

Fourteen Secret British Documents Concerning Count John Capodistrias (February–March 1828)

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With the establishment of Hellenic independence in 1828, the British government was certain that the Greek government threatened its various interests in the Ionian Islands¹). As the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands since April 1824, Sir *Frederick Adam* expended great efforts to maintain Ionian neutrality, and he felt that the Greek government might annex the Ionian Islands upon the orders of its new president, Count *John Capodistrias*. Born in Corfu during 1776, *Capodistrias* served briefly as the junior Foreign Minister of the Russian government under Tsar *Alexander I*, and his insistence at the Congress of Vienna of 1814–1815 that the short-lived ‘Septinsular Republic’ — an independent government of Ionian aristocracy established during the Napoleonic Era — should be resurrected forced the British government to restore Ionian independence under its diplomatic protection in 1817. In spite of his resignation from the Russian government shortly after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in March 1821, *Capodistrias* incurred the distrust of British officials in both London and Corfu, thus *Adam* welcomed the opportunity of sending his aide-de-camp, Major *Edward Baynes*, to assist the Greek government in 1828 with the evacuation of the Egyptian forces from Greece²). The Egyptian viceroy, *Mehemet Ali*, had tentatively agreed to withdraw his forces from the Peloponnese since the hostilities of the Greek Revolution had nearly ended, and *Baynes* would serve as an intermediary between *Ibrahim Pasha*, the Commander-in-Chief of these forces, and the Greek government — while

¹) Cf. W. David Wrigley, *The Ionian Islands and the Advent of the Greek State (1827–1833)*, *Balkan Studies*, Vol XIX/2 (1978), pp. 413–426.

²) *Buchanan to Parish*, 14 Feb 1828, Foreign Office 352/20a (hereinafter: F.O.); and *Capodistrias to S. Canning*, 26 Aug 1828, F.O. 352/210. Cf. C.W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence*. Cambridge: University Press 1930, p. 117; and Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833*. Los Angeles: University of California Press 1973, pp. 238–247.

he also waited news from Colonel *J. Hobart Cradock*, the British emissary in Cairo. Apart from these diplomatic responsibilities, *Baynes* also made some acute observations about both *Capodistrias* and his newly-formed government.

As he was soon taken into the confidence of the Greek president, *Baynes* quickly formed a rather pessimistic view about the internal situation in Greece. Compiled in a series of confidential reports which he forwarded to the British authorities in Corfu, *Baynes* related that the Greek government was unable to discipline its armed forces, and he concluded that *Capodistrias* — whom he often described as a ‘political charlatan’ — was highly unsuitable to govern a nation of such unruly inhabitants³). *Baynes* was dismayed by nearly all the events which he witnessed in Greece, and his accurate impression about the financial resources of the Greek government diminished the hopes of the Lord High Commissioner that *Capodistrias* would resolve over £ 3,000 in collective, outstanding claims resulting from losses which the Greek navy had inflicted on Ionian shipping between 1821 and 1828⁴). Overall, *Baynes* had little praise for *Capodistrias* and his unflattering remarks about the Greek president convinced both the Lord High Commissioner and other British diplomats in both Greece and the *Levant* that this Corfiote expatriate posed a permanent threat to the Ionian interests of the British government⁵). Eventually, *Baynes* was recalled to Corfu after it was learned that the Egyptian government would not readily evacuate its forces from the Peloponnese, and British fears about a Greek annexation of the Ionian Islands continued to incite tension in Anglo-Hellenic relations even after the Greek Revolution finally ended in 1831.

With one exception, all these previously unpublished letters are contained in Volume 556 of the collection known as the Ionian papers (Colonial Office correspondence series #136, C.O. 136). This collection contains over 1,400 volumes of documents, and it is wholly repositied in the Public Record Office (P.R.O.) of London. Because the British authorities enforced the neutrality of the Ionian Islands in the most strict manner, these islands were basically isolated from the hostilities of the Greek Revolution; and as a result, historians of this nationalist struggle have often ignored the wealth of historical evidence contained in the Ionian papers⁶). Even though

³) *Baynes* to *Adam*, Private and Confidential, 7, 9, 20 Feb and 3 Mar 1828, Colonial Office, 136/556 (hereinafter: C.O.).

⁴) *Adam* to *Baynes*, Secret and Confidential, 1 Feb 1828, C.O. 136/48; and *Gliddon* to *Barker*, 14 Oct 1828, F.O. 286/287.

⁵) *Baynes* to *Adam*, Private and Confidential, 29 Feb 1828, C.O. 136/149; and *Adam* to *Hay*, Private and Confidential, 7 Oct 1829, C.O. 136/149. Cf. C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria*. London: Oxford University Press 1973, pp. 353—431.

⁶) Documents of a similar nature, obtained mostly from Continental archives, but including also many from C.O. 136, are presented in: D.C. Fleming, John

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their contents provide an interesting picture of the Greek government during its earliest years of formal independence, these particular letters have been neglected by historians of the Greek Revolution and by biographers of *John Capodistrias* alike, while the few books and dissertations on Ionian history which have appeared in recent years altogether neglected these particular letters⁷). Due to this situation, these previously unpublished letters assume an historical importance since they provide substantiation for the tensions which affected Anglo-Hellenic diplomatic relations following the Ottoman defeat in Greece. These letters are not presented *in extensio*, but they are presented in an edited form with additional punctuation to ease the prolix style employed by Major *Baynes*.

Letter No. 1:

Baynes to Adam, Secret and Confidential, 7 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

“In conformity to the instructions with which I was honoured by Your Excellency’s Letters of the 1st instant marked ‘Secret and Confidential’⁸), I arrived here on the 4th, and finding that the Count Capodistrias had formally assumed the reins of Government as President of Greece, I lost no time in obtaining an audience and communicating to him the object of the Mission with which I was entrusted by Your Excellency on the part of His Majesty’s Government, together with the result of the conference held with Ibrahim Pasha at Modon, and Colonel Cradock’s mission to the Viceroy of Egypt.

I found His Excellency perfectly alive to the operational advantages which the Government of Greece must derive from the Viceroy’s consent to with-

Capodistrias and the Conference of London, 1828—1831. Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies 1970, pp. 163—381.

⁷) Both Dakin and Crawley have utilized the Ionian Papers to a limited extent, however, Dakin’s latest study, *The Greek Struggle for Independence*, does not feature this archival collection, nor does Woodhouse in his biography of *John Capodistrias*, Cf. footnotes No 2 and 5. Few other studies on either the Greek Revolution, or *John Capodistrias*, or even the Ionian Islands, utilized the Ionian Papers for reason of historiography, and have mainly cited this archival collection for bibliographical purposes. Unpublished works extensively utilizing the Ionian Papers are: J.J. Tumelty, *The Ionian Islands under British Administration, 1815—1864*. Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge: University of Cambridge 1952, 371 pp., James Lawrence McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic*. Ph.D. Thesis, Madison: University of Wisconsin 1965, 226 pp.; and W.D. Wrigley, *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality during the Era of the Greek Revolution, 1821—1831*, D.Phil. Thesis; Oxford: University of Oxford 1983, 353 pp.

⁸) *Adam to Baynes*, Secret and Confidential, 1 Feb 1828, Corfu, C.O. 136/148.

draw his support from the present conflict, the removal of his Troops from the Peloponnesus, and his neutrality, in the event of the Allied Powers being compelled to proceed to extremities with the Porte in order to enforce the Treaty of the 6th July⁹). His Excellency is fully prepared to follow any course which may be pointed out to him by His Majesty's Government to facilitate the negotiations now going on, and in the event of its' succeeding to afford every assistance which may be required from the Government of Greece, to secure the evacuation of the Morea by the Egyptian Force and their return, unmolested, to Alexandria.

His Excellency assured me that it was with feelings of the most poignant regret that he bore witness to the obloquy brought in the Greek name, by the atrocious acts of Piracy which have been committed under the Flag of Greece¹⁰), and that it would be his incessant occupation to devise and apply the means most likely to eradicate so numerous an evil; although he had to lament that the very reduced state of Finances of Greece, which amounts to absolute distress, precluded the possibility of his fitting out a ... Flotilla under the command of Officers of honour and integrity, and with which he would be certain of putting down, at once, the lawless gangs which have so been engaged in piratical pursuits, to the detriment of the Commerce of all Nations, and of the disgrace of the Greek Name."

Letter No. 2:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 7 Feb 1828, Egina, F.O. 916/846.

"In my official of this day's date marked 'Secret and Confidential'¹¹), I have had the honour of stating to Your Excellency the result of the princi-

⁹) By the Treaty of London (6 July 1827), the British, French, and Russian governments agreed to impose an armistice by forceful means if either of the belligerent participants, i.e. the Hellenic and Ottoman governments, refused to cease its hostilities in this armed struggle. Cf. M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774—1923*. New York: St. Martin's Press 1968, pp. 66 f.

¹⁰) Largely composed of uncommissioned squadrons, the Hellenic navy often violated the neutrality of Ionian shipping, especially when its undisciplined sailors went unpaid for prolonged periods. By 1829, the Hellenic government owed £13,433 in compensation to Ionian claimants resulting from such attacks occurring in only the previous two years, and *Capodistrias* soon suspended the payment of all this compensation since his administration simply did not have such financial resources. Of course, French and Russian claimants experienced no such setbacks as their governments made periodic loans to the Hellenic government whereas Sir *Frederick Adam*, restricted by both Ionian and British neutrality, could not extend any such loans to *Capodistrias*. *Dawkins to Adam*, 7 Mar 1829, F.O. 286/11; and *Dawkins to Aberdeen*, 13 Jul 1829, F.O. 32/5.

¹¹) Cf. Letter No. 1.

pal object of my mission to the Count Capodistrias; which I trust will prove satisfactory and meet with your approbation.

