹⁵⁾ Ibid., VI, No. 4131; VII, No. 4200. In 1722 Peter planned to use the proceeds from the state salt tax to cover this expense. The following year, however, he decided to levy a special tax of four grivna (forty kopecks or slightly less than one-half of a ruble) on the population of the two gubernii not enrolled in the Landmilitia regiments.

twenty in 1731¹⁶). The troops were utilized both in the construction and military maintenance of the last of Russia's great southern defence works, the Ukrainian Line¹⁷). This Line, conceived in plan by General von Weisbach, then commander of Russia's Ukrainian troops, consisted of a series of fortresses along the Orel River from its mouth on the Dnieper, eastward to Iziium on the Donetz¹⁸). The defenses were thus located just north of the southern frontier as defined in the 1713 Treaty of Adrianople, between Russia and Turkey. They stretched across one of the chief regions through which the Crimean Tatar tribes traveled on their raids into Russian territory. Along this Line, in the fall of 1732, Münnich stationed his twenty Landmilitia regiments under the direct command of Major Generals Tarakanov and de Brine¹⁹).

The total complement of the regiments numbered approximately 22 000 men and officers. Four regiments were infantry with a strength of 1 280 soldiers each, and sixteen of cavalry composed of 1 059 men each²⁰). Each of the soldiers in the lower ranks received a definite allotment of land to allow for his own and his family's maintenance. This allotment for these soldiers is interesting since it was based on the earlier size of land grants to the *odnodvortsi*. It included about 180 acres of arable land plus pasturage, forest, and acreage for house, garden, threshing and storage²¹). In addition to land for the soldiers, Tarakanov was ordered to grant acreage to the brothers or other relatives of a soldier who accompanied him to the Line²²). There were two reasons for this. First, each settled soldier was required to supply at least one laborer for construction of the defence works²³). Second, these laboring settlers were utilized as replacements when vacancies occurred in the regiments and were supposed to act as a substitute defence force when the regular troops were on campaign. The laborers were usually blood relations of the men in the regimental ranks.

¹⁶) During the reigns of Catherine I and Peter II the number of Landmilitia regiments was increased to ten, probably under the impetus of Count Münnich who came into the Russian service during the latter's reign.

¹⁷) *Ibid.*, VIII, No. 5673; Miliukov, P. N., *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kultury*, 5th ed., 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1904), I, 60.

¹⁸) Bagalei, *Ocherki kolonizatsii*, p. 298.

¹⁹) PSZ, First, VIII, No. 6279.

²⁰) *Ibid.*, No. 5680.

²¹) *Idem.*

²²) *Ibid.*, No. 5673.

²³) *Ibid.*, IX, No. 6315; XI, No. 8787.

Along with the land grant, the state agreed to furnish military supplies, seed for planting, maintenance for horses and a small annual wage to the soldiers²⁴). The workers were paid for their labor on the construction project. But for all of these ostensible benefits, the settlement of the families of these men proceeded very slowly. While by the end of 1733 the fortresses were built up sufficiently to allow for the permanent establishment of nine of the twenty regiments²⁵), it is clear that this process of settlement did not move smoothly. In the summer of 1735 the Empress approved a report which censured Tarakanov severely. He was blamed for the poor planning and faulty execution of the entire project. The report pointed out that the houses were poorly constructed, if built at all. Fields were not planted. Wood and water were often in short supply. In brief, bivouac conditions prevailed where established communities should have been the rule²⁶).

That these admonitions had little effect was seen in the spring of 1736 when Field Marshal Münnich assumed direct control over the Landmilitia. He was, of course, interested in strengthening his southern defenses for the coming conflict with Turkey. Raising the Ukrainian troops to the status of a corps, he eliminated the infantry, changing those regiments to mounted troops. At the same time he urged the utmost effort and speed in the settlement, indicating clearly that soldiers of the nine settled regiments were still separated from their families to a large extent. To alter this situation, and effect the completion of the projected settlement, his ukase of reorganization stated very clearly that the greatest efficiency would be achieved if the Swedish system were emulated. To assure this development, he appointed two Major Generals, von Meidel and von Rading, to the Landmilitia Corps solely because of their familiarity with the Swedish rules and institution²⁷). While

²⁴) Ibid., IX, No. 6925.