With regard to the second part of your instructions, you will at once be convinced from the very short time which has lapsed since the reins of the Greek Government have been assumed by the Count Capodistrias that there cannot possibly exist solid ground upon which to form an opinion as to the effect which his arrival in Greece is likely to produce; particularly as he has hitherto confined himself entirely to the organization of a new Provisional Government, whose operations have not yet commenced.

Any anticipations at this period must be premature, and I shall therefore simply narrate what measures have been taken for the organization of this new Government; adding such remarks as to their nature and the impression which they appear to have made on the Primates and proper men assembled at Egina, as I conceive may suit the spirit of my instructions.

The *Warspite* arrived here on the 27th of January, and the Count Capodistrias landed the next day amidst shouts of joy and demonstrations of sincere enthusiasm; having been visited on board early in the morning by the Commission of Government.

The first step taken by Count Capodistrias after landing here, was to assemble the Commission of Government and the Permanent Committee of the Legislative Assembly, receiving from the former the resignation of their authority to himself as President of Greece, and informing the latter that he would dispense with their services until a general assembly of the Representatives could be convened. This important step was managed with great judgement and address, and did not meet with the slightest opposition, or even the appearance of dissatisfaction on the part of those concerned; the most impracticable of which he had already convinced of the expediency of placing the administration upon an entirely new footing, however always grounded upon the act of the Representatives of Greece at Epidavros, Astros, and Troezen (Damala)¹²).

On the 1st of February appeared his first Proclamation in which he pointedly alludes to the honours paid the Greek Flag, which at the time of his entry into Egina was hoisted on board the *Warspite* and saluted with 19 Guns from that Ship and from a French Frigate which happened to be here at the time. The remarkable point in this Proclamation appear to be ... that the Congress of Troezen ... is divided into three section — namely, Finance, Interior, and War. To each of these sections are attached nine members including the chairman and two secretaries — the chairman of the Section of Finance presiding the Panhellenium¹³) when it meets in a

¹²) It was the political decisions of these assemblies, especially the one which was convened at Troezen (Damala) in April 1827, that enabled *Capodistrias* to become President of Greece. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 194—207.

¹³) Composed of select members, including British philhellenes, from the

body. And the decrees of the President of Greece are to be forwarded upon the reports in writing of the Panhellenium if of a Legislative nature ... But the most important part of this decree [is the] sanctioning in the name of the Greek Nation the unjust measures which are ... called to establish the future happiness of Greece ... while the present crisis of the Greek cause requires prompt and decisive steps, he concurs it indisputably necessary to establish a Provisional Government, to be in force from until such time as the whole of the Representatives of the Nation can meet in General Congress ...

Simultaneously with this Proclamation was published a Decree of the President of Greece, by which a Council styled the Panhellenium (Representation of all Greece) is constituted. This council which is to be composed of 27 members, will share with the President of Greece the labours and the responsibility of Government.

Another decree of the same day initiates a Council of War to be led by the President of Greece, and of which the Generalissimo of the Land Forces and the High Admiral are members¹⁴) — and to which may be added such general officers and individuals as the President may think fit to consult.

In the situation of the Chairman and the Secretaries for each section of the Panhellenium, the Count has displayed great skill, and the choice has met with universal approbation; he has given the Primates ... a distinguished participation in the Government of the Country, and consolidated in ture measure contradictory and conflicting interest by amalgamating the leaders and flattering the Constitution ... [and] the Panhellenium is vested with the power of legislating in cases for which the acts of Congress of Troezen have not provided. This same decree establishes the functions of a General Secretary to the President of Greece, to be styled Secretary of State, and provides also for Special Commissioners in particular cases; the members of which are to be selected by the President of Greece indiscriminately from the Sections of the Panhellenium.

An ordinance of the 3rd February defines the matters which are to be discussed by the Panhellenium ... in which appears the nomination of the Chairman and Secretaries of the three Sections of the Panhellenium, and the adjournment of that of the remaining 18 members of that Council. The reason for not completing at once the Panhellenium as explained to me in

highest levels of the Hellenic government, the *Pan-Hellinion*, was the legislative branch of the Capodistrian administration, and it often appeared to be dominated by Ionian expatriates. *Lee to Adam*, 8 Nov 1828, C.O. 136/151; and *Church to Adam*, 9 Oct 1829, C.O. 136/155.

¹⁴) At the time, these high-ranking officers were respectively: Sir *Richard Church* and Lord *Cochrane*, both British philhellenes. Cf. Douglas Dakin, *British and American Philhellenes during the War of Greek Independence, 1821—1835*. Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies 1955, pp. 144—159.

conversation with Count Capodistrias, is that he wishes to try the experiment with the small number already named, and judge them the expediency of providing to fill up the vacancies. Even if the institution as it now stands should realize his expectations ... it is not his intention that the Panhellenium should arrive at one time to the full extent of its numbers, but means the nominations to take place gradually and that the selections should be made by the Members already installed ... however, the Count Capodistrias will himself submit to them, and ... he will take care ... to preclude the possibility of the choice falling upon individuals of whose character he may have reason to doubt, or who may therein not be deserving of his confidence, their ambition. The Primates may be gained over by these measures; but it is to be feared that by awakening the jealousy of the Captains, who will find themselves on the eve of losing their influence and hitherto uncontrolled power, it will favour their underhand intrigues to upset the Government¹⁵). It is said, however, that the great mass of the People, who have so long been in ... the vexation and oppression of these military chieftains, are with the Primates; if this be really the case, and if the Government can find the means of supplying and paying the Solidery, the Captains will soon sink into insignificance and quietly follow the stream, or will fall victims to their viscious obduracy. It is with men drawn in this manner from the absurd undisciplined bands which these Captains lead, that Capodistrias looks forward to bring together a small number of good soldiers, and embodying them under the immediate orders of the Government, supplying them and paying them regularly, and placing their command in the hands of men of honour and of integrity from a nucleus upon which to model a regular and safe Force; in fact the opinion of all persons of sound judgment here, whether actually associated, or otherwise identified with the Government, or private individuals, that however well calculated the measures invoked by Count Capodistrias may be to promote the welfare of the Greek cause, and eventually lead to the establishment of a respectable Government ... in Greece; however sincerely he may be supported and assisted by his coadjuncts, that unless he has at his disposal,

¹⁵) Although the Hellenic government was filled with able politicians from aristocratic backgrounds, the actual fighting in the Greek Revolution was done by native *klephtes* (captains) who controlled the armed forces. Even though they were bitter enemies of the Ottoman authorities, these captains offered their services to anyone for the right price, both before and during the Greek Revolution, and it was quite likely that such individuals as *Theodoros Kolokotronis*, one of the earliest captains to support *Capodistrias*, received a pecuniary reward for this support. *Adam to Goderich*, Private and Confidential, 19 Jun 1827, Corfu, C.O. 136/43; and Cf. *Theodoros Kolokotronis, the Klepht and the Warrior*, trans. by Mrs. Edmonds. London: Unwin 1892, passim.

and that immediately, considerable funds, all his endeavours will be fruitless, and like all the former attempts, end by total failure.

It may not be out of place to mention here that the *Warspite*, having touched at Napoli di Romania (Nauplion), in account of the weather, on her way to this place, the Count Capodistrias was received with many demonstrations of joy, and every appearance of submission on the part of the leaders of the contending factions in that unfortunate district. Grivas justified his readiness to give the Palamides¹⁶⁾ to the Count, but there is every reason to believe that he anticipated that Capodistrias came provided with treasure, and that when undeceived on this point, he will not be sumptuous in breaking his promise. Capodistrias, however, spoke confidently of the sincerity of Grivas' professions, and has left at Napoli Sig. Bulgari¹⁷⁾, an Engineer for the double purpose of unarming the Fortifications and of preparing a House for the reception of the President ... at the time of the Counts' arrival, the native inhabitants were drawn to despair by the oppression and intentions of the Military, who addressed in their justification that they had no provisions and no money to procure them. The inhabitants had actually determined to abandon their native place and take refuge in the Islands¹⁸⁾. The appearance of the Count, and the arguments he used have calmed them for the moment, but how long this may last is doubtful. Capodistrias' plan, in the event of resistance from Grivas and his associates, is to offer employ and Pay to their followers who would no doubt abandon them, but before he can do this he must have the means, and by all that I have been able to learn, the Count far from having those means, literally does not possess wherewithal to carry this matter ... upon which he is now acting for more than three weeks or, at furthest, one month ... It is after this discussion I must be permitted to return to my observations on the situation of the individuals who form part of the new provisional Government.

¹⁶⁾ The commander of the Palamidi fortress in Nauplion since 1826, *Theodoros Grivas* had been feuding with *Nasos Fotomaras*, the commandant of the same town, thus forcing the Hellenic government to transfer its bureaucratic operations elsewhere. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, p. 196.

¹⁷⁾ An Ionian expatriate, Count *M.A. Bulgaris*, subsequently became a Russian consul in the Levant. *Adam to Hay*, Private and Confidential, 7 Oct 1829, Corfu, C.O. 136/149.

¹⁸⁾ Most likely, *Baynes* is referring to the Ionian Islands where the British authorities had established, with much reluctance, an internment camp for Greek refugees on the isle of Calamos. In 1828, at the end of the Egyptian campaign in the Peloponnese, as many as 15,000 refugees in this camp were receiving public relief from the Anglo-Ionian governments. *Adam to Capodistrias*, 7 Oct 1828, F.O. 32/2; *Rudsdell to Mawdesley*, 23 Jul 1827, C.O. 136/541; and *Trigance to Mawdesley*, 28 Jan 1828, C.O. 136/561.