²⁵) B a g a l e i, Ocherki kolonizatsii, 317-18. The fortresses were not finally completed until 1738. Von M a n s t e i n, C. H., Mémoires historiques, politiques et militaires sur la Russie depuis l'année 1727 jusqu'à 1744 (Amsterdam, 1771), p. 122. Cited hereafter as M a n s t e i n, Mémoires.

²⁶) PSZ, First, IX, No. 6791.

²⁷) Ibid., IX, No. 6925. Little is known of these two men, but Manstein records that von Rading was in command of Landmilitia troops during the campaigns of 1737. M a n s t e i n, Mémoires, p. 185.

not naming the indelningsverk as the model to be followed, there can be little doubt that this was what he meant²⁸).

Although Anna and Münnich stressed their desire to keep Landmilitia troops with their families and assured them of extensive aid from the state, there was apparently little effort on the part of the recruited settlers to show proper appreciation. In the first place, they deserted in substantial numbers²⁹). Secondly, their farming activities never returned enough food for their subsistence. The army commissariate repeatedly issued rations to men, laborers and their families when they arrived on the fortress line. Prior to the arrival of their families, the men often had victuals carted to them from their old homesteads³⁰). The settlers involved were often in severe distress because of the heavy taxes and the large number of their best men commandeered for service on the Ukrainian Line. Of the twenty regiments formed in 1731-1732, no more than nine were settled with their families. In the war which began against Turkey in the summer of 1736, and was terminated in 1739, Münnich used some five thousand of these troops in supporting actions along the lower Dnieper River³¹). As defense forces they reduced the devastating effect of the Tatar raids, but were unable to stop them completely. Their fine quality as soldiers, however, was remarked by General C. H. von Manstein, who served throughout the Russo-Turkish War under Münnich in the Ukraine and was stationed there after 1739, and was testified to by Münnich himself when he formed the famous Izmailov Life-Guard regiment from them and used them as cadres for his Cuirassier regiments³²).

The major effect that the actions of Münnich and the Empress had on the organization was that they gave to the nine regiments settled along the Ukrainian Line an administration which brought

²⁸) Cf. Zhuravskii, D. P., „Statisticheskoe obozrenie raskhodov na voennia potrebnosti, 1711 po 1825 god,“ in Voennyi sbornik, 60 vols. (St. Petersburg 1850—1917) (1859), No. 9, 35. Cited hereafter as Zhuravskii, Voennyi sbornik.

²⁹) PSZ, First, VIII, No. 6055.

³⁰) Bagalei, Ocherki kolonizatsii, p. 320.

³¹) Münnich, B. E., Tagebuch in E. Hermann, Beiträge zur Geschichte des russischen Reiches (Leipzig, 1843), p. 198.

³²) Dolgorukii, Khronika rossiskoi imperatorskoi armii (St. Petersburg, 1799), No. 6; Manstein, Mémoires, 122—23. General von Manstein wrote, „Je dirai par parenthèse, que ces troupes sont les plus belles qu'il y ait dans toute la Russie.“

them into complete identity with the principle of settled troops. Beginning in January, 1731, the official ukases relating to the development of the Landmilitia troops had stressed repeatedly the urgent need for giving land to each settled soldier on an equal basis, and to the necessity of keeping him united with his family. No major alterations were made in terms of pay and government benefits to the men in these regiments. The Petrine pattern was followed almost exactly, except that the land provisions and state commitments in terms of agricultural aid were clearly defined. But when the government uprooted these men from their homesteads back of the defense line, and ordered them and their families to settle at the newly fortified places, the military settlement principle was as thoroughly in effect as it ever was. The references in 1736 to the Swedish model showed that such was the intent of the government. Both the Russian and Swedish systems provided for the maintenance of their settled troops through a combination of self-support, aid from collateral families and from the state. There was some difference in the military function of troops of the two nations in that the indelta soldiers were closer to militia status than the Ukrainian Landmilitia forces which were considered as being constantly on active duty, the former troops being more of a trained, ready reserve. As far as can be determined, the Russian organization, during Anna's reign at least, never achieved the degree of self-sufficiency or well-ordered organization of the indelningsverk, in spite of von Meidel and von Rading.