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The Chairman of the Section of Finance is George Condourioti¹⁹⁾ of Hydra ... Andrea Zaimi²⁰⁾, of the Peloponnesus who is supposedly of Mavrocordatos' party, presides over the Section of the Interior, and the chair of the Section of War is given to Petros Mavromicali, Bey of Mania, and father of the Senior Member of the late Commission of Government. He received with almost general Satisfaction for altho' of the party of Mavrocordato, who is very obnoxious in Greece, he appears not to have many enemies.

The Count Capodistria expresses the highest regard for Prince Mavrocordato²¹⁾, and profess to consider him as one of the very few men of integrity and capacity at present in Greece — he employed him in the negotiations which took place at Carabusa, the consequence of which form the subject of a separate dispatch which I have this day addressed to Your Excellency. I have reason to believe, indeed I am almost certain that Prince Mavrocordatos is at this moment occupied at the desire of Capodistrias in making a draft of Regulations for the commissariat of navigation. It is whispered, but I cannot say with what degree of probability, that Mavrocordato²²⁾ and Viaros Capodistria²³⁾ are to be Members of the Ministerial Council, the nominations to which have for the present been adjourned.

¹⁹⁾ As the provisional President of Greece in 1823—1824, *Georgios Koundouriotis*, a wealthy shipowner, had opposed the plans of *Kolokotronis* and his Roumeliote followers to control the central government, thus a civil war ensued in Greece for two years.

²⁰⁾ Another primate from the Morea, *Andreas Zaimis* was an Anglophile who had initially opposed *Kolokotronis* and the Roumeliotes in 1824—1825 until he also dissented against the Hellenic government. After several changes of government, *Zaimis* left his Ionian asylum and became a nominal supporter of *Capodistrias* despite his Anglophilia.

²¹⁾ A powerful Moriote primate, *Petrobey Mavromichalis* of Mani was among the earliest participants in the Greek Revolution, and he had also rebelled against the Hellenic government in 1824. Though he was subsequently appointed to a high political office, *Petrobey* joined with *Zaimis* and others to form a strong opposition to *Capodistrias*, and it was the *Mavromichalis* clan which, after the arrest of *Petrobey*, assassinated the Hellenic president in October 1831. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 241 and 299ff.; and C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria*, p. 501.

²²⁾ Another hereditary primate, *Alexandros Mavrocordatos* served as the first provisional President of the Hellenic government in 1821, and he was generally opposed by such Moriote captains as *Kolokotronis*. In 1828, he was appointed 'Minister without Portfolio' by *Capodistrias*. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, p. 241.

²³⁾ Born in January 1774, *Viaros Capodistrias* was the eldest brother of the Hellenic president, and he had led the Ionian chapter of the *Philiki Etairia*, the Greek conspiratorial society, during the Greek Revolution. Through much effort and expense, *Viaros* purchased the support of the Greek captains and primates

The inauguration of the President of Greece and of the Members of the new Provisional Government who have been elected, take place today at noon, and will be attended by Captain Parker and the officers of the British and Russian ships of War now here, which consist of the *Warspite* and *Weazle* sloop, British, and of the Frigate *Helena*, and *Revel* sloop — Russian; it is perhaps worth observing that a French vessel of War is now at Egina. The Secretaries are the principal men of the several parties, and some of them possess a considerable share of ability, they have been very skillfully divided in the several sections, and placed in a manner which secures a perfect degree upon the chairman and themselves; for instance, Andrea Zaimi is a notorious ... Tribal Chief in the Morea, and Sig. Psilia²⁴), who is first Secretary of the Section over which he presides, is an Athenian and a most determined democrat; it is therefore impossible that these two should plot together ...

The mark of attention shown by both the British and Russian Squadrons to the Count Capodistrias as President of Greece, tend not a little to facilitate his operations, which are by this means in appearance countenanced if not suffered in the eyes of the Greeks by these two Nations, and I find that the Count does not lose this opportunity of adding to the idea which his countrymen have formed of his consequence, and of the influence which he is supposed to possess with the Allied Powers ...”

Letter No. 3:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 7 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

“Having ascertained that Captain Hamilton²⁵) has proceeded to Corfu in the *Iska*, I conclude that Your Excellency will have learnt from that officer

to promote *Capodistrias* for the Hellenic presidency. *V. Capodistrias to Cicalianni*, 5 Feb 1827, C.O. 136/42; Cf. C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria*, pp. 225 f.

²⁴) An early supporter of *Mavrocodatos*, *George Psilas* was an Athenian intellectual who played a minor role in the Greek Revolution. Though he cooperated with *Capodistrias* to limit the authority of the new Ministers by serving as the first Secretary of the Interior ministry, *Psilas* was dismissed by the Greek president in October 1829. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 241, 293.

²⁵) As skipper of HMS *Cambrian*, Captain *G.W. Hamilton* was primarily responsible for the eradication of Greek corsairs from the open waters around Greece and the islands of the Archipelago. Although his methods were often both direct and violent, *Hamilton* achieved great rapport with the Greek primates of the various islands since he spoke Greek fluently, and his successful anti-piracy campaigns encouraged the Admiralty to keep him posted with the Mediterranean fleet despite his repeated requests for a transfer elsewhere. *Hamilton to Moore*, 13 Aug 1823, Admiralty (hereinafter Adm) 1/440; *S. Can-*

the particulars of the attack made on the Pirate Vessels at Carabusa²⁶) and of all that preceded that event, and it therefore only remains for me to acquaint you with the arrangements which have been subsequently made between the Senior Officer of His Majesty's Ships and the Count Capodistrias, President of Greece.

The Garrison of Carabusa having engaged to withdraw from that Island, and to give up the Fort to any Officer duly appointed to take command of the same by the Count Capodistrias, Sir Thomas Staines requested Captain Parker to use his best efforts with the Greek Government in order that a Garrison of from 200 to 250 Men under a trustworthy commander should be sent to occupy Carabusa — under the clear understanding that not one of the present Garrison, or of that who had been concerned in carrying on or conniving at Piracy were to remain, and further that the Greek Government itself should guarantee that no Piratical expedition would in future be fitted out at Carabusa, or shelter given to Vessels or Men engaged in such lawless pursuit.

Count Capodistria readily assented to the principle, as stated at the same time that with the very limited means he possessed, he felt he could not maintain a Garrison for Carabusa more than 100 strong, and that he would lose no time in endeavouring to assemble that number of men and select a proper person to command them. Captain Parker offered to convey this Garrison by means of the *Cambrian*, and it was settled that they were to embark the next day.

It seems however that the Count altered his determination, or rather as I have good reason to suspect, he could not bring together the force he proposed, and the next day he caused to be communicated to Captain Parker that he thought it better to send to Carabusa, Colonel Urquhart (an Englishman)²⁷), who had command of the Marines on board the Greek Corvette *Hydra*, with 30 of his Men, to which would be added 30 more from the Cretan regulars already on the spot; with regard to the present occupiers of Carabusa, he stated that they would be ordered to join the expedition against the Turks in Candia, but that the Greek Government could not consistently offer the guarantee demanded by Sir Thomas Staines, until

ning to Hamilton, Private and Confidential, 27 Apr 1826, F.O. 352/15a; *S. Canning to Planta*, Confidential, 8 Feb 1827, F.O. 352/17a.

²⁶) Located off the northwestern coast of Crete, the isle of Carabusa, now known as "Grabusa", was a notorious stronghold for Greek corsairs who frequently attacked Anglo-Ionian shipping, especially in the waters around Cerigo. *Adam to Staines*, 2 Jan 1828, C.O. 136/1121; and *Adam to Huskisson*, 21 Mar 1828, C.O. 136/49.

²⁷) As a commissioned officer in the Hellenic army, Colonel *Charles Gordon Urquhart* had served at the battle of Athens in April-May 1827. Cf. D. Dakin, *Philhellenes*, pp. 149—155.

such time as Colonel Urquhart reported himself in a state to maintain order in Carabusa.

Captain Parker acceded to this proposition, and orders were immediately sent by Count Capodistrias to Admiral Miaouli²⁸) at Scio (Chios) where the *Hydra* is now stationed, to send him down to Carabusa forthwith for the preferred carrying into effect the measures agreed upon, and the Count has expressed to me that he will endeavour to keep *Hydra* on the Carabusa station; for the better security of the Porte, and to suppress as much as possible any piratical attempts in that neighborhood ...”

Letter No. 4:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 8 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

“After the ceremony of inauguration yesterday, the Count Capodistrias expressed a wish to see me at his residence in the course of the next day, and this morning I waited upon him accordingly.

The Count read to me the draft of a letter which he intends addressing to Your Excellency, in which after a short allusion in general terms to the object of my mission, he proceeded to solicit your support with His Majesty’s Government of the representation which he has made through Sir Edward Codrington²⁹), and by which he implores in the name of the Greek Nation, immediate succor within the shape of pecuniary subsidy ... and without which he firmly asserts that every attempt to establish a regular Government in Greece must be attested with total failure.

So pressing does he consider his want at this crisis that he fears that even the short time would lapse before he can obtain a decisive answer to his application thro’ Sir Edward Codrington may be fatal to his interprize

²⁸) Before he became the chief officer in the Hellenic navy, Admiral *Andreas Miaoulis* had organized one of the earliest navy squadrons to participate in the Greek Revolution during 1821, and his Anglophilia had convinced the British authorities on Corfu that he was one of the few ‘honest’ politicians in the Hellenic government. *Adam to Hay*, Private, 6 Jan and 21 Jul 1829, C.O. 136/54.

²⁹) As commander of the Mediterranean fleet, Sir *Edward Codrington* let the combined Allied squadrons which destroyed the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets at Navarino on 20 October 1827. Though he had implemented the Treaty of London to his best ability, *Codrington* had received very ambiguous instructions from the Admiralty, and he was recalled from active duty in the aftermath of Navarino for his supposedly inhumane attitude towards those Greek civilians who had been enslaved by the Egyptian government, rather than for his shortcomings concerning Allied diplomacy in the Greek Revolution. *Malcolm to Croker*, 25 Aug 1828, Adm 1/450; Cf. C.M. Woodhouse, *The Battle of Navarino*. London: Hodder and Stoughton 1965, pp. 84f., 107, 153f., 166—169.

Fourteen Secret British Documents Concerning Count John Capodistrias

(sic), and defeat the salutary views with which the Allied Powers entered into the Treaty of 6 July 1827, and he therefore applies to you for an immediate loan of 100 Thousand Dollars [£21,000] from the Ionian States to be repaid from the first monies which may come to hand in account of Greece, or else from his own private property at Corfu³⁰).

The object he had in requesting my attendance at his residence today was to impress on my mind the truth of his statement, and to induce me to corroborate it and recommend his proposal to your favorable consideration.

The manner in which he conducted this communication and two or three observations which had previously fallen from him ... a supposition on the part of the Count that I had in my pocket, credentials which I might produce at discretion, and I therefore felt it my duty at once to undeceive him in that respect. I clearly and positively assured him that my visit to the seat of the Greek Government was purely on a Special Mission for the sole and exclusive object which I had communicated to him in our first conference; and that my only motive for remaining at Egina was to await the issue of Colonel Cradock's mission to Egypt, and in the event of his succeeding to settle with the Head of the Greek Government the terms of Neutrality to which he had already acceded in principle.

I have no doubt that he was convinced that I had no credentials in reserve, but I am equally certain that he is too practical a Statesman to be persuaded that my only object in staying at Egina is to await the result of Colonel Cradock's mission to Mehemet Ali Pasha³¹).

There is not the least doubt that M. Ribeaupierre³²) when here formally presented M. Vlassopoulo³³) to the Commission of Government as Consul

³⁰) Due to his strict enforcement of Ionian neutrality, Sir *Frederick Adam* would not loan one penny to the Hellenic government, and *Capodistrias* did not receive any funds from the British government until April 1830 when the Allied states loaned 60 million francs to his administration. *Dawkins to Aberdeen*, 17 Nov 1830, F.O. 32/14.

³¹) Born in Albania, *Mehemet Ali* has served in the Ottoman army during the Egyptian campaign of 1798—1799, and he subsequently became the Viceroy of Egypt, 1805—1849. In return for his support, *Mehemet Ali* was granted political control of Crete by the Ottoman government, and after withdrawing his armed forces from Greece in 1828, he annexed both Palestine and Syria during 1831—1833. Cf. M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 78—86.

³²) Although he was appointed in 1824 to be the Russian ambassador at the Porte, *M. Ribeaupierre* did not reach Constantinople until February 1827 due to the Russo-Ottoman crisis over the Danubian Principalities, and he subsequently fled to Poros where he stayed with his British and French colleagues in the aftermath of Navarino. Cf. C.W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek ...*, pp. 83—97, 113—126.

³³) In his official capacity as the Russian consul at Patras, *Ioannis Vlassopoulos* had facilitated the transfer of local members of the *Philiki Etairia*

General For Russia, recommending him to their protection as such, altho' he was not as yet furnished with regular written credentials from St. Petersburg. This I had heard from several quarters, but Count Capodistrias confirmed it to me this morning, at the same time mentioning his dissatisfaction at the wording of the Secret Article in the Treaty of London, which provides for the appointment of *Consular* agents from the Allied Powers in Greece³⁴).

The Count added that he had expressed his sentiments on this subject both in England and in France, and that he trusted a wider interpretation might be given to *Agency* that the strict letter of the Article conveys, that his pretensions did not go so far as to expect that Envoys or Ministers should be sent to Greece at this early period, but that he certainly hoped that the Consul General might also be vested with the more dignified style of Resident or Political Agents.

His principal reason ... he states to be the impression which cannot be removed from the minds of the people in these parts that the office of Consul is identified with participation in mercantile transactions ...

That such feeling should exist is much to be lamented, but the vicious proceedings of the herd of petty agents throughout the Islands of the Archipelago who assume the style of Consuls and Vice Consuls could have no other result, and situations which ought to be considered of the highest priority have become despicable from the conduct of unworthy individuals.

The British commercial interests here are under the protection of a M. Gropius, formerly Austrian Consul at Athens, and who holds that office in this place, and holds that of Russia until relieved by M. Vlassopoulo, who is also the nominal Commissioner General of the Russian Fleet ..."

from the Ionian Islands to the Peloponnese on the eve of the Greek Revolution, and he had also incited the pro-Hellenic riot on Zante in October 1821. In spite of these deeds, he often visited Zante and Ithaca during the early months of the Morean hostilities until the British authorities in Corfu restored order in the Ionian Islands. *Maitland to A'Court*, 19 Apr 1820, C.O. 136/429; *Meyer to Hankey*, 11 Dec 1820, F.O. 78/103; "Information on several points regarding the Morea — obtained from persons worthy of credit," 11 May 1821, C.O. 136/464; *Heathcote to Adam*, 6 Oct 1821, C.O. 136/435. Cf. Panagiotis Chiotis, *Historia tou Ioniou Kratous*. 2 vols; Zante: By the Author, 1874—1877, I, pp. 310 ff., 349 f.

³⁴) To encourage the resumption of Anglo-Ottoman relations, the British government did not wish to establish full diplomatic relations between London and Egina, thus it merely appointed one Resident, *Edward Dawkins*, and a number of consuls to maintain its *commercial* interests in Greece. *Aberdeen to Dawkins*, 22 Sep 1828, F.O. 286/3; and *Dawkins to Aberdeen*, 22 Jun 1829, F.O. 32/5.

Letter No. 5:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 9 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

“I have reserved for the last moment writing on the passing Military operations in these parts, in order to convey to Your Excellency the latest intelligence, but excepting at Scio, every thing seems paralyzed.

The last accounts from there mention a sortie made by the Turks of 800 men, who by favor of the night, surprized the Greek Out Posts and gained possession of one of the Batteries, but were soon repulsed by the besiegers and ultimately driven back into the Fort with the loss of 500 Men — the amount may be exaggerated, but what is certain is the advantage obtained by the Greeks ...

Several measures of attack are said to be under consideration with the President of Greece, but the only step which I have ascertained to have been determined upon, is the taking possession of ... Attica, and passing by the Turks in Athens. Several Turks deserters from the Acropolis and from Livadia have arrived here and join themselves up to the Greeks, asking only to be conveyed to Asia. They say they are driven to despair by the ill-treatment they received from the Pashas who want to make regulars of them, and that they prefer deserting and coming to the Greeks, by whom they are certain of being stripped almost to the skin, than submit to the hardships and fatigue to which they are exposed.”

Letter No. 6:

Baynes to Adam, Quite Private, 9 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

“As you limited me to five days I shall not detain the *Weazle* an instant beyond that time, and she will start as soon as I have finished this.

In my demi-officials, I have exhausted almost all the information I have been able to collect. I sent them myself ... entirely on that interest which you so generously take in me, and of which the many and manifold proofs I have received can have no doubt, for your looking any mistake I may have made in the drawing up of these communications. I have made them separately in order that you may take them or not as it may to you appear most expedient. I have had but Humble material to write upon and this must be my last

In my official report of the result of my Mission, I have only put that which I received from Count C. d'I (Capodistrias) ... but I must here add what the Count said further on the subject of the Morea. He very properly

reflected that the evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pasha³⁵) and the Egyptian Force would not entirely clear the Peninsular of the Mussulmans ... and he gave me clearly to understand that he would propose to use his best endeavours with the Greeks, to give the Turks the chance of remaining in the country and in possession of their property providing they would acknowledge the Greek Government and submit together with the Christians to the Laws which might be instituted for the government of the inhabitants of Greece; he went so far as to establish religious tolerance, and permit the Turks to retain their Mosques and follow openly the forms of their Worship.

I am not at all surprized that those who see Capo d'I 'a' cas vergin' should be taken with him, he has certainly the most fascinating manners added to a graceful appearance, and to those who are not aware of his duplicity, his affected candour must pass current. But with all this I must confess that I cannot discover in him that profundness which I would have been inclined to think must always be the sham of an eminent statesman, who like himself has figured in the first diplomatic circles of Europe, and to speak plainly I think there is not a little of the Charlatan in him. His affected indifference approaching to neglect toward the Russian Captain and officers at the inauguration attracted even the attention of our officers

As an instance of his humbug, you are aware that Church³⁶) sent him the intercepted dispatches from Ibrahim Pasha; well, it seems they contained nothing interesting, excepting an anonymous letter, which is supposed to be from Negib Effendi, in which it is said in the words of the Sultan that *he knew that the loss of his Fleet* was occasioned by treachery ... this Capodistrias immediately issued up, and literally made Capt. Parker and all here believe that this document was an acknowledgement on the part of the Porte that they had been the aggressors at the Battle of Navarin. This naturally created a great Stir and it was in the mouth of every naval officer, and a copy of the translation was actually sent by the Cambrian to Sir T. Staines at Carabusa to be sent to the Admiral at Malta accompanied by a letter from Capo d'I. I felt as you may vainly conceive very anxious to

³⁵) Son of the Egyptian viceroy, *Ibrahim Pasha* directed the Egyptian campaign in Greece during 1825—1828, and he subsequently directed the invasion of Palestine and Syria during 1831/1833. Cf. M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 78f.