The history of these regiments for the remaining years of Anna's regime indicates no changes in their status or organization.

Under Empress Elizabeth the nine regiments were confirmed in their assignment to the Ukrainian Line, while the eleven nonsettled units were sent back to their homes and kept as a reserve force from which replacements were furnished for the units on the Line³³). By 1742 the plight of the families of those southern settlers either taxed for the support of or enlisted to duty with the regiments was so severe that the government made special efforts to assist them. Seeds for sowing were issued from government sources, a regiment of dragoons was sent to the Line for summer duty to relieve the men of the Landmilitia, and the settler-soldiers were given the best horses from those of the eleven furloughed regiments. The harvests had been so poor that both Landmilitia troops,

³³) PSZ, First, XI, No. 8787.

their families and relatives had to be supplied with food from government military magazines. Since there were approximately sixty-five thousand settlers either serving in or working for the Landmilitia in 1742-1743, the drain on these magazines was very heavy³⁴). The General-Proviantmeister of the Army, Sheremetev, informed the War College that after October of 1743 he could not be responsible for this maintenance. It was only then that the government undertook to send home the bulk of the regiments. The distress continued, however, as was evidenced by the numerous orders issued threatening severe penalties for desertion or aiding deserters³⁵).

To help offset the defections and short-comings of these settlers, Elizabeth initiated one of the most interesting institutions of her reign, the settlement of New Serbia. In 1751 she sent an embassy to petition the Austrian Crown for permission to give service to one Lt. Colonel Horvath, a Serbian in the Austrian army. Permission was granted and Horvath was given the Russian rank of Major-General and a large grant of frontier land on which he promised to settle several thousand of his compatriots³⁶). One of the major conditions of this grant was that he form four regiments of Serbs for border defense, the officers to be from regular Russian regiments³⁷). Actually, only enough Serbian settlers followed Horvath to supply men for two regiments, one of hussars and one of pandurs, or light marauding cavalry³⁸). Each man in these two units was given land for maintenance of themselves, their families, and their horses. One of the interesting minor problems connected with settlement of Serbs is apparent in an order from the Tsarina to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, whose traditional territory was contiguous to the land assigned to the new colonists. The Cossacks were forbidden to offer any type of verbal insult to the incoming colonists.

³⁴) In 1742 nearly 140 000 quarters of wheat, rye, and barley were issued to the Landmilitia. Zhuravskii, Voennyi sbornik (1859), No. 9, 36.

³⁵) PSZ, First, XI, No. 8801; XII, Nos. 9144, 9533; Bagalei, Ocherki kolonizatsii, p. 323.

³⁶) PSZ, First, XIII, No. 9919. See Noldé, B., La formation de l'empire russe, 2 vols. (Paris, 1952-53), II, 30 ff. for a discussion of Horvath's experience.

³⁷) PSZ, First, XIII, Nos. 9921, 9924.

³⁸) Ibid., XIII, No. 9935. Von Hietzinger, C. B., Statistik der Militär-Grenze des österreichischen Kaiserthums, 2 vols. in 3 (Vienna, 1817-1823), I, 32. Cited hereafter as Hietzinger, Statistik. Most of the people who went to New Serbia were from the old Theiss and Marosch Militärgrenze.