³⁶) Since he had commanded the Greek Light Infantry during the Napoleonic wars, Sir *Richard Church* was known by all the leading participants of the Greek Revolution. Although he assumed command of the Hellenic army in March 1827, he resigned his commission in August 1829 after he had differed with *Capodistrias* over the constitutional rule of Greece. Nevertheless, he was the most ardent of all the British philhellenes. Cf. D. Dakin, *Philhellenes*, pp. 186f.

get hold of the French Translation to send to Corfu ... and after a good deal ... Capo d'Istria gave it [to] me, and on perusing it, I saw at the first glance the whole joke, and in my observing to Capo d'Istria that I could detect no such measuring as he had given to this document, he looked rather taken aback for an instant, but recovering himself with great quickness he said that certainly it was not very suspicious, but that he intended to send the original dispatch to Sir E. Codrington I was not however sorry to get hold of the document as it contains some very interesting particulars relative to the Egyptian Forces in the Peloponnesus; it would appear that Tahr Pash had suspected Ibrahim of intending to abandon the Morea, and said so to the Sultan on his arrival at Constantinople. There are also the assurances of Mehemet Pasha that he would hold from his Troops in the Peninsular, and called on the Porte to trust the fidelity of his Son (Ibrahim Pasha) and to trust him

Lord Cochrane³⁷) is gone to *England* in his Yacht, leaving a letter addressed to Count Capo d'I to say that he was tired of inaction, that he had not been able to do anything for want of Funds and that he was going to England to procure means amongst his Friends and would soon return to equip a formidable Fleet. Capo d'I seems very much inclined to suspect his return, and ... appears determined to dispense with his services His favorite now is Capt. Thomas who commanded the Greek Brig *Saracen* which was wrecked at Scio a few weeks ago; he tells me he intended to give him the command of the Flotilla, and has employed him to draw up Naval regulations. Capt. Thomas was formally a Lieutenant in our Navy ...³⁸).

Viaros Capodistrias is to have no employment ostensibly, but his Brother means to have him as his legal advisor, and assist him in framing a Code of Laws and establish a Judicial Administration. In Judges, he tells me he looks entirely to the Ionian Islands; he says he has already opened on this subject with the Pan-Hellenium taking motion from the several questions pending before the Admiralty Court in which most of the greatest

³⁷) A former officer in the Brazilian navy, *Thomas Cochrane*, the tenth Earl of Dundonald, assumed the command of the Hellenic navy in September 1825. After he had ordered a British firm to construct several warships for the Hellenic navy, *Cochrane* arrived in Greece during the spring of 1827, but had returned home by February 1828 since he would not serve under *Capodistrias*. *G. Canning* to *S. Canning*, Private, 3 Jul 1826, F.O. 352/13a. Cf. D. Dakin, *Philhellenes*, pp. 174—177.

³⁸) As with other British philhellenes, Captain *George Thomas* joined the Hellenic forces in 1826 after serving in the Spanish American rebellions. Although he was designated for a high command in the Hellenic navy, *Thomas* followed *Cochrane* by resigning his commission in 1828. *Hamilton* to *S. Canning*, 22 Jan 1828, F.O. 352/20a.

Nations in Europe are concerned; and asking them whether there existed a single individual amongst them capable of passing a Sentence, which would most likely become the subject of discussion in some of the first Cabinets of Europe?

Immediately after Lord Cochrane's departure, Miaoulis manned the *Hel-las* Frigate ... the *Warspite* must be at Sea when Miaoulis went on board to visit Capodistrias, he was saluted with 13 guns It is past noon and I must not detain *Weazle* any longer, altho' I have withheld my anticipation in my demi-official, I have no hesitation in saying privately to Your Excellency that it is my opinion and that of a great many of the Greeks, amongst other Mavrocordato, that it is impossible that Capo d'Istria can succeed unless he can get money to form a nucleus of hired foreign troops to which later mention the Count is extremely aware ...

I have not yet been able to procure even a room on shore; the place is so ... that the people live actually in the tombs which are in the environs of the town; besides which Captain Parker fancies that your private letter about me conveys a wish that I should not live on shore, and you know I cannot well undeceive him. I have however hopes of getting a room tomorrow especially as *Warspite* goes in two, or three days to water at Poros, it will give me a plausible cause to disembark"

Letter No. 7:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 18 Feb 1828, C. O. 136/556.

"Since my dispatch of the 9th Feb. by His Majesty's Sloop *Weazle*, no opportunity has offered by which I could have again had the honour of addressing Your Excellency, and indeed so slow in the march of affairs here that even if a conveyance had occurred, I should have had nothing of much interest to communicate.

The only two measures which have been adopted since my last report, and discerning of mention, are the institution of a National Bank, and a decree regulating the Commercial Navigation.

The enclosures Nos. 1 to 5 [not included here] will put Your Excellency in full possession of the nature of their projected Bank, and of the style and tendency of the appeals, both public and private, which the Count Capodistria has made to the Nation in general, and to those who are known to be amongst the most wealthy of the Greeks in particular in both of which it is worthy of remark that a pecuniary subsidy from the Allied Powers is confidently spoken of. The effect however is very doubtful, though the Count himself is most sanguine of success, but if we are to form anticipation from the support given to the establishment by those who are more immediately connected with the Government, very little indeed is to be expected. I can

only learn of one offer actually fulfilled, being from Petro Bey Mavromichali³⁹) who has taken a share of *300 Dollars* [£ 62,4/-,2d]⁴⁰) in the Bank; and I understand that Condourioti having made a similar tender was recommended to show a better example, the effect of which admonition has not however, as yet, appeared.

The Navigational Decree has still to be promulgated, but I am acquainted with the spirit of the regulation, the President having thought proper to apply to me for information on the subject, and which I felt no hesitation in giving, as far as my recollection of the Ionian Acts assisted me, considering that this particular branch came distinctly within the range of my instructions, in that part which relates to the suppression of Piracy. I understand the regulation has been framed almost in the precise terms of the Ionian Navigational Acts, with this difference only, that instead of taking security from private individuals, the authorities of the Seven Islands or Provinces from whence the trading Vessels are fitted out, are called upon to certify the good character of the Masters and Crews, and are held responsible for the regular and lawful proceedings of the mercantile shipping licensed upon their Certificate, under a patent from the Government. The Prince Mavrocordato, vested with the necessary powers, is to proceed in the Russian Frigate *Helena* on a tour to all the Islands, and on a Mission to explain and regulate the details of this Decree.

But however well calculated these regulations may be, to introduce a system in the commercial Navigation under the Greek Flag, and however studies the detail of this application, it is scarcely to be hoped that they will produce the desired effect, unless the Government has a disposable Flotilla, well organized and commanded, to enforce this observance, and the Count positively asserts that he does not ... possess the means of equipping a force equal to so arduous and extensive a Service ...”

Letter No. 8:

Baynes to Adam, Private, 20 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

“I have endeavoured in my officials to give Your Excellency all the particulars of affairs here, and I believe I have omitted nothing that could merit consideration.

There is however one point which is of a very delicate nature, and which I have not thought it prudent to hazard in a fuller communication, but which I think it is quite necessary that Your Excellency should be aware of, to make such use of the same as your wisdom may consider expedient.

³⁹) Cf. above, footnote No. 21.

⁴⁰) During the 1820s, one Spanish dollar equalled 50d.

I allude to the part taken by our Navy on this station, where every officer who for a short space of time because the Service, takes upon himself all communication direct with the Greek Government, appoints consular Agents, forms Commissions for the settling of differances between our Subjects, in fact assumes all the powers of a regularly appointed and accredited authority.

I do not at the least mean to criticize the measures which they may scarcely have adopted, but it is to the principle that I conceive there is attached a great and important objection. I may be wrong in this opinion, but I hope Your Excellency will not find fault with my submitting the circumstances in this private shape⁴¹).

I need offer no observations on the marked countenance given by our Ships of War to the Count Capodistrias, which is only short of actual support, and have in my official endeavours sufficiently to show the fact, without appearing to state it in the form of a distinct report, leaving it to those to whom it belongs to draw such conclusions as may be expedient."

Letter No. 9:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 20 Feb 1828, Egina, C.O. 136/556.

"The former communications which I have had the honour of making will have given Your Excellency occasion to perceive that all the public measures of the Count Capodistrias since his installation as President of Greece, have been either theoretical, or of a Legislative nature; in private, however, he seems to have been occupied in dispensing matters so as to

⁴¹) In conformity with the Treaty of London, the British government had appointed only a *commercial* agent to administer its various interests in Greece. Since the Ottoman government still refused to compromise on the issue of the Greek Revolution, the Foreign Office felt that it might next recognize the full political independence of the Hellenic government, thus appointing an ambassador to serve at Egina. In the meantime, such local representatives as Captain *Hamilton* of the Royal Navy dealt directly with the Capodistrian administration, and British consuls were not assigned formally to the various ports of Greece until 1829 when it was hoped that the Greek Question could be finally settled. Unfortunately for the Foreign Office, the Anglophobia of the Hellenic government increased under the direction of *Capodistrias*, and the high percentage of Ionian expatriates in his administration resulted in many Anglo-Hellenic tensions, despite the efforts of several British consuls to resolve many outstanding problems of either a mercantile, or a diplomatic nature. *Aberdeen to S. Canning*, 11 Sep 1828, F.O. 78/164; *Dawkins to Aberdeen*, 7 Dec 1828, F.O. 32/2; *Crowe to Aberdeen*, 28 May 1830, F.O. 32/17; and *Crowe to Dawkins*, 2 Aug 1830, F.O. 32/13.

commence active operations. It appears that his first practical experiment will be an endeavour to remove the Roumeliote Troops from the Morea, and to place the command of the Fortresses which they now occupy, into the hands of officers of ability and integrity, with garrisons formed of people quite unconnected with the parties of the Roumeliote or Peloponnesian Captains.

With this view it appears the President has convinced all the Roumeliote Chiefs in the Peninsula to trust him at the commencement of the ensuing week at Damala (Troezene), opposite Poros, for the ostensible purpose of administering the oath of allegiance to the Troops, and forming them into separate Corps, but in reality with the object of personally holding out to the Soldiery the certainty of being, from that moment, regularly supplied with provisions and ammunition from the Government *direct*, and the well founded prospect of pay eventually. By this step the Count seems to calculate upon detaching the Soldiers from their present predatory system, and by rendering them at once less dependent upon their arbitrary and turbulent leaders, reducing the influence of these, and make them less likely to resist or thwart the important measures he has in contemplation; namely, the immediate employment of the whole Roumeliote Force now in the Peloponnesus, consisting by all accounts of nearly 3000 men including the Garrisons of the principal strongholds, in an expedition against Athens under the command of Prince Ypsilanti⁴²), supported by a small naval division to prevent supplies being carried to the Turks by the Greek speculators from the sea; in which patriotic practice several of the Islanders are at this moment engaged.

The Count appears to be quite confident of the voluntary evacuation of the Palamides by Griva, and of the Acro Corinth by Zavellas⁴³), but when I had occasion to visit the latter place in company with Captain Parker a few days ago, I could discover no symptoms of such a determination, but on the contrary found them clamorous in regard to a sum of 300 Thousand Pias-

⁴²) A Russian aristocrat of Hellenic descent, *Demetrios Ypsilantis* was the younger brother of General *Alexander Ypsilantis*, the leader of the *Philiki Etairia* who precipitated the Greek Revolution by invading the Danubian Principalities in March 1821. Assigned to the Peloponnesus, *Demetrios Ypsilantis* led the Greek forces of the Hellenic government, and he generally sided with the hereditary primates of the central government who opposed the more-autonomous views held by the various Greek captains. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 79—84.

⁴³) Originally from Albania, the *Zavellas (Tzavellas)* clan was a Souliote family who joined the Hellenic forces during the Greek Revolution. Although their military record was hardly distinguished, this Souliote clan participated in several major campaigns and one of its members, *Kitsos Tzavellas*, initially supported the Hellenic government after the assassination of *Capodistrias* in October 1831. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 303f.

ters [£ 9,615] which they assert to have paid the Moriote Chief Astura for the possession of that Fortress, and being left at the time we were there, without bread sufficient to support them beyond the next day ...”

It is really very difficult to say what may be the result of Count Capodistrias' operations, countenanced as they are by the continued presence of a considerable Naval Force of each of the Allied Powers; the mere appearance of which would at all times serve as a powerful auxiliary for the effect on the minds of this ignorant people, but which becomes particularly so when wielded by a person whose interest it is to make the most of it, and who from his ability and experience knows how to take all possible advantage of every favourable circumstance; however, it is the opinion of the rival thinking class, and I believe a very generally adopted one, that whatever may be his apparent success under such auspices, it will before long vanish like a dream, unless supported by firmness on his part, and assisted by pecuniary means; for it is idle, they say, to expect that any permanent system can ever be established in Greece without a subsidy procured and placed at the disposal of the supreme authority, in order to consolidate the power of the Government, and form a nucleus by which it may be enabled to enforce the observance of salutary regulations and necessary laws. There are some who go still further, and think that the Count does not possess means sufficient to carry him through his undertaking without direct support, and that he will do nothing permanent without the presence of Foreign Troops, though the Count himself is of a far different opinion, and declares openly that the first step of a foreign soldier in Greece will be the signal for his resignation and departure from the land of his forefathers; and very few days will at all events give a serious trial to the hitherto factions and uncontrollable Chieftains, and by putting their professions of moderation and satisfaction to the test, offer some criticism by which to judge how far the influence of Count Capodistria may operate towards conciliating contending parties and joining interests, and consequently what probabilities exist of his being able to establish such an authority as may eventually place the Government of Greece in a situation to merit and maintain relations of friendly intercourse with other nations.

His measure of reducing the exorbitant wages to seamen, introduced by Lord Cochrane, has met with strong opposition from the Hydriotes who have sent a deputation here to remonstrate, the Count, who is inclined to attribute this resistance to the intrigues of a few Primates at Hydra who are inimical to Miauli⁴⁴), talks of being very firm on the occasion, but has in the meanwhile deferred giving any answer, or taking any other step, until his arrival at Poros; to which place he is to proceed on Saturday in the *Warspite* for the purpose of meeting the Roumeliotes assembled at Damala as I have before mentioned, he will be followed by the Russian Frigate

⁴⁴) Cf. above, footnote No. 28.

Helena, and the French Corvette, Captain Le Blanc who arrived here a few days ago. I intend to avail myself of Captain Parker's polite invitation to accompany him on this short cruise.

The last accounts from Smyrna, if true, seem to indicate pacific intentions; the Porte is said to have countermanded the orders for levying Troops, and suspended the works of defence at Tenedos and at the Dardanelles.

The siege continues with as much vigor as the Greeks are susceptible of, and opinions are very much divided as to the prospect of success, but those who ought to understand such matters best, and amongst these Fabvier⁴⁵) himself, seem to consider the surrender of the Fort quite hopeless, as the Turks are continuously supplied from Cerme, in small quantities it is true, but still sufficient to defeat the object of reducing them by famine, and all other means they assure, are out of the question. There have been violent dissensions, and actual fighting within the Garrison, but all is quiet again"

Letter No. 10:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 29 Feb 1828, Poros, C.O. 136/556.

"We arrived here on Sunday morning after having been joined at Egina by the second Russian Frigate, on her return from a successful cruise against the Pirates on the other side of Cape Colouna. She destroyed two Schooners and the entire Crew of one of them, who took up a position on a rock off Port Rafti, from whence they opened fire upon the Russian Boats. She has brought thirty prisoners taken in the other Vessel, but what will be done with them remains to be seen.

We brought Count Capodistria and suite, for the purpose mentioned in the report which I had the honour of addressing to Your Excellency on the 20th.

A rumour had gained ground at Egina on the morning of our departure, which stated Ibrahim Pasha to have arrived suddenly at Tripolizza with the whole of his Force, and that fears were generally entertained of an attack upon Napoli; on our arrival here we ascertained the fact of Ibrahim's march, but at the same time learnt that he was busily employed in razing the fortifications and demolishing the buildings of Tripolizza, which gave

⁴⁵) A French philhellene with republican sentiments, Colonel *C. Fabvier* served in the Hellenic forces during the Greek Revolution. Unlike his contemporaries, he did not support the French plan to establish a monarchy in Greece with a Orleanist prince, and he was rather critical of the military skills exhibited by the Hellenic forces. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 123, 138.

strong indications of an intention to retreat, rather than make new incursions⁴⁶).

Nevertheless the Count Capodistria, after having been on Shore, I presume found the intended removal of the Roumeliotes assembled at Damala into Attica, not so easy an undertaking as he at first seemed to consider it, for these men did not conceal their feeling that from the spirit of the Treaty of London, they apprehended that this country would not be included in the boundaries assigned to the emancipated Greeks⁴⁷); and if it were therefore in the power of the Moriots to drive them out of the Peninsula, they would be left with their families without a roof to shelter themselves under, and they besides advanced pretensions to a credit of upwards of 300 Thousand Piasters. The Count seems therefore to have been glad of an excuse to put off the projected expedition against Athens, and urged in consequence the inexpediency of weakening the force in the Peloponnesus, while hostilities on the part of the Egyptian Troops were likely to be renewed. However this may be, the enclosed note was addressed to me for the purpose of being explained to Captain Parker who is not sufficiently acquainted with the French language to understand with the necessary accuracy a communication of such length and impact. From this note Your Excellency will perceive that his plan was entirely changed, and that the immediate possession of the Palamides became all at once his principal and most pressing object.

I, of course, declined answering, and Captain Parker did not give any written reply, but went in person to the Count and explained that he would feel happy to be the means of conveying His Excellency to Napoli, but that he must distinctly decline being present at the embarkation of the intended new Garrison at Hydra and Specie [Spetses], as he conceived it would bear the appearance of taking too open and decided a share in the internal operations of the Greek Government, with which he could have no course.

⁴⁶) Before the Egyptian army was evacuated from the Peloponnese, *Ibrahim Pasha* ordered the destruction of Tripolizza (Tripolitsa) where thousands of Turkish civilians had been slaughtered by the Hellenic forces in October 1821, and he also ordered his forces to confiscate the Morean harvest, thus creating a widespread famine during 1827/1828. *Baynes to Adam*, Private and Confidential, 3 Mar 1828, C.O. 136/556; and *Parker to Adam*, Private and Confidential, 10 May 1828, C.O. 136/50.

⁴⁷) Basically, the Roumeliote troops were correct in thinking that their homeland would still remain under Ottoman control. By the terms of the Treaty of London (6 July 1827), only the Peloponnese and the Cyclades Islands were designated for political independence; however, in the aftermath of Navarino, the Conference of London would determine that the frontiers of the Hellenic nation should be expanded to include areas of Epirus, Attica, and so forth as far north as the demarcation line running roughly from Arta to Volos. Cf. D.C. Fleming, *John Capodistrias ...*, pp. 87 ff.

The offer of conveyance was accepted, and the touching at Hydra and Specie waived, and finally agreed that the *Warspite* should sail immediately after the review of the Roumeliote Troops collected at Damala; the neighbourhood of which they were plundering in every direction. This Review, or rather visit from the President to the Roumeliots, took place yesterday; and the Captains of the Ships of War having agreed to accompany His Excellency, I took the opportunity of going with Captain Parker.

The President, we all thought, was very coolly received, and his proclamation containing the organization of the Army, which I enclose in original together with an English translation [not included], drew forth only a few faint 'Evvivas' from a small group of Officers assembled in the front of the Troops and marshalled by Prince Demetrios Ypsilantis⁴⁸), to whom the Count has confided the Chief Command of the Roumeliote Corps.