During the spring and summer of 1752, Elizabeth made her final major amendment to the organization of her Ukrainian Landmilitia. In April of that year she set up schools for the children of some of the settled soldiers and other families from whom the Landmilitia were recruited³⁹⁾. Only six of the regiments were granted this privilege, the remaining three not containing enough eligible children to warrant the expense. The children who were declared eligible were those over seven years of age who were orphaned. These youngsters, up to age fifteen and at a quota of twenty-five per year per school, were given maintenance, books and equipment. Their curriculum included mathematics (advanced study was offered to those capable of absorbing the work), reading, writing, and military tactics. When they reached the age of fifteen, they were placed on military duty with the regiments of the army as clerks. This system of educating the orphans of soldiers was continued by Catherine II⁴⁰⁾ and the succeeding rulers of Russia, quickly developing into an institution which became a major feature in Russian military life.

With the assumption of power by Catherine in 1762 the Ukrainian Landmilitia Corps underwent many changes. Early in 1764 the Empress authorized the first of a series of actions which terminated a generation later in the complete absorption of these troops into the regular army. She established a special commission to investigate Russia's southern defenses and to make recommendations for any needed reforms. The commission reported to her in June. It found, among other deficiencies, that the old Ukrainian Line was not only of little value, since most colonists lived south of it, but that the settled regiments living in and around its forts were in very poor condition. Its chief recommendation was that a new defense line be established south of the old one and that it be extended further eastward⁴¹⁾. Within a week, Catherine approved changes in the size and function of the Landmilitia organization. The twenty regiments were reduced to eleven, ten of which were assigned to infantry duty, while the eleventh was given status as

³⁹⁾ PSZ, First, XIII, No. 9972.

⁴⁰⁾ Ibid., XVI, No. 12174.

⁴¹⁾ Ibid., XVI, No. 12180.

a unit of dragoons⁴²). The remaining ten regiments were scattered throughout the territory of South Russia, although they continued to be supported and maintained by the *odnodvortsi*. Additional taxes were levied against these particular peasants for this purpose. Each year in January the War College assigned three of these regiments to special duty as guards along the old Line, and one unit to act as special garrison at Kiev⁴³).

No change was made in this new arrangement until January, 1769. At that time all of the Landmilitia units were placed on a regular army footing and the name, Landmilitia, withdrawn from their designations⁴⁴). Their chief connection with their former organization lay in two things, the *odnodvortsi* continued to supply them with replacements and maintenance, and they continued to be considered as settled regiments⁴⁵). Exactly why this formal change of status came in the midst of Russia's war with Turkey is not explained. It may have been a command problem aiming at a more efficient use of these troops to combat the terrible raids made that winter by the Crimean Tatars. Although these were the last large-scale incursions made by these semi-independent vassals of the Porte, they were among the worst ever suffered by the colonists in Russia's southern regions⁴⁶).

Finally, nearly a generation later, in 1787, the final link of these regiments with their past organization was severed, and their replacements were ordered to come from the general recruitment, while the families of these old landmilitia troops were given status as state peasants⁴⁷). This was the formal end of both the Ukrainian Landmilitia and the Ukrainian Line.

During the period when the Ukrainian Landmilitia was helping to guard Russia's southern frontier, the Austrian Landmiliz of the well-known *Militärgrenze* along the Austro-Turkish border was performing a similar function. This was the organization which

⁴²) Ibid., XVI, No. 12185. At the same time that this change was being made similar changes were being carried out in the territory of New Serbia. It was now incorporated into the newly formed guberniia of Ekaterinoslav, and its settled regiments were thoroughly reorganized. Ibid., XVI, No. 12099. Von Stein, F., *Geschichte des russischen Heeres* (Hannover, 1885), pp. 152-53.

⁴³) PSZ, First, XVI, No. 12185.

⁴⁴) Ibid., XVIII, No. 13230.

⁴⁵) Ibid., No. 13203.

⁴⁶) Bagalei, *Ocherki kolonizatsii*, pp. 342-48; Thompson, G. S., *Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia* (London, 1947), p. 133.