Griva of Palamide⁴⁹) ... and Zavella of Corinth⁵⁰) were not there; the Captains and chiefs present seem to have held the same language I have before mentioned, in regard to the necessity of their securing a shelter for themselves and their families, not to remain at the mercy of the Peloponnesians from whom they had nothing but evil and outrage to expect. His Excellency, it is said, used his best endeavours to persuade them that he would ensure them a competent share of whatever country might eventually become the portion of the Greeks now struggling for their independence.

Thus ended this long connected interview from which such important results had been anticipated by those who planned it, having the Roumeliotes almost precisely in that same state they previously were, the only alteration in their condition being a daily allowance of Bread from the Government's stores at Poros, which is not likely to deter them from the predatory system they have been so long in the habit of exercising upon the unhappy peasantry.

From my observation I become every day more persuaded of what many have thought before me, that the Count Capodistrias wants nerve, and is too fond of negotiation and half measures, to obtain that superiority and influence once the minds of these semi-barbarian chieftains, which alone can conduce to this end which is contemplated by his arrival in this Country, without the immediate support of a Foreign Force."

Letter No. 11:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 3 Mar 1828, Nauplion, C.O. 136/556.

"According to what I had the honour of stating to Your Excellency in my letter of the 29th ultimo from Poros, the *Warspite* cast Anchor here yester-

⁴⁸) Cf. above, footnote No. 42.

⁴⁹) Cf. above, footnote No. 16.

⁵⁰) Cf. above, footnote No. 43.

day afternoon, having on board Count Capodistria, and his suite consisting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Tricoupi⁵¹), the Prince Mavrocordato, Colonel Heideck⁵²), — the intended Governor of the Palamidi, and two under Secretaries.

We were scarcely moored when Mr. Theotoky⁵³) of Corfu, whom the Count has named chief civil Magistrate of Napoli, came on board and related that Ibrahim Pasha after having destroyed every thing at Tripolizza, had retired towards Modon, without however attempting any hostilities against the Greeks stationed in the neighbourhood.

A report having reached through Hydra that a Fleet had arrived at Candia from Alexandria on its way to Modon, it was considered expedient to ascertain with precision what are the present movements of Ibrahim, and whether there are well founded reasons to conclude that he has in view the final evacuation of the Morea. A courier furnished by the Greek Government was dispatched to Ibrahim's head quarters at 4 p.m. under the pretext of carrying a letter from Captain Parker to His Highness mediating for an exchange of Prisoners proposed by Count Capodistria, but in reality to collect and bring back the desired information.

Late in the evening, Mr. Theotoky returned on board with the intelligence that a peasant from the mountains of Arcadia had come in with information and for the purpose of reporting that on the morning of Saturday last he saw 15 large Vessels go into Navarin, but could not at that distance distinguish whether they were Men of War or merchant Vessels. This report vague as it appears to be might not from prudential motives be neg-

⁵¹) Renowned for his account of the Greek Revolution, *Spyridon Tricoupis* was an Anglophile member of the Hellenic government. In August 1825, he had presented the Lord High Commissioner at Corfu with the 'Act of Submission', a request of British protection for the Hellenic state. Due to Ionian neutrality, his request was denied, and *Tricoupis* subsequently became a highranking official, including membership in the *Pan-Hellinion* of the *Capodistrian* administration. *Tricoupis to Adam*, 28 Aug 1825, C.O. 136/504; and *Adam to Bathurst*, 31 Aug 1825, C.O. 136/29. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 240, 243.

⁵²) A Bavarian philhellene, Colonel *Wilhelm von Heideck* had served with General Sir *Richard Church* during the Greek Revolution. With the establishment of a Hellenic monarchy under Prince *Otto of Bavaria*, *Heideck* was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and he played an essential role in the administration of the Hellenic government during the 1830s. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, p. 310.

⁵³) *Ioannis Theotoky*, an Ionian expatriate, was an early supporter of *Capodistrias*, and he served as the Commissioner of Nauplion during the earliest months of the *Capodistrian* administration. Like *Psilas* and their other intellectual contemporaries, *Theotoky* served to temper the political authority of the primates and captains in the Hellenic government until he was dismissed from office by the Greek president. Cf. D. Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, p. 242n.

lected, and Captain Parker has therefore determined to send round the *Mosquito* to Modon to ascertain the fact, and obtain all possible details from the *Iphigenni* French Frigate now cruising in those Waters. I avail myself of the opportunity to forwarding reports to Your Excellency via Zante by an Ionian Boat which I have requested Captain Martin to engage at Modon and under charge of one of his Officers who will deliver the dispatches to the Resident. I have written to Sir Frederick Stovin [the Resident of Zante] requesting him to forward them to Corfu by his Scampavia, should the Steamer not be on the spot or shortly expected.

Matters have seem to take as favourable a turn as could be expected, as far as fair words and promises go; but as yet no facts appear. Strato⁵⁴) is said to have promised to join the camp at Damala immediately with the whole of his followers, delivering the lower Fort of Napoli to those whom the President may appoint to take charge of the same. It is certain that Griva has removed his treasures from the Palamide, and that he has likewise appropriated to himself and sold all that was moveable in that Fortress, including the Brass Guns, the Provisions, and the Powder; retaining only 9 Barrels of the latter, from this it is argued that there will be little or no difficulty in getting the Palamide out of his hands.

In order to propitiate these worthy Chieftains, His Excellency says he has ordered a body guard for himself to be formed of the followers of Griva and Strato, 25 from each, under the command of the brothers of these Captains. Colocotroni who came here yesterday from Poros has been requested by the President to retire to Astros, as his presence at Napoli is likely to prove an obstacle to Count Capodistrias' views on the Palamide. I do not know how far this proceeding can be considered on good policy on the part of the Head of the Greek Government. It would seem to me that by coaxing the Roumeliotes he exposes his weakness, and offends the Moriotes."

Letter No. 12:

Baynes to Rudsdell, 3 Mar 1828, Nauplion, C.O. 136/566.

"We are playing here most early at the Royal Game of Humbug; as for part I am determined not to Bottle my Trumps, but hand it I've got a partner who works and sometimes makes me funk. I have however the satisfaction of seeing my adversaries at 4, and at all events they shall not get out by hours, 'a' bon interdiction poche parole.'

⁵⁴) Although it is uncertain, *Baynes* has referred possibly to *Sotiris Stratos*. Like many of contemporaries, *Stratos* was a Roumeliote chieftain whose political sympathies often favoured the Ottoman authorities, and he only cooperated with the Hellenic government when the political situation suited his own purposes. Cf. *ibidem*, pp. 234f.

As you may readily conceive, I am heartily sick of this cruize, and look forward with the utmost impatience to the moment when I may with propriety retire from the scene of action, and shake hands with you at Corfu.

From my letter to His Excellency [Sir Frederick Adam] you will learn all that is going on in this party and any thing I could say here would be useless repetition. In a private letter I have told His Excellency exactly what my opinion is in regard to Capodistria and his measures; I have done it in plain terms because his last injunction to no were to do so, and I hope he will not think that I have taken advantage of his permission to say that which I ought to have kept to myself ...

I was just provoked to find that *Weazle* has not reached you on the 16th, and to tell the truth I am not a little annoyed at not hearing further from you, as I conclude that what I sent by *Weazle* most long since have been in your possession.

I shall certainly start on my way back to Corfu, by the end of the week, unless I get contrary orders from you; and which I sincerely hope may not be the case ...”

Letter No. 13:

Baynes to Adam, Private, 3 Mar 1828, C.O. 136/566.

“The more I see of Count Capodistria, the more I am persuaded that he is a perfect Charlatan, and the greater my astonishment at seeing in him the person who has played, or who at least is said to have played, such a great role in the settlement of affairs of Europe. I can perceive nothing in him beyond a ‘faiseur de phrasis’, and it must be confessed, an agreeable companion, possessing elegant manners, and a fascinating address. I can however discover no quickness in his judgment, no solidity in his arguments, and decidedly no nerve in his actions. His system of conferences and *pour parlars* may do well at a Congress and between ministers, but it will not answer amongst these people; he must display energy, and act more than talk with these semi-barbarians. His arrival here under the countenance of the Allied Powers, the presence of their Squadrons, and the more than ordinary honours which are paid to him, must naturally cause at first impression, a very imposing effect in their minds, now therefore, is the moment for him to show his talent in the use of this advantage; seize the reins with vigor, and casting them with skill give himself a good chance of success; but if he temporizes, if he allows them time to recover from their surprize at his appearance under such auspice, he is lost, and the curtain must drop for good after the first act of what may then with justice be called a Farce.

He says he can do nothing because he has got no money — he commences to pursue the impossibility of establishing order without a nucleus formed of an armed Force of foreigners; he would wish to procure it, but again re-

peats that he possesses not the means. In the meanwhile, he concedes to coax the very Roumeliotes whom he considers the pest of this country, and his first step in arriving here and learning from all quarters the villanies and atrocities which they still practice, is to form a body guard for himself comprised of 50 Men, one half from Griva's followers and the other from those Strato, under the command of their respective brothers! Of the dependents of those very men who so late as yesterday have been engaged in plundering and selling the property of the Government in the Palamidi, down to the very guns and ammunition! The most ignorant cannot suppose that he wishes to encourage such infamy, they can therefore only attribute his proceedings to weakness, which is the most dangerous construction they can put upon it for the ultimate success of his undertaking; the measure, besides, must and will create jealousy amongst the Moriotes who look upon those of Roumelia as their most bitter foe, and will eventually estrange Colocotroni⁵⁵) and his powerful party from the system of things which he is endeavouring to introduce. The fact appears to me as simply this: Capodistria came here under the dictates of his vanity, and figuring to himself that the magic of his name would be sufficient to remove every obstacle, and to carry every thing before him, fancying that it would be with these notoriously turbulent and lawless bands, as with the Slaves of the ring or of the Lantern in the Arabian Tales, 'to hear is to obey,' but he will very soon be undeceived if he has not already discovered his mistake.