⁴⁷) PSZ, First, XXII, No. 16552.

grew from the beginnings of systematic border defense made by Emperor Ferdinand I in the mid-sixteenth century. By 1700 the two original Grenzen, the Kroatische and the Windische, had been expanded so that the early force of 5000 to 6000 militiamen had grown to include nearly 15 000 trained and organized Grenzer defending the frontier from the Adriatic to Petrinia. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz between Austria and the Porte in 1699, new territories were added to the Austrian side of the border and incorporated into the defense system as new Militärgrenze. These were the Save-Danube, the Theiß-Marosch, and the Banal, or Petrinar, Grenze. Aside from the native populations of these areas, large numbers of refugees from Turkish sovereignty were settled in the new Austrian districts. Most of these people were Serbs who had sought sanctuary in Austrian and Hungarian lands during the long period of fighting from 1687-1699. At least 40 000 families of these people fled to the north in this period, most of them under the leadership of Patriarch Arsenius Černojević. In addition to these immigrants the population of the Temescher Banat was organized into militia units during the 1720's under the leadership of Count von Mercy, while a similar effort was made in the narrow strip of land ceded to Austria out of Serbian territories. By 1724, when the Ukrainian Landmilitia regiments were placed on permanent footing, the militia forces in the Militärgrenze numbered well over 25 000 men.

The organizational bases upon which these frontier districts were organized were ones which followed fairly closely the terms of the Privilegien issued by Ferdinand I in 1524-1535. In return for militia duty in guarding the frontier and allegiance to the Austrian Crown, the Grenzer were given patents entitling them to the use of arable, meadow and wood lands. For the administration of the Grenze, the Austrian government established various official positions, court procedures, land holding norms, and military regulations. The first major statement of these administrative rules was contained in the Verfassungs-Statut issued by the Emperor Ferdinand II in 1630⁴⁸). During the following years of that century and the first half of the next many modifications of this statute

⁴⁸) Sch w i c k e r , J. H., Geschichte der österreichischen Militärgrenze (Vienna and Teschen, 1883), pp. 17 ff. Cited hereafter as Sch w i c k e r, Geschichte. V a n i č e k, Fr., Specialgeschichte der Militärgrenze, 4 vols. (Vienna, 1875), I, 86-99. Cited hereafter as V a n i č e k, Specialgeschichte.

were made by succeeding Austrian rulers. Gradually the state imposed more and more regulations on the people living in the Grenze, specifying the size of land allotments, the number of persons required for militia duty, and the regular military responsibilities of the frontier districts. The early irregular organization and casual defense arrangements were slowly changed to a uniform system of administration which imposed ever greater military functions upon the Grenzer while still maintaining the essential features of an agrarian-military institution, but the general premises of the Privilegien and the organizational foundations remained essentially the same throughout the frontier.

The area of each Grenz was divided into smaller districts—Capitanate and Dörfer for administration and military organization. Each such district was commanded by appropriate officials, usually military officers appointed by the Crown. All males in the area were considered as being potential militiamen as soon as they reached the age of seventeen. Selection of individuals for military duty depended partially upon physical and mental capabilities, partly upon the military responsibilities assigned to the area, partly upon the commanding officer's desire, and partly upon the size of family and of land allotment with which the soldier was connected. It was essential, of course, that sufficient men be left free from military duties to carry on the industrial, commercial and agricultural activities necessary to the community. This fact emphasized the two major aspects of the peculiar organization of the Militärgrenzes, the economic and the military.

The basic economic unit in all of the areas organized on the principles of the Grenzinstitut was the Hauscommunio, or the Familiengemeinschaft⁴⁹). The essential element of this unit was that no individual owned property in his own name, but only in the name of his family of blood relations. Patents of land usage were given to family units. The household assumed responsibility for military service, not the individual man, or even the head of a family. Selection of men for military service was thus predicated in the first place upon the number of men in a household and upon the size of its landholding (liegende Gut). The blood relations living on the same

⁴⁹) See Rajacsich, Baron, *Das Leben, die Sitten und Gebräuche, der im Kaiserthume Oesterreich lebenden Südslaven* (Vienna, 1873), for detailed outline of this institution.

land worked the land together, shared communally in any profits from the land, voted as a unit on all decisions affecting the family and generally exercised a basic control over all members of the household⁵⁰). Each household elected its most capable adult male as Hausvater. He was not necessarily the oldest man in the family. If no competent man was available, a Hausmutter might be elected to manage the household's affairs. This system of the Hauscommunion was traceable directly to the well-known Serbian custom of the zadruga, a group of people with common parentage, living and working together for communal benefit⁵¹).

The amount of land a household had the right to use came originally from the allotments granted to each man who did service in Landmiliz of the Grenze. The size of these allotments varied greatly, of course, depending as it did upon the number of people living in any particular area and the amount of land available for their use. The guiding principle followed was to grant the usage of enough arable and meadow land so that each family could be adequately maintained. Thus, for example, mounted soldiers in the Save Grenze were allotted 24 Joch of plowland and 5 Joch of meadow. Foot soldiers got slightly less. Both groups were allowed common use of wood lands for building materials and firewood⁵²). In the Temescher Banat area at the same time a foot soldier was allotted 18 Joch of plowland, 3 Tagwerke of meadowland, while the mounted soldier received 20 Joch of plowland and 4 Tagwerke of meadows⁵³). Strict regulations governed the sale and purchase of lands. The inheritance provisions were likewise strictly prescribed, following the principles upon which the Hauscommunion operated.

The military operations of the Grenze followed patterns which were as peculiar in their own way as was the family organization

⁵⁰) V a n i č e k, Specialgeschichte, III, 199 ff. This reference is to details of the 1807 Grundgesetz issued by Francis I for the Militärgrenze of that time. It sets forth regulations not completely in force during the eighteenth century, but follows faithfully the general outlines of the long-established custom. The Uskoks settled in the sixteenth century had introduced the system into the Grenze areas. Cf. S c h w i c k e r, Geschichte, p. 18. H i e t z i n g e r, Statistik, I, 259 ff.; II, 130-6.

⁵¹) Cf. M o s e l y, P. E., „The Peasant Family: The Zadruga,” in *The Cultural Approach to History*, C. E. W a r e, ed. (New Haven, 1940), pp. 95-108; and V e r n a d s k y, G., *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, 1948), p. 133.

⁵²) V a n i č e k, Specialgeschichte, I, 133.

⁵³) S c h w i c k e r, Geschichte, p. 35.

in the economic field. Only in the campaigns of 1733-1736 were the Grenzer first ordered to duty outside of the areas of the frontier. Up to that time their military organization was based primarily on the concept that they would be used only for guarding the border. For this purpose they were formed into units which operated only in the very local sphere of the particular Capitanat or Dorf where the militiamen lived. After the Treaty of Karlowitz, however, this concept began to change in favor of a more normal army procedure. Foot soldiers (Hajduken) and mounted troops (Husaren) were organized into company formations of about 180 men each. An additional military group was formed to do service in the watch-towers (Tchardaken) which were erected at regular intervals along most of the frontier. This group, the Tschardakenvolk, were organized into small units and assigned to the watching post nearest their homes.

For military service either within their local district or outside of its boundaries, all members of the Landmiliz were paid. Usually this was in money, but occasionally the pay was a combination of money and produce. In the Theiss-Marosch Grenze, for example, it was customary during the eighteenth century for a Hussar to receive 18 florins and 6 Kübel Frucht annual pay. A foot soldier of the same place and time was paid an annual wage of 12 florins and 6 Kübel Frucht⁵⁴). These men were also provided with uniforms, horses, shoes and other military supplies. In return for this pay and equipment, and their land allotment, the Grenzer were expected to take their turn either at border patrol duty, watch-tower duty, community work projects, or at the military training periods which were held regularly during the year. The amount of time each man spent varied somewhat in each locality but in no case did it exceed much more than one-half of a year's time. In the 1760's a further responsibility was given the Militärgrenze, that of guarding the frontier not only against military attack, but also of keeping epidemic diseases out of Austro-Hungarian territory⁵⁵). No information is available to the author to indicate the age at which these responsibilities of service ceased for the individual soldier, but in 1807 it was set at the fiftieth birthday⁵⁶).