Of course Your Excellency and all that belong to you are not in good odour with the Count, and I can clearly perceive that it is with reluctance if not pain, that he finds himself obliged to transact business in that direction, and my presence here, I am certain is a considerable thorn in his Side. He is much more sore than you would have imagined in regard to the prohibition of touching at Corfu on his way to Greece⁵⁶); the subject is reviewed almost at every interview, my answer is always the same: the arrangement of His Majesty's Government and Your Excellency's practice of strictly adhering to the letter of instructions.

I do not see that me further stay here can be conducive to any advantage to His Majesty's Service. So far I am glad that my presence has enabled me to make Captain Parker touch with the hand that all that Capodistria says is not to be implicitly received as the fact; and on one occasion detected him in a perhaps mischievous but entirely gratuitous falsehood. It was my intention to have returned to Corfu in the *Mosquito* the moment the affair

⁵⁵) Cf. above, footnote No. 15.

⁵⁶) During a brief visit to London in August 1827, *Capodistrias* was advised by the Foreign Office to avoid landing at Corfu on his return to Greece as such a visit would harm the Ionian interests of the British government. *J. Capodistrias to Huskisson*, 19 Oct 1827, C.O. 136/51; and *Adam to Hay*, Private, 6 Dec 1827, C.O. 136/44. Cf. C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria*, pp. 334 ff.

of the Palamidi was settled either one way or the other, but as Captain Parker sent her to Modon, and as I think it may not be unadvisable to have precise and circumstantial detail of the termination of this experiment, I have determined upon remaining here till the *Warspite* returns towards the Ionian Islands, provided it be within the current week; but should Captain Parker be further delayed, I shall avail myself of the *Mosquito* when she comes back from Modon. In so doing, I hope I shall meet with Your Excellency's approbation.

It is rather extraordinary that we hear nothing from Grabusa, owing to the weakness and mismanagement of Miaulis, the *Hydra* Corvette mutinied for wages; this was settled it is true, but delayed here these four days, and all we know is that she left Poros so far back as the 19th ultimum with Colonel Urguhart and the new Garrison for Grabusa. I fear however from the interest of a letter by Sir Thomas Staines to Captain Parker that the Grabusians are not quite so ready to submit to the President's arrangements as was understood and expected.

The inhabitants of Napoli tell the President that they are ready to send the considerable part of their money to the national Bank, the moment they are relieved from the pillage of the Roumeliotes, and the Roumeliotes declare to him that they are ready to cease plundering upon their claims being satisfied, and their subsistence furnished them, but from the present appearance of affairs neither seem likely to be called upon very soon to fulfill these engagements.

Your Excellency will observe ... from Capodistrias ... how naturally he speaks of employing M. Vlassopoulos⁵⁷), and with him much confidence he alludes to the influence that gentleman might be expected to exercise upon Griva and Strato.

I believe there is no doubt but Ibrahim Pasha sent to Egypt with the last Fleet a very large number of women and children as Slaves⁵⁸). It is apprehended that he will attempt to do the same again in the event of his ultimately evacuating the Morea; and I understand from Count Capodistrias that he has mentioned the subject to you in a Letter which you by this

⁵⁷) Cf. above, footnote No. 33.

⁵⁸) During 1825—1827, at least 10,000 Greek civilians were enslaved and exported by the Egyptian forces in Greece. In conformity with its policy on Christian slavery, the British government opposed this Egyptian practise; however, Admiral *Codrington* (cf. above, footnote No. 29) was unable to prohibit such shipments, even in the aftermath of Navarino, and subsequent investigations revealed that many Greek slaves refused to be liberated since they could expect better living conditions in Alexandria, especially as the Peloponnese had been devastated by a decade of revolution. *Barker to Adam*, Private, 21 May 1828, C.O. 136/50; *Dudley to Codrington*, 10 Mar 1828, Adm. 1/468; and *Malcolm to S. Canning*, 13 Sep 1828, F.O. 352/21c.

opportunity, containing also his reply to the complaint from your Excellency to the Greek Government in regard to the violation of the Territory of Cerigo.”

Letter No. 14:

Baynes to Adam, Private and Confidential, 8 Mar 1828, Nauplion, C.O. 136/556.

“I do myself the honour of informing Your Excellency that the Keys of the Palamidi were, with great formality, delivered to Count Capodistrias at three o'clock yesterday afternoon by Griva, who had evacuated that Fortress with all his Troops, and the Roumeliot families which resided within it. Strato had already renounced the command of the ... lower Fort in the same manner.

The inducements which have led to this satisfactory termination of an undertaking, the success of which was the least questionable even under the auspices of the Allied Squadrons, have not been revealed; and the terms upon which these Strong holds have been delivered to the Government by the Roumeliotes are kept equally secret. All that has transpired is the nomination of Griva to the personal Staff of the President, which places him on an equal footing with his antagonist Colocotroni the elder, who had already been appointed on of His excellency's Aid de Camps, and the permission given Strato, eventually to join General Church in Acarnania.

Nothing has been said in regard to the immense quantities of Stores and Ordnance which Griva sold from the Palamidi appropriating the proceeds to his own profit. The promise of a veil to be thrown over this, as well as other equally nefarious practices, and the consigning to oblivion of a series of cruel extortions, may have propitiated their sordid chieftain, and paved the way to his apparently unconditional adherence to the wishes of the President; Strato being the weaker party could not have offered opposition with any prospect to success when Griva had determined to submit, and therefore by following his example consulted his best security, so closely did he watch the motions of his rival that he was even beforehand with him in the process of evacuation.

The followers of both these Chieftains are to proceed in the first instance to the Camp at Damala, where the whole Roumeliote Force will be met by the President, and an attempt made to organize them into distinct corps, preparatory to their employment in an expedition against Athens.

The Provence and Garrisons of Nauplia are placed under the *Superintendance* of Colonel Heideck⁵⁹) The new Garrisons are comprised of

⁵⁹) Cf. above, footnote No. 52.

Hydriots, Speriots, Ipsariots, and *Ionians*, and are said to amount in the aggregate to about 350 Men. The Bourzi, a small isolated Castle, is to remain in possession of the Missolonghiotes who have garrisoned it for some time past. The new Roumeliote Body Guard of the President will be quartered for the present in the Town of Nauplia, where the families of their comrades who proceed to Damala are also to remain, at the charge of the Government.

Accounts very unfavorable to the Greeks have arrived from Scio, or from the *mastick expedition* as it is jokingly denominated here, from the well known circumstance of its having been undertaken at the instigation of a company of Merchants who speculated for the collection of the Mastick, and who furnished the sum necessary for fitting out the expedition, besides a bribe to the Members of Government who sanctioned it. These patriotic merchants having secured all the mastick, feel no further interest in the success of Greek Arms, and have ceased giving specie or supplies, whereby the whole weight has fallen upon the Government, who are said to have sent the *Hellas* to reinforce the besiegers. But from Captain Wyvile of the *Camelion*, who joined us about an hour ago from Grabusa, we learn that the Greeks have been driven out of the Town with the loss of all their Cannon, and that it was supposed General Fabvier would abandon the enterprise. Possibly the *Hellas* may have gone to bring him away, but the President did not even hint at the probability of such an event.

The *Camelion* left Grabusa on Tuesday last, and brings the melancholy intelligence of the death of Colonel Urquhart⁶⁰), the newly appointed Governor, who was Killed by the falling of the roof of a House in which he had taken shelter from the weather, after having conducted himself with great intrepidity and judgment, and to the entire satisfaction of Sir Thomas Staines. It appears that after much difficulty the Greek Force under Colonel Urquhart was admitted into the upper Fort of Grabusa; but so refractory are the inhabitants that the Commodore, to secure the accomplishment of the searches which are to be made for plundered property, has reinforced the Garrison with 100 Marines, half English and half French, under the command of Captain Strangeways. Five of the principal persons engaged in the repeated atrocious piracies committed by Vessels fitted out at Grabusa, amongst which a Papas [Orthodox priest], have been secured and sent to Malta for trial, not without great trouble, as these villains resorted to all sorts of disguise, even dressing themselves in female apparel, to elude the pursuit, but their attempts were rendered abortive by the firmness of Sir Thomas Staines, who at length succeeded in getting them into his power. Some of the plundered property has already been found, but a great deal more is said to exist in the Island concealed under ground, amongst some casks of Flour which had been plundered from an Austrian Vessel;

⁶⁰) Cf. above, footnote No. 27.

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one was found with a false bottom covering a Tin case with Tar containing Turkish dispatches, which Sir Thomas Staines has sent to the Admiral at Malta ...

We hear that from the wealthy Island of Syra, the centre of all the commerce of the Archipelago, and from which the greater contributors to the establishment were entrusted, 13 Thousand Dollars [£2,708] only to have been offered to the Bank, and I know that the Count Capodistrias never calculated upon more than 12 Thousand Dollars [£2,500] from the rest of the Islands; if, therefore, the latter anticipation were to be realized to its full extent, it would make a total of 25 Thousand Dollars [£5,208] disposable from this institution; a sum which will hardly suffice to meet the Expenditure of a fortnight, even under the present parsimonious administration, where the functionaries get a very scanty allowance, and the Troops and Navy nothing but provisions.

The recent events at Nauplia are very favourable to the Count's ambulant system of Government, but I should doubt his ever arriving at the consolidation of the detached parts of his administration, or even his being able to maintain his present advantage, beyond the period up to which the hopes of succour from the Allied Powers can be held out to the Nation with a shadow of probability. This period is not far distant, and all agree that the Count's Government must stand or fall by the result of his application for pecuniary aid from the Allied Sovereigns, unless he has some secret Fund at his command."