⁵⁴) Ibid., p. 28.

⁵⁵) V a n i č e k, Specialgeschichte, II, 143 ff.

⁵⁶) H i e t z i n g e r, Statistik, II, Pt. II, 335.

In the period 1736-1737, under the impetus of the Duke of Hildburghausen, the first regimental formation of the Militärgrenze troops was made. Regular field regimental organization was established in the Warasdin Grenze. By 1742 the Hofkriegsrat in Vienna had approved this procedure for all frontier districts.

Beyond these operational features of the Grenzinstitut, the population was well organized in the operation of both commercial and industrial activities. Flax spinning, glass blowing, cloth wearing and salt mining were among the established enterprises. Commerce on both sides of the border was encouraged, although generally entrusted to licensed merchants and traders. Culturally the Grenze were fairly advanced communities of their time and place. Schools were fairly common, but undoubtedly were largely used for the children of officers and civil officials. Freedom of religion was always a standing principle in these areas, although there were occasional conflicts between the Greek Orthodox Serbs and the Roman Catholic Germans and Croats. Another source of unrest was the often unclear delimitation of authority between civil and military authority. This became particularly irritating in the matter of justice where military discipline and procedures often conflicted with civil processes. The latter were frequently administered by church officials. Still a further source of trouble was the greed and harshness of many of the military officers in the enforcing of discipline and their habit of withholding pay and payments in kind. During the 1720's considerable trouble arose in several localities over this type of action. The general satisfaction with the Grenzinstitut was demonstrated, nevertheless, in the events which accompanied the abolition of the Theiß-Marosch Grenze in 1750. As this was being carried out, the Grenzer were given a choice of remaining where they were and coming under the jurisdiction of Hungarian provincial administration or of moving southward into the Banat and there continuing under the system of the Militärgrenze. The great majority chose this latter arrangement⁵⁷).

Whatever the troubles that occurred from time to time, the Militärgrenze accomplished their function well. In Austria's various clashes with Turkey during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the frontier was effectively protected, and the Landmiliz

⁵⁷) It was at this time that over a thousand Serbian families from the old Theiß-Marosch Grenze went to Russia to settle in the southern district known as New Serbia. H i e t z i n g e r, Statistik, I, 32; S c h w i c k e r, Geschichte, p. 76.

fought well and loyally. During the War of the Austrian Succession large numbers of Grenzer fought outside of their native districts and were specially commended by Empress Maria Theresa. In 1754 she approved a Grenzrecht for the Karlstädter and Warasdiner Grenze which codified all existing regulations and relationships. This law remained the basic administrative standard until 1807⁵⁸). So excellent was the service of the Grenzer in the Seven Year's War that the Empress decided to extend their form of organization over the entire length of the southeastern Austro-Hungarian border. In 1761-1766, therefore, and in the face of considerable local opposition, four regiments were formed from the peoples on that frontier and the area was designated as the Siebenbürgische Grenze. At the same time, in 1764, a special battalion was organized for water transport purposes on the Theiß and Danube. Named the Tchaikisten-Bataillon, this small unit was located at the confluence of the two rivers⁵⁹). With its establishment the basic growth of the Militärgrenze came to an end. By the end of the reign the troops of the frontier districts were organized into seventeen regiments of foot soldiers, four regiments of cavalry, one corps of Hussars, and the Tchaikisten battalion. These units numbered over sixty thousand men and accounted for about one-third of Austria's ground forces⁶⁰).

Not until 1784, under the Emperor Josef II were any fundamental changes made in the organization. In that year the so-called Cantonssystem was put into effect as the Emperor sought to improve the administrative procedures and efficiency of the Grenze. Dividing the political and economic aspects of administration from the military, Josef II established separate groups of officials and officers for each function. The innovation was certainly a failure, creating great antagonisms between the two sets of administrators and leading to a chaotic state of affairs throughout the frontier. The intervention of the Napoleonic wars prevented any real reform in the system until 1807. In that year, under the inspiration of Archduke Carl an all-encompassing Grundgesetz was approved

⁵⁸) Sch w i c k e r, Geschichte, pp. 100-04; V a n i č e k, Specialgeschichte, II, 1-39.

⁵⁹) Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks used the word chaika to mean a river-boat, while the word chay is Turkish for river. Cf., V e r n a d s k y, G., Kievan Russia (New Haven, 1948), p. 30.

⁶⁰) Sch w i c k e r, Geschichte, pp. 146-7

by Francis I and remained the essential governing basis for the Militärgrenze until their termination in 1881.

Throughout the period of their co-existence these two organizations—the Ukrainian Landmilitia and the Austrian Militärgrenze—had a common purpose and a common basis of organization. Each served to guard its native frontier from attack by Turkish forces. Each was based upon a fusing of military operation and self-subsisting economic function. In the details of operation there were certain identities and many differences, the latter in part due to the natural influences of local and national customs. Although the internal policies of each nation rested on such varying premises that exact comparison of internal institutions is invalid, there were, nevertheless, certain interesting parallels. Each was based upon a relationship of individual to the state which was that of subject to lord. In Russia this took the form of a serf's relation to owner and master. The *odnodvortsi* who comprised the bulk of the Landmilitia were, after 1724, placed in a social category analogous to that of the state peasant, and were made completely subject to state authority⁶¹). In Austria the position of the Grenzer was much less restricted, but was still essentially that of *Untertan* to sovereign. The Austrian subject had a large degree of choice as to whether he would become a member of the Militärgrenze communities. The members of the Landmilitia, on the other hand, had no choice whatsoever once the state decided to assign them to the border regiments.

In the matter of internal political and economic development, the Austrian institution was much more advanced than its Russian counterpart. A significant factor in this situation was the very nature of the differing geographic conditions of the two frontiers. Beyond this was the fact that in Russia the state was constantly making an effort to render the Ukrainian Line obsolete and to make the Black Sea the southern border. Thus, there was the continual pressure of non-military colonists entering the general border area and serving to accentuate the confusion and disorder of any moving and growing frontier area. Against this, the Austro-Hungarian border remained fairly static after 1718, and the state made

⁶¹) Cf. *Svod zakonov rossiiskoi imperii*, 1847 ed., IX; Latkin, V. N., *Ucheb-nik istorii russkago prava perioda imperii (XVIII i XIX st.)*, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1909), pp. 193-95.

no particular effort to import new population, utilizing the local natives and immigrants.

Behind the two organizations there were apparently two quite opposite ultimate purposes. The Ukrainian Landmilitia was conceived and developed as a regularly organized part of Russia's armed forces for the purpose of meeting a threat which the state was actively trying to eliminate permanently. In this sense, the Landmilitia was a temporary formation, even though the period of its life could not be accurately foretold. The Militärgrenze, on the other hand, while conceived as a form of organization which could help meet the same sort of threat, slowly evolved into a permanent and particular section of Austria's population. A new and special class of citizen was created, for whom permanent social, economic and political standards were formulated. For this reason the state exercised great care in regulating all aspects of life in the border districts. In Russia the state made repeated efforts to see that the economic needs of the Landmilitia were met, but the social and political institutions in the communities on the Ukrainian Line were not consistently treated as being equal in importance to the military function.

The relative effectiveness of the two organizations is difficult to assess; too little is known, for example, of the actual military operations of the Landmilitia. In frequency of use and numbers of men involved, the Russian units can scarcely be compared with the Austrian. Both groups produced excellent soldiers and both performed creditable military services. In an economic sense the Militärgrenze were much more effectively organized and operated than their Russian counterparts, while the same conclusion must be reached in the spheres of social and political development. When allowances are made for the differing conditions under which each grew and functioned, it must be admitted, however, that for the time and places, a form of military-economic settlement was a logical institution and a valuable asset